The Privatisation of a National Project: by Schwake, Gabriel
The  
Privatisation  
of a National 
Project
The settlements along the 
Trans‑Israel Highway since 1977
Gabriel Schwake

The  
Privatisation  
of a National 
Project
The settlements along the 
Trans‑Israel Highway since 1977
Gabriel Schwake
TOC
A+BE | Architecture and the Built Environment | TU Delft BK
20#14
Design | Sirene Ontwerpers, Rotterdam
Cover photo | Tzur Yithzah, 2010 (Ori~)
Keywords | history; architecture; urbanism; housing; privatisation;  conflict; frontiers; 
Israel/Palestine#
ISBN 978-94-6366-304-5
ISSN 2212-3202
© 2020  Gabriel Schwake
Digital version freely available at abe.tudelft.nl
All rights reserved. No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in 
any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information 
storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the author.
Unless otherwise specified, all the photographs in this thesis were taken by the author. For the use of 
illustrations effort has been made to ask permission for the legal owners as far as possible. We apologize for 
those cases in which we did not succeed. These legal owners are kindly requested to contact the publisher.
TOC
The Privatisation of 
a National Project
The settlements along the 
Trans‑Israel Highway since 1977
DISSERTATION
for the purpose of obtaining the degree of doctor
at Delft University of Technology
by the authority of the Rector Magnificus, prof.dr.ir. T.H.J.J. van der Hagen
chair of the Board for Doctorates
to be defended publicly on
Tuesday, 8 September 2020 at 10:00 o’clock
by
Gabriel SCHWAKE
Architect, Master of Arts in Architecture, Tel Aviv University, Israel
Born in Nahariya, Israel
TOC
This dissertation has been approved by the promotors.
Composition of the doctoral committee:
Rector Magnificus, 
Prof.dr.ir. C.H. Hein 
Dr. H.D. van Bergeijk 
Independent members:
Prof. dr.ir. M.G. Elsinga 
Prof. H. Yacobi 
Prof. dr. M.T. Tasan-Kok 
Prof. dr. I. Heinze-Greenberg 
Prof. dr. C. Wagenaar 
chairperson
Delft University of Technology, promotor 
Delft University of Technology, copromotor
Delft University of Technology
University College London
University of Amsterdam
Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
University of Groningen, reserve member
This study was financed by the Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich Scholarship Fund
TOC
“Those among us who are unwilling to expose their ideas to the hazard of 
refutation do not take part in the scientific game”
Karl Popper, (The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p.279)
TOC
TOC
Preface
After graduating from my architectural studies at Tel Aviv University in 2013, I was 
more than ready to apply my knowledge and enthusiasm in practice. Interested 
in dwellings, I began working in an architectural firm that focused on residential 
buildings that had earned its reputation due to a unique public housing project it 
planned in Tel Aviv. Charmed by the aesthetics of the designs produced by the office 
and by the seemingly social approach I was sure that I would be involved in improving 
the housing conditions of the local middle-class. Quite immediately, I understood that 
I was basically designing the façades of volumes that were already dictated by the 
speculative interest of the different entrepreneurs. Losing interest in the “architecture 
of 20cm”, as a colleague referred to the work we were doing while indicating the 
width of the exterior walls we were designing, I chose to move to urban planning. 
I was hoping that with the capacity to influence urban policy I would contribute to 
the development of better, more socially oriented and just residential environments. 
Working on a new neighbourhood in southern Israel I was asked by the client, the 
Ministry of Construction and Housing, to plan an outline scheme for 1500 units that 
blend with the natural landscape of the desert. During a work meeting, the project 
manager from the ministry mentioned that the plan we proposed was perhaps “nice”, 
but far from being “marketable”, and thus suggested to replicate another outline from 
a neighbouring town in order to appeal to a larger number of private developers.
This thesis began as an attempt to understand the mechanism behind the 
“marketable” Israeli residential neighbourhoods. Initially, I thought of concentrating 
on case studies that are far away from the contested area of the West-Bank and 
other national frontiers. Nevertheless, while analysing preliminary sites I was drawn 
to the border area with the occupied territories, where the state’s geopolitical 
interests of appropriating additional lands and the entrepreneurial growth 
considerations meet. Consequently, during my research, I understood that these 
seemingly contradicting interests are quite inseparable, coupled in a reciprocal 
relationship of national, individual and corporate development. Eventually, this 
thesis turned into a study of the local social, economic, and political considerations 
that influence the planning process, and eventually dictate the form of the built 
environment and the everyday life of the individuals it houses.
Gabriel Schwake 
Amsterdam, May 2020
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Summary
In Israel, the development of new settlements is a leading national project. This 
began in the turn of the 20th century as national Zionist organisations established 
new frontier settlements in Palestine, in the efforts to secure the territory needed 
for a future state and to encourage a spiritual national renaissance. With its 
establishment in 1948, the young state of Israel took over the process, continuing 
the pre-state settlement endeavours of securing spatial control while endorsing a 
new unified national identity. Accordingly, the state promoted, directed, and executed 
the construction of a series of rural and industrial settlements that corresponded 
with the national geopolitical agenda and the hegemonic socialisation policy. 
Consequently, the architectural and urban features of these settlements were parallel 
to the ruling political, economic and social values and were thus characterised by 
reproduced homogeneous and economical residential environments.
During the 1970s, the monolithic state-led development began to transform with 
the growing privatisation of the Israeli economy. These transformations reached a 
point of no return with the election of the first liberal and anti-socialist government 
in 1977; eventually turning into a national consensus. At the same time, the state 
did not abandon its geopolitical agenda and the attempts of securing spatial control 
through settlement. Nevertheless, it began dismantling its monopoly over the 
establishment of new localities, granting selected group spatial privileges and thus 
turning them into spatial agents that develop the frontier on its behalf. Initially, the 
privatisation of the national settlement project began with ex-urban and suburban 
communities, serving favoured societal groups. Eventually, with the growing 
involvement of private capital, it turned into a large-scale corporate-led development 
venture, dictated by financial interests while fulfilling geopolitical objectives.
Privatisation, neoliberalism and market-economy are usually used as an antithesis 
to state involvement, regulation and nationalism. Conversely, this dissertation 
illustrates that the privatisation of the national territorial project was a state-
directed effort intended to align the geopolitical agenda with the prevailing neoliberal 
order; using the market-economy as a means to enhance the state’s control over 
space. This dissertation focuses on the border area with the occupied Palestinian 
West-Bank, the Green-Line. Scarcely populated in the first three decades after 
the establishment of Israel, this area witnessed an ever-growing state-directed 
development effort following the occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1967. 
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Developed by an increasing private involvement, this area constitutes a unique case 
study on the relationship between geopolitics and market economy; marked by the 
construction of the first privately developed national infrastructure project in the 
early 2000s – the Trans-Israel Highway.
To understand the privatisation of this national project since 1977, this dissertation 
proposes focusing on the settlement mechanism. This comprises the reciprocal 
interests of the state and various private groups to develop and domesticate the 
frontier area of the Green-Line. Centring on the spatial privileges the state granted 
diverse spatial agents, this dissertation examines how different favoured groups were 
given the power to colonise, plan, develop and market space in return for enhancing 
the state’s power over it. Investigating how this settlement mechanism transformed 
over the years, including a variety of spatial agents and diverse spatial privileges, this 
research explores the increasing privatisation of the local economy and culture, as 
well as the manner in which it was manifested in the built environment. Examining the 
modifications in the architectural and urban products this mechanism produced, this 
research analyses the materialisation of the privatised national settlement project 
and how it transformed together with the changing political and economic interests.
Focusing on the area along the Green-Line, this dissertation starts with examining 
the Community Settlements of the late 1970s and then moves to the Suburban 
Settlements of the 1980s. Examining both phenomena, the dissertation explains 
how their ex-urban and suburban qualities corresponded with the granted spatial 
privileges, forming a geopolitical tool intended to domesticate the Green-Line. 
Subsequently, the dissertation concentrates on the mass suburbanisation of the 
1990s and the financialisation of the 2000s. Examining both stages, this dissertation 
illustrates how the state asked to domesticate the frontier by turning it into a real 
estate market; directing investment while securing the developers’ profitability 
and rentability concerns. Observing these four stages, this dissertation examines 
the gradual privatisation of the settlement mechanism. Analysing the different 
settlement phenomena, this research explains how the transforming individual and 
corporate interests were manifested in the built environment. Eventually, enabling 
the continuation of the national geopolitical agenda by tying it to the rationale of 
the market; replacing the former monolithic state-led development by uniform and 
reproduced corporate-led projects.
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Samenvatting
In Israël is de ontwikkeling van nieuwe nederzettingen een toonaangevend natio-
naal project. Dit begon aan het begin van de 20e eeuw toen nationale zionistische 
organisaties in Palestina nieuwe grensnederzettingen vormden, in een poging het 
gebied veilig te stellen dat nodig is voor een toekomstige staat en om een spirituele 
nationale renaissance aan te moedigen. Met de oprichting van Israël in 1948 nam de 
jonge staat het proces over en zette de inspanningen van de pre-statelijke nederzet-
tingen voort om de controle over de ruimte af te dwingen en tegelijkertijd een 
nieu-we verenigde nationale identiteit te onderschrijven. Dienovereenkomstig, leidde 
en voerde de staat de bouw van een reeks landelijke en industriële nederzettingen 
uit die overeenkwamen met de nationale geopolitieke agenda en het hegemoniale 
socia-lisatiebeleid. Bijgevolg liepen de architectonische en stedelijke kenmerken van 
deze nederzettingen parallel aan het heersende politieke, economische en sociale 
waar-den stelsel en werden daarom gekenmerkt door homogene gereproduceerde 
eco-nomische woonomgevingen.
In de jaren zeventig, met de toenemende privatisering van de Israëlische economie, 
begon de monolithische door de staat geleide ontwikkeling te veranderen. Deze 
ver-anderingen bereikten een punt van geen terugkeer met de verkiezing van de 
eerste liberale en anti-socialistische regering in 1977; het resulteerde uiteindelijk 
in een nationale consensus. Tegelijkertijd had de staat zijn geopolitieke agenda en 
de po-gingen om ruimtelijke controle door vestiging te verzekeren niet opgegeven. 
Niet-temin begon de staat zijn monopolie op de vestiging van nieuwe plaatsen te 
vermin-deren en zijn controleapparaat te ontmantelen. Dit werd mogelijk gemaakt 
door het toekennen van ruimtelijke privileges aan geselecteerde groepen en deze te 
verande-ren in ruimtelijke agenten die de grenszone namens de staat ontwikkelen. 
Aanvanke-lijk begon de privatisering van het nationale nederzettingsproject met 
buiten-stedelijke en voorstedelijke gemeenschappen in het belang van begunstigde 
maat-schappelijke groepen. Uiteindelijk, met de toenemende betrokkenheid van 
particulier kapitaal, veranderde het in een grootschalige en zakelijke-georiënteerde 
ontwikke-lingsonderneming, gedicteerd door financiële belangen en de 
verwezenlijking van geopolitieke doelstellingen als doel.
Privatisering, neoliberalisme en markteconomie worden meestal gebruikt als anti-
these tegen betrokkenheid, regulering en nationalisme van de staat. Omgekeerd 
illu-streert dit proefschrift dat de privatisering van het nationale territoriale project 
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een door de staat geleide poging was om de geopolitieke agenda af te stemmen op 
de heersende neoliberale orde. De markteconomie wordt gebruikt als middel om de 
controle van de staat over de ruimte te vergroten. Dit proefschrift richt zich op het 
gebied dat grenst aan de bezette Palestijnse Westelijke Jordaanoever, de zogeheten 
Groene Lijn. Nauwelijks bewoond in de eerste drie decennia na de oprichting van 
Is-raël, was dit gebied getuige van een alsmaar groeiende staatsgerichte ontwikke-
lingsinspanning na de bezetting van de Palestijnse gebieden in 1967. Dit gebied, 
ontwikkeld door een toenemende particuliere betrokkenheid, vormt een unieke ca-
sestudy over de relatie tussen geopolitiek en markteconomie. Het wordt gekenmerkt 
door de bouw van de eerste particulier ontwikkelde nationale infrastructuurproject in 
de vroege jaren 2000 - de Trans-Israël Snelweg.
Om de privatisering van dit nationale project sinds 1977 te begrijpen, stelt dit proef-
schrift voor om zich te concentreren op het afwikkelingsmechanisme. Dit omvat de 
wederzijdse belangen van de staat en verschillende particuliere groepen om het 
grensgebied van de Groene Lijn te ontwikkelen en te domesticeren. Dit proefschrift 
concentreert zich op de ruimtelijke privileges die de staat aan verschillende ruimte-
lijke agenten heeft verleend, en onderzoekt hoe verschillende bevoorrechte groepen 
de macht kregen om ruimte te koloniseren, plannen, ontwikkelen en op de markt 
te brengen in ruil voor het vergroten van de macht van de staat erover. Door het 
on-derzoeken van hoe dit afwikkelingsmechanisme door de jaren heen is getransfor-
meerd, gepaard gaand met een verscheidenheid aan ruimtelijke factoren en diverse 
ruimtelijke privileges, verkent dit onderzoek de toenemende privatisering van de 
lo-kale economie en cultuur, evenals de manier waarop het zich manifesteert in de 
ge-bouwde omgeving. Dit onderzoek naar de veranderingen in de architectonische 
en stedelijke producten die dit mechanisme opleverde, analyseert de materialisatie 
van het geprivatiseerde nationale nederzettingsproject en hoe het samen met de 
veran-derende politieke en economische belangen veranderde.
Het proefschrift, dat zich richt op het gebied langs de Groene Lijn, begint met het 
onderzoeken van de communautaire nederzettingen van de late jaren zeventig en 
verplaatst zich vervolgens naar de voorsteden van de jaren tachtig. Het proefschrift 
onderzoekt beide fenomenen en legt uit hoe hun buiten-stedelijke en voorstedelijke 
kwaliteiten overeenkwamen met de toegekende ruimtelijke privileges en een geopoli-
tiek instrument vormden dat bedoeld was om de Groene Lijn te domesticeren. 
Ver-volgens richt het proefschrift zich op de massale suburbanisatie van de jaren ne-
gentig en de financiering van de jaren 2000. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt beide fasen 
en illustreert hoe de staat vroeg om de grens te domesticeren door er een vast-
goedmarkt van te maken. Zij bleef leidinggeven aan investeringen en tegelijkertijd 
zorgen over de winstgevendheid en verhuurbaarheid van de ontwikkelaars. In de 
vier fasen wordt in dit proefschrift de geleidelijke privatisering van het afwikke-
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lingsmechanisme onderzocht. Det onderzoek analyseert de verschillende vesti-
gingsverschijnselen en legt uit hoe de veranderende individuele en zakelijke belan-
gen zich manifesteerden in de gebouwde omgeving. Uiteindelijk maakte dit de 
voortzetting van de nationale geopolitieke agenda door deze aan de grondgedachte 
van de markt te koppelen. De voormalige monolithische door de staat geleide ont-
wikkeling werd vervangen door uniforme en door bedrijven gereproduceerde en 
ge-leide projecten.
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1 Introduction
 1.1 Foreword
For a fee of thirty-four new Israeli Shekels one can enjoy an entire private car-ride 
along the 200 km of the Trans-Israel highway and witness the ever-increasing 
construction boom that turned the area from a frontier zone into a blooming real 
estate market. Built in the early 2000s, the new privately funded four-lane motorway 
presented the local driver with an uninterrupted drive in an average speed of 130 
km per hour, bypassing the heavily crowded Tel Aviv metropolis all the way into 
the 3rd millennium. At the same time, riding along the highway and observing the 
new settlements that the state promoted since the late 1970s, it is impossible 
not to notice shimmers of the West-Bank Separation Barrier that surrounds the 
Palestinian cities of the occupied territories; despite the efforts to hide it with well-
maintained gardening and landscape. The overt private highway and the covert 
state-constructed barrier constitute a mutually rewarding relationship, where the 
former contributes to the interests of the latter and vice versa. This thesis asks to 
understand the nature of this mutually rewarding relationship and how it shapes the 
local built environment.
This dissertation has its feet in political economy, yet it is written from the 
perspective of architectural and urban planning history. Correspondingly, 
architecture and planning are the subjects of this dissertation, while using political 
economic analyses as a perspective to understand how they are formed. Therefore, 
this dissertation focuses on the production process, rather than the product, using 
the Israeli settlement mechanism as its object of research in order to understand the 
built environment that it produced. This mechanism is part of a century-long process 
that began with the first waves of Zionist immigration to Palestine in the late 1800s, 
intensified during the British mandate and continued to form an official policy even 
after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Consequently, forming an 
integral part of the spiritual and physical Jewish national revival and constituting a 
leading case study of a state-led geopolitical- spatial development process. With the 
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global neoliberal turn during the 1970s and the liberalisation of the local economy, 
the state began privatising its settlement project, merging individualistic interests 
and speculations with geopolitical considerations.
This dissertation claims that the increasing privatisation of the settlement 
mechanism since the late 1970s was a state-directed effort to ensure its 
continuation by harnessing it to the logic of the market. Consequently, leading to a 
coalition of geopolitical and private interests that dictate the formation of the local 
built environment. This dissertation focuses on the settlement along the border with 
the occupied Palestinian West-Bank (the Green-Line) - a former frontier area that 
the state began intensely developing following the occupation of the Palestinian 
territories in 1967 and the election of the first right-wing and economically liberal 
government a decade later. Consistently, the state increased the involvement of the 
private sector in the area, marked by the construction of the first privatised national 
infrastructure project in 2002- the Trans-Israel Highway.
This dissertation shows that the settlements along the Trans-Israel Highway 
are an outcome of various spatial privileges, which produced different housing 
typologies over the past four decades. These privileges are based on the state 
granting favoured groups of individuals, developers and entrepreneurs the ability 
to influence the formation of built space as a means to continuously develop and 
settle the national frontiers. Therefore, the settlements along the Trans-Israel 
Highway constitute a unique case study of the relationship between the political 
interest to control space and the ability to form it. Analysing these spatial privileges 
and the housing typologies they produced this dissertation examines how the 
state incorporated a variety of private groups into its territorial project, ensuring 
its continuation while transforming the local built environment. Therefore, unlike 
the research perspective that sees privatisation as a state-led effort to ensure 
the survival of capitalism, this dissertation asks to present a contrary scenario 
of privatisation as an economic means to a geopolitical end. Accordingly, this 
dissertation challenges the conception of the built environment as a cultural 
product, as its sheds light on the ability of political and economic agendas to dictate 
the production of space; drawing a continuous line from the strategical regional 
planning level, through urban design and all the way to the architecture of the single 
dwelling unit.
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 1.2 Research Focus
As an outcome of a privatised geopolitical project, the settlements of the Trans-Israel 
Highway are a servant of several masters. Accordingly, this research claims that 
as the state was interested in expanding its power over space, it granted selected 
groups spatial privileges that included the power to inhabit, plan and construct it. 
Therefore, the production of these settlements followed the different functions they 
were meant to serve. First is the national-territorial aspect of controlling space, 
which dictates the location and spread of new settling points, which appears in 
strategic regional plans as dots or continuous ink stains. Second, is the individual 
and speculative interests of the different private groups that the state involved in 
its territorial project since the late 1970s, which dictates the manner each ink stain 
is materialised. Additionally, this research also claims that with the changes in the 
local economic, political and cultural values, the nature of these selected groups 
altered, and with it the spatial privileges they received. Thus, as the interests behind 
the production of the built environment transformed, its architectural and urban 
product had to transform accordingly. Therefore, this research first aims to identify 
the changing geopolitical, individual and corporate consideration that influence the 
formation of the Israeli built environment. Then, it asks to understand how these 
interests were manifested in built space. Thus, defining the architectural and urban 
components that define the privatised Israeli national project. Correspondingly, this 
thesis asks to clarify how the development of the Trans-Israel settlements evolved 
since 1977 in line with national-economic and geopolitical agendas, and how these 
were manifested in the settlements’ architectural and urban form.
This thesis focuses on the border area with the West-Bank (the Green-Line) 
since 1977, as both the location and time period signify the privatisation and 
financialisation of the Israeli economy and the expansion of the national settlement 
enterprise. This area was sporadically settled by the state during the 1950s-60s, 
as it preferred to develop other national frontiers.1 With the occupation of the 
West-Bank in 1967 and the election of the first right-wing and pro laissez-faire 
government in 1977, the geopolitical status of the area became a leading national 
interest while its relative proximity to the Tel Aviv metropolis gave it the potential 
to answer personal desires and economic speculations.2 Located on the fringes of 
1 Gazit and Soffer, Between the Sharon and Samaria.
2 Berger, Autotopia: Suburban In-between Space in Israel.
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the West Bank, it was ideological enough to become an area of national importance, 
yet not too ideological like the depth of the occupied territories, and thus appealed 
to almost all sectors of the Israeli [Jewish] society.3 Correspondingly, it turned 
into a platform to one of the most intense development processes, which in less 
than twenty years concluded in the construction of over 30 new localities. As an 
extension of the Tel Aviv metropolis these new settlements attracted thousands of 
upper-middle-class families with strong affiliations to the secular and centre-left 
political sector.4 Therefore, giving the territorial project a seemingly apolitical and 
neutral mask.
Developed by a coalition of geopolitical, personal and financial objectives the 
settlements along the Green-Line represent the privatisation of the Israeli national 
geopolitical project. The construction of the adjacent transnational highway in the 
early 2000s, the first privately built and operated road in Israel, emphasises this 
further; creating a geographical unit of privatised national projects. Focusing on 
the manner in which the development mechanism was privatised and the different 
settlement typologies it produced, this thesis shows how their location, urban fabric 
and the architecture of their houses corresponds with national-territorial aspirations, 
private interests, and profitability concerns.
To explain how the settlements along the Trans-Israel Highway took shape, this 
thesis focuses on four different development phases, each with its specific spatial 
privileges and its own settlement phenomenon. First is the neo-rural development 
of the late 1970s, which was based on young urban families seeking a pioneer-like 
experience in the national frontiers and the small-scale Community Settlements they 
established. Second, is the gentrification of the Green-Line and the new Suburban 
Settlements that housed the Israeli upper-middle-class during the 1980s, in its 
quest for a detached private house in a commuting distance from Tel Aviv. Third, is 
the mass-suburbanisation of the 1990s, which witnessed an increasing involvement 
of private developers, leading to reproduced and high-rise residential environments. 
Concluding, is the current financialisation phase and its speculative projects, which 
promote the construction of corporate-led settlements, suburban in terms of 
everyday life, yet urban in terms of scale.
3 Newman, ‘Settlement as Suburbanization: The Banality of Colonization’.
4 Ibid
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 1.3 Political historiography of [Israeli] 
architecture and urban planning
The built environment is the human-made space in which we all conduct our everyday 
life. This consists of the buildings, streets, infrastructure and non-natural landscape 
that surrounds them. Being a cultural artefact, it reflects the social context in which it 
was produced. Therefore, in a basic Marxist analysis, the built environment would be 
part of the superstructure, shaped by the base that consists of the means and relations 
of production.5 Expanding this analysis, Adorno and Horkheimer, in their writings 
on the Dialectic of Enlightenment, coined the term culture industry; thus classifying 
culture as an integral part of the means of production and the base that produces the 
societal superstructure.6 Correspondingly, Lefebvre, in his analyses of built space, 
claimed that it does not only reflect the existing social order as it is rather an integral 
part of it, ensuring its continuation while functioning as “a means of production” 
and also as “a means of control, and hence of domination”.7 While most Marxist 
and neo-Marxist theoreticians focused on economic classes, Gramsci introduced 
the concept of hegemony, which is the ruling social class. Consequently, explaining 
additional ruling interests and values that go beyond the simple economic rationale, 
such as nationalism, conservatism and orthodoxy. The influence of this ruling class, 
according to Gramsci, is rendered in the built environment, as it controls “Everything 
which influences or is able to influence public opinion, directly or indirectly... even 
architecture, and the layout and names of the streets”.8 Nevertheless, whether the 
built environment is produced by the social order or whether it reproduces it, they both 
correlate one to the other. Moreover, as the means and relations of production are 
constantly changing, the ruling hegemonic values change harmoniously. Respectively, 
their spatial manifestations are supposed to transform as well. Thus, by studying the 
planning history of a given place, and in the case of this thesis - Israel, we are able 
to understand the prominent political, economic and cultural values that dictated its 
formation and how they changed over the years.9
5 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, 1:12.
6 Adorno, The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture; Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment.
7 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, 26.
8 Gramsci, Selections from Cultural Writings, 389.
9 Hein, ‘The What, Why, and How of Planning History’, 6-5;8.
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The existing scholarship on the politics of the built environment is vast and 
multifaceted. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify several leading approaches 
that characterise the main research perspectives, analysing the way the power of 
the state is both reproduced and represented in built space. The representational 
perspective focuses on the manner architecture “symbolizes,” “expresses,” “houses,” 
or “displays” the power of the state.10 Accordingly, the focal point is primarily iconic 
governmental buildings or national compounds,11 usually of totalitarian regimes 
like Nazi Germany, the USSR or Fascist Italy, which their aesthetics is supposed 
to idealise the state and thus legitimise and inflict its rule.12 Besides the common 
attention to fascist aesthetics, other researchers dealt also with democratic regimes, 
like the metaphoric aspects of transparency in West-Germany,13 or the adoption 
of Bauhaus architects by the American establishment as a means to represent 
itself as the protector of democracy and freedom.14 Similarly, on the urban level, 
Lawrence Vale’s analyses of capital cities focus on the manner they were used to 
emphasise the authority of the state and its dominant culture.15 On the other hand, 
James Holston and James Scott analyse capitals as a state-led social engineering 
process, intended to enforce a certain behaviour and everyday life that confirms 
the ruling socio-political order.16 In that sense, the focus is more on the built 
environment’s ability to reproduce the existing power relations and less on its 
representational capacities.
The emphasis on spatial practices, rather than representation, originates from 
social-studies theories of the 1960s and 1970s. Whether in Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of Habitus and the divisions and hierarchies that create a common 
ideological construct,17 Anthony Giddens’ analyses of privacy and rules as spatial 
10 Molnar, Building the State Architecture, Politics, and State Formation in Post-War Central Europe, 11.
11 Sklair, ‘Iconic Architecture and Urban, National, and Global Identities’, 179–95.
12 Sontag, ‘Fascinating Fascism’; Lane, Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918-1945.
13 Barnstone, The Transparent State: Architecture and Politics in Postwar Germany, 27–60.
14 Betts, ‘The Bauhaus as Cold War Legend: West German Modernism Revisited’, 75–100.
15 Vale, Architecture, Power and National Identity, 3–47; Vale, ‘The Temptations of Nationalism in Modern 
Capital Cities.” I’, 196–205.
16 Holston, The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia, 74–84; Scott, Seeing Like a State: 
How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, 117–30.
17 Bourdieu, ‘The Berber House’, 98–110.
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domination structures,18 Michel Foucault’s study of space’s disciplinary power,19 
they all focused on the dominance mechanism produced through built space as 
an attempt to subjugate the individual to the rule of the state. The innovation and 
popularity of the social perspective led to a vast architectural and planning history 
research that is based on the theories of the scholars mentioned above, as well as on 
other similar approaches.20
At the same time, as stated by architectural and urban critic Kim Dovey, the 
spatial adaptation of the social sciences perspective usually diminishes the role of 
individuals, considering them solely as subjects, rather than agents. Therefore, he 
suggests a pluralistic approach that considers them as both, with an ability to be 
“empowered” and “disempowered” by the built environment.21 Drawing on the work 
of Jeffrey Isaac,22 Dovey emphasises the difference between power over, which is 
the ability to harness the capacities of others to one’s interests, and power to, which 
is “[t]he ‘capacity’ to imagine, construct and inhabit a better built environment”.23 
Applying this distinction to the development of Israeli settlements, we could easily 
claim that this was a process where the state enhanced its power over space by 
providing its citizens housing opportunities in frontier areas. Accordingly, this was 
a state-led social engineering project, which created a spiritual bond between the 
citizens and the state while securing its legitimacy and territorial rule; using built 
space to control the citizens on the one hand and using the citizens to control space 
on the other.
Allegedly, the privatisation of housing development is a process with a potential 
of turning the individual from a mere subject into an agent. By transferring the 
responsibility from the state to the individual, the latter is granted the power to 
inhabit, plan and form the built environment. Respectively, Lisa Findley, highlights 
the role of architecture as a liberating tool of subjected people, confirming their 
18 Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory.
19 Foucault, Discipline and Punish.
20 Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed; Holston, 
The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia; Findley, Building Change: Architecture, Politics 
and Cultural Agency; Hirst, Space and Power: Politics War and Architecture; Stanek, ‘French Post-War 
Architecture and Its Critics’, 113–25; Molnar, Building the State Architecture, Politics, and State Formation in 
Post-War Central Europe; Barnstone, The Transparent State: Architecture and Politics in Postwar Germany.
21 Dovey, Framing Place. Mediating Power in Built Form, 20.
22 Isaac, ‘Beyond the Three Faces of Power’, 32–55.
23 Dovey, Framing Place. Mediating Power in Built Form, 10.
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participation in cultural production. Therefore, she refers to Le Corbusier’s statement 
that “Taking possession of space is the first gesture of living things… The occupation 
of space is the first proof of existence”.24 In this sense, the power to occupy space 
is seen as an essential component of individual liberty that turns one into a spatial 
agent.25 Similarly, the neoliberal order, which shifts the focus from the state’s role as 
a provider to that of an enabler, adopts the same discourse of individuals as agents. 
At the same time, as shown by David Harvey, neoliberal economies that claim to 
reduce state involvement eventually conclude in major “special interventions”, meant 
to encourage “‘good business or investment climate’ for capitalistic endeavours”.26 
Ultimately, limiting the individual’s power to affect the formation of the built 
environment while harnessing one’s interests to those of the market.27 Nevertheless, 
while Marxist geographical analyses usually depict geopolitics as means serving 
capitalist objectives,28 complex ethno-territorial contexts, like Israel, usually present 
an opposite scenario.
Superficially, a privatised national settlement project seems as an oxymoron, as 
individual interests usually contradict those of the state. Similarly, Charles Jencks 
in his analysis of architectural production depicts three separate systems - private, 
public and corporate, all of which have their own motivation – usage, budget, and 
profit, respectively.29 Nevertheless, Jencks does not mention the ideological or 
political incentives of the state. Most important, he ignores the fact that it is the state 
that enables the private and corporate systems to operate, and that their produced 
architecture is thus subjected to the state’s interests as well, especially in a case 
like Israel.
To analyse the privatising settlement project and the role private agents began 
playing in it we will be using the term spatial privileges. The term is usually used 
to describe the advantages members of a hegemonic group enjoy within the built 
24 Le Corbusier, quoted in Findley, Building Change: Architecture, Politics and Cultural Agency, 5.
25 Ibid
26 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 70.
27 Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years, 376.
28 Brenner and Elden, ‘Henri Lefebvre on State, Space, Territory’; Brenner et al., ‘State Space in Question’.
29 Jencks, The Language of Post-Modern Architecture, 25.
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environment,30 being it a question of race, ethnicity, gender or social class.31 Thus, 
it is an integral part of Logan and Molotch’s “place stratification model”,32 which 
describes the ability of privileged groups to manipulate the production of space for 
their own socio-economic benefit.33 Re-explaining the model, Logan defines “spatial 
privilege” as the objective of hegemonic groups seeking segregation, eventually 
creating a “rigid hierarchy of places”.34 However, in this dissertation, we will be using 
the term to describe the exclusive rights members of favourable groups received 
from the state as a means to incorporate them in the national geopolitical project 
with the purpose of ensuring its continuation and constantly recreate the hierarchy 
of places. Returning to Dovey’s analysis, these spatial privileges are an outcome of 
a prit pro quo relationship that is based on granting favoured groups the power to 
plan, construct, and colonise space, as a means to enforce the state’s power over it. 
Therefore, in the privatisation of a geopolitical project, it is by enabling [selected] 
groups and corporations to participate in the production of new settlements that the 
state is capable to domesticate its frontiers.35
Ethnically oriented, the state granted spatial privileges to specific socio-economic 
groups that could ensure the geopolitical objectives of its territorial project and the 
evolving economic rationale behind it. Haim Yacobi and Erez Tzfadia refer to this 
process as “selective privatisation”, as the Israeli Government granted substantial 
spatial rights to “selected elites” in order to promote the settlement of its national 
30 Logan, Zhang, and Chunyu, ‘Emergent Ghettos: Black Neighborhoods in New York and Chicago, 1880–
1940’; Wilton, ‘Colouring Special Needs: Locating Whiteness in NIMBY Conflicts’; Leonard, ‘Landscaping 
Privilege: Being British in South Africa’; Dirsuweit and Wafer, ‘Suburban Road-Closures and the Ruinous 
Landscapes of Privilege in Johannesburg’; Neupane and Chesney, ‘Violence against Women on Public 
Transport in Nepal: Sexual Harassment and the Spatial Expression of Male Privilege’; Van Slyck, ‘The Spatial 
Practices of Privilege’.
31 Other uses include pedagogy studies, explaining the relations between the pupils and the teacher 
inside a classroom and even in computer science, examining the user experience design- see Niu and Gang, 
‘Enforcing User-Space Privilege Separation with Declarative Architectures’; Engle, Langer-Osuna, and 
McKinney de Royston, ‘Toward a Model of Influence in Persuasive Discussions: Negotiating Quality, Authority, 
Privilege, and Access Within a Student-Led Argument’.
32 Logan and Molotch, Urban Fortunes: A Political Economy of Place; Alba and Logan, ‘Variations on Two 
Themes: Racial and Ethnic Patterns in the Attainment of Suburban Residence’, 431–53.
33 Pais, South, and Crowder, ‘Metropolitan Heterogeneity and Minority Neighborhood Attainment: Spatial 
Assimilation or Place Stratification?’, 261.
34 Logan, Zhang, and Chunyu, ‘Emergent Ghettos: Black Neighborhoods in New York and Chicago, 1880–
1940’, 1058.
35 Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries, 36–55; Weizman, ‘Principles of Frontier Geography’, 84–92.
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frontiers and to expand its territorial control.36 This selective privatisation is 
precisely Harvey’s special interventions, meant to introduce a certain economic 
climate. Subsequently, creating a unique coalition of private, corporate and national 
interests, which changed together along with the transformations in the Israeli 
economy, politics and culture.
The privatisation of Israel is a long and varying process that benefited different 
social groups in various manners. The global decline of the welfare-state approach, 
which began in the late 1960s and early 1970s, affected the Israeli economy as well, 
as the government promoted more liberal approaches instead. This ignited a process 
of privatisation that intensified throughout the 1970s and 1980s, concluding in 
comprehensive reorganisation of state-led projects, which included the development 
of new settlements and housing estates. The state continued to act as the initial 
planner and initiator of these projects as it still controls more than 90% of available 
land parcels; their construction and marketing, however, were conducted by 
private individuals, associations, corporations and entrepreneurs.37 Consequently, 
privatising the Israeli project. Subsequently, the reciprocal relations between the 
state’s power over and the private power to, transformed; granting diverse spatial 
privileges to different selected groups over the years, according to the changing 
interests of the state and the individual.
Developed by a coalition of individual, corporate and national interests makes the 
Israeli settlement project a unique case of privatisation and thus an exceptional 
case study of the influence of political-economic interests on the production of the 
built environment. To understand the politicisation of housing under a privatised 
economy, this thesis uses seemingly mundane, ordinary and banal housing projects. 
These, unlike iconic public or commercial buildings that are usually the focal point in 
the research of politics, economy and architecture, constitute the vast majority of the 
built environment while dictating the everyday life of the individuals living in them;38 
thus, forming the ultimate research object to study the relationship between the 
state, the individual and spatial process production.
36 Yacobi and Tzfadia, ‘Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and 
Nationalization in Israel’, 6.
37 Yiftachel and Avni, ‘Privati-nation’– Privatization, Nationalization, Housing and Gaps’, 225–47.
38 Lane, Architecture and Politics in Germany, 1918-1945; Findley, Building Change: Architecture, Politics 
and Cultural Agency; Molnar, Building the State Architecture, Politics, and State Formation in Post-War 
Central Europe.
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This thesis studies the role of the built environment in the national geopolitical 
project while focusing on its production, instead of its architectural and urban 
products. Similar to the work of Rafi Segal and Eyal Weizman’s “A Civilian 
Occupation”, the thesis discusses how architecture and planning became part of the 
national territorial agenda. At the same time, focusing on production, this thesis aims 
to avoid possible oversimplifications. For example, Segal and Weizman cite a 1984 
report of the Ministry of Construction and Housing, which recommended orienting 
the living rooms in settlements towards the open view. Relying on Paul Virilio, they 
explain that this was intended to create a “network of observations“, which would 
control the local Palestinian population.39 In “Hollow Land”, Weizman repeats this 
analyses once again, mentioning the Hebrew term of “Mitzpe” (lookout) that is 
used to refer to a new settling point.40 Nevertheless, as the same guidelines were 
published already in 1982 by the Jewish Agency’s Settlement Division, in a document 
with clear instructions on how to increase the “quality of life” in mountainous 
sites,41 the desire to provide each household with an open panorama constitutes 
a more reasonable explanation than Weizman’s panoptic analyses. Accordingly, 
the Hebrew translation of “Hollow Land” was mockingly criticised in the right-wing 
national-religious Makor Rishon newspaper. Concentrating specifically on this issue, 
the review claimed that the book is based on unsupported political statements, and 
that “in the twisted world of the extreme left, every settler is a spy”.42 Schnabel, the 
reporter who wrote the review, was not horrified from the territorial role attached to 
settlements, but rather from the claim that the architecture of their houses relies on 
militaristic principles.
To understand the geopolitical role of the built environment this dissertation studies 
it as the product of the settlement mechanism. Compatibly, the Jewish Agency’s plan 
for the West-Bank spoke of “settlement tools”,43 which are the different incentives 
used to attract people to the occupied territories, such as grants, subsidies, real 
estate speculations, and social seclusion. Therefore, built space was not a settlement 
tool meant to attract settlers or to function as a reconnaissance device, but rather an 
outcome of the various policies that were intended to stimulate the development of 
new settlements. Therefore, this thesis studies the settlement mechanism, which is 
39 Segal and Eyal, ‘The Mountain’, 85–86.
40 Weizman, Hollow Land, 130–32.
41 Naim, ‘Lot sizes in Toshavot and Community Settlements with mountainous topography’, 1–4.
42 Schnabel, ‘In the twisted world of the extreme left, every settler is a spy’.
43 Settlement Division, ‘The 100.000 Plan’, 15.
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the coalition between the state, the differing agents it used and the spatial privileges 
they were granted. To understand how the settlement mechanism works, this thesis 
concentrates on the changes it went through over the years, examining the various 
spatial privileges granted to different spatial agents and analysing how these 
transformed the local built environment. Respectively, with the focus on production, 
rather than the product, this dissertation deliberately ignores the role of architects 
and planners as the masterminds of the production of built space, referring to them 
as mere executers of the settlement mechanism.
This thesis enhances the existing scholarship on the Israeli settlement enterprise by 
introducing a new layer and an additional perspective. Most of the current literature 
focuses on the ideological and political aspects, while relatively neglecting the 
economic standpoint. At the same time, scholars that focus on the privatisation 
of Israel usually do not deal with its spatial urban and architectural morphology. 
Accordingly, the focal points are frequently politically contested case studies like 
the West-Bank, like in the varied work of Weizman, Segal, Newman, Cahaner, Allegra 
and many others,44 or ethnically divided cities, former Palestinian neighbourhoods 
and peripheral towns inside Israel, like the studies of Pullan, Yiftachel, Nitzan-
Shiftan, Yacobi, Tzfadia and Jabaraeen.45 While they all discuss the political agenda 
thoroughly, the link with political-economics is quite preliminary, including several 
papers like Yacobi and Tzfadia’s “neo-settler colonialism”, Gutwein’s concept of 
“alternative welfare-state” or Yiftachel and Avni’s short introduction on “privati-
nation”.46 Moreover, the existing literature usually studies the regional and 
urban levels, creating a research gap in the architectural level that would draw 
a continuous line from the national scale to the individual one. Efrat’s ground-
breaking work on the “Israeli Project” and Allweil’s “Homeland” are in fact written 
44 Weizman, Hollow Land; Segal and Eyal, A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture; 
Newman, ‘Settlement as Suburbanization: The Banality of Colonization’; Cahaner, ‘Between Ghetto Politics 
and Geopolitics: Ultraorthodox Settlements in the West Bank’; Allegra, ‘The Politics of Suburbia: Israel’s 
Settlement Policy and the Production of Space in the Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem’.
45 Pullan, ‘Frontier Urbanism: The Periphery at the Centre of Contested Cities’; Yiftachel, Ethnocracy; 
Nitzan-Shiftan, Seizing Jerusalem: The Architectures of Unilateral Unification; Yacobi, ‘Architecture, 
Orientalism and Identity: The Politics of the Israeli-Built Environment’; Tzfadia, ‘Public Housing as Control: 
Spatial Policy of Settling Immigrants in Israeli Development Towns’; Jabareen and Dbiat, Architecture and 
orientalism in the country.
46 Yacobi and Tzfadia, ‘Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and 
Nationalization in Israel’; Gutwein, ‘The Settlements and the Relationship between Privatization and the 
Occupation’; Yiftachel and Avni, ‘Privati-nation’– Privatization, Nationalization, Housing and Gaps’.
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from an architectural and regional perspective.47 Yet, they mainly focus on the 
nation-building process, discussing its representational and social engineering 
roles, and thus do not address the territorial, individual and corporate interests of 
post-1977. Researchers that do deal with the architecture of settlements in the past 
four decades analyse it as an attempt to normalise occupation through banal and 
aesthetic spatial practices.48 However, this dissertation sates the contrary, claiming 
that architecture is the product of privatisation and normalisation, rather than 
their producer.
The case studies that this dissertation examines represent the increasing 
privatisation of the settlement mechanism and the differing spatial privileges it 
was based on (fig 1.1). Sal’it, the Reihan Bloc, Nirit and Ya’arit demonstrate the 
early privatisation measures of the late 1970s, which were based on granting 
small homogeneous groups the right to form an exclusive Community Settlement. 
Kochav Yair, Alfei Menashe, Oranit and Reut, represent the mid-1980s, which relied 
on granting privileged groups of well-connected private association and private 
developers the right to develop and/or populate a new Suburban Settlement. Bat 
Heffer, Tzoran, Tzur Yitzhak, Tzur Yigal, Matan, Ela’ad, Shoham and Lapid represent 
the mass-suburbanisation of the 1990s and the shift to private corporations. Harish, 
the last case study, illustrates the current finance-led development that is based on 
the power to speculate as the main feature in the settlement mechanism.
To understand the development mechanism behind the production of these case 
studies, we will rely on different types of primary and secondary resources. These 
include meeting protocols, correspondences, ministerial reports, aerial photos, 
maps, national strategic plans, urban outline schemes, architectural drawings, 
photographs and historical news articles. This also includes relevant statistical 
information on the population and the development process and combines interviews 
with key figures and documentation of the settlements’ current situation. To analyse 
the mutual geopolitical, individual and corporate interests we will first examine each 
case study from the strategical level - analysing its location along the Green-Line, 
its size and affinity to other existing Jewish and Arab towns while clarifying the 
state’s incentive to increase its power over this specific space. Then, identifying the 
47 Efrat, The Israeli Project: Building and Architecture 1948-1973; Allweil, Homeland: Zionism as Housing 
Regime, 1860–2011.
48 Handel, Rand, and Allegra, ‘Wine-Washing: Colonization, Normalization, and the Geopolitics of Terroir 
in the West Bank’s Settlements’; Newman, ‘Settlement as Suburbanization: The Banality of Colonization’; 
Allegra, ‘“Outside Jerusalem—yet so Near”: Ma’ale Adumim, Jerusalem, and the Suburbanization of Israel’s 
Settlement Policy’.
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relevant spatial agents, their interests and desires in correspondence with the spatial 
privileges they were granted, we will analyse the way their power to inhabit and form 
the built environment matched the state’s geopolitical agenda.
FIG. 1.1 The different development phases along the Trans-Israel 
highway and the chosen case studies (highlighted in black) - (Illustrated 
by the author)
TOC
 35 Introduction
Subsequently, to understand the spatial manifestation of the privatised national 
agenda, we will analyse each case study from its urban outline to the layout of the 
single dwelling unit. Starting from the street system, its arrangement and hierarchy, 
moving to the zoning and distribution of public and private functions, as well as 
the sites’ gross and net density. We will then examine the residential buildings’ 
sizes, height, volume and envelope, as well as the composition and distribution 
of dwelling units, their inner layout and relationship with the buildings’ envelope. 
Thus, explaining how the architectural and urban products are an outcome of the 
settlement mechanism (fig 1.2).
FIG. 1.2 Location, Developer, Population composition; Intended everyday routine; Zoning, Density, street 
Layout; Buildings’ size, Buildings’ envelope; Units’ composition, Units’ layout, Units and volume (Illustrated 
by the author)
 1.4 Relevance and contribution
Using the settlements constructed on the fringes of the Tel Aviv metropolitan 
area, this thesis ties the national geopolitical agenda to the seemingly apolitical 
suburbanisation process and real estate-oriented development. Accordingly, while 
most of the existing research focuses on large cities like Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, or 
highly contested areas like Hebron or isolated West-Bank outposts, this dissertation 
deals with the undisputed settlements along the nation’s main arterial road. 
Respectively, it explores the popular local architecture, which houses the majority of 
Israeli families; defining their everyday life while shaping the state’s urban landscape. 
Therefore, this thesis offers a new theoretical framework that could explain the 
current form of Israeli housing and settlement development mechanism.
Examining the geopolitical and economic interests that influence the production 
of the Israeli built environment, this thesis illustrates the manner in which the 
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individual’s capacity, or power to influence the production of built space is entwined 
with the state’s interests to secure its power over it. Thus, indicating how even our 
most intimate environment, our home, is dictated by the greater socio-economic and 
political order. Analysing these influences, the dissertation challenges the creative 
role of architects and planners in the production of space, presenting them as an 
integral part of the political and economic mechanism. Furthermore, focusing on 
the global phenomenon of neoliberalism, yet in a specific geopolitical context, this 
thesis presents a local implementation of market-oriented urban development, and 
a cynical version of critical regionalism. Analysing how the global neoliberal turn 
received a local implementation, this thesis discusses how it was used by the Israeli 
Government as a means to constantly revive its geopolitical agenda. Therefore, 
claiming that while all market economies are alike, each nation-state implements it in 
its own way.
 1.5 Outline
After introducing the main features of the thesis, the following background chapter 
provides the historical and theoretical context to the development of the Trans-Israel 
settlements. It explains the geopolitical role of settlements in Israel/Palestine and 
the manner in which their production mechanism transformed over the last century. 
Relying on key theories on the welfare nation-state and the global turn towards 
neoliberalism and market economy, the chapter presents the Israeli version of the 
phenomenon. Illustrating the entangled relations between nationalism, territoriality, 
and privatisation this chapter clarifies the complexity of the subject and explains 
its unique profile. Presenting a general view of the development mechanism of the 
settlements along the Green-Line and the Trans-Israel highway, the chapter prepares 
the reader for the following ones, explaining what makes the area a privately 
developed national project. Each of the following chapters focuses on a singular 
frontier domestication mechanism and the new type of privatisation it relied on. 
Accordingly, each chapter includes different selected groups enjoying particular 
spatial privileges, or powers to produce built space, in order to secure and expands 
its power over it. Consequently, generating specific settlement phenomena that 
corresponded with each of the different phases during which they were shaped.
The third chapter focuses on the neo-ruralisation of the frontier, which forms the 
first step in the privatised domestication of the Green-Line. Accordingly, it deals with 
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the Community Settlements - small-scale non-agricultural villages that consist of 
a limited number of families and a relatively homogeneous character. These were 
first used by the Israeli Government and its different planning agencies during the 
1970s in order to attract city dwellers to frontier areas by offering them a pioneer-
like experience. Consequently, granting them the power to form their own secluded 
ex-urban communities while strengthening the state’s power over areas of national 
interests. This chapter examines six different settlements that were initiated during 
1977-1981 along the Green-Line and constitute first example of early privatisation. 
First is the settlement of Sal’it. Second is the settlement cluster of Reihan, Hinanit, 
and Shaked. Then, the chapter introduces Nirit, the only case study built west 
of the Green-Line and on official Israeli territory. Last is the case of Ya’arit, a 
West-Bank settlement that was never built, however, being initiated by a private 
developer it forms an interesting and intriguing example. Illustrating and analysing 
the development of these six case studies, and how they changed over the years, 
this chapter shows how the neo-rural experience and the concept of community 
became the leading force behind the national territorial project in the early 1980s. 
Then it shows how the focus shifted towards the individual during the 1990s, which 
eventually gave an emphasis on corporate interests in the early 2000s.
Chapter four deals with the gentrification of the Green-Line, which was a state-
led effort to attract upper-middle-class families to settle the area. Accordingly, it 
focuses on the Suburban Settlement - a spatial phenomenon of the early 1980s that 
offered the option of spacious houses in a homogeneous commuters’ community 
that suited the desires of the newly forming bourgeoisie class. Concentrating on this 
new settlement mechanism, this chapter illustrates how the power to develop space 
became a privilege given to restricted upper-middle-class families and contractors 
the state asked to attract to the area. Consequently, gentrifying the former frontier 
and eventually enabling its further domestication. This chapter deals with the first 
Suburban Settlements established along the Green-Line, which are Kochav Yair, 
Alfei Menashe, Oranit and Reut. By presenting their story and analysing the method 
of their construction, as well as their [sub]urban and architectural characteristics, 
this chapter illustrates how the changes in the settlement development mechanism 
led to changes in housing practices and transformed the local built environment. 
Moreover, it shows how the emerging upper-middle-class was able to promote 
its own segregated suburban communities, and how the state used the suburban 
aspirations of this class in order to incorporate the former frontier into the main 
metropolitan area.
Chapter five concentrates on the mass-suburbanisation of the 1990s, which 
included an unprecedented involvement of the private sector. Accordingly, unlike 
earlier examples, where the construction of new settlements was a collaboration of 
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national institutions, settling movements and small-scale private initiative, by the 
early 1990s, the state forwarded the process to the hands of large-scale private 
developers. Consequently, resulting in the mega suburbs of the 1990s – mass-
produced residential environments, consisting of tract-housing developments and 
repetitive architectural typologies. This chapter focuses on the ‘Stars’ settlements 
- eight new sites initiated by the state in the early 1990s that demonstrate the 
completion of the transition into a privatised national project. Analysing the 
architectural and urban characteristics of these new settlements, as well as their 
development mechanism, location, and intended target population, this chapter 
provides additional insight to the changing relationship between the private power 
to, and the state’s power over space.
Chapter six focuses on the financialisation of the Green-Line, which derived from the 
increasing attempts to develop frontier settlements by creating a real estate market 
and relying on the speculative interests of entrepreneurs and investors. Therefore, 
this chapter deals with the case of Harish, a project that different governments 
unsuccessfully tried to develop during the last forty years. Its peripheral location 
and proximity to the West-Bank and other Arab towns on the one hand, and the 
lack of interest in rural settlement in the other, repeatedly prevented the site’s 
development. By 2010, the wide demand for new dwelling units, the construction 
of the Trans-Israel Highway and the newly built West-Bank Separation Barrier all 
contributed to turning Harish into an attractive piece of real estate. Consequently, 
enabling the Israeli Government to designate it as a city with a target population of 
60,000. Focusing on the case of Harish, this chapter illustrates the financialisation 
of the national settlement project, explaining how the state granted the power to 
develop a real estate market in a certain area, in order to supply the needed dwelling 
units while expanding the national territorial project. Analysing the urban layout and 
the housing units in Harish, this chapter explains how this future city embodies the 
privatisation of the national settlement project and the manner in which architecture 
turned into a mere product of economic speculations.
Chapter seven discusses the main findings of the dissertation. It draws a continuous 
line between the different development phases and settlement phenomena presented 
in the previous chapters and explains how they constitute a gradual process of 
privatisation. This chapter summarises the different national and private interest in 
the development of the area along the Trans-Israel highway and explains how this 
influence was manifested in the local built environment and civilian everyday life. 
Relying on the case studies presented in the thesis, this chapter concludes with 
insights that explain the relations between nationalism and neoliberalism, and how 
the coalition of these two is manifested in built space.
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2 Background
The Evolution Of A National Project
Two shorter versions of this chapter were published as:
–  Schwake, G. (2020). Settle and Rule. Architecture and Culture. 1–22. DOI:10.1080/20507828. 
2020.1730624.
–  Schwake, G. (2020). The Americanization of Israeli Housing Practices. The Journal of Architecture. 25:5. DO
I:10.1080/20507828.2020.1730624
 2.1 Settle and Rule
To understand the privatisation of the Israeli settlement mechanism, we must first 
understand the physical and spiritual role of the local built environment and how 
it evolved over the past century. Though the initial essence of Zionist settlement 
in Palestine during the late 19th century was equivocal and consisted of multiple 
interpretations, it rapidly turned into a territorial project where land control played a 
leading part. Through the promotion of a territorial sequence of Jewish settlements, 
while dismantling the Arab one, several leading Zionist organisations (later the state 
of Israel) asked to fortify and expand their presence, securing their power over 
space.49 Therefore, focusing on the act of settlement as a governance apparatus, 
I would claim that this strategy could be understood as a ‘settle and rule’ policy; 
adopting and adapting the phrase of ‘divide et impera’, translated from Latin as 
divide and rule.50 This strategy began forming in the turn of the 20th century and it 
continues to dictate the development of the local built environment into the third 
millennium. However, as the hegemonic cultural, economic and political values of 
Zionism and the state of Israel transformed over the last 100 years so did the spatial 
implementation of this strategy.
49 Yiftachel, ‘The Internal Frontier: Territorial Control and Ethnic Relations in Israel’, 493–95; Dovey, 
Framing Place. Mediating Power in Built Form, 9–15.
50 Sometimes as divide and conquer
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In this chapter we will see how the concept of ruling by settling remained the core of 
the national territorial project, yet its materialisation transformed with the changing 
modes and the relations of production. We will first focus on the national geopolitical 
role of the local territory and built space, which began in the pre-statehood days and 
continued with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Then we will identify 
four different modes of spatial production and control, each with its particular 
state-led efforts to attract people to settle the national frontiers, according to the 
leading societal values of their time. Beginning with cultivate and rule approach led 
by several Zionist movements in pre-statehood years and included an emphasis 
on frontier rural settlements. With the privatisation of the settlement mechanism 
during the 1970s, the state relied more and more on the private sector, and thus 
incorporated various individualistic and speculative interests by granting spatial 
privileges to selected groups. Consequently, the state first adopted an approach of 
suburbanise and rule, which harnessed the growing desire for better living standards 
to the national territorial agenda. With the ever-growing influence of the private 
market, this eventually gave way to a more corporate-led approach of financialise 
and rule, where investments and real estate speculation became the main driving 
force behind the development of new settlements.
Zooming into the area of the Green-Line, enables us to grasp the privatisation of 
the Israeli settlement mechanism. Using the Trans-Israel Highway as a paradigm 
to the local implementation of the global neoliberal turn, this chapter discusses the 
selective nature of Israeli privatisation, explaining what makes it a unique case of a 
national-oriented market economy. Then, presenting an overview of the development 
of the area along the Green-Line, this chapter provides an insight to the evolving 
alliance between individual and corporate interests and the state’s geopolitical 
project; preparing the ground for the next parts of the dissertation that focus on 
each of the phases discussed in this general overview.
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 2.2 An evolving national project
“It is not our historic claims that will determine the borders of the land, but rather 
our posts. Our role now is to seize and settle.” Moshe Shertok51
The modern development of Jewish settlements in Palestine commenced with the 
first waves of Zionist immigration to the area in the turn of the 20th century. Despite 
the inability to speak of ‘a’ unified Zionist doctrine, the leading Practical Zionism 
approach supported a variety of activities focusing on immigration, land acquisition 
and settlements, all in order to actively promote the establishment of a homeland for 
the Jewish nation in Palestine.52 What began as a sporadic and relatively insignificant 
presence, shortly turned into a large settlement enterprise, fuelled by the growing 
demand for Jewish independence and additional waves of immigration. During 
the British Mandate (1921-1948), as the dispute with the local Arab-Palestinian 
population continued to grow, the act of settlement became an act of land 
appropriation, intended to create a substantial sequence of Jewish presence in the 
area and to enlarge the future territory of the independent Jewish state.53
Under the British mandate, it became clearer that the future of the area would 
conclude in a territorial division between the Arab and the Jewish Population. 
Meaning, that the designated Jewish homeland would be established upon the areas 
owned and settled by Jews in Palestine, and that the Arab State would take place in 
areas owned and settled by Arabs. Therefore, land acquisition turned into a zero-
sum game of power over space, as both sides sought to enlarge and safeguard their 
future territory. Consequently, the Zionist Federation, the Jewish National Fund 
(JNF), the Jewish Agency (JA), the Palestine Land Development Company and other 
Zionist organisations carried out an intensified effort to purchase additional lands 
and to establish new settlements in all parts of Palestine.54 Local Arab leadership, 
on the other hand, concentrated on preventing the transference of Arab land into 
Jewish ownership. Both these efforts intensified with the Peel Commission, a royal 
British committee in charge of investigating the causes of the 1936 violent uprising 
51 A quote from 1937; Sharet, Political Diary B, 175. (Shertok changed his name to Sharet)
52 Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics.
53 Ibid
54 Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War; Kano, The Problem of Land Between Jews and Arabs 
(1917-1990).
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and to recommend a solution for the area, which proposed the first concrete division 
plan. Therefore, it became even more obvious that the international community 
would eventually endorse a territorial division between the Arab and the Jewish 
sides.55 Accordingly, leading to a fiercer effort to acquire more lands, as stated in the 
mentioned quote of Moshe Shertok, who acted as the secretary of the JA in Palestine 
during the Peel Commission. Thus, turning the settle and rule approach into the 
official national policy.
This mission continued to evolve after the formation of the state of Israel in 1948, 
and the built environment maintained its geopolitical role. The new government 
aimed to strengthen and secure its control of former Arab territories and over the 
new border areas while decentralising the local Jewish population that was heavily 
concentrated in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area (Gush Dan).56 Taking responsibility 
over the settlement mechanism while acting jointly with the pre-state organisations, 
the state asked to settle the millions of Jewish immigrants across its new borders.57 
The state thus planned, funded and constructed a series of new industrial towns, 
aimed to offer housing, subsistence, and occupational opportunities, while creating a 
unified national identity and promoting its territorial control.58
The Israeli national development process was of an ethno-centric nature.59 Even in 
its definition, the term Leom that is used as the Hebrew equivalent of nation, could 
also be translated into ethnicity. In the pre-statehood days, it was clear that the use 
of the word Leom refers exclusively to the Jewish nation; like the Jewish National 
Fund (JNF), which was in charge of acquiring Admot Leom (lands for the nation) for 
the sake of a Bayit Leomi (national home). Nonetheless, even after the establishment 
of the state of Israel, with a 20% Arab Palestinian population, the term was never 
used to refer to an Israeli nation.60 In evidence to that is the Israeli civil registration 
which from the variety of different possible classifications for the term Leom, it does 
not include Israeli as one of them, and the majority of Israeli citizens are registered 
55 Ibid
56 Efrat and Dash, The Israel Physical Master Plan.
57 Efrat, The Israeli Project: Building and Architecture 1948-1973; Efrat, The Object of Zionism: The 
Architecture of Israel.
58 Carmon, ‘Housing Policy in Israel: Review, Evaluation and Lessons’, 181–208.
59 Yiftachel, Ethnocracy, 11–50.
60 Sand, The Invention of the Jewish People.
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either as members of the Jewish Leom or the Arab one.61 Despite several petitions 
and appeals the state’s official position remained that there is no such thing as an 
Israeli Leom, or nation; a position that was defended by the Israeli High Court of 
Justice.62 Respectively, the terms national considerations, national lands, national 
priorities, and nation-state refer mainly to ethno-national Jewish ones. This would 
become official in 2018 with the “Nation-State Bill” that defined Israel as the nation-
state of the Jewish people.63 In this sense, the national settlement mechanism of the 
state of Israel continued the former pre-state ethno-national Jewish efforts.64 Thus 
turning the terms Israeli settlements and Jewish settlements into synonyms.
The political role of the built environment intensified since the 1970s. The 
occupation of the West-Bank in 1967 and the attempts to fortify the state’s 
control in the peripheral areas of the northern Galilee and the Negev, were an 
outcome of a state-directed effort to establish new Jewish settlements. These 
focused on strengthening the state’s presence by creating a Jewish territorial 
sequence and by disassembling Arab-Palestinian ones.65 Though the right-wing 
religious settlements in the heart of the West-Bank were considered controversial 
in the eyes of large parts of the Israeli public, those inside the pre-1967 borders, 
became an integral part of the national consensus. Furthermore, while the efforts 
in the West-Bank were intended to fortify the Israeli occupation and prevent the 
formation of an independent Palestinian entity by expanding the state’s territory, 
the ones in the Galilee and the Negev focused on strengthening the state’s control 
inside the pre-1967 borders. Although allegedly these endeavours were different, 
they used the same basic tactics of establishing new settlements as a tool to 
secure territorial dominance. Accordingly, using the same planning discourse of
61 Occasionally, Leom is used as nationality, as the civil registration does include an East and West-German 
Leom. A better possible explanation to the term Leom, is the difference between the Arabic term for nation: 
Qaumiya, which refers to the general Arab nation, and Wataniya, which refers to a specific Arab nation such 
as Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi etc. see: Sheikh, ‘Pan-Arabism: A Tool of Ruling Elites or a Politically-Relevant 
Ideology?’, 93–107.
62 Israel High Court of Justice, Ruling 8573/08 - Uzi Arnon against the Ministry of Interior.
63 Knesset of Israel, Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People.
64 Yiftachel, Ethnocracy; Tzfadia, ‘Abusing Multiculturalism: The Politics of Recognition and Land Allocation 
in Israel’, 11150–1130.
65 Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel’s Policies; Portugali, ‘Jewish Settlement in 
the Occupied Territories: Israel’s Settlement Structure and the Palestinians’, 26–53; Segal and Eyal, ‘The 
Mountain’.
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 “Hesech” - “scarcity of Jewish settlement”, “Havira” - “Interconnections between 
Jewish settlements” and “Hayetz”- “Separation between Arab areas”, to define the 
“national priority” of a certain area.66
The settle and rule strategy formed the official development policy in Israel up 
until the 1990s and to some extent even today.67 During the 1990s, the state’s 
new approach asked to tie the national development process to the needs of the 
liberalising local economy while implementing a more market-oriented approach.68 
At the same time, territorial expansion was not forsaken, yet its implementation and 
method of realisation were adjusted according to the new market-led development 
perspective. Therefore, the built environment continued to play a leading geopolitical 
role, while its implementation and method of realisation changed significantly over 
the years.
 2.3 The Frontier: rural pioneers
The logic behind the Israeli settlement mechanism is based on the concept of 
frontier domestication. Frontiers, unlike borders, are zones of varying widths that are 
either between two neighbouring states, unpopulated areas within a state or ones 
that have not yet been incorporated into an adjacent political entity.69 Moreover, 
frontiers are usually sparsely settled areas or populated by indigenous peoples 
who the settling society considers as part of the natural landscape that needs to be 
tamed.70 Though the act of settling frontier areas dates to pre-modern times, in the 
era of nation building it became an instrument of the modern state to enforce its 
sovereignty and to practice its control over a certain territory.71 Weizman, describes 
66 Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel’s Policies, 29.
67 Yiftachel and Kader, ‘Landed power: the making of the Israeli land regime’, 67–103.
68 Shachar, ‘Reshaping the Map of Israel: A New National Planning Doctrine’, 209–18.
69 Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries, 36–40; Ron, Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia 
and Israel, 1–13.
70 Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’, 11–40; Weizman, ‘Principles of Frontier Geography’.
71 Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries, 30–40.
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frontier settlements as an archipelago of enclaves and exclaves that are isolated 
from the geographical context that surrounds them. They constitute an ex-territorial 
geographic system of settling points and connecting lines, where order and law are 
exempted. This temporary situation remains until the frontier is domesticated, and 
larger populations are able to migrate and inhabit it.72 Frontier settlement, Weizman 
claims, is a chaotic and law-less situation which is directed by the remote entity that 
it serves as a means to expand its control and enforce its law;73 eventually enforcing 
its “power over” space.74 Subsequently, in the modern era, frontier areas have been 
increasingly disappearing and are replaced by borders.75 By settling the frontier, 
states are able to impose both their empirical and juridical sovereignty and thus to 
rule over it.76
The manner in which frontier settlement is practiced changes according to its 
historical, cultural and socio-economic context. While pre-modern examples usually 
consisted of civilianised military strongholds, modern ones are often an integral part 
of the nation-state attempts of creating a national identity.77 The frontier, therefore, 
answered the material need of settler societies for land and resources, as well as 
their spiritual aspiration to create a new culture.78 Perhaps the most immediate 
example is the American westward expansion, which is usually affiliated with groups 
of pioneers, outlaws, and vigilantes.79 However, though based on the values of 
individualism and personal freedom, it was heavily dependent on the growth interests 
of the capitalist urban establishment that funded it.80 The Wild-West was thus a 
coordinated state of chaos, directed by the urban centres, intended to lead to the 
domestication of the frontier.81
72 Weizman, ‘Principles of Frontier Geography’, 84–92.
73 Pullan, ‘Frontier Urbanism: The Periphery at the Centre of Contested Cities’, 15–35.
74 Dovey, Framing Place. Mediating Power in Built Form, 10.
75 Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries.
76 Ron, Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel.
77 Turner, The Frontier in American History.
78 Yiftachel, ‘Nation‐building or Ethnic Fragmentation? Frontier Settlement and Collective Identities in 
Israel’, 149–69.
79 Turner, The Frontier in American History.
80 Hirst, Space and Power: Politics War and Architecture.
81 Weizman, ‘Principles of Frontier Geography’; Pullan, ‘Frontier Urbanism: The Periphery at the Centre of 
Contested Cities’.
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“Kibush HaShmama”, conquering the wilderness, or frontiers, was a leading narrative 
in the Practical and Labour82 Zionist approaches that led to the establishment of 
the state of Israel.83 In that sense, the well-known concept of “a land without a 
people to a people without a land”, portrayed Palestine as an empty, undeveloped 
and unsettled area waiting for redemption.84 Similar to the American westward 
expansion, settling the frontier was not only a means to appropriate lands but 
also to form a territorial-based national identity.85 A shared identity, as claimed 
by Hobsbawm, was a crucial aspect in the formation of the modern nation-state, 
which significantly relied on a union between the geographic and ethno-national 
entities.86 Thus, it was by the act of settling the “land without people” that the 
“people without land” would become a nation. Consequently, settlements, housing, 
and dwelling units were a leading national mission. The method in which these 
were developed, however, transformed significantly along the years. While the 
settle and rule approach was maintained, the manner in which it was implemented 
adapted to the changes in the local economy and culture. Eventually, what began 
as a pioneer act of conquering the frontier, turned into an elaborated and complex 
real-estate venture.
In the pre-statehood years, the main frontier settlement efforts were carried out by 
the various Labour Zionism movements. These movements, headed by the Zionist-
Socialist Mapai party that formed the ruling hegemony of the Jewish population 
during the British mandate years, promoted the establishment of small-scale rural 
settlements all across Palestine. Agriculture and rural settlements were thus used 
in order to expand the borders of the future Jewish state; or as said in the famous 
quote of Zionist leader Joseph Trumpeldor “Wherever the Jewish plough cultivates 
its last furrow, that is where the border will run”.87 This led to the communal 
agricultural settlements of the moshavim and kibbutzim, which expanded the 
areas populated by Jews while also acting as a disciplinary mechanism, meant to 
reconnect the Jewish nation to its historic fatherland through its active cultivation. 
82 An ideological framework that emphasised on creating a new progressive and socialist Jewish society in 
Palestine.
83 Kemp, ‘The Frontier Idiom on Borders and Territorial Politics in Post-1967 Israel’, 78–97.
84 Said, The Question of Palestine, 9.
85 Yiftachel, ‘Nation‐building or Ethnic Fragmentation? Frontier Settlement and Collective Identities in 
Israel’, 150.
86 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780; Hobsbawm, ‘Identity Politics and the Left’; MacIver, The 
Modern State.
87 Gordis, Avishay, and Levi, Israel’s National Security and West Bank Settlements, 6.
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The pioneer agricultural rural experience was thus both end and means; all focused 
to promote the physical and spiritual Jewish national revival.88
These actions, called “land redemption” (Geulat Adama), meaning redeeming of 
the Land of Israel to its ‘rightful’ owners, included the construction of settlements 
intended to eventually secure the redeemed land. It was mostly carried out by the 
Palestine Office of the World Zionist Organisation (Hamisrad Haeritzyisraeli), which 
coordinated the land purchasing procedures funded by various donors, contributors, 
the JNF, and the actual foundation activities executed by a variety of settling groups. 
These groups were usually part of what was known as The Labour Settlement 
(Hahityashvut Haovedet), an umbrella term that refers to the different national 
movements that promoted a mixture of Zionist and socialist values and advocated for 
pioneer rural settlements.89
The pioneer experience was an integral part of the land redemption efforts (fig 2.1-
2.2). The new settlements were supposed to enlarge the area populated by Jews, 
while promoting the formation of a healthy and idealistic society. ‘Conquering the 
labour’ (kibush haavoda) and ‘conquering the wilderness’ (kibush hashmama) were 
thus complementary terms, as the physical cultivation of the land would eventually 
complete the rebirth of the Jewish nation in its historic homeland.90 The Halutz, 
the pioneer, was perceived as an adventurous, firm and ideological character that 
is involved in conquering the wilderness through its cultivation and by establishing 
new rural settlements. The image of the Halutz turned into the ideal prototype of 
Labour and Practical Zionism; a contra to the anti-Semitic image of Jews as a nation 
of wandering and deformed moneylenders and merchants.91 Settling the frontier was 
thus an act of Hagshama, fulfilment, where one fulfils one’s individual calling, as part 
of the greater national mission.92
88 Troen, ‘Frontier Myths and Their Applications in America and Israel: A Transnational Perspective’, 
1209–30.
89 Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics; Douer, Our Sickle 
is Our Sword.
90 Kemp, ‘The Frontier Idiom on Borders and Territorial Politics in Post-1967 Israel’, 80.
91 Troen, ‘Frontier Myths and Their Applications in America and Israel: A Transnational Perspective’; 
Neuman, Land and Desire in Early Zionism; Almog, The Sabre - a Profile.
92 Kemp, ‘The Frontier Idiom on Borders and Territorial Politics in Post-1967 Israel’, 81.
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FIG. 2.1 Lands owned by the JNF in the Jezreel 
valley, 1930 (Central Zionist Archive)
FIG. 2.2 NF fundraising poster to purchase land in 
the Jezreel Valley, 1925. (Central Zionist Archive). In 
red are lands “redeemed” and in green are lands to 
be “redeemed”
The pioneer rural settlement in these years followed their settling group’s level of 
communality and agricultural considerations. The kibbutzim, being a communal 
agrarian settlement, consisted of a hierarchical layout that emphasised its collective 
nature while limiting the role of the individual. Correspondingly, they were made out 
of a shared public core that contained the dining hall and all other public functions, 
surrounded by a ring of communal dwelling units. On the edge of the kibbutz, one 
could find the shared industrial and agrarian functions. On the other hand, the less 
communal moshavim, consisted of a more balanced relation between the collective 
and private spheres. Accordingly, they were based on a public core, surrounded in 
this case, by single-family detached houses and their private farmlands. Nahalal, 
for example, designed by architect Richard Kaufman, forms an architype of the 
Moshavim, presenting an almost perfect arrangement of a collective entity made out 
of private units. The Moshav Shitufi, was a hybrid prototype, somewhere between the 
communal kibbutz and the more individualistic Moshav. It consisted of system private 
households with a communal ownership of the means of production. Consequently, 
the layout of a the Moshav Shitufi, limited the private sphere to the individual family 
house, while highlighting the shared public areas for farming, labour, and education 
(fig 2.3).93
93 Sharon, Physical Planning in Israel; Chyutin and Chyutin, Architecture and Utopia: Kibbutz and Moshav.
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FIG. 2.3 A kibbutz; a moshav (Nahalal); a Moshav Shitufi. İllustrated by Arieh Sharon, 1951. Arieh Sharon 
Archives. Note the spatial arrangement according to the level of communal living
Whether as a kibbutz or moshav, the various rural settlements were the leading 
territorial tool in the pre-statehood years. Though differing in their layout and 
architecture, all these settlements had a leading joint concept - the alliance between 
agriculture and land redemption. Through rural labour, the settlers were able to 
physically reclaim the land and to secure its control while fulfilling their pioneer 
aspirations. This combination of agricultural and defence could be seen in the logo 
of the Palmach brigades, a sword and wheat crops, which formed the executer and 
ideological backbone of the Labour Settlement before 1948. This is also evident in 
the logo of its ideological successor, the Nahal,94 which consists of a sword, a sickle 
and wheat crops as well (fig 2.4). It is possible to understand this combination of 
agriculture and defence as a tactic of cultivate and rule.
FIG. 2.4 Palmach logo (left); 
Nahal logo (right), both depicting 
a sword and wheat crops to 
symbolize the connection 
between agriculture, land and 
defence. IDF official website. 
(idf.il)
94 Nahal, is an acronym for Noar Halutzi Lohem, literally meaning: Pioneer combatant youth: A military unit 
that took several national missions, among them the establishment of new small-scale settlements.
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 2.4 The Internal Frontiers: from pioneers 
and proletariats to shareholders
The 1948 Arab-Israeli War significantly altered the demographic and territorial 
balance in the area. In November 1947 the UN assembly agreed on the Partition Plan 
of Mandatory Palestine. The plan followed the ethnic land ownership and designated 
most of the Jewish owned land to be part of the future Jewish state, and the Arab 
owned land as part of the future Arab state (fig 2.5). The partition plan ignited a 
series of skirmishes between local Arab and Jewish militias, which in May 1948, 
with the end of the British Mandate and the declaration of the establishment of the 
state of Israel, escalated into a full-scale war between the young Jewish state and 
its Arab neighbours.95 In 1949, with the end of the war, the Jewish state was larger 
than that proposed in the UN Partition Plan, as it included several Arab areas, as 
well as around 600 depopulated Arab villages and towns that were vacated by their 
700,000 inhabitants, who fled or were deported to neighbouring states.96
FIG. 2.5 Land ownership in 
Mandatory Palestine according to 
ethnic group, the 1947 Partition 
Plan and the eventual border 
of the State of Israel in 1949. 
(Illustrated by the author)
95 Morris, The Birth of The Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited; Morris, 1948: A History of the First Arab-
Israeli War.
96 Ibid
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The official Israeli policy was to prevent the Arab Palestinian refugees from returning 
to their homes.97 To preserve this situation, the construction of new settlements on 
formerly Arab land, which became state-owned land, began immediately after the 
war.98 These areas, that were either unsettled by Jewish Israelis or predominantly 
populated by Arabs, became the state internal frontiers, where the government 
continued the mechanism of settle and rule. Settling was now not only an act of 
physical control, but also of consciousness and narrative, as the Israeli Government 
asked to rinse the area of its Arab Palestinian heritage through the construction of 
new localities.99
The ethnocentricity of the nation-building process was highly apparent in the 
management of state-owned lands. In the eve of the 1948 War, less than 13,5% 
of the future area of the state of Israel was under Jewish ownership. After mass 
confiscations, more than 90% of the area became state-owned; of which the state 
sold some 15% to the JNF that incorporated them into its pool of Admot Leom. In 
1960 the state established the Israel Land Administration (ILA), a body in charge 
of managing all state-owned lands in Israel, including those of the JNF. The treaty 
between the JNF and the Israeli Government granted the former half of the seats in 
the executive council of the ILA, while stating the state’s obligation to “support the 
JNF in fulling its goal to redeem the wastelands”.100 Thus, officially turning the state-
owned lands into an ethno-national resource (fig. 2.6).
97 Morris, The Birth of The Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited.
98 Benvenisti, Sacred Landscape; Khalidi, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and 
Depopulated by Israel in 1948; Kishk and Bakir, ‘Arab Land and Israeli Policy’, 121–30.
99 Yiftachel, Ethnocracy; Yacobi, ‘Architecture, Orientalism and Identity: The Politics of the Israeli-Built 
Environment’, 94–118; Jabareen and Dbiat, Architecture and orientalism in the country; Rotbard, White City, 
Black City: Architecture and War in Tel Aviv and Jaffa.
100 Abreek-Zubeidat and Ben-Arie, ‘To Be at Home: Spaces of Citizenship in the Community Settlements of 
the Galilee’, 209; Israel, Treaty between the Government of Israel and the JNF, 2.
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FIG. 2.6 The increase in Jewish 
and state-ownership from the 
Pre-War (left) to the Post-
War(right) period. (Illustrated by 
the author)
After acquiring the needed lands, the state focused on securing its power over them. 
Unlike the pre-1948 years, the scale and scope were significantly larger as the new 
Israeli Government had the means of a state to form and spread its ideology over the 
increasing influx of Jewish immigrants that doubled the local population in several 
years (fig 2.7). Therefore, the former settling practices, which were sporadic and 
quite tactical, were replaced by a governmental-controlled strategy that harnessed 
the development of the state’s industry and infrastructure. Thus, the Israeli nation-
building process, like the pre-state efforts, had both spiritual and physical aspects 
as well, with the newly developed settlements providing shelter and housing 
opportunities; promoting socialisation and territorial control.101
The settlement mechanism corresponded with the concerns of the young state and 
its quasi-socialist Mapai government.102 These issues included the transformation 
of an amalgam of Jewish immigrant communities into one unified society, providing 
them with proper housing solutions, establishing a national industry, and securing 
the state’s new borders. The new strategic plan for the young state called for a 
hierarchical system of development towns and focused on industry and infrastructure 
that were meant to disperse the local population, secure the borders and strengthen 
the state’s control over its territory. While earlier the pioneer experience formed an 
educational role model, now, as a state, the Israeli establishment was able to use 
its various apparatus, like housing, in order to create a bond with its citizens and 
101 Yiftachel and Kader, ‘Landed power: the making of the Israeli land regime’, 67–103; Allweil, Homeland: 
Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011, 1–28.
102 I prefer referring to The Israeli socialism as quasi-socialism, or semi-Keynesian, as the state welfare 
system was highly selective; especially to the local Arab population, which though being citizens of the state, 
were under martial law until 1966.
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to form a nation.103 In this sense, Israel’s actions resembled the Fordist-Keynesian 
welfare-state model,104 which provided the individual with a variety of social services 
in exchange for his/her labour and civil obedience, tying his/her personal interests 
to that of the state and its industry.105 Housing, as claimed by Peter Marcuse in 
his critique on the post-war welfare system, was a seemingly benevolent act that 
tightened the dependence of the individual to the state, and actually helped the latter 
in controlling the first.106 Thus, forming an integral part of the state’s disciplinary 
institution.107 Corresponding with Marcuse’s claims, the modernistic Israeli industrial 
towns of the early statehood years, were a governance tool, intended to construct 
and shape a new form of collective belonging.108 Appropriately, granting the newly 
coming Jewish immigrants the power to inhabit certain places while securing the 
state’s power over them and continuing the national territorial mission. Or in other 
words, industrialise and rule.
FIG. 2.7 Population in Israel 
1948-1953
The young state’s strategic plan, composed by Arieh Sharon,109 continued the pre-
war Zionist policy of securing territorial ownership by settlement. Based on Walter 
Christaller’s Central Places Theory of the 1930s,110 Sharon suggested dispersing 
103 Allweil, Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011, 6–7.
104 Filc, Hegemony and Populism in Israel.
105 Adorno, The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture; Lefebvre, Writings on Cities; Marcuse, 
One-Dimensional Man.
106 Marcuse, ‘Housing Policy and the Myth of the Benevolent State’, 21–26.
107 Foucault, Discipline and Punish.
108 Holston, The Modernist City: An Anthropological Critique of Brasilia; Yacobi, Constructing a Sense of 
Place: Architecture and the Zionist Discourse.
109 Architect Arieh Sharon (1900-1984). Not to confuse with Ariel Sharon (1928-2014), general, minister 
and later prime minister.
110 Efrat and Dash, The Israel Physical Master Plan; Trezib, Die Theorie der zentralen Orte in Israel und 
Deutschland: Zur Rezeption Walter Christallers im Kontext von Sharonplan und ‘Generalplan Ost’.
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the Israeli population, from the heavily populated coastal plain into a hierarchical 
system of new industrial towns that expanded into the country’s periphery (fig 2.8). 
This national decentralisation of the [Jewish] population was, according to Sharon 
“imperative for national and defence standpoints”,111 thus preserving the results 
of the 1948 war by urban development. Michel Foucault, in his analyses of power 
relations, stated that: “Politics is the continuation of war by other means”,112 
inverting the famous quote of Prussian general Carl von Clausewitz. In the Israeli 
case, though the violent aspect of the 1948 war ended in the 1949 Armistice 
Agreement, it continued through the state’s territorial policy, which focused on 
securing its geographical dominance by the construction of new settlements and 
dispersing the Jewish population into the state’s periphery and internal frontiers.
FIG. 2.8 “Planning or laissez faire” - Sharon’s Plan for national 
decentralisation and population dispersal from the coastal plain to the 
periphery and internal frontiers. 1951. (Arieh Sharon Archive)
Sharon’s plan was based on a coalition between the state’s industrial needs and its 
political interest. In the introduction to the 1951 masterplan he stated that: “The 
physical planning of a country must be based on economic, social, and defence 
considerations”.113 Sharon claimed that the new industrial towns would secure 
the country’s geographical frontiers, while enabling the development of the state’s 
111 Sharon, Physical Planning in Israel, 5.
112 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 15.
113 Sharon, Physical Planning in Israel, 9.
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industry, which would be much more productive due to the low operation costs in the 
periphery.114 Therefore, on the one hand, the new state-owned lands, seized in the 
1948 war, functioned as a platform for the principals to develop a dispersed urban 
system. On the other hand, it functioned also as an objective, to be secured by this 
new system, as the construction of new towns in peripheral areas was intended to 
safeguard the new Israeli borders and to ensure the state’s control over the ex-Arab 
lands. Sharon claimed that these new towns would provide the proper habitation, 
education and employment to the Jewish immigrants and would therefore “expedite 
their integration into one organic and productive unit”.115
This corresponded with semi-Keynesian-Fordist welfare-state approach of the 
contemporary local ideology. In its first decades, the state of Israel asked to provide 
its citizens with the basic needs of habitation and employment, while promoting 
a new unified Israeli identity.116 On the strategic level, Sharon asked to create 
24 planning regions, each containing a population of 75-12,000, which would 
decentralise the local Jewish population, enhance the state’s territorial control while 
developing a balanced industry and proper housing opportunities. Each region would 
include a medium-sized industrial town, which would function as a regional hub and 
as a civil centre. In the centralised Israeli economy of the 1950s and 1960s, the 
state was not only in charge of the planning process, but acted also as the initiator, 
financier, and constructer of these new towns. Accordingly, the massive state-led 
construction of new industrial towns in the Israeli periphery became known as the 
Israeli Project.117 Consequently, their spatial characteristics followed the state’s 
ideology, promoting homogeneous and uniform residential environments that 
emphasised the role of the individual as an integral part of the collective national 
organism. Subsequently, they consisted of a top-down hierarchical plan that relied 
on single-use zoning and a series of reproduced residential estates. The use of 
separated residential and industrial areas did not only correlate with the state’s 
desire for homogeneity, but also with its aspiration to simultaneously appropriate 
and ignore the remains of depopulated Palestinian towns; settling the areas 
surrounding their remnants while leaving them to decay (fig 2.9).
114 Ibid
115 Physical Planning in Israel, 4.
116 Kimmerling, The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony; Filc, Hegemony and Populism in Israel.
117 Efrat, The Object of Zionism: The Architecture of Israel.
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FIG. 2.9 Models for new industrial towns illustrated by Arieh Sharon - Beer Sheva; Ashkelon; Kiryat Shmona. 
1951, (Arieh Sharon Archives). Note, in brown are the remains of depopulated Palestinian settlements.
Being part of a large state-led project, the construction of new residential 
neighbourhoods and development towns was controlled by the governmental 
ministries. Initially, it was the Planning Directorate in the Ministry of Labour and 
Construction and the Housing Directorate that guided the development of new 
residential environments during the 1950s.118 With the growing need to coordinate 
and concentrate the national development of dwelling units, the Israeli Government 
established the Ministry of Housing in 1961.119 Though the new ministry did not have 
additional responsibilities compared to the former directorate, its establishment 
points out the key role dwelling units played in the young state. As an outcome 
of a massive state-concentrated effort, the dozens of industrial development 
towns promoted by the Housing Directorate and later the Ministry of Housing, are 
considered to be one of the most controversial episodes in Israeli history.120 They 
were forcibly populated, mostly by underprivileged Mizrahi immigrants,121 and as 
the attempt to industrialise the periphery failed, the term development town turned 
into a synonym for urban failure, discrimination, and neglect.122 In this sense, the 
participation in the national territorial project was based on the lack of spatial 
privileges that settled non-hegemonic Jewish groups in anonymous, alienating 
118 Shadar, The Foundations of Public Housing, 14–15.
119 Shadar, 76.
120 Cohen, ‘Problems of Development Towns and Urban Housing Quarters’, 117–25; El-hanani, ‘Feelings of 
Ethnic Discrimination in two Development Towns’, 97–99.
121 Jews originated from Arab or Islamic countries
122 Efrat, ‘New Development Towns of Israel (1948-93); Shenhav, The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of 
Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity.
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and reproduced housing estates in the state’s periphery. With the economically 
liberalising society of the early 1970s and the shifting focus on self-expression and 
self-fulfilment the industrialise and rule policy promoted through the 1950s and 
1960 was replaced by a new one, which focused on living standards and private 
initiative. This initially began as an attempt to prevent negative immigration from 
development towns by providing better dwelling opportunities locally, consisting of a 
detached private household, and later developed as a model for new settlements.123
While the main focus turned towards industrial towns, the agrarian effort was not 
entirely forsaken. In the early 1950s, the state initiated a series of kibbutzim and 
moshavim in frontier areas and on previously Arab owned land, mainly adjacent to 
the newly established borders with Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. The establishment 
of the military Nahal corps, under the direct orders of prime-minster Ben Gurion, 
played a key role in these efforts.124 In the first three decades up to 1978, Nahal 
soldiers took a significantly active part and led the construction of almost 150 
new settlements. This was carried out in concentrated operations resembling the 
pre-state Tower and Wall settlements, such as in the case of the Frontier Fortresses 
Plan and Operation SUS (sof-sof – literally meaning “finally”) of 1960. These border 
settlements were first established by a Gari’in (core group), made out of Nahal 
soldiers, which was in charge of the first preparation stages. After a given period, 
they were handed to a civilian settling group, in what became to be known as a 
civilising or naturalisation ceremony. Turning fully civilian, the new settlement would 
develop according to the new group’s ideology: A kibbutz in the case of a socialist 
group, and a fully private moshav in more liberal cases (or a hybrid form that had 
both communal and private features). Alongside the Nahal led efforts, several new 
rural settlements were built through other national agencies, which included the JNF, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and the World Zionist Organisation.125
By the early 1970s, Israeli society would go through significant social and cultural 
changes. In the late 1960s the Israeli economy entered a process of liberalisation 
and privatisation, which accelerated in 1977 with the election of the first liberal-
oriented right-wing government. In this process, the state sold several key national 
enterprises and services to the private market.126 As a result, the national mission of 
123 Berger, Autotopia: Suburban In-between Space in Israel; Hatuka et al., Neighborhood-State.
124 Douer, Our Sickle is Our Sword.
125 Abreek-Zubeidat and Ben-Arie, ‘To Be at Home: Spaces of Citizenship in the Community Settlements of 
the Galilee’.
126 Hason, Three decades of privatisation; Filc, Hegemony and Populism in Israel.
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developing and settling was privatised as well, and the local built environment began 
being influenced not only by national considerations such as ideology, identity, 
security, and sovereignty, but also by economic and personal ones. Accordingly, in 
the liberalising Israel, the old ideology of Labour or Socialist Zionism that sought to 
promote the renaissance of the Jewish nation in its historic homeland by physically 
returning to it and cultivating it was less relevant.127
At the same time, the national mission to continue constructing new settlements was 
not abandoned. In a way, it even intensified with the occupation of the West-Bank 
in 1967 and the political turnover of 1977. The economic changes that followed 
were realised in many aspects of the Israeli culture and society.128 Accordingly, the 
Ministry of Housing, turned into the Ministry of Construction and Housing in 1978, 
as the emphasis began shifting from state-led construction, to state sponsored 
private development.129 Correspondingly, the national mission of frontier settlement 
changed as well, and while in the early statehood days the pioneer spirit formed 
the main driving force behind frontier settlements, in the liberalising Israel this act 
was no longer merely an ideological deed, but one that is also based on individual 
and economic interests.130 Consequently, the national focus on creating a unified 
society gave way to the individual chase for “quality of life” in ex-urban and 
suburban contexts, which became an integral feature in the construction of new 
settlements.131 New settlements, offering larger houses in small communities in a 
communing distance from the main city centres became the main logic behind the 
national territorial project;132 a strategy of suburbanise and rule, where the national 
Hagshama (fulfilment) was tied to Hagshama Atzmit (self-fulfilment); based on the 
state granting members of favoured groups the spatial privilege to consume space.
127 Kimmerling, The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony.
128 Ram, ‘Glocommodification: How the Global Consumes the Local – McDonald’s in Israel’; Ram, The 
Globalization of Israel; Segev, Elvis in Jerusalem: Post-Zionism and the Americanization of Israel.
129 Shadar, The Foundations of Public Housing, 164.
130 Allegra, ‘The Politics of Suburbia: Israel’s Settlement Policy and the Production of Space in the 
Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem’, 497–520; Newman, ‘Settlement as Suburbanization: The Banality of 
Colonization’; Gutwein, ‘The Settlements and the Relationship between Privatization and the Occupation’.
131 Billig, ‘The Jewish Settlements in Judea and Samaria (1967–2008): Historical Overview’, 331–47.
132 Allegra, ‘The Politics of Suburbia: Israel’s Settlement Policy and the Production of Space in the 
Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem’, 497–510; Allegra, ‘“Outside Jerusalem—yet so Near”: Ma’ale Adumim, 
Jerusalem, and the Suburbanization of Israel’s Settlement Policy’, 48–63.
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The decline of the Israeli welfare-state was parallel to the decline of the global one. 
This eventually brought to the rise of post-modernism, neoliberalism and market 
economy.133 Consequently, the former welfare system went through a process 
of privatisation, where key social services began being supplied by corporations 
instead of the state. Liberalising the welfare system meant that the state privatised 
its disciplinary institutions, such as the built environment; thus, altering the interests 
that shaped it. With the new metropolitan-based local-decentralisation efforts of 
the 1980-90s, which changed the former national distribution strategy,134 the state 
began attaching the national development process to the rationale of the market. 
Thus, increasing the involvement of private capital in the settlement mechanism, 
which increased the commodification of the produced residential environments.135 
The only way the individual was able to participate in this process was by investing 
from her/his private funds; literally buying a “piece of capitalism” while concluding in 
the “financialisation of the everyday life”.136
While the early privatised settlement efforts focused on attracting families by 
promising better living standards, later ones included a growing reliance on large-
scale private corporations. Therefore, with the state granting private developers the 
spatial privilege to produce space, the settlement mechanism transformed into a 
real estate project. Subjected to the financial logic of the market, a house in a new 
settlement turned into an investment, its development was based on speculations, 
and its owner became a shareholder in the national territorial mission of financialise 
and rule. Therefore, in each phase, the state used a different mechanism to enforce 
its interests on the individual; whether by forcing him/her to move to the periphery, 
seducing her/him by the suburban lifestyle, or by incorporating the territorial project 
into to existing social structure, as an integral part of the market economy.137
The geopolitical role of the built environment received an official status with the 
approval of the controversial Nation-State Bill Law by the Israeli parliament in July 
19th of 2018. Among the 11 clauses of this law, which has constitutional status 
and defines Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, a special paragraph 
is designated to the issue of Jewish settlement, stating that: “The state views the 
133 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity; Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism.
134 Shachar, ‘Reshaping the Map of Israel: A New National Planning Doctrine’, 209–18.
135 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism.
136 Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years, 367.
137 Dovey, Framing Place. Mediating Power in Built Form, 3.
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development of Jewish settlement as a national value and will act to encourage and 
promote its establishment and consolidation”.138 By mentioning Jewish settlement as 
a national interest, this bill proves that the strategy of settle and rule did not cease, 
and still constitutes a leading ideological principle. Continuing along the different 
periods, from the pre-statehood efforts, through the nation-building decades of the 
1950s and 60s, to the current neoliberal years of the early 2000s, the settle and 
rule ideology evolved and changed according to the societal, political and economic 
transitions (fig 2.10). Focusing on the settlements along the Green-Line, which 
witnessed a growing involvement of private capital, this thesis aims to explain how 
this gradual privatisation of the settlement mechanism developed over the years and 
how this transformed the local built environment.
FIG. 2.10 The evolution of Israeli housing typologies according to the different phases in the national 
settlement Project (Illustrated by the author)
138 Knesset of Israel, Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People.
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 2.5 Privatising and Privatisation: 
The Trans‑Israel Highway
Privatisation is a process in which the state transfers its property, responsibility and 
control to private hands. The term is often associated with the sale of government 
companies or public services to private corporations. These include the control of 
natural resources, the development of civil infrastructure and the national industry, 
or even basic welfare services such as education, security, or health. Privatisation is 
basically the liquidation of the post-war Fordist-Keynesian state that controlled the 
development of the economy, securing the individuals employment and providing 
one with the basic welfare services. The logic behind privatisation is that a profit-
driven private entity would be able to provide the same services as the state, 
yet better and more efficiently, and most importantly, without ‘spending’ public 
money’.139 With the challenges of the 1970s, which were characterised by monetary 
recession and wide national debts, privatisation turned into the common economic 
perspective of the industrialised western world; perceived as a means to recover and 
salvage failing financial systems.140 This was the main logic behind the rise of the 
neoliberal agenda, which asked to return to the main concepts of the liberal, pre-war 
economic rationale.
The privatisation of Israel followed similar paths, yet, it had its own unique 
characteristics. David Harvey describes neoliberalism as an attempt of the old 
economic elites to retain their former financial powers by reducing the control of 
the state. In fact, in industrialised western countries, where the economic inequality 
decreased significantly during the 1950s and 1960s, it began to increase during the 
1970s once again.141 In Israel, which was a young quasi-socialist country, with an 
economic system that was heavily controlled by the state, it is quite hard to speak 
of an old economic elite asking to retain its power. Moreover, as a country based 
on an ethnic-oriented nationalism, and ruled by a certain hegemonic group, Israeli 
was a semi or quasi-welfare-state. The Arab population, which was under martial 
rule until 1966, and the Mizrahi sector, received far from similar conditions such as 
139 Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years; Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity.
140 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism.
141 Harvey, 15–19.
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the privileged Ashkenazi sector that was affiliated with the ruling Mapai party and 
Labour Zionism.142
The first privatisation measures that took place during the 1960s stimulated the 
formation of a local middle-class. This group consisted of liberalising members of 
the Labour Zionism hegemony and other urban while-collar families; an evidence to 
that is the foundation of the Israeli Liberal Party in 1961.143 These would later join 
forces with marginalised right-wing Revisionist Zionists and large segments of the 
Mizrahi sector, creating the Likud party and eventually overthrowing the socialist 
Mapai regime in 1977. Promoting a liberal economic agenda was thus both an anti-
establishment act, protesting against the discriminating Mapai protectionism, and an 
attempt to support the interests of the emerging middle-class.144 At the same time, 
as the state-controlled market and industry was of an ethno-national nature, its 
privatisation followed a similar path.
1977 was a crucial year in the privatisation of Israel. Under the new government of 
Menachem Begin, the process, which was already underway, significantly intensified 
as further and more crucial steps were made to finally free the market from Ben 
Gurion’s “Bolshevism”.145 Subsequently, the Israeli economy underwent a cordial 
inflation in the early 1980s, which led to a stock crash and the bankruptcy of the 
Labour’s union and later the Kibbutzim Movement (the two main Mapai institutions). 
The varied consequences of that time concluded in the loss of union power, further 
privatisation and a devaluation in the expedience and profitability of agriculture.146 
According to Gutwein, the hegemony of the socialist Ashkenazi sector fully 
cooperated with the post-1977 privatisation measures in order to retain its power by 
turning its privileges into financial capital.147 Gutwein highlights the 1985 Economic 
Stabilisation Plan. According to him, the fact that it was promoted and approved by 
the national coalition headed by Prime Minister Shimon Peres from the Labour Party 
and concluded in significant cuts in government expenditures and privatization of 
many government-owned businesses, provides a clear proof to this collaboration. 
142 Kimmerling, The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony, 21–29; Shenhav, The Arab Jews: A Postcolonial Reading of 
Nationalism, Religion, and Ethnicity, 136–84.
143 Gutwein, ‘The class logic of the “long revolution”, 1973-1977’, 21–57.
144 Filc, Hegemony and Populism in Israel.
145 Segev, Elvis in Jerusalem: Post-Zionism and the Americanization of Israel, 49.
146 Hason, Three decades of privatisation.
147 Gutwein, ‘The class logic of the “long revolution”, 1973-1977’.
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Thus, if 1977 accelerated the process of privatisation, 1985 turned into a point of no 
return where the neo-liberal agenda became the obvious way ‘things are done’.148
Transforming from state-controlled and ethnic-based socialism into a market-
oriented economy, retained the existing social structures. In most cases, the transfer 
of governmental and public-owned companies to private hands was done to a limited 
number of emerging businessmen. Due to their political connections these well-
connected entrepreneurs were able to receive extremely favourable conditions, which 
allowed them to purchase the public companies way below their market value. This 
eventually transformed the state market concentration into a private one, where in 
a short period of time a limited number of new tycoons were able to take over the 
local market.149 Moreover, besides the fact of previously being quasi-socialist, Israel 
is still an ethnic-based society. Subsequently, the privatisation of the local economy 
was accompanied by the creation of a series of ‘ethno-classes’ that are meant 
to retain the ethnic segregation by widening socioeconomic gaps. Yiftachel and 
Avni refer to this process as Privati-nation, as it consists of selective privatisation, 
meant to economically empower a specific ethnic group, and thus enhance its social 
dominance.150 Correspondingly, Yacobi and Tzfadia highlighted the same “Selective 
Privatisation” as a means to attract privileged groups to frontier areas by promising 
them exclusive spatial rights; promoting the states control while creating their own 
ethnically secluded communities.151 Consequently, the forces of the market that 
are supposedly colour-blind turned into a tool used to prevent social and ethnic 
integration, promoting spatial privileges as a means to ensure geopolitical and 
demographic dominance.
The Trans-Israel Highway is perhaps one of the best examples to the local 
privatisation mechanism. The highway, which began operating in 2002, is one of the 
largest infrastructure projects in the history of the state of Israel, and the first to be 
developed and operated by private means. The first ideas of such a highway, which 
would constitute an eastern parallel to the coastal routs, emerged already in the late 
1960s.152 The National Outline Plan 3 (NOP) mentioned a minimised version of the 
148 Rabinowitz and Vardi, Driving Forces: Trans-Israel Highway and the privatization of Civil Infrastructures 
in Israel, 15.
149 Ibid
150 Yiftachel and Avni, ‘Privati-nation’– Privatization, Nationalization, Housing and Gaps’, 225.
151 Yacobi and Tzfadia, ‘Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and 
Nationalization in Israel’, 2.
152 Efrat, ‘Israel’s Planned New “Crossing Highway”’.
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current route already in 1976, however, concrete planning did not begin before the 
late 1980s. With the construction boom that followed the immigration waves of the 
early 1990s, the Public Works Department (PWD – Maatz) resurfaced the idea and 
turned it into a 300km road connecting Beer Sheva in the south and Yokneam in 
the North (fig 2.11). In 1991 Netivei Israel - the National Transport Infrastructure 
Company Ltd, conducted a feasibility study that showed an urgent necessity to 
construct the road, which led to the establishment of the Trans-Israel Road ltd, a 
governmental company meant to promote and manage the construction of the new 
highway.153 The company conducted several additional analyses, which pointed out 
the feasibility and economic potential of such a road. Though the studies ignored 
other possibilities like developing the national train system and used selective data 
to support the car-oriented approach,154 the Israeli Government and all the relevant 
offices all supported the construction of the new road. This decision was backed 
by the main political parties, and while the hawkish right-wing factors saw it as 
a possibility to strengthen the Jewish settlement along the Green-Line, the more 
dovish factors pictured it as a utopian road of peace, which would one day connect 
Egypt and Lebanon through Israel.155
FIG. 2.11 Proposed rout of the Trans-Israel 
Highway, 1992. (Garb, 2004)
153 Trans-Israel ltd, ‘Transisrael’.
154 Garb, ‘Constructing the Trans-Israel Highway’s Inevitability’, 180–217.
155 Azrayahu, ‘Rabin’s Road: The Politics of Toponymic Commemoration of Yitzhak Rabin in Israel’, 73–82.
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The Trans-Israel Road ltd encouraged the construction of the highway by private 
capital. The Israeli Government, headed by Yitzhak Rabin’s Labour Party, promoted 
the proposal to fund the construction process by extra-budgetary sources, with a 
private corporation funding, paving, and operating the freeway as a toll road - for 
a 30-year franchise (a BOT format- Built, Operate, Transfer). This decision was 
undisputed by almost all sides of the political spectrum and shortly after approving 
the construction of the road in 1994, the Israeli parliament approved the toll road 
option as well.156 The rationale behind the decision was that an experienced private 
corporation would have better managerial skills and planning competencies that 
would lead to quicker, more efficient, and professional execution. Moreover, the 
privatisation of the process was justified due to the profit-minded risk management, 
which would lead to relatively low toll prices.157 However, as shown by Rabinowitz 
and Vardi, the governmental guarantees given to the private franchisees promised 
significant subsidies in case of low usage, preventing major losses, and insignificant 
dividends in case of over usage, ensuring major profits. Moreover, they also showed 
how the government repeatedly supported the rise in toll prices, leading to rates that 
are significantly higher than in comparable examples elsewhere.158 Thus, the profit 
was privatised, but the risk remained public.
The franchisee of the Trans-Israel Highway was a private congregate named Derech 
Eretz that enjoyed significant support from the state. It started when Canadian 
Highways International Corporation (CHIC) was interested in competing in the 
national tender for the highway. Looking for a local partner they first turned to 
Bank Leumi. The bank, which at that time was nationalised with all other banks 
following the local banking crisis of the 1980s, directed CHIC to Africa-Israel ltd, 
a construction and holding company owned by it. Africa-Israel had almost no 
knowledge and experience in infrastructure, yet, it was interested in the project 
due to its recently acquired sub-companies of Packer Steel and Alon energy. 
Africa-Israel saw the economic potential in the construction materials that Packer 
Steel would provide for the project and the filling stations that Alon would build 
along it. Moreover, as a real estate company, the development of the area created 
new potential investments for Africa-Israel. For CHIC, the partnership with 
inexperienced Africa-Israel promised the needed contacts and connections with 
the local authorities. In 1996, as part of the privatisation efforts, the state would 
156 Garb, ‘Constructing the Trans-Israel Highway’s Inevitability’.
157 Trans-Israel ltd, ‘Transisrael’.
158 Rabinowitz and Vardi, Driving Forces: Trans-Israel Highway and the privatization of Civil Infrastructures 
in Israel.
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sell its shares in Bank Leumi to Lev Leviev, an Israeli-Uzbek businessman and 
diamond trader, who would also become the owner of Africa-Israel. In 1998, the 
third partner in Derech Eretz, the French Société Générale would sell its shares to 
the Israeli Shikun U’Binui ltd. Shikun U’Binui was a construction company owned by 
the Histadrut, the decades-old central workers’ union, which due to its economic 
recovery measures in 1995 had to sell its shares to Ted Arison, an Israeli-American 
businessman. Arison, had already purchased the previously nationalised Bank 
Hapoalim in 1997, one of the main banks in Israel, which was the one that gave 
Derech Eretz the credit to build the highway that same year; a deal which was done 
only after a clear governmental guarantee that would lower the risks taken by 
the franchisees once again.159 The soap opera behind Highway 6 thus presents a 
national infrastructure project, constructed by privatised construction companies 
that were owned by the same conglomerates as the banks that funded the process, 
yet all backed by the government and public funds.
The state-backed private congregate was eventually able to minimise all opposition 
to the project. The main objections were from environmentalists and landowners 
whose lands were confiscated for the construction of the road. The landowners 
were mainly Arab and Jewish farmers, yet while the Jewish farmers, enjoyed a tough 
political lobby and a unified representation, the Arab farmers were divided and 
poorly represented. In order to appease the Jewish farmers, the state promised 
them to promote new commercial centres and industrial parks on land parcels 
owned by them on the roads leading to the new highway. Moreover, the Kibbutzim 
Movement, which still owned shares in Alon Energy, a filling stations that is part of 
the Africa-Israel concern, was interested in the future joint real estate projects that 
both companies could promote. The negotiations with the Arab farmers were done 
mainly individually, with the majority of them preferring to receive alternative farming 
parcels. Eventually, the new commercial and industrial compounds that the state 
promoted in the area contributed mainly to the Jewish localities along the roads, 
while the alternative lands the Arab farmers received were in a worse state than the 
ones they previously owned. Thus, the privately built Trans-Israel Highway actively 
enhanced the existing ethno-economic stratification. Similarly, the battle against the 
environmentalists was mainly a PR campaign, and Derech Eretz used its connections 
to recruit key figures and decisions makers while conducting an aggressive 
greenwashing campaign that portrayed those against the highway as irrelevant, 
privileged, and marginal organisations that prevent the development of Israel.160
159 Ibid
160 Ibid
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This entangled story of the Trans-Israel Highway turns it into an ideal example of 
the post-socialist and ethno-nationalist Israel neoliberalism. From its first years, the 
governmental Netivei Israel company was headed by Moshe Levi. Levi, the former IDF 
Chief of Staff, was a highly decorated and well-respected general. He was regarded 
as an honest, trustworthy and authentic officer, whose height and Mizrahi origin 
added to his public persona. Already his appointment as the head of the Israeli 
military was an attempt to cleanse it from the controversies of the Lebanon War 
of 1982. Selecting Levi as the CEO of Netivei Israel gave the project the aura of an 
undisputed national and patriotic mission; an aura that continued to function as 
Netivei Israel promoted the interests of the private franchisees building the highway. 
Therefore, Levi’s transformation from a promising young officer, to Chief of Staff and 
then into a patriotic mask for a privatised project, illustrates the Israeli version of 
neoliberalism (fig 2.12).
FIG. 2.12 Levi’s transition from a promising cadet receiving his ranks from Prime-Minister and Minister of 
Defence David Ben Gurion in 1955; to chief of staff with Prime Minister Peres in 1986; to the middleman 
between Lev Leviev (left) and Minister of Infrastructure Ariel Sharon in 1998 (Governmental Press Office- 
GPO)
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 2.6 The evolving domestication of the 
eastern frontier
The border area between the Israeli coastal plain with the occupied West-Bank went 
through major transformations in the past eight decades. Before the 1948 war, 
the area had limited Jewish presence and it consisted mainly of Arab Palestinian 
towns and villages and their farmlands. After the war, the area was depopulated 
of its Arab Palestinian inhabitants and the 1949 Armistice Agreements shaped the 
new international border, creating a divide between the new state of Israel and the 
Kingdom of Jordan (fig 2.13). This border, which came to be known as the Green-
Line,161 followed the topographical features of the area, leaving the Samarian hills on 
the Jordanian side and their western plains on the Israeli one. As a result, the Israeli 
coastal plain, the Tel Aviv metropolitan area of Gush Dan and its eastern fringes, 
were of a width of almost a mere 15km, which formed the only connector between 
Israel’s northern area and its centre and thus became known as the country’s 
‘narrow waist’.162 During the 1950s, to strengthen its control over this new internal 
frontier, the state promoted the construction of more than 20 new rural settlements 
in the area, on the sites of former Palestinian villages and along the new border 
(fig 2.14).163
While the state did promote a plan to establish new settlements in the area during 
the 1960s, it preferred to develop other internal frontiers. This plan, named “The 
Frontier Fortresses”, was not completely fulfilled and produced an irrelevant number 
of new posts. Though it demonstrates the perception of the area as a neglected, 
vacant, breached and dangerous zone, which needs to be fortified and protected, its 
lack of fulfilment points out the state’s preferences to settle other internal frontiers, 
such as the Galilee and the Negev.164 The strategic perspective of the young state 
focused on a wide national-scale decentralisation effort, and it thus chose to locate 
the newly built development towns far from the heavily populated coastal plain.165 
161 The name derives from the colour of the ink that was used to draw the line upon the map
162 Soffer and Gazit, Between the Sharon and Samaria.
163 Tal, The Frontier Fortresses Plan.
164 Soffer and Gazit, Between the Sharon and Samaria; Tal, The Frontier Fortresses Plan.
165 Efrat, ‘Geographical Distribution of the Soviet-Jewish New Immigrants in Israel’; Efrat, The Object of 
Zionism: The Architecture of Israel.
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As the state preferred to develop other border areas, this part of the Green-Line was 
not frontier-like enough to receive the needed attention for its development, and it 
functioned more as a peripheral border zone.
FIG. 2.13 The Green-Line area in 1949. (Illustrated 
by the author)
FIG. 2.14 New rural settlements along the Green-
Line during the 1950s. (Illustrated by the author)
The occupation of the West-Bank in 1967 changed the status of the Green-Line, 
turning it into an area of national importance. The fact that Israel ruled over both 
sides of the former border, even though the West-Bank was not officially annexed, 
turned the area into a transition territory from the Israeli coastal plain to the 
occupied West-Bank. The new status of the area as a Seam-Zone (Kav HaTefer), 
which simultaneously detaches and connects Israel and the occupied territories, 
turned it into a frontier to be domesticated. Nevertheless, in the first years after the 
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1967 war, the state did not adopt a clear agenda for the development of the area. 
In the plan of Defence Minister Yigal Alon for the future of the occupied territories, 
which was never officially accepted, the areas east of the Green-Line should have 
either returned to Jordanian control or become part of a Palestinian autonomous 
rule;166 whereas Israel would annex the Judean Desert, the Jordan Valley and areas 
around Jerusalem (fig 2.15). Subsequently, the non-official state policy was to avoid 
settling in areas other than those the Alon Plan intended to annex. Therefore, the 
Labour Government of the 1970s initially tried to limit the actions of the religious 
right-wing movement of Gush Emunim that asked to construct Jewish settlement 
all across the West-Bank.167 Even the far reaching “Double Column Plan” (HaShidra 
HaKfula) of 1975, which called for the development of an eastern counterpart to the 
Israeli coastal plain, all along the borders with Jordan and the eastern part of the 
occupied Sinai peninsula, had left the heart of the West-Bank out (fig 2.16).168 This 
approach would change in 1977 with the rise of the first right-wing Likud regime and 
Ariel Sharon’s term as Minister of Agriculture.169
Despite the changing perspective of the new Israeli Government of 1977, the area 
remained relatively undeveloped. The national-religious settlers like the members 
of Gush Emunim, preferred settling in the core of the West-Bank, especially in areas 
with some affiliation to the biblical texts. Their plan was focused on small-scale 
settlements on the Samarian hills (fig 2.17), while the plan of the World Zionist 
Organisation’s Settlement Division and the Israeli Government of 1978 concentrated 
on groups of settlement blocs (fig 2.18). Besides a few new settlement points, the 
Seam-Zone was relatively untouched, and the majority of the new sites developed 
between 1977-1981 had been already authorised by the former Labour Government, 
before the elections of 1977.170 Nonetheless, this would introduce a new settlement 
typology along the Green-Line, the Community Settlement (fig 2.19).
166 Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.
167 Gush Emunim, ‘Proposal for Settlement in Judea and Samaria’.
168 Wachman, ‘The Double Column Plan’.
169 Weizman, ‘Principles of Frontier Geography’; Yiftachel, ‘From Sharon to Sharon: Spatial Planning and 
Separation Regime in Israel/Palestine’, 73–106.
170 Douer, Our Sickle is Our Sword.
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FIG. 2.15 The “Alon Plan”, 1967 
(Tessler, 1994)
FIG. 2.16 The Double Column Plan, 1975. Avraham Wachman. In black 
are the areas for intense Jewish settlement
FIG. 2.17 Gush Emunim Plan, 1977. (Gush Emunim Movement) FIG. 2.18 The World Zionist 
Organisation Plan (‘Drobles’ Plan), 
1978. (WZO)
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FIG. 2.19 New neo-rural settlements along the 
Green-Line area 1977-1981. (Illustrated by 
the author)
The neo-rural or Community Settlements lacked almost all means of production; 
industrial, commercial as well as agricultural. Nevertheless, as their objective was 
not to create a commuter-based community but rather one that is connected to the 
local natural landscape, they were quasi or neo-rural settlements, and much more 
counter-urban than simply suburban. As such, they consisted of a small previously 
organised group, which was usually affiliated to certain settlement movement or 
a political party. The mechanism behind them relied on the state granting these 
selected groups the spatial privilege of exclusively settling a site and by that to 
establish their own homogeneous community away from the urban centres, as a 
means to increase the state presence and control.171 The establishment of these 
171 Yiftachel, ‘Bedouin-Arabs and the Israeli Settler State’, 21–47.
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sites consisted of a pioneer-like phase of temporary houses that eventually turned 
into a permanent settlement. Thus, mimicking pre-statehood frontier settlement 
methods and adopting a frontier-like discourse and lifestyle.172
In the early 1980s, the state’s development perspective became much more 
suburban (fig 2.20). This occurred in light of the changes in the national 
economy and culture, which led to increasing demands for suburban residential 
environment.173 The Settlements Division’s plan of 1981 continued to insist on 
settling the entire West-Bank, yet, it began to incorporate terms as “areas of high 
demand” , “commuting”, “private initiative”, “living standards” and “middle-class 
families”.174 The main assumption of the Settlement Division was that the heart of 
the West-Bank would attract a more ideological population, while the area close 
to the Tel Aviv metropolis and the coastal plain would to attract middle-class and 
upper-middle-class families looking for affordable better living standards.175
At the same time, both the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) and the Ministry of 
Construction and Housing (MCH) began encouraging private-led construction in the 
area, relying on a new set of spatial privileges.176 As stated in an official report of 
the MA, the official policy was that “west Samaria will become a part of Gush Dan”, 
while directing the “Pioneer population” to settle other parts of the West-Bank.177 
The growing private construction in the West-Bank concluded in a public dispute 
between the Minister of Housing David Levi, and the Deputy Minister of Agriculture 
Michael Dekel, regarding the responsibility of directing new privately initiated 
settlements.178 In this dispute, both offices emphasised their role in promoting 
private construction. CEO of the MCH, Asher Wiener, claimed that his office was “a 
pioneer in bringing private developers to build from their own money”, while both the 
MA and the Settlement Division state that the MCH is not using the “demand forces” 
172 Rotbard, ‘Wall and Tower’, 39–58; Kemp, ‘The Frontier Idiom on Borders and Territorial Politics in 
Post-1967 Israel’, 79.
173 Gutwein, ‘The class logic of the “long revolution”, 1973-1977’, 21–57; Allegra, ‘The Politics of Suburbia: 
Israel’s Settlement Policy and the Production of Space in the Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem’, 497–510.
174 Settlement Division, ‘The 100.000 Plan’, 8–20.
175 Ibid
176 Weismann, ‘Private Settlements in Samaria’.
177 Ministry of Agriculture, ‘Renewal of settlement momentum in Judea and Samaria’, 2.
178 Barel, ‘CEO of MH Warns Apartment Buyers in the West Bank’, 1; Maoz, ‘MA and MH agree on cooperation 
in construction in JS’, 1.
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as needed.179 Settling the dispute needed the direct intervention of Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin, and eventually, beside the allocation of sites, the establishment of 
new settlements became a mission of the MCH’s department of rural development; 
leading to a more organised and controlled suburbanisation process that began 
relying on larger and more experienced contractors and developers.
FIG. 2.20 Existing settlements and areas of national importance (grey); Settlement areas according to 
demand areas; needed roads to connect the WB settlements to the coastal plain. 1981, Settlement Division, 
(WZO)
The suburban focus affected the development of the area along the Green-Line. 
Accordingly, during the 1980s, the MA and the MCH promoted the gentrification 
of the area through the construction of ten new Suburban Settlements. Unlike the 
earlier neo-rural examples, these new settlements relied on creating a suburban 
residential environment, with spacious houses and a well-maintained landscape, and 
most important, an easy commute to the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. Not surprisingly, 
the new settling families were far from resembling the allegedly more ideological 
religious settlers of Gush Emunim, and they consisted mainly of city dwellers looking 
to improve their living standards. The new population was characterised as an 
upper-middle-class, more secular and politically left-central leaning, and usually 
179 Wiener, Letter to Michael Dekel, 1; Settlement Division, ‘Population dispersal policy and development of 
Judea and Samaria’, 2.
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not part of the right-wing religious bloc.180 These new Suburban Settlements began 
forming the territorial sequence between the coastal plain and the West-Bank that 
attracted large segments of Israeli society (fig 2.21). The recession of the 1980s and 
the decrease in the national demand for dwelling units prevented this process from 
being even larger.181
FIG. 2.21 New suburban settlements along the 
Green-Line during the 1980s. (Illustrated by the 
author)
180 Portugali, ‘Jewish Settlement in the Occupied Territories Israel Settlement Structure and the 
Palestinians’, 26–53; Benvenisti, Report: Demographic, Economic, Legal, Social, and Political Developments in 
the West Bank; ICBS, ‘Socio-economic index value 2013, cluster of locality’.
181 Razin, ‘Urban Economic Development in a Period of Local Initiative: Competition among Towns in Israel’s 
Southern Coastal Plain’, 685–703.
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The gentrification of the area during the 1980s enabled its mass suburbanisation 
during the 1990s. These years were characterised by the Jewish immigration from 
the Former Soviet Union, which increased the Israeli population by 20% in less than 
ten years, and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that followed the First Intifada of 
the 1980s.182 To increase the national supply of dwelling units, which was needed 
due to the increasing immigration, and to improve its territorial claims in any future 
negotiation by appropriating more lands, the Israeli Government promoted the 
construction of new suburban settlements along the Green-Line. The objective of the 
governmental scheme, known as the “Stars Plan” (fig 2.22-2.23), was to offer middle-
class families affordable suburban housing, which would lead them to evacuate their 
apartments in the Gush Dan area for the use of the newly coming immigrants.183
FIG. 2.22 The “Stars Plan”, 1992. 
(Dunsky Planners)
FIG. 2.23 The suburbanisation of Green-Line area 
during the 1990s. (Illustrated by the author)
182 Efrat, ‘Geographical Distribution of the Soviet-Jewish New Immigrants in Israel’; Tolz, ‘Jewish Emigration 
from the Former USSR since 1970’, 1–27.
183 Nahoum Dunsky Planners, ‘Development of the Hills’ Axis: The Seven Stars Plan’.
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The new Stars Plan of the 1990s completed the suburban turn of the Green-Line and 
finalised its domestication. The plan of 1991 relied on a similar un-executed scheme 
from 1978 named the ‘Hills Axis Plan', prepared by Baruch Kipnis for the MCH and 
even mentioned it in its subtitle.184 However, the 1978 plan spoke of creating an 
alternative urban system that would run parallel to the existing coastal plain all along 
the country, while the new plan asked to extend the coastal plain eastwards, towards 
the Green-Line (fig 2.24-2.25).
FIG. 2.24 Hills Axis Plan, site for new urban 
settlements along the Green-Line, 1978. (Baruch 
Kipnis)
FIG. 2.25 Division into areas and their connection 
to the coastal plain, the Stars Plan, 1992. (Dunsky 
Planners)
184 Kipnis, ‘Potential of Developing Urban Housings along the Hills Axis’.
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The intention to create a suburban ring along the Green-Line was part of the new 
national planning perspective. While during the first statehood decades, the planning 
strategy asked to create a general national decentralisation of population and means 
of production, the approach of the 1990s began favouring a concentrated local 
decentralisation. Both the National Outline Plan 31 (NOP 31) of 1993 and National 
Outline Plan 35 (NOP 35) of 2005 focused on a metropolitan-based approach, which 
asked to tie the national strategy to the rationale of the market. At the same time the 
territorial agenda was not entirely forsaken, and both plans addressed the issue of 
settling frontier areas.185 Therefore as the government asked to connect the ‘areas 
of high demand’ with the ‘areas of national interest’, internal frontier areas like 
the Green-Line that also had an economic potential, became the main focus of the 
national development efforts.186 Consequently, the Green-Line was blurred, and what 
was once considered the country’s frontier, or the Seam-Zone, became an integral 
the Tel Aviv Metropolis (fig 2.27). Moreover, the advanced planning of the new Trans-
Israel Highway during the mid-1990s implicated that this developing area would 
become an essential part of the Israeli core.
FIG. 2.26 The development of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area according the CBS (ICBS, 2008)
185 Shachar, ‘Reshaping the Map of Israel: A New National Planning Doctrine’, 209; Yacobi and Tzfadia, ‘Neo-
Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and Nationalization in Israel’, 17–19.
186 Charney, ‘A “Supertanker” Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning 
in Netanyahu’s Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel’, 1243.
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The development of the area would halt by the early 2000s but regenerate less than 
ten years later. After the construction boom that followed the mass immigration from 
the Former Soviet Union, the Israeli building industry entered a stage of recession, 
caused by an overflow of supply. Subsequently, the construction of new settlements 
and new dwelling units significantly decreased and the MCH decided to freeze some 
of the planned projects along the Green-Line; fearing their economic failure (fig 
2.27). The violent incidents of the Second Intifada which began in 2000 brought an 
initial decline in the interests in the area. The proximity of the Green-Line settlements 
to the ongoing attacks, clashes, and raids in the West-Bank turned them into a 
frontier zone once again.187 At that time, the Ministry of Defence began carrying 
out the construction of the West-Bank Separation Barrier. This land obstacle, which 
consists of 6-meter concrete walls, barbed wires, a patrol road, guarding posts, and 
an elaborated surveillance system did not follow the Green-Line, in the intention 
to leave as many Jewish settlements possible on the ‘Israeli’ side. Thus, expanding 
the metropolitan area of Gush Dan further into the West-Bank. The completion of 
the first segments of the privately developed Trans-Israel Highway during the same 
years, adjacent to the Separation Barrier, retained the status of the area as a safe, 
well connected region, which is far enough from the coastal plain, yet so close.
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FIG. 2.27 Construction of dwelling units in Israel (CBS)
187 Levi-Barzilai, ‘A House with an attached Tank’, 16.
TOC
 80 The  Privatisation  of a National Project
The West-Bank Separation Barrier and the Trans-Israel Highway laid the 
infrastructure and created the needed economic feasibility, yet it was the 2010 
housing crisis that enabled the Israeli Government to use this potential. To address 
the increasing demands for dwelling units the government sought to enlarge the 
overall supply. Nonetheless, as it was not able to do so in the areas of demand inside 
the main metropolitan cities, it tried to expand those areas into the periphery and 
the internal frontiers by tendering state-owned lands to private developers.188 The 
state hoped that the profitable cheap land prices would lead private entrepreneurs 
to produce the needed units in affordable prices, which would eventually attract 
large numbers of Israeli families. By financialising the development process, formerly 
unbuilt or small-scale settlements turned into large-scale housing schemes, and the 
former frontier turned into a real estate project.
Over the past 40 years, the state promoted the construction of more than 30 
new settlements along the Green-Line (fig 2.28). What was once a frontier area, 
that the state sought to domesticate through sporadic moshavim and kibbutzim 
during the 1950-60s, became a site for rural-like settlements in the late 1970s. 
With the growing demand for a suburban lifestyle in the 1980s, the state sought 
to domesticate the area through its gentrification, promoting the construction of 
gated upper-middle-class communities. The gentrification of the 1980s, enabled the 
areas mass suburbanisation during the 1990s, and finally its financialisation during 
the 2000s. With these transformations in the methods of frontier domestication, 
the state relied on different agents to whom it granted varying spatial privileges; 
eventually, leading to the formation of different settlement typologies over the past 
four decades. First were the small rural, or neo rural, Community Settlements of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, which gave way to the first Suburban Settlements of the 
mid-1980s (chapter III+IV). The intense development during the 1990s consisted 
of mass-produced suburbs, which eventually led to the high-rise development of the 
2000s (chapter V+VI).
The private development of both the Trans-Israel Highway and the current large-
scale housing projects along it create a seemingly market-oriented area. However, 
as claimed by David Graeber: “Whenever someone starts talking about the “free 
market,” it’s a good idea to look around for the man with the gun. He’s never far 
away”. In the case of the settlements of the Trans-Israel Highway, the “man with the 
gun” is located on the adjacent Separation Barrier, proving Graeber’s claims that 
it is States that create Markets. This market was created by a gradual involvement 
188 Charney, ‘A “Supertanker” Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning 
in Netanyahu’s Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel’, 1223–25.
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of private capital in the development of the settlements along the Green-Line. This 
privatisation process was of a selective nature, as the state sought to enhance its 
territorial project by directing the free market to the use of specific groups. 
Thus, privatisation was not simply an instrument to fulfil the national settlement 
agenda, but actually, an integral part of it, as the seemingly colour-blind 
liberal economic discourse was used to promote the construction of ethnically 
homogeneous gated suburban communities.
FIG. 2.28 The Green-Line area, 
2000-2015. (Illustrated by the 
author)
The free market façade the state gave to the area eased its merger into the greater 
national consensus. In 2014, Minister Naftali Bennet, from the religious right-
wing HaBayit HaYehudi Party, addressed the Israeli Institute for National Security 
Studies (INSS). In his 13-minute speech, Bennet stated the threats of establishing a 
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Palestinian state on “Highway 6” and the hazards of having “hundreds of thousands 
of Palestinian refugees protesting” on its fences; asking whether “you think they 
would stop there?”. 
In the following years, Bennet would repeatedly use the highway as a cause to prevent 
the formation of a Palestinian state, using intimidations as “ISIS sovereignty on 
Highway 6”, “millions of Palestinians on Highway 6”, or a “Palestine on Highway 6”. 
Bennet, a young and charismatic politician, is known for his ability to appeal to the 
wide Israeli consensus, and his use of the highway implies on its wide perception 
as an integral part of the country’s core. Bennet’s mentions illustrate the manner in 
which the massive development of the area blurred the existence of the Green-Line, 
and though de jure, it is still the official border of the state of Israel, de facto, the 
privately developed Trans-Israel Highway and the settlements around it moved this 
border eastward.
 2.7 The privatising domestication 
of the Green‑Line
As explained in this chapter, the Israeli built environment retained its geopolitical role 
over the past century. From the early agricultural settlements in the pre-statehood 
days, to the current corporate development, the concept of ruling by settling 
remained a leading national value, a political agenda and a governance strategy 
that ensured the state’s power over space. In contrary to the popular perception of 
privatisation, which is based on decreasing state control, this version of privatisation 
was meant to increase state control. In that sense, the privatisation of the settlement 
mechanism, was a state coordinated effort that continuously harnessed the national 
territorial agenda to the constantly changing economic climate and cultural values. 
Therefore, ensuring the survival of the national geopolitical project by tying it the 
rationale of the market.
The special circumstances of the area along the Green-Line turns it into a unique 
case study of the privatising settlement mechanism. As the national interest to 
develop the area increased only in the 1970s, it did not witness a substantial state-
led development like other internal frontiers. Consequently, its increasing national 
importance and economic potential, together with the relatively undeveloped 
environment, turned the eastern frontier into a clean slate, ready for to be developed 
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by the different settlers, contractors, speculators and entrepreneurs. Therefore, 
missing out on the first phases of cultivate and rule and industrialise and rule, the 
Green-Line witnessed mainly the more private-led mechanisms of post-1977.
Using the settlements along the Green-Line as a case study, the following chapters 
analyse and clarify how the settlement mechanism transformed since 1977. With 
each chapter focusing on a particular stage in the privatising settlement mechanism, 
they first analyse the evolving entangled geopolitical, individual and economic 
interests. Accordingly, they each analyse a different processes in the settlement 
mechanism and the spatial privileges it was based on; examining the differing 
reciprocal relationships of granting settling groups, or spatial agents, the power to 
colonise, inhabit, plan, develop or market space, as a means to increase the state’s 
power over it. Then, examining the settlement typologies, each chapter clarifies 
how they are a product of the privatising mechanism that generated them and an 
outcome of the evolving territorial, individual and corporate coalition; from the 
strategic level of locating new sites along the border, through their layout, all the 
way to the architecture of the dwelling units. Focusing on the process, each chapter 
examines a new practice of settlement production and explains the architectural and 
[sub]urban products it produced.
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3 [Neo]Ruralisation 
& The Community 
Settlement
A shorter versions of this chapter was published as:
–  Schwake, G. (2020). The Community Settlement: a neo-rural territorial tool. Planning Perspectives, DOI: 
10.1080/02665433.2020.1728569
 3.1 Introduction: early signs of privatisation
The Community Settlements that began appearing along the Green-Line during 
the late 1970s corresponded with the liberalising Israeli economy and society 
of that time. While former frontier domestication efforts focused on communal 
agricultural settlements or industrial development towns, which derived from the 
socialist Labour Zionism ideology, these aspects were no longer evident in this new 
settlement phenomenon. Accordingly, the Community Settlements were based on 
the desire of homogeneous groups to create their own small-scale localities away 
from the city and the larger societal context.189 Therefore, the dynamics behind there 
development relied on granting selected groups spatial privileges that consisted 
of the power to exclusively colonise the frontier by establishing their own ex-urban 
communities while securing and enhancing the state’s power over space. As an early 
example of the privatised settlement mechanism, the development of the Community 
Settlements was a fusion of individualistic desires and pre-privatisation residues. 
Consequently, they were inspired by former rural examples, using a pioneer-like 
framework and the spatial syntax of communal agricultural settlements.190 Lacking 
189 Yiftachel, ‘From Sharon to Sharon: Spatial Planning and Separation Regime in Israel/Palestine’, 73–106.
190 Kemp, ‘The Frontier Idiom on Borders and Territorial Politics in Post-1967 Israel’, 79.
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any means of production, the Community Settlements were a neo-rural phenomenon, 
using agricultural concepts and pioneer discourse as a mere facade, rather than an 
essential component of the group’s everyday life.
Focusing on the cases of Sal’it, Nirit, the Reihan Bloc, and Ya’arit, which constitute 
the first Community Settlements in the area, this chapter analyses the neo-
ruralisation of the Green-Line during the late 1970s and early 80s. Focusing on 
these early case studies, this chapter sheds light on the changing role of architecture 
and planning, starting from a territorial and societal role and concluding as an 
artefact of the privatising settlement mechanism. Analysing how the granted spatial 
privileges shifted from the power to exclusively consume space to the power to 
produce it, this chapter explains how production itself became a settlement tool, with 
architecture and urbanism turning into its outcome. Studying the changing spatial 
privileges and their evolving materialisation over the years, this chapter explains 
how the Community Settlements first corresponded with the neo-rural ambitious 
of their inhabitants and later became part of the greater suburban turn.191 Thus, 
transforming from ex-urban settlements to commuter-based localities while shifting 
the focus from the community to the individual, and later from the individual to 
the corporate.
 3.2 The neo‑rural experience
“There are individual men and women, and there are families… There is no such 
thing as society.” Margaret Thatcher192
Rurality, in the Israeli context, was an integral part of the nation-building process. 
The early agricultural settlements of the kibbutzim and moshavim of the pre-state 
years, despite being a relatively small portion of the local Jewish population, formed 
the ideological backbone of the leading Labour Zionist ideology. Focusing on the 
image of the pioneer, these rural settlements were not only a territorial tool of land 
191 Benvenisti, The West-Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel’s Policies, 32–48; Newman, ‘Gush Emunim 
and Settlement‐type in the West-Bank’, 33–37.
192 Thatcher, Margaret Thatcher’s Interview on Women’s Own.
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redemption but also an educational one, intended to lead to the formation of a new 
and healthy nation, which is connected to its historic land and thus to its past. With 
the changes in Israeli society, economy and culture, the old pioneer ideology gave 
way to a pioneer experience, which embraced the pioneer discourse and the act of 
frontier settlement as a lifestyle.193 During the 1950s and 1960s, the common rural 
house was the one-story units supplied by the Jewish Agency to the moshavim and 
kibbutzim and thus became known as “Agency House” (Beit Sochnut) (fig 3.1-3.2). 
Consisting of a simple white cube covered by a sloping red roof, it represented the 
humble and modest housing model that is suitable for an ideological pioneer.194 
Consequently, as this chapter shows, it formed the architectural inspiration for the 
neo-rural experience.
FIG. 3.1 “Agency Houses” in Moshav Avivim, 1958. 
(Central Zionist Archive)
FIG. 3.2 “Agency Houses” in Moshav Hayogev, 
1953. (Central Zionist Archive)
Neo-rurality is a post-industrial phenomenon that includes the immigration of 
middle-class and upper-middle-class city dwellers to rural areas. Fuelled by 
different incentives, such as the despair from urban centres or the renaissance 
of the countryside, it took variant manifestations. In most cases, this included 
the transformation of the rural built environment in order to adapt to the lifestyle 
sought by the newly arriving ex-urban settlers.195 The rural, therefore, became an 
experience consumed by the migrating urban upper-middle-class, as part of the 
193 Kemp, ‘The Frontier Idiom on Borders and Territorial Politics in Post-1967 Israel’.
194 Allweil, Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011.
195 Chevalier, ‘Neo-rural phenomena’, 175–91; Smith and Phillips, ‘Socio-Cultural Representations of 
Greentrified Pennine Rurality’, 457–69; Halliday and Coombes, ‘In Search of Counterurbanisation: Some 
Evidence from Devon on the Relationship between Patterns of Migration and Motivation’, 433–46.
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post-industrial course of Rurbanisation”.196 This global phenomenon, which emerged 
during the 1960s and 1970s, was characterised by a transformation in the patterns 
of population distribution that included an increase in rural settlements at the 
expense of urban ones. Categorised by several scholars as rural gentrification, it is 
much more complex than a simple replacement of local low-income communities 
by new higher income ones.197 Neo-rurality refers also to the new ways of life city 
dwellers moving to rural areas were seeking to adopt or develop; whether they were 
working-class groups looking to escape the hardship of urban centres, or others that 
sought to adopt a peasant-like or an artisan-like lifestyle.198
Neo-rurality is not mere suburbanisation as it could also be part of a counter-urban 
process. Most groups moving away from urban centres are usually interested in 
improving their current living standards while searching for a more tranquil way of 
life. In Suburbia the emphasis is on being away from the city’s disadvantages while 
yet being close enough to all of its advantages. In counter-urban examples of neo-
rurality, the emphasis is on the remoteness from the entire urban system.199 Meaning 
that the rural idylls are enhanced by the distance from the city. Therefore, though it 
is sometimes hard to draw the line between both phenomena, counter-urbanisation 
and suburbanisation are not synonyms, but rather two different manifestations of 
rural gentrification and neo-rurality.200 As an expression of post-industrialism, which 
focuses on the production and consumption of experiences, neo-rurality is supposed 
to supply a new authentic experience, unlike the unauthentic everyday life of the 
city.201 Neo-rurality is thus an experience that is based on a relaxed and pleasant 
life in affinity to nature and landscape, which is further enhanced by the “sense of 
community” and social empowerment.202
196 Chevalier, ‘Neo-rural phenomena’, 176. Hines, ‘In Pursuit of Experience: The Postindustrial Gentrification 
of the Rural American West’, 285–203.
197 Guimond and Simard, ‘Gentrification and Neo-Rural Populations in the Québec Countryside: 
Representations of Various Actors’, 449–64; Rose, ‘Rethinking Gentrification: Beyond the Uneven 
Development of Marxist Urban Theory’, 47–74.
198 Halliday and Coombes, ‘In Search of Counterurbanisation: Some Evidence from Devon on the 
Relationship between Patterns of Migration and Motivation’.
199 Ibid
200 Guimond and Simard, ‘Gentrification and Neo-Rural Populations in the Québec Countryside: 
Representations of Various Actors’.
201 MacCannell, The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class; Liechty, Suitably Modern Making Middle-
Class Culture in a New Consumer Society.
202 Hines, ‘In Pursuit of Experience: The Postindustrial Gentrification of the Rural American West’, 296.
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The search for a sense of community was not unique to the neo-rural phenomenon 
but rather part of the larger neoliberal turn. The decline of the welfare-state and the 
rise of the neoliberal order in the 1970s, did not only challenge the economic system, 
but also the concept of a society.203 With the liquidation of the welfare-state the tie 
between the individuals and society was weakened, forcing them to seek alternative or 
compensatory systems, often found in smaller, more homogeneous groups that offered 
a sense of security and belonging.204 Accordingly, Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm 
would claim that this led to a greater focus to create smaller fragmented Gemeinschafts 
(communities), in contrary to a single unified Gesellschaft (society), a seen in 
separatism, identity politics, sectarianism and neo-nationalism.205 Not surprisingly, 
Margaret Thatcher, one of the leading figures of neoliberalism, undermined the concept 
of a society.206 The neo-rural experience, could therefore be understood as an attempt 
of the post-industrial individual to escape the unauthentic context of the urban 
Gesellschaft, looking for a small-scale and authentic rural Gemeinschaft. Therefore, the 
Israeli Community Settlements, with their emphases on landscape and community life, 
constitute a new territorial approach, where the Israeli administration asked to turn the 
neo-rural experience into a new method of frontier domestication, following the former 
rural and industrial processes. Moreover, the Community Settlements illustrate how 
neo-rurality is able to eventually become suburban, forming a mere extension of the 
urban context initially opposed.
203 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 23; Bauman, Community Seeking Safety in an Insecure World.
204 Filc, Hegemony and Populism in Israel.
205 Tönnies, Community and Civil Society; Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780; Hobsbawm, 
Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism.
206 Gutwein, ‘The Settlements and the Relationship between Privatization and the Occupation’, 21–33.
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 3.3 The Community Settlement
The Community Settlement model was an integral part of the West-Bank project.207 
It was first mentioned in a report of the Movement for New Urban Settlement 
of 1975, which represented six Jewish localities in the West-Bank that asked to 
develop a new framework that differed from the traditional moshav or kibbutz. This 
report, which was endorsed by the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), proposed focusing 
the settlement’s inner structure on the community life while promoting a more 
flexible economic framework than in the cooperative rural settlements.208 The unity 
in this new framework was not in the joint aspects of labour or production, but 
rather in the societal aspect of creating a homogeneous group interested in living 
together. Consequently, one of the main features of the Community Settlements 
were their relative small size, 250-500 families, and the central role of the 
admission committee, which made sure that the settling core would have common 
characteristics, promoting a “closed society” that functions better than the “larger” 
and “open” one.209 Therefore, this new model was essentially a gemeinschaft-
oriented framework, expressing the desire of middle-class families to look for 
“quality of life” in “gated localities”, protected from the greater society.210 This 
report was endorsed by the MA, the JA and the Settlement Division of the World 
Zionist Organisation (WZO),211 which embraced these exclusionary criteria and 
promoted them as a means to attract families to areas of national interests.212
207 Newman, ‘Gush Emunim and Settlement‐type in the West Bank’, 33–37.
208 Appelbaum and Newman, Between Village and Suburb: New Forms of Settlement in Israel.
209 Movement for New Urban Settlements, ‘The Community Settlement’, 2; Gush Emunim, ‘Proposal for 
Settlement in Judea and Samaria’.
210 Yiftachel, ‘Bedouin-Arabs and the Israeli Settler State’, 27; Allegra, ‘The Politics of Suburbia: Israel’s 
Settlement Policy and the Production of Space in the Metropolitan Area of Jerusalem’, 497–510.
211 The Settlement Department (המחלקה להתיישבות, HaMahlaka LeHityashvut) was the executive arm of the 
Jewish Agency (JA), in charge of establishing agricultural settlements in the State of Israel, and previously in 
Palestine during the British Mandate. The department supported the settlements from their initial phases up until 
the establishment of their own economy, provided them with productive means, farm buildings and residential 
units. Its activities later dissolved into other departments of the JA. The Settlement Division (החטיבה להתיישבות, 
HaHativa LeHityashvut): Is an independent unit of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) and forms the executive 
arm of the State of Israel for the purpose of developing settlements in the West-Bank and the Golan Heights 
(Previously also in the Sinai Peninsula). Founded in 1967, it operated as part of the Settlement Department, 
under the same management (though with different funding sources) in order to expand its works also to the 
newly occupied areas, until their separation in 1992. The Division is funded entirely by the State of Israel. 
212 Settlement Division, ‘Community Settlements’.
TOC
 91 [Neo]Ruralisation & The Community Settlement
Lacking farming uses, yet mimicking previous agricultural models, the Community 
Settlements were a neo-rural phenomenon. This new prototype reused several 
concepts from agricultural settlements, such as the reliance on an association 
and the division into households sharing a communal system. Thus, enabling 
the Community Settlement to produce the experience of a rural lifestyle, without 
having to physically engage in agricultural work. Not by chance, the development 
of Community Settlements was carried out by the same institutions that were 
in charge of the former cooperative rural settlements, such as the JNF, the JA 
and the MA, while being planned and initiated by the JA’s rural settlement unit. 
The JA’s newly established Settlement Division, which was separated from the 
JA’s Settlement Department and focused on the occupied territories, continued 
the former apparatus and encouraged small-scale groups, often with a common 
ideological background, to form an initial settling core for a future settlement.213 
By promoting these homogeneous communities, the planning officials sought to 
attract families that were seeking to move out of the city and into small-scale ex-
urban communities.214
The Community Settlement was a leading feature in the Drobles Plan, which 
presented the Israeli policy for the West-Bank. Unlike the Gush Emunim Plan (see 
chapter II), in this case, the suggested sites were no longer remote and isolated 
outposts, but rather clusters of small-scale settlements located one close to the 
other, sharing civil infrastructure and welfare services while functioning as “blocs”.215 
Furthermore, these blocs would create a Jewish-Israeli territorial chain sequence, 
while simultaneously disassembling the Palestinian-Arab one.216 This was further 
developed in the more elaborated plan of 1981, titled the 100,000 Plan, which asked 
to settle 100,000 Jews in the West-Bank in five years.217
The pursuit for better ‘quality of life’ was a fundamental aspect of the Community 
Settlement phenomenon. Whether targeting religious and ideological families, or 
more secular and politically neutral ones, all mentioned settlement plans highlighted 
the potential of better living standards Community Settlements able to provide. 
In the late 1970s ‘quality of life’ and ‘living standards’ revolved around the ability 
213 Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel’s Policies, 49–58.
214 Rosen and Razin, ‘Enclosed Residential Neighborhoods in Israel: From Landscapes of Heritage and 
Frontier Enclaves to New Gated Communities’, 2895–2913.
215 Drobles, ‘Master plan for Settlement Development in Judea and Samaria, 1979-1983’, 2.
216 Ibid
217 Settlement Division, ‘The 100.000 Plan’.
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to live in a small homogeneous community, surrounded by a natural landscape. 
Compatibly, the Gush Emunim plan called for the creation of “closed societies” 
as promoters of “vivid communal life” where “the individual’s participation is 
willingly and consciously”.218 The Drobles Plan stated that “In order to create a 
widespread of settlements that would consist of high living standards, it is suggested 
that the settlements in Judea and Samaria would be constructed as Community 
Settlements”.219 In the 100,000 Plan, Community Settlements were mentioned 
once again as a way to create “special social qualities”, that would attract potential 
settlers.220 Nevertheless, as the later plans suggested tying the development of the 
Green-Line to the private market, the emphasis shifted towards a growing focus on 
the affordability of spacious and large detached houses in the new settlements, in 
comparison to the expensive and small apartments in the dense coastal plain.221 
Correspondingly, by the mid-1980s, the Community Settlements were no longer 
the minimalistic and withdrawn residential environments but rather a platform that 
provided lucrative living standards.
The different settlement agencies applied the Community Settlement model both 
inside and outside of the West-Bank, using the neo-rural appeal to attract young 
families to frontier areas. The Settlement Department, in charge of promoting 
settlement in areas inside official Israeli territory, began using this new model in the 
late 1970s to attract new families to its areas of responsibility.222 The Settlement 
Department would usually start with an open call for settlers through public media, 
and families interested in joining one of the new settlements would sign up and 
then attend a joint tour in the area. After passing a selection process, which would 
ensure the family’s suitability to the project and the future community, they would 
be included in the first settlement phase, which consisted of temporary houses 
and limited infrastructure. After constructing the permanent houses (fig 3.3), new 
families would be accepted only after passing an Admissions Committee, which 
was made of representatives of the JA, the regional council, and the settlement’s 
members, ensuring the homogeneity of the community.
218 Gush Emunim, ‘Proposal for Settlement in Judea and Samaria’, A3.
219 Drobles, ‘Master plan for Settlement Development in Judea and Samaria, 1979-1983’, 2.
220 Settlement Division, ‘The 100.000 Plan’, 13–14.
221 Settlement Division, 14.
222 Abreek-Zubeidat and Ben-Arie, ‘To Be at Home: Spaces of Citizenship in the Community Settlements of 
the Galilee’, 205–27; Yiftachel, ‘The Internal Frontier: Territorial Control and Ethnic Relations in Israel’, 493; 
Shafir, ‘From Overt to Veiled Segregation: Israel’s Palestinian Arab Citizens in the Galilee’, 1.
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FIG. 3.3 A Joint tour to the site of the future settlement of Mitzpe Hila in the Upper Galilee, 1979; Construction 
of temporary houses in Mitzpe Hila; Permanent Houses in Mitzpe Hila, 1985. (Mitzpe Hila Council)
The spatial privileges enacted in the early Community Settlements were based 
on the ability of small-scale and uniform groups to exclusively use a certain site 
and to create their own gated ex-urban compounds. The settlements’ Admission 
Committees excluded vast portions of the greater Israel society, especially its Arab 
citizens, guaranteeing the desired social seclusion.223 Therefore, the better ‘quality 
of life’ the Community Settlements had to offer was manifested in small gated 
communities, isolated from cities and connected with nature. Later, as this chapter 
shows, the ‘quality of life’ would consist also of spacious detached single-family 
houses, which were significantly more luxurious than the urban dwellings middle-class 
families usually inhabited; shifting the focus from the community to the individual. 
Subsequently, in the 1980s, the pursuit for ‘quality of life’, whether due to Community 
Settlements’ pseudo-rural character or better living standards, turned into the most 
effective promotion technique to settle the state’s internal frontiers (fig 3.4).
FIG. 3.4 Commercial for West-Bank Settlements 
promoted by the World Zionist Organisation, 
1983. The title highlights “quality of life, (national) 
fulfilment and landscape” (Ma’ariv Newspaper)
223 Shafir, ‘From Overt to Veiled Segregation: Israel’s Palestinian Arab Citizens in the Galilee’, 20–22.
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The Community Settlements combined individual fulfilment (Hagshama Atzmit) with 
national fulfilment (Hagshama Leomit). Respectively, with the growing emphasis on 
better living standards, the Settlement Division, Settlement Department, the different 
planning administration and the settling families still portrayed the Community 
Settlement as a pioneer act that is an integral part of the national territorial mission. 
The Community Settlements were thus a neo-rural phenomenon that merged ‘quality 
of life’ and a pioneer-like lifestyle; an ideal post-industrial neo-rural experience. This 
could not be better described than in a recent commercial to the new neighbourhood 
of the settlement of Haspin in the Galilee:
“Welcome to Haspin - a religious community located in the heart of nature and 
Jewish history. Residents of the community enjoy a wide range of services such as a 
library … a grocery store, swimming pool, dental clinic, youth hostel and many Torah 
institutions…. Haspin combines an excellent way of fulfilling the values of settlement 
with quality of life and community.” 224
The settlements discussed in this chapter, Sal’it, Reihan, Hinanit, Shaked, Nirit and 
Ya’arit demonstrate how the Community Settlement model started as a counter-
urban pioneer-like phenomenon in 1977 that was eventually incorporated into the 
growing suburbanisation enterprise of the mid-1980s (fig 3.5.
FIG. 3.5 Map of the area and 
case studies in 2015. Green-Line 
in green, West-Bank Barrier in 
red and purple. (Illustrated by 
the author)
224 Homee, Website for Rural Living.
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 3.4 Sal’it: a non‑agricultural rural settlement
Sal’it constitutes one of the first examples of neo-rural development along the 
Green-Line. In August of 1977, the new administration of Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin authorised its establishment as one of the first sites in the state-directed 
efforts to settle the area. Located a few kilometres east of the rural settlement of 
Tzur Nathan from 1966 and Kibbutz Eyal from 1950, it formed an extension of the 
pre-1967 state efforts to strengthen Jewish Israeli presence in the area and was thus 
first named Tzur Nathan B.225 Placed between the Palestinian villages of Kufr Sur, 
Kufr Jamal and Falame in its east and the Arab town of Taybeh, inside of Israel226, 
in its west, Sal’it formed a territorial wedge in the area; extending Israeli control 
eastwards while preventing any possible Arab cross-border connections (fig. 3.6). 
Though Begin’s Likud-led government took the credit for the decision, the initial 
preliminary authorisation of the site was carried out by the Labour government in 
April of 1977, a month before the elections and the political turnover.227 Due to the 
site’s location slightly across the Green-Line, the decision was even declared as 
”administrative” and “not-political” by the inter-ministerial Settlement Committee.228 
Compatibly, the decision was backed by Ra’anan Weitz,229 head of the Jewish 
Agency’s Settlement Department, who usually asked to focus on settling sites inside 
the official borders of Israel, rather than in the occupied territories. According to 
Weitz, the new site corresponded with the unofficial Alon Plan of 1967 that limited 
Israeli settlements to the border area of the Green-Line, the Jerusalem metropolis 
and the Jordan Valley.230 Subsequently, the development of the new settlement was 
set, receiving an official status and a new name- Sal’it, from the Hebrew noun for 
Rock (סלע- Sel’a), due to the rocky terrain upon it was to be erected.231
225 Davar, ‘The Three Settlements’, 2.
226 Housing Palestinian Citizens of Israel
227 Waxman, ‘Green light for three settlements over the green-line’, 3.
228 Waxman, 3.
 A main figure of the settlement department since 1948, and its director from :(1919-1998 ;רענן וייץ) 229
1963-1984. Though being in charge of settlement development he ideologically opposed the West-Bank 
enterprise and advocated for other areas.
230 Ibid
231 Douer, Our Sickle is Our Sword, 233–35.
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FIG. 3.6 Sal’it in 2015, Located 
between the Green-Line (green) 
and the West-Bank Separation 
Barrier (red and brown), as well 
as between Palestinian localities 
inside the West-Bank and inside 
the pre-1967 borders (Illustrated 
by the author)
As soldiers of the Nahal corps took the lead in the development of Sal’it, mounting 
the site in December of 1977, its development matched former rural examples. 
This custom of a military Nahal settlement was quite common in developing frontier 
areas, and it usually consisted of preliminary military outpost settled by a small 
group of soldiers (Gar’in)232 that safeguarded the area and prepare it for its future 
as a civilian settlement; housed either by former Nahal soldiers, or by members 
of another political settling movement.233 With the military taking the lead, the 
territorial importance of the site derived from its strategical importance as a 
defensive shield to the coastal plain. Respectively, Moshe Nehorai, head of the Nahal 
division in the Ministry of Defence, in his speech to the soldiers of the outpost stated 
that in “every peace arrangement” the lights of Sal’it “on top of the mountain” will 
“expand the breath of Israel”, increasing the safety of all “mothers and children in 
their sleep, [and the] workers in the fields and factories in the lowlands”.234
As an outpost, Sal’it followed the typical line of a military settlement. 
Correspondingly, it consisted of five prefabricated buildings that were used as 
barracks and as a communal kitchen and dining area. Arranged in a U-shaped form, 
and positioned at the highest topographical point, they created a defendable inner 
232 Gari’in, a (ןיערג; Pl.: Gari’inim): Hebrew for Kernel. Used to refer to the initial core of a settling group, 
which would carry out the first phases of foundations. A Gari’in could be a civilian one, belonging to one of 
the settling movements, or a military one, as part of the Nahal corps.
233 Douer, Our Sickle is Our Sword, 233; Davar, ‘The Three Settlements’, 2.
234 Douer, Our Sickle is Our Sword, 233.
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courtyard suitable for a military base, which the soldiers used for informal and formal 
activities. As a site of future rural activity, the soldiers maintained a daily routine that 
consisted of guarding duties and agricultural work in nearby settlements.
The Settlement Department’s rural unit began planning the site before the settling 
group was chosen, following outlines of agricultural settlements developed by the 
JA.235 Located in the West-Bank, Sal’it was officially under the responsibility of 
Settlement Division. Nevertheless, in the late 1970s, the Settlement Division was 
still in its initial stages and relied on the experience and knowledge of the Settlement 
Department and the JA while enabling their planners and administrators to operate 
in the West-Bank under the cover of a different entity. Correspondingly, the planners 
began with the common process of studying the boundaries of the state-owned 
lands and analysing the site’s topography, which led to the oblong form of the future 
settlement with a topographic peak in its core. As the state and the JA controlled 
the planning process of Sal’it, its future settlers had almost no power to influence 
the procedure, leading the planners to focus on the site’s restrictions while using 
existing settlement practices.
With the rural unit taking the lead, its planners continued using settlement patterns 
they were familiar with. Respectively, they gave Sal’it the form of a Moshav Ovdim; 
a rural settlement made out of private family households with a cooperative system 
of purchasing supplies and marketing produced goods. Accordingly, they turned 
the former military post on the hilltop into the new centre while spreading a system 
of inner dead-end streets with adjacent private households along it. This star 
shape model indeed resembled the common form of a rural moshav, generating 
a hierarchical order that emphasised the relations between the community and 
the individual. The planners enhanced the communal aspect by merging the 
different private parcels into a continuous open space while using a system of 
pedestrian paths that connected all points of the settlement. Therefore, promoting 
the perception of the individual as a member of the community, similar to former 
communal rural settlements. At the same time, as a neo-rural project, the presence 
of agricultural fields and other means of production was clearly absent and reserved 
only to the north-western entrance (fig. 3.7). Additionally, the Ministry of Agriculture 
(MA) recognised Sal’it as a Community Settlement and was therefore not willing to 
develop any local agricultural uses.236 Together with the restricted options due to 
the rocky and sloping terrain, this limited the future agricultural options and the 
235 Settlement Department, ‘Outline Plan for Sal’it’.
236 Sal’it Council, ‘Letter to Deputy Minister Michael Dekel’, 1982, 1.
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formation of family farming parcels. Therefore, the intentions to shape Sal’it as a 
rural settlement were clearly figurative and superficial, using only the spatial rhetoric 
of a moshav while discarding its agrarian essence.
FIG. 3.7 planning and preparation of Sal’it - Upper row: Barracks in Sal’it, 1977 (Israel Land Authority); 
Mapping of state-owned lands in the area, 1977; Topography analyses of the area (Central Zionist Archives) 
– Lower row: Plan of Sali’t, 1977. (Central Zionist Archives)
Parallel to the planning process, the Settlement Division concentrated its efforts to 
allocate a relevant civilian settling group interested in this neo-rural project, granting 
it the spatial privilege of using the site. Initially, the Israeli Government thought that 
the left-leaning HaShomer Hatzair movement would take over the site.237 However, 
in 1977 it officially stated that it will no longer take part in any settlement action 
over the Green-Line.238 Therefore, the MA assigned the site for the right-wing 
Herut-Beitar settling movement, which was part of the right-wing Herut Party (and 
later Likud). Unable to find a suitable group in time, Matityahu Drobles, head of the 
Settlement Division and the former head of the Herut-Beitar settlement movement, 
 Literally meaning the young guardian. A Socialist-Zionist youth movement established in :(השומר הצעיר) 237
1919. It is also the name of Marxist-Zionist Party active in Mandatory Palestine, which later became part of 
the Israeli Mapam (Mifleget HaPoalim HaMeuhedet; The united workers party).
238 Tzimuky, ‘Salit Outpost Naturlises Today’, 3.
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approached the B’nai Brith239 organisation, which had already organised a settling 
group and was looking for a fitting location. This group consisted of 16 young urban 
couples that were interested in leaving the city and adopting a new rural way of 
living. As members of the politically neutral B’nai Brith, the group was not focused 
on strengthening the Jewish presence in the West-Bank per se and were thinking of 
relocating to other ex-urban regions. At the same time, the offer of the Settlement 
Division was too attractive to refuse, as the group was not sure whether there will 
be another possible site in the near future. Drobles, conditioned the allocation of 
the future settlement to the B’nai Brith group by insisting that they would join the 
Herut-Beitar movement;240 officially retaining its control of the site while giving a 
political frosting to a seemingly non-political deed. As the group agreed to the terms, 
the Settlement Department granted them the power to exclusively colonise the site, 
turning Sal’it into their home while controlling its societal composition.
The setbacks in the transition into a civilian settlement emphasise that the site 
was not crucial to defence and security standpoints, but rather a statement of 
sovereignty and expression of territorial control. The Settlement Division was ready 
to populate the site quite early, yet, budgetary considerations delayed the project 
for almost two years. Eventually in May of 1979, after a long dispute between the 
Ministry of Finance and the Settlement Division, the Israeli Government agreed to 
double the budget for the West-Bank, designating more than a billion Israeli Liras241 
for this enterprise and supporting its planned expansion.242 As the Sal’it project was 
delayed, in the summer of 1979 its site was still undeveloped, lacking the needed 
infrastructure and proper family dwelling units. At the same time, the military, which 
initially highlighted the importance of controlling the site, was not interested in 
maintaining its position and declared that it would leave the outpost by the end of 
the year. The Settlement Division, afraid of losing this foothold, pressured the group 
to replace the soldiers and to inhabit their barracks in a temporary manner while 
the planning process and construction were underway.243 Despite its temporary 
form, the ‘naturalisation’ of Sal’it was marked by a ceremonial occasion attended 
by Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon, in which the Nahal soldiers handed the 
 Is a Jewish social organisation founded in New York in1843. Today, it has about half a million (בני ברית) 239
members in 60 countries and is one of the largest Jewish organisations worldwide.
240 Gilboa, Interview in Salit [Interview].
241 Approximately 18.000.000 Euros in 2018 standards (calculated according to the Central Israeli Bank 
statistics)
242 Tzuriel, ‘Samaria Is Open for Settlement’, 17.
243 Gilboa, Interview in Salit.
TOC
 100 The  Privatisation  of a National Project
flag of the settlement over to the settling families; symbolising the transition from 
a military occupation to a civilian one, and from defence concerns to geopolitical 
considerations (fig 3.8).
FIG. 3.8 Establishment Ceremony; Soldiers in Sali’it Establishment Ceremony; Ariel Sharon, the Minister of 
Agriculture, in Sali’it Establishment Ceremony, 1979. (Photographed by Smadar Gilboa)
Replacing the soldiers in Sal’it, the families initially moved into their former barracks, 
a practically unnecessary step that granted the settlers the sought pioneer 
experience. The families could have waited for the completion of infrastructure 
works and the construction of their permanent houses. Still, they consciously chose 
to inhabit the former military compound on a temporary basis; highlighting their 
devotion and ideological commitment.244 These barracks consisted of four precasted 
concrete buildings surrounding an inner courtyard; one functioned as a club and 
dining hall, while the other three functioned as family dwelling units (fig 3.9). Each 
building was made out of four smaller units of ca. 16 m2, consisting of a bedroom, 
small kitchen and a bathroom. Families with children received two adjacent units and 
were able to unite them by opening a door between them, creating a larger two-
bedroom apartment. Later, as the families moved into their permanent houses, the 
former barracks became a historical evidence to the pioneer phase of Sal’it; turning 
into the public centre of the settlement and housing several key functions such as a 
clinic, grocery store, club, offices, and most important - temporary dwelling units for 
new arriving families during their trial period.245
244 Gilboa.
245 Settlement Department, ‘Outline Plan for Sal’it’.
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FIG. 3.9 Barracks of Sal’it. 
(Illustrated by the author)
In December of 1980 the Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH), supplied the 
first permanent housing units, which corresponded with the neo-rural profile of the 
settlement. They were prefabricated concrete units assembled on site, resembling 
other mass-produced houses built by Ashdar ltd for the MCH, which became known 
as Ashkubit; a portmanteau of Ashdar and Cube.246 The houses consisted of two 36 
m2 cubes, that were placed one attached to the other, with a minor setback; creating 
an L-shaped form, leading to a larger joint area between every two neighbouring 
units. According to several of the first settlers, they were able to convince the MCH 
to improve the common model, and to turn it into a split-level unit with a division 
between the ‘night-uses’ of bedrooms and bathroom, and ‘day-uses’ of the living 
room and kitchen.247 The ‘day-use’ cube was the lower one, oriented towards the 
landscape, yet, as the units consisted of three parallel load-bearing walls, openings 
in these façades were limited. Appropriately, it was the side façades, which were 
oriented towards the shared entrance area between each two units, that were 
more porous; emphasising the communal aspect once more. To enhance the rural 
appearance of the prefabricated houses, they were covered by a sloping red roof, 
giving them the shape of ideal countryside cottages (fig 3.10).
246 Ashtrom, ‘Milestones’.
247 Gilboa, Interview in Salit.
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FIG. 3.10 Infrastructure works in Sal’it and Construction of Houses in Sal’it, 1980. (Smadar Gilboa) Note the 
“view” from the living room
With the state-supplied units enforcing a unified form and quite minimalistic 
conditions, the settling families immediately began altering their new houses, 
promoting their singularity and distinctiveness. Despite being provided by the state 
and though they were not officially owned by their inhabitants, the Settlement 
Division enabled the settling families to modify the newly supplied dwelling units. 
Consisting of two bedrooms, the original houses fitted the needs of the young 
families in their first years in Sal’it.248 Yet, as these families began growing, the 72 
m2 units were no longer enough, and the modifications that followed were mainly 
intended to provide the expanding household with more space. Correspondingly, 
most alterations were extensions for additional bedrooms, attached to the upper 
cube. Later alterations included an extension to the lower cube, which, as it was no 
longer depended on the existing load-bearing walls, could be opened towards the 
landscape, providing the house with an open panorama suitable for a countryside 
family. In a more developed stage, some families asked to use the height difference 
248 Samaria local construction committee, ‘Permit 8/908/0 [Sal’it]’.
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in order to build an additional floor on top of the lower cube (fig 3.11).249 Eventually, 
the changes made in the houses turned them from small spartan prefabricated 
units into multi-level houses, which several families expanded further, adding 
even a basement.250
FIG. 3.11 Original and extensions to dwelling units in Sal’it. (Illustrated by the author)
Choosing first to populate the northern part of the settlement, the Settlement 
Department and MCH promoted a more communal cluster. Unlike the initial idea 
of creating an alignment of private households, the first setting was much more 
gemeinschaft-oriented and followed the compound model of units sharing a 
collective open space that lacked any parcellation. Slowly, Sal’it began admitting 
new members and expanding, however, this was done in a significantly slow manner. 
Each new family would be admitted only following a trial period of one year residing 
249 Samaria local construction committee, ‘Permit 852/84 [Sal’it]’; Samaria local construction committee, 
‘Permit 8/68 [Sal’it]’; Samaria local construction committee, ‘Permit 8/52 [Sal’it]’.
250 Gilboa, Interview in Salit.
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in the former barracks, and after passing the settlements’ Admission Committee that 
decided whether the considered family fits with the community’s desired character. 
Consequently, leading to a maximum growth of two families per year. The slow 
admission process was reinforced with the frontier location of Sal’it at that time, 
which still meant a significantly long car-ride from main urban centres and even a 
guarding duty. Therefore, Sal’it of the 1980s was still an ex-urban frontier settlement 
with a small community, limited accessibility, and quite spartan conditions which 
included interrupted water and electricity supply.251
Sal’it’s definition as a Community Settlement contradicted its moshav layout, turning 
it into a non-agricultural rural settlement, or in other words - neo-rural. Though 
the MA did help in developing some agricultural industries in Sal’it, these were 
insufficient, and as it was not officially categorised as a rural settlement the MA was 
unable to provide Sal’it with additional means of production. Fearing the lack of 
development, the Sal’it council sent a complaint letter to the Jewish Agency in 1984, 
protesting their treatment as “any other Community Settlement” while regarding 
“Community Settlement” as a derogatory term.252 Yet, as the local means of 
production were not provided, Sali’t began losing its already limited rural characters, 
and the majority of its families soon left their new agricultural profession and sought 
other employment, though not yet in cities, due to the undeveloped infrastructure.253 
Consequently, Sal’it, continued to be remote, small and still counter urban while 
remaining non-agricultural and neo-rural.
With the slow expansion of Sal’it, the spatial privilege of being able to construct 
a private house amidst nature became the main settling tool, leading to more 
individualistic models than the first community-oriented units. The newly admitted 
members, which went through the year-long trial period, were allowed to build 
their house on one of the vacant plots in the settlement. The new houses were no 
longer provided by the MCH, nor built in a joint process, but rather an individual 
procedure carried out by each family in its own pace and according to its needs, 
demands, and taste.254 Though the building regulations mainly addressed the issues 
of building rights, dictating the maximum number of floors and overall built area, 
the new houses followed similar designs. As homes for members that did not belong 
to the initial veteran group, the newly built houses were more family-focused than 
251 Aigen, 35 Years for Sal’it.
252 Ilan, ‘Letter to the Jewish Agency regarding payemnt for house redemtion’, 1984, 1.
253 Gilboa, Interview in Salit.
254 Shomron Regional Council, ‘Building Permits Archive’.
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community-oriented. While the earlier setting consisted of shared entrance areas the 
new houses were fully detached, separated from their surroundings through natural 
or artificial height difference, enhanced by a closed-off façade and the placement 
of the family living room area at the rear. Unlike the early spartan prefabricated 
unites supplied by the state, the new houses were much larger and spacious. Still, 
despite their size, they were not extravagant. Using simple building materials, 
such as concrete blocks, white plastered walls and common terrazzo tiles, the new 
houses were modest cubes with minimal openings covered by a double-slope roof.255 
Therefore, affordably built and simply designed, they were an enlarged version of the 
common Israeli countryside house (fig 3.12).
FIG. 3.12 House of a new admitted family in Sal’it. 1986. (Samaria Regional Council)
In the gradual expansion of Sal’it, newly coming families began gradually fulfilling 
its original plan while shifting the focus from the community to the individual. By 
the end of the 1980s, the development of the regional infrastructure and the rise in 
the demand for the area,256 exposed Sal’it to a larger group of potential members. 
The admission process was not revoked, yet the settlement was now open also for 
families interested in improving their living standards while staying within the context 
of the greater metropolitan region. Accordingly, Sal’it began transforming from a 
frontier settlement into an exclusive community of commuters.257 With the ongoing 
expansion, the southern arms of the planned star model were steadily forming, 
255 Samaria local construction committee, ‘Permit 8/1 [Sal’it]’; Samaria local construction committee, 
‘Permit 8/77 [Sal’it]’.
256 Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel’s Policies, 49–58.
257 Sal’it Council, 40 Years for Sal’it.
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developing a more private household-based layout. This change was strengthened 
by the emergence of surrounding fences and walls, pavements, and even a swimming 
pool in the late 1980s;258 replacing the former spartan pioneer characteristics with a 
growing emphasis on private family life and better living standards.
The changes in the planning and execution of Sal’it were parallel to the transition 
from a rural to neo-rural settlement mechanism. Correspondingly, it was planned as 
a moshav, consisting of a star-like layout with a clear public centre and an array of 
private family parcels, backed by a secondary system of pedestrian paths intended 
to strengthen the physical and social ties inside the settlement. Nevertheless, the 
absence of agricultural functions turned the rural spatial characteristics of Sal’it 
into an empty shell, mimicking former settlement methods while lacking its main 
component - means of production. At the same time, its location, just on the fringes 
of the coastal area and a couple of kilometres into the West-Bank, ensured the 
needed distance that would provide the desired disconnection from the city, while yet 
staying in its proximity. Moreover, placed on a hilltop, Sal’it enjoyed an uninterrupted 
panoramic view, which strengthened its physical and spiritual affinity to rurality and 
nature. Therefore, the spatial characteristics of Sal’it continued to form a settlement 
tool, attracting families interested in a rural-like lifestyle while maintaining their 
original occupation.
The improvement of nearby infrastructure during the 1990s enhanced the 
development of a commuter community in Sal’it. Consequently the connection to 
the coastal plain and the Tel Aviv metropolis was tightened and more families came 
due to the site’s location and landscape and the ability to build a substantially 
large detached house, rather than the desire to adopt a new lifestyle or reinforce 
Jewish presence in the area.259 Sal‘it, therefore, turned into an attractive Community 
Settlement and the moshav character remained as a residue from its early years, 
expressed in the official classification of the settlement, its public core, and the 
active Agricultural Council, which includes only the veteran families and has minimal 
symbolic responsibilities. Yet, these excesses, still grant Sal’it a neo-rural character 
that forms a basic element in its appeal.260 Later, as this chapter shows, this neo-
rural character would form a leading role in its corporate-led suburban development, 
which became the main settlement tool since the early 2000s.
258 Ibid
259 Berger, Autotopia: Suburban In-between Space in Israel, 50–54.
260 Gilboa, Interview in Salit.
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 3.5 Reihan Bloc: neo‑rural, ex‑urban 
and peripheral
The settlements of the Reihan Bloc form a leading example of the developing neo-
rural appeal. The Settlement Division developed the Reihan Bloc as cluster of small-
scale localities meant to attract city dwellers while enhancing the Jewish Israeli 
presence in the area. Located south of the predominantly Arab region of Wadi A’ara 
inside the state of Israel, and north of the Arab-Palestinian region of Jenin, it was 
meant to create a Jewish territorial sequence across the Green-Line while preventing 
the formation of an Arab one (fig 3.13). Named after the first West-Bank settlement 
in the area, Reihan, it was supposed to function as a new regional Jewish presence, 
strengthening the nearby Mei-Ami that was founded in 1965.261 Part of a greater 
plan for Wadi A’ara, the establishment of the Reihan Bloc intended to introduce 
additional Jewish settlements in the area, on both sides of the Green-Line and in the 
future even a city (see chapter VI).262
FIG. 3.13 The Reihan Bloc 
between the Green-Line and the 
West-Bank Separation Barrier, 
creating a wedge between the 
West-Bank and localities of 
Palestinian citizens of Israel in 
Wadi A’ara (Illustrated by the 
author)
261 Douer, Our Sickle is Our Sword, 278–81.
262 JA and WZO, ‘A plan for the development of Jewish Settlements in the Ara Hills - Reihan’; JA and WZO, 
‘Nahal Eron Project’.
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The Settlement Division put Reihan on the development course of a frontier rural 
settlement. Correspondingly, in 1977 it began the traditional path of a temporary 
Nahal outpost, turning into a civilian settlement a couple of years later (fig 3.14). 
Similar to Sal’it, the decision to establish a Nahal outpost was taken already before 
the 1977 elections by the Labour Government of Yitzhak Rabin in April 1977. The 
site was immediately prepared by the Jewish Agency (JA), yet the Nahal soldiers 
would arrive only in September, following the orders the new Begin administration. 
Though the soldiers belonged to the left-leaning and the newly anti-West-Bank 
settlement Hashomer HaTzair movement, they began carrying out the preparation 
works immediately with their arrival. Moreover, the military ceremony held for the 
inauguration of Reihan focused on the site’s strategical importance as a means 
to expand Israeli territorial control towards the West-Bank and to change the 
demographical balance of the area.263
FIG. 3.14 The temporary site of 
Reihan, 1979. Chanania Herman 
(GPO)
With the initial rural orientation, the plan for Reihan suited the layout of a typical 
Moshav Ovdim. Accordingly, following the site topographical analyses and the 
study of state-owned lands, the planners of the JA created a hierarchical outline 
consisting of a central public area surrounded by the members’ dwelling units that 
shared a common open space. Therefore, the planners placed the public functions 
of secretariat, grocery store, kindergarten, and club in the settlement’s entrance, 
in the former Nahal barracks and in the site’s topographical peak. The centrality of 
the public entrance was highlighted by the circular access road that split out from it, 
circulating the settlement with diverging smaller dead-end streets, which accessed 
263 Walter, ‘Nahal Reihan Outpost Is Goes on Site’, 4.
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the dwelling units while creating a car-free residential area. Consequently, turning 
the settlement’s core into a continuous open area, consisting of a central square 
and a system of pedestrian paths, running between the detached family houses and 
the private lots they were planned on (fig 3.15). At the same time, as a neo-rural 
environment, the industrial and agricultural uses were not an integral part of the 
settlement’s outline and were planned to be built outside the residential ring;264 thus, 
disconnecting the link between the settlers and their means of production.
FIG. 3.15 Plan of Reihan, 1979. 
(Central Zionist Archives)
FIG. 3.16 Houses in Reihan during construction, 1980. (Ma’ariv 
Newspaper)
After numerous setbacks, caused by the lack of budget, a group of city dwellers 
arrived in Reihan in June of 1979, receiving the spatial privilege to settle the site 
and ready to start their new counter-urban experience.265 They were around a 
dozen of young families and married couples, originating mainly from cities in the 
Israeli coastal plain, which sought to change to a more rural lifestyle by moving 
into the geographical periphery.266 These families, in their search for rural living, 
were directed by the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) to the liberal HaOved HaTzioni267 
movement, which was in charge of organising the settling group for Reihan. 
264 Settlement Department, ‘Outline Plan for Reihan’.
265 Davar, ‘Rozolio: Setbacks in Settlement in Undisputed Areas’, 2; Pripaz, ‘Nahal Reihan: Moshav Shitufi’, 4.
266 Cohen, Interview in Reihan [Interview].
 The Zionist Worker): A settlement movement established in 1936, affiliated with the ;העובד הציוני) 267
non-socialist line of Zionism (yet non-revisionist), later the liberal Israeli Progressive Party and the General 
Zionists.
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Receiving the power to colonise the site, they became an integral part of the 
Settlement Division’s plan to enhance the state’s power over the West-Bank. While 
the majority of West-Bank settlements belonged either to the right-wing Herut-
Beitar movement or the religious Gush Emunim, the group in Reihan, located slightly 
over the Green-Line, was affiliated with the centre of the Israeli political spectrum, 
and to a non-religious movement. This was echoed in the inconsistent statements 
made by settlers from Reihan in the early phases that included hawkish declarations 
like “establishing a Jewish settlement in the heart of the Arab one was close to our 
heart”268 or “[those opposing us] don’t understand the strategical necessity of 
Reihan”269, and more dovish ones like ”we are from HaOved HatZioni, the liberals, we 
are not Gush Emunim, we are not settlers… we are in the consensus… agreed upon 
by all parties” or “We are for settling in Judea and Samaria, but not in the sole of the 
Arabs… we have good relations with the Arabs”.270
After several months of living in temporary dwellings, the MCH supplied the settling 
families with prefabricated dwelling units that fitted Reihan’s frontier profile. These 
were 16 Ashkubit houses, made out of precasted concrete walls, creating two 36 
m2 cubes and a unit with a total area of 72 m2 (figure 3.16). Similar to the units 
in Sal’it, the central and two external casts were load-bearing walls, forming the 
unit’s structural framework. Divided into a ‘public’ cube of a kitchen and a living 
room and a ‘private’ one of bedrooms, bathroom, toilet, and an open study, these 
two areas did not completely overlap, providing each unit with a front yard. As the 
settlement’s core consisted of pedestrian paths and lacked any significant fences or 
barriers between the lots, the private front yards formed an extension of the open 
public space, connecting each household to the greater community. Nevertheless, as 
the units were assembled on-site, they were in need of an external staircase, which 
would overcome the height difference and separated each unit from its surroundings 
(fig 3.17). Fitting the profile of a rural settlement, the non-functional sloping 
asbestos roofs that covered all units granted the houses of Reihan the appearance of 
an idyllic countryside environment while disguising the prefabricated concrete cubes.
The lack of means of production, the peripheral location and internal tensions 
between the members prevented the proper development of Reihan as a rural 
settlement. Already in 1981, the settlement witnessed a severe crisis that derived 
from differences regarding social issues. This caused stern divisions between 
268 Levav, ‘In Reihan Are Worried from Controversy over Other Settlement with the Same Name’, 20.
269 Harif, ‘Prof Zamir: Haven’t yet Finished My Examination Regarding Reihan and Dotan’, 1.
270 Levav, ‘JNF to establish 3 more points in the triangle area’, 4.
TOC
 111 [Neo]Ruralisation & The Community Settlement
the group and concluded in the departure of several families and changes in its 
leadership.271 With the fragmentation of the initial settling group, Reihan would 
suffer from continuous changes in its populating composition and a severe lack 
of new families interested in joining the community. Consequently, several of the 
16 houses were repeatedly vacated, left uninhabited for long periods, and several 
families declined sale offers, even at significantly low prices.272
FIG. 3.17 Dwelling units in 
Reihan (Illustrated by the author)
Following repeated failed attempts to develop Reihan, the Settlement Division tried 
to regenerate it by shifting the focus from a communal rural village towards and 
individualistic Community Settlement. These efforts were not meant to enlarge the 
overall area of the settlement, but rather to fill the underpopulated existing fabric 
through the construction of new housing units.273 Subsequently, the Settlement 
Division commissioned the Samaria Central Development Company and the right-
wing-affiliated Amana ltd to construct 20 of the new units while designating the 
remaining ten to be built by their future inhabitants.274 Unlike the first spartan 
prefabricated units, that formed an extension of the public core, these new houses 
were more spacious and family-oriented. Appropriately, the Amana houses were 
first detached from the public sphere through the topographical differences and 
surrounding fences. This detachment was further enhanced through the orientation 
of the bedrooms towards the public core, creating a closed façade, while orienting 
the joint living room and kitchen area to the rear and emphasising the role of the 
private backyard, rather than that of the front yard in the former example. Moreover, 
271 Ibid
272 Cohen, Interview in Reihan.
273 Samaria local construction committee, ‘Permit 12-38/99-01 [Reihan]’, 12.
 HaHevra HaMerkazit LePituah HaShomron, Halap): Is a ;החל״פ :החברה המרכזית לפיתוח השומרון) 274
private company owned by different communities in the Samaria Regional Council and does not receive 
government assistance; (אמנה): Is a settlement movement established in 1976 by Gush Emunim, aimed to 
develop settlements is the West-Bank, Golan Heights, Galilee, Negev and Gaza Strip. It was registered as an 
association in 1978, and later recognised by the World Zionist Organisation
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while the sloping roof of the first units functioned merely as ornamentation, in this 
case, it formed a reserve for prospect construction, enabling the future expansion 
of the house (fig 3.18-3.19). The emphasis on detachment was manifested also 
in the self-built units, as they two consisted of the same spatial characteristics 
of the Amana houses. Likewise, these principles affected also the first units as 
the inhabiting families began constructing fences, rearranging the inner layout 
through extensions and replacing the asbestos roof with a more appealing tiled one 
(fig 3.20).275
FIG. 3.18 The new units 
in Reihan, Samaria Central 
Development Company. (Samaria 
Regional Council Engineering 
Department Archive)
FIG. 3.19 Plan of Amana House, 
Reihan (Illustrated by the author)
FIG. 3.20 Amana House, Reihan 
(Illustrated by the author)
FIG. 3.21 Extension in Reihan 
(Illustrated by the author)
The neighbouring settlements of Reihan and Shaked constitute a further step 
towards individuality and neo-rurality. Both sites were part of the ongoing state 
efforts to expand its power over the area through the construction of additional 
Jewish Settlements. Hinanit, initially called Reihan B (חיננית; Hebrew for the 
275 Shomron Regional Council, ‘Building Permits Archive’.
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Daisy flower), was formed out a Gar’in of Herut-Beitar which consisted of Jewish 
immigrants from the Caucasus that came to Israel in the 1970s; giving it the 
name the “Caucasian Gar’in”.276 Shaked (שקד; Hebrew for Almonds) started out 
as a private initiative of several families that sought to establish a settlement in 
the West-Bank. Later, it was incorporated into Herut-Beitar, and was taken under 
the personal care of Uri Bar On, Ariel Sharon’s assistant for rural settlement, who 
personally endorsed the settlement by allocating the site to the forming group and 
by promoting the needed development works.277 Unlike Reihan, both Hinanit and 
Shaked were officially declared as Community Settlements, forming a clear neo-rural 
example.278
The societal composition of Hinanit turned it into a unique case of neo-rurality. 
Consisting of Caucasian families living in coastal town of Hadera, the new residents 
of Hinanit were interested in moving to the West-Bank and adopting a more rural 
lifestyle, manifested in private households and small-scale agriculture. However, 
with land restriction and the limited agricultural options, the proposed site was 
unable to provide the needed means of production and the families had to settle for 
limited small-scale farming and livestock. Moreover, Hinanit’s profile was not only 
different in regard to origin, but also in regard to age, as the average adult man in 
Hinanit was 40 years old, much older than in the surrounding settlements. This also 
meant that the families were already larger and in need of a bigger house. Moreover, 
belonging to a conservative and less secular sector, the employment of women was 
relatively limited, and though the men were interested in agriculture, they lacked 
any professional experience and had no time to receive the necessary vocational 
training.279 Nevertheless, by granting the Caucasian families the power to colonise 
the site and develop their secluded neo-rural community, the Settlement Department 
was able to incorporate them in the attempts to enhance the state power over space.
The planners of Hinanit took in mind these rural aspirations, and while it was officially 
labelled as a Community Settlement its layout featured several agricultural features. 
Therefore, despite not having a direct ability to influence the process, the settlers 
of Hinanit had an indirect power to impact the formation of their future settlement. 
Correspondingly, the land parcels designated for each family were significantly large, 
276 Caucasian: originating from the Caucasus, and not the term used to describe a white person in the US; JA 
and WZO, ‘A plan for the development of Jewish Settlements in the Ara Hills - Reihan’.
277 Ma’ariv, ‘Samaria: Uri Bar On Road’, 19.
278 JA and WZO, ‘A plan for the development of Jewish Settlements in the Ara Hills - Reihan’.
279 JA and WZO.
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around one dunam,280 almost double the size of parcels in neighbouring settlements. 
Nevertheless, this was not done to allow the construction of larger houses, but 
rather to enable the maintenance of small-scale agriculture and livestock in the 
family plots.281 Later, this would also enable the construction of an additional unit 
on the same parcel for the next generation. Rural-like, Hinanit followed the outline 
of an entrance holding all public functions and located in the highest point in the 
settlement, with a circular outer road that followed the topographical lines. The 
smaller cul de sac streets provide access from the circular road to groups of 12 to 
20 houses while creating a common car-free inner core, connected through a system 
of inner pedestrian paths (fig 3.22).282
FIG. 3.22 Map of Hinanit, 1980. 
(Central Zionist Archive)
Despite being provided by the MCH, the houses in Hinanit demonstrate the shifting 
responsibility from the state to the individual and the evolving spatial privilege of 
producing space. Unlike earlier examples, Hinanit did not include a preliminary 
Nahal outpost and the MCH supplied the units already before the arrival of the 
Gar’in in January of 1981.283 At the same time, the houses corresponded with the 
pioneer-like character of the early 1980s and they were simple and minimalistic 
70 m2 units. Moreover, in Hinanit the MCH used a more efficient model, which did 
not consist of prefabricated walls, but rather of two precasted cubes assembled on 
site. Consequently, reducing the construction time and the needed manpower. With 
one cube containing the kitchen, living room, and an external balcony, forming the 
more public area, and a cube containing two bedrooms, a bathroom, and open study 
280 (Ottoman Turkish: منود   ; Turkish: dönüm) An Ottoman measurement unit that is an equivalent of 1000m2.
281 JA and WZO, ‘A plan for the development of Jewish Settlements in the Ara Hills - Reihan’.
282 Settlement Department, ‘Hinanit Local Outline Plan’.
283 Levav, ‘First Members of the Caucasian Gari’n Arrive in Reihan B’, 4.
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forming the more private one, the dwelling units were oblong meek volumes. The 
simplified character of this model was further enhanced by the lack of the popular 
ornamental sloping roof and the houses retained the flat one of the prefabricated 
cubes (fig 3.23-3.24). On the one hand, this might seem that the conditions in 
Hinanit were harsher than in previous case studies. On the other, using these simple 
cubes, the houses in Hinanit formed a preliminary unit that the settling families 
could alter and adapt more freely. Thus, already from the first steps in Hinanit, the 
Settlement Division promoted self-expression and individual initiative, forwarding 
the power to produce space to the settlers, who immediately began modifying their 
houses; starting by adding a tilted roof and continued with further expansions and 
alterations (fig 3.25).284
FIG. 3.23 Houses in Hinanit, 1980. (JNF archives) FIG. 3.24 Houses under construction in Hinanit, 
1980. Amos Levav (Ma’ariv Newspaper)
FIG. 3.25 Original dwelling unit in Hinanit and Shaked and their varying extensions. (Illustrated by the author)
Due to its peripheral location and unique societal composition Hinanit developed 
in a significantly slow pace, far from reaching its planned size during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Gradually, new members started joining the settlement, however, this 
concluded in a mere dozen self-built houses that did not fill up all existing vacant 
lots. Similar to Reihan, the Settlement Division tried to reignite the development 
of Hinanit by the construction of an additional dozen new private houses by the 
284 Samaria local construction committee, ‘Permit 1503/85 [Hinanit]’.
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Samaria Central Development Company during the mid-1990s (fig 3.26). These 
efforts did introduce new members to the settlement, yet were insufficient to 
generate the desired development process, which this chapter later shows, would 
come only twenty years later.
FIG. 3.26 Hinanit, 2005. (govmap.gov.il). Note 
the alterations to the old housing units in the 
eastern part, and the newly constructed ones in 
the western part
As the last site to de developed in the bloc, Shaked had the least rural features 
in comparison with Reihan and Hinanit. It began as an initiative of a few families 
interested in settling in the West-Bank. After forming a Gar’in, joining the Herut-
Beitar movement, advertising a call for families to join and working closely with the 
MA, the group grew significantly. Most families were relatively secular, upper/middle-
class, and living in cities in northern Israel or the central coastal plain. Almost all of 
them were affiliated with the right-wing of the Israeli political spectrum, and even 
one former member of the nationalist Lehi militia.285 Due to their connections with 
the ruling Herut administration, the MA offered them the specific location in 1980, 
granting them the power to colonise the site while the Settlement Division began the 
planning process and the needed groundwork.
Despite the similarity to the neighbouring settlements, the layout of Shaked was 
less communal and more individual-oriented. Still rural-like, Shaked too consisted 
of a central public area located in the settlement’s entrance and on the site’s 
highest point. At the same time, the layout was much more family-oriented, and 
 Lohamei Herut Israel – Lehi): Literally meaning Fighters for the Freedom of ;לח״י - לוחמי חרות ישראל) 285
Israel, was a nationalist Zionist paramilitary organisation founded by Avraham (“Yair”) Stern in Mandatory 
Palestine aiming to evict the British authorities from Palestine by force, allowing unrestricted immigration of 
Jews and the formation of a Jewish state. It split out of the Irgun in 1940, in order to continue fighting the 
British during WWII.
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lacked the common car-free public core. On the contrary, it consisted of an array 
of private parcels placed along access roads that followed the site’s topography; 
creating a circular and car-oriented arrangement.286 The communal focus did not 
entirely disappear, as the layout consisted of four different compounds sharing 
a common public area; all connected through a series of green open spaces and 
pedestrian paths (fig 3.27). Nevertheless, Shaked was much more fragmented as 
the plan subdivided each of the compounds into smaller private parcels, rather than 
promoting a unified collective-minded area.
FIG. 3.27 Plan of Shaked, 1988. (ILA). Note the 
settled area in the middle of the plan.
The houses in Shaked constitute a further step in the privatising settlement 
mechanism. Still part of the pioneer-like and neo-rural wave of the early 1980s, 
they resembled the state-supplied units in Hinanit and they were the same simple 
prefabricated cubes assembled on site. Moreover, like in the case of Hinanit, 
Shaked did not include a temporary phase where the settling families waited 
months in provisional housing. Similarly, following a small ceremony attended by 
representatives of the WZO and the MA, the families moved in in August of 1981, 
two months after the MCH supplied the houses (fig 3.28). Subsequently, Shaked 
began performing as an independent locality and the settling families had the power 
to shape their new settlement; using their exclusive spatial privileges to adjust the 
site to their needs by altering the units, paving and erecting barriers and fences. 
Respectively, the settling families chose to decorate the state-supplied units with 
a sloping red roof, that granted Shaked to image of an ideal rural-like settlement 
(fig 3.29). Nevertheless, while in Hinanit the state-supplied units filled almost half 
of the settlement’s layout, in Shaked they were less than a fifth, while the majority 
286 Settlement Department, ‘Shaked - Plan’.
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of the settlement would be developed in the Build Your Own House method (BYOH). 
Therefore, these plain units were not intended only to form the first step of larger 
individually developed houses, but also an initial phase that would encourage the 
development of the entire settlement; shifting the power to produce space further 
towards the individual settler.
FIG. 3.28 Houses in Shaked, 1981 (Shaked Council)
FIG. 3.29 Houses in Shaked covered with 
sloping roofs, 1991. (Shaked council)
The relative success of Shaked, in comparison with Hinanit and Reihan, correlates 
with the shift from a community-based development towards an individual-oriented 
one. In its first years, Shaked witnessed some social tensions, mainly between 
the veteran families and ‘new’ ones regarding the admission of new members.287 
Furthermore, interests in moving to the settlement were low, and most families 
that were accepted eventually chose not to join.288 Still, compared to Reihan and 
Hinanit, Shaked was the most attractive settlement in the bloc. Housing a population 
of a secular families and its upper-middle-class profile, with a more individual 
287 Veterans of Shaked, ‘A letter to Michael Dekel from residents of Shaked’, 16 February 1984; Ministry of 
Agriculture, ‘Rejection of new families’, 1984.
288 Schwartzberg, ‘Letter from Avi Schwartzberg, secretary of Shaked to Michael Dekel, 2.2.1984’, 1984.
TOC
 119 [Neo]Ruralisation & The Community Settlement
oriented layout, Shaked was able to offer new members a more attractive residential 
environment. Therefore, though Shaked did have an active Admission Committee, 
newly admitted received a private lot they could develop in the BYOH method, while 
being more detached from the collective everyday life. Consequently, the settlement 
admitted additional members by the end of the 1980s, reaching almost 80 families 
by 1989; while Hinanit had 21 and in Reihan there were around 10.289
Due to its ex-urban context, the Reihan Bloc relatively stagnated during its first 
two decades. During the 1980s the different planning administrations promoted 
a variety of plans for the area, all intended to strengthen Jewish presence in the 
region. Though concluding in the establishment of small-scale settlements such 
as Katzir, Harish and Tel Menashe, greater plans to develop a new cluster of 
Community Settlements and an urban centre were not carried out.290 The lack of 
proper connection to the central metropolises, as well as the inability to develop 
proper employment opportunities prevented the possibility to continue developing 
the area. The long commute prevented the settlements of the area to turn into 
suburban communities, and those living in the Reihan Bloc were mainly employed in 
other settlements in the West-Bank or in the nearby Afula; a town that lacked proper 
employment opportunities as well.291 Therefore, employment, connection, and 
accessibility, as well as security considerations remained the main weaknesses of the 
area; retaining it as neo-rural and preventing its suburban transformation.
Though only Reihan itself was officially a moshav, and Shaked and Hinanit were 
declared as Community Settlements, they followed the same community-oriented 
characteristics. While differentiating in the level of fragmentation and independence 
of the private parcel, they all followed the compound model of a circular plan of 
a public area in its entrance and an enclosing peripheral road surrounding its 
inner core, consisting of family houses sharing a common open space (fig 3.30). 
Nevertheless, over the years, with changes and expansions of the settlements, 
the community-oriented compound model gave way to the more individualistic 
star model, as the inner open core turned into access roads and parking places, 
and the enclosing road became a central street with newly constructed houses 
along it. Consequently, losing the former rural or rural-like features and becoming 
more suburban.
289 JA and WZO, ‘Nahal Eron Project’, 18–20.
290 JA and WZO, 35–59; Kipnis, ‘Examination of the need and justification for the establishment of an urban 
settlement in the area of Iron - Reihan’, 20–25.
291 JA and WZO, ‘Nahal Eron Project’, 23–25.
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FIG. 3.30 Reihan, Hinanit, Shaked. (Illustrated by the author)
The Reihan Bloc was too marginal to become a cluster of appealing Community 
Settlements, yet not ideological enough to attract the national-religious right-wing 
sector. As frontier localities, yet not precisely rural, the settlements of the Reihan 
Bloc lacked both the agricultural means of production needed for an independent 
ex-urban context, and the proximity to central areas necessary for a suburban 
environment. Though initially the Settlement Division intended to develop local 
employment opportunities, the majority of adults worked outside of the bloc. At the 
same time, as the needed infrastructure was not developed until the late 1990s, 
commuting to the area was not an easy and comfortable task. Therefore, families in 
the Reihan Bloc had to rely on the already limited employment options of the area. 
Accordingly, the Reihan Bloc, was able to provide neo-rural experience of living 
outside the city, yet, unable to provide the option of commuting or the sufficient 
occupational opportunities, which resulted in stagnation and lack of development. 
The location inside the West-Bank and the unstable security conditions did not help 
as well, minimising the attractivity of the settlements to the larger Israeli population. 
At the same time, being far away from the heart of the West-Bank, the area of Reihan 
was relatively ignored by the backbone of the settlement enterprise, the religious 
Zionist sector. Consequently, its domestication efforts turned it from a frontier to a 
periphery, and not precisely the appealing residential environment the planners and 
officials of the Settlement Division initially had in mind. The neo-rural environment 
promoted by the state was not the most useful tool, and the spatial privilege of 
building a private house was not appealing as well. Therefore, as this chapter later 
shows, as the suburban turn re-ignited the development of the area, it would form a 
rescue rope from its continuous neglect by appealing to the interests of the private 
sector and granting it the power to develop space; eventually generating new 
architectural typologies.
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 3.6 Nirit: a neo‑rural settlement on the 
“Israeli” side of the Green‑Line
Nirit, established in 1981, forms a unique case in comparison to other settlements 
due to its location and development method. It is the southernmost site of the 
mentioned case studies and it lies adjacent to the Green-Line, yet western to it, 
making it the only example inside official Israeli borders. Furthermore, promoted by 
the Moshavim Movement and the Agricultural Centre,292 it began as an initiative of 
the rural sector. In moshavim constructed on state-owned lands, only a single child 
in each family has the right to inherit the parents’ household and continue cultivating 
and inhabiting it. As small settlements surrounded by farmlands, moshavim usually 
lack substantial expansion options, causing members of the younger generations 
to search for alternative housing solutions. Consequently, the 1970s and 1980s 
witnessed a growing demand to establish new settlements for continuing generations 
of the rural sector. Nirit, thus started as an attempt to provide young couples from 
the moshavim of the area a moshav-like community, though with no agricultural 
functions. Therefore, it was first defined as a “landless village” and later as a 
Community Settlement.293
 Tnuat Hamoshavim): Established in 1933 by members of Moshavim to deal with their ;תנועת המושבים) 292
unique problems vis-à-vis the various national institutions. It is the largest settlement movement in Israel, 
representing 254 of them. The movement also deals with the representation of the moshavim vis-a-vis 
state institutions in all matters relating to members rights to land ownership, agricultural and rural policy 
in the State of Israel and economic development in rural areas; (המרכז החקלאי; HaMirkaz HaHaklai): Is a 
Settlement Movement established in the pre-statehood years as a joint framework of the Labour Settlement 
and the agricultural education workers. It is made out of representatives of the Agricultural Labourers’ 
Union (established 1919), which later formed a central part of the Histadrut (established 1920). With the 
organisational change of the Histadrut in 1994, the Agricultural Centre disengaged from it. It still represents 
the interests of farmers and rural settlements vis-à-vis the government institutions. Since 2001, the 
Agricultural Centre, together with representatives of other agricultural organisations and settlements formed 
a joint body named The Israeli Farmers Union.
293 Davar, ‘First experiment in Eastern Sharon’, 7.
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FIG. 3.31 Nirit in 2015 on the 
western side of the Green-Line, 
forming an additional settlement 
point in the area (Illustrated by 
the author)
The site of Nirit was an integral part of the Settlement Department’s efforts to 
develop new Jewish localities on the western side of the Green-Line as a counterpart 
to the Settlement Division’s work inside the West-Bank. The site was mentioned in 
the department’s plan from 1978, under the name of Mitzpe Zchor, due to the nearby 
ruins of a former Palestinian village by the same name (figure 3.32). Located west 
of the Green-Line, on official Israeli territory, and on state-owned land, it was under 
the responsibility of the Jewish Agency (JA) and the Settlement Department, which 
conducted the initial analyses of the site and approved its state-ownership before 
assigning it to the Agricultural Centre. Moreover, outside the occupied territories, the 
site of Nirit turned into an attractive option for members of the Agriculture Centre 
and the Moshavim Movement, who were relatively less supportive of the West-Bank 
settlement project.294 At the same time, located close enough to the West-Bank, Nirit 
was a frontier settlement, and thus received the support of the JA, the Israel Land 
Administration (ILA) and the Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH).
Rurally affiliated, the planning of Nirit was handled by the Settlement Department’s 
rural unit. The unit’s planners initially began with mapping the precise state-owned 
parcels and then drafted the layout of the first temporary phase.295 Respectively, 
Nirit’s development followed the common trajectory of a moshav, which included a 
first temporary outpost phase that consisted of a small number of families, a Gar’in, 
that would hold and safeguard the site while the preparation works and the search 
for new members were underway. Located on state-owned lands, inside the official 
Israeli borders made the temporary outpost phase redundant, yet, it gave the entire 
294 Davar, ‘First experiment in Eastern Sharoin’; Dor, Development of Nirit [Interview].
295 Settlement Department, ‘Mitzpe Yarhiv’.
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process the sought pioneer-like aspect. Correspondingly, the plans for the temporary 
phase were gemeinschaft-oriented resembling the typical compound model and 
consisted of minimalistic dwelling units sharing a communal open space.
FIG. 3.32 Possible settlement development, 1978, WZO, 
(Central Zionist Archives) Highlighted in Red is the site of Mitzpe Zchor.
The initial Gar’in of Nirit matched the objectives of the Agricultural Centre as it was 
formed out of young couples from moshavim in the Sharon area. They consisted of 
fifteen families that were organised by the Agricultural Centre, which settled the site in 
1981 (fig 3.33). Meanwhile, the Moshavim Movement began searching for new members 
that would form the remaining 80 families in the first development phase and 200 in 
the final one. The Moshavim Movement launched a call for families interested to join. 
First, the search was in the moshavim of the Sharon area, but due to low response it 
expanded to moshavim in other places and eventually even outside of the Moshavim 
Movement.296 In 1985, eighty-five families were admitted to the settling group, from 
which more than half were from cities and towns that sought a more rural lifestyle. Still, 
each joining family had to go through a selection process handled by the Agricultural 
Centre, in order to make sure they fit the needed rural profile.297
296 Glick, ‘Nirit: Labour Pain’21.
297 Dor, Development of Nirit.
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FIG. 3.33 Plans of the first units in Nirit, 1983. The Jewish Agency. (Drom HaSahron Regional Council)
The initial phase of Nirit did not form a base for future development, but rather a 
preliminary and temporary steppingstone for a better-organised development. Unlike 
previous examples, which relied on the concrete Ashkubit units supplied by the MCH, 
the first units in Nirit were supplied by the JA and were made out of tin walls and an 
asbestos roof, giving them their common name – Asbestonim (fig 3.34). Accordingly, 
these units were clearly for the temporary phase and were intended to be replaced 
(and not altered or extended) with the settlement’s transition to its permanent stage. 
They were one-story houses, of approximately 62 m2, with an entrance terrace 
leading to a joint living room and kitchen area in the front, and a bathroom, study 
and two bedrooms in the back (fig 3.35). The planners of the Settlement Department 
placed the units on a common open area while creating a system of pedestrian paths 
that connected between them. Using the compound model, the planners oriented 
the entrance of all units towards the settlement’s centre, forming a continuation of 
it. Nevertheless, the plan for the permanent phase did not use the first settling site 
as the centre of the future settlement, thus, pointing out that this step was merely a 
residue of former rural examples, which perhaps enabled the Settlement Department 
to begin with the needed infrastructural works but did not constitute the base of a 
future community.
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FIG. 3.34 First units in Nirit, 1981-1983. (Nirit Council)
FIG. 3.35 First units in Nirit. 
(Illustrated by the author)
As a “landless” moshav, the proposed layout of Nirit resembled a typical rural 
settlement, despite the lack of family farming parcels and any other agricultural 
functions. The planners of the rural unit did attempt to designate an area for small 
industrial and agricultural uses, however, they eventually had to revoke this intention 
and focus on housing, mainly due to lack of lands and due to the need to preserve 
the forests in the area.298 Preserving some spatial concepts of a moshav, Nirit had 
a clear public core, which included the settlement’s main public functions and an 
area for public buildings in front of them. At the same time, the circular moshav-like 
layout began taking the shape of a more suburban-like system of winding cul de 
sac streets, spreading out of the public area in the entrance of the settlement (fig 
3.36). This suburban character would continue to grow with the development of the 
settlement over the years.
The members’ involvement and power to influence the planning and development 
process led to significant setbacks in the realisation of Nirit. The outline scheme for 
the permanent phase was authorised in 1985, and the families were supposedly able 
298 Planning Administration, ‘Meeting regarding Nirit Outline Plan’, 1–2.
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to start building their houses. Yet, inner tensions between the settlers, especially 
between the veteran fifteen families living in the temporary site and the remaining 
eighty-five, regarding payments for development works led to serious setbacks, and 
even to the departure of several members. These differences were eventually solved 
by the direct involvement of the Agricultural Centre and the Moshavim Movement, 
which were able to dismantle the existing board and to form an appointed committee 
in its place. With a majority of representatives from the JA, the Agricultural Centre, 
the Moshavim Movement, and a minority of Nirit members, the newly appointed 
committee limited the powers of the existing settles and was thus able to manage 
the process more efficiently. Moreover, paying for the development of inner 
infrastructure, the member families had the power to dictate the construction of 
roads, pavements, and sewage system inside the settlement; thus, having more 
control on the hand while causing additional delays on the other. Consequently, 
though the cornerstone ceremony took place in September of 1986, it would take 
almost three more years to finish the construction of the houses.299
FIG. 3.36 Plan of Nirit’s second 
phase, 1986. (ILA). note the first 
houses in the middle and the new 
public core in brown
In the meantime, though most members of Nirit lived outside the settlement, it 
functioned as a community in exile. Accordingly, the communal council took an active 
part together with the Agricultural Centre in contacting the needed developers and 
managing the construction process. Both bodies were also in charge of monitoring 
and negotiating the needed payments of all families, leading to a subsidised fee for 
the cost of the parcel payed to the ILA, the infrastructure development costs to the 
MCH, and instalments payed to the council for the construction of each dwelling 
299 Glick, ‘Inconsistent Line’, 2; Glick, ‘The Price of Cheap Construction’, 5.
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unit.300 Fostering a sense of community, the Agricultural Centre and Nirit council 
organised meetings and trips, and even an on-site guarding duty, where each couple 
(husband and wife from the same family), were responsible for guarding the site of 
Nirit from 24:00-04:00.301 As most couples did not reside in Nirit at that time, it 
meant that they had to drive from their current house to Nirit, finish their duty and 
return home to start their day.
Caught between rural development and individual aspirations, the transition from 
the temporary outpost was almost a decade-long process. This was mainly due to 
the construction method the Moshavim Movement and the Agricultural Centre chose 
to conduct. On the one hand, they were not interested in an entire settlement made 
out the same repetitive model, while on the other, enforcing a BYOH method meant a 
long and expensive process, which the young couples moving to Nirit would not have 
been able to sustain. The Agricultural Centre therefore contacted two architects, 
Michael Azmnaov and Dror Sofer, which already had built themselves a reputation for 
designing private family houses in the area.302 The architects were asked to propose 
different models each, producing a pool of possible variants each family was able to 
choose from. Every model had a full and a partial option, according to the families’ 
needs and abilities, as well as a possibility to add a basement for additional costs.
The selection of the preferred housing model and the allocation of plots promoted 
both singularity and uniformity. The architects eventually presented the members 
with twelve different models, which through a voting process were narrowed to six, 
in order to limit the number of options and rationalise construction. Each family 
was then able to choose one out of the six models, while the parcels were assigned 
through a raffle.303 Designed by two architects, the different house alternatives had 
similar spatial characteristics. With the ability to reach almost 250 m2, the houses 
were spacious and highly individualistic.304 Focusing on the nuclear family, they 
were detached from their nearby surrounding environment through an enforced 
height difference and by orienting the living room area towards the backyard. This 
300 Dor, Development of Nirit.
301 Nirit Council, ‘Guard duty in Nirit’.
302 Sofer, Nirit: Sofer Architects [Interview].
303 Dor, Development of Nirit.
304 Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, ‘Permit 42/103 [Nirit]’, 42; Drom HaSharon 
regional council construction committee, ‘Permit 44/103 [Nirit]’; Drom HaSharon local construction 
committee, ‘Permit 4184/1020000400 [Kochav Yair]’; Drom HaSharon regional council construction 
committee, ‘Permit 52/103 [Nirit]’.
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detachment was enhanced through the use of the split-level model, which created 
additional height differences while arranging the different inner functions according 
to levels. Moreover, this enabled an expansion of another level, whether in the first 
construction phase or later (fig 3.37). Despite their significant large size, the design 
of the houses was relatively simplistic. Consisting of cubic volumes with small 
windows, made out of inexpensive construction materials, the houses in Nirit were 
affordable large versions of the ideal rural house.
FIG. 3.37 An example of a house in Nirit with a possible extension level (illustrated by the author)
Managed by organisations with experience in rural settlements, yet with limited 
knowledge in handling a concentrated production of a series of singular houses, the 
construction of the permanent houses lasted more than three years. Consequently, 
despite beginning in 1986, several managerial and bureaucratic issues postponed 
the completion of the houses until 1989. First, there were problems with the local 
administration and authorities, mainly in regard to building permits, infrastructure, 
and lease.305 Second, the contractor hired by the appointed committee was soon 
bankrupted, leaving the work unfinished. After several failed attempts to find new 
contractors the appointed committee was still unable to continue the construction 
works, and in 1988 the houses in Nirit were still only in the skeleton phase (fig 
3.38).306 Unable to find a contractor willing and able to complete the project, the 
committee concluded that each family would continue on its own. The guarantees 
from the contractors were foreclosed and divided between the members, who 
were then in charge of contacting smaller private contractors that would finish the 
305 Eter, ‘Houses with No Permits, Sewage with No Way Out’, 4; Pinhas, ‘Who can live inside a home’, 13.
306 Glick, ‘The Price of Cheap Construction’, 5.
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construction.307 Therefore, to guarantee the completion of the project, the council 
and Agricultural Centre, had to fragmentise their organisational responsibilities to 
the member families; granting them the power to manage the construction of their 
own house.
FIG. 3.38 Nirit under construction - Brought in (Pinhas, 1987); (Yedioth Ahronot, 1987); (Glick, 1988)
With the completion of the first permanent houses Nirit fulfilled its pioneer-like phase 
and was on the course to become a regular settlement. By 1990, the Agricultural 
Centre dissolved the appointed committee and declared the first elections for the 
cooperative council. Simultaneously, the construction of additional forty-two houses 
was underway. These houses were built in the same method as the early eighty-five, 
using the same models and the same construction concept. At the same time, the 
attractive lease conditions the ILA granted the first settling families were no longer 
available, which affected the socio-economic composition of the newly admitted 
members and attracted more upper-class urban families. In the mid-1990s, the 
regional council of Drom HaSharon, and not the Agricultural Centre, initiated another 
residential neighbourhood. It commissioned a private firm that composed a linear 
plan for additional ninety-seven units; consisting of a single winding access road 
that surrounded the settlement, designed to produce as many private parcels as 
possible (fig 3.39). While the first two phases were made out of the same housing 
models, the third phase was built in the BYOH method; thus, contributing to the 
suburban image of self-expression.308 At the same time, almost half of the units were 
built by a single developer that constructed the houses and sold them to the newly 
admitted members.309
307 Dor, Development of Nirit.
308 Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, ‘Permit 416/87 [Nirit]’.
309 Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, ‘Permit 98288 [Nirit]’; Drom HaSharon regional 
council construction committee, ‘Permit 98281 [Nirit]’.
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FIG. 3.39 Extension 
neighbourhood of Nirit, 1996. 
(ILA)
Despite having no agricultural features, the members of Nirit insisted on maintaining 
its rural affiliations. By the late 1990s, Nirit housed nearly 200 families of which the 
majority had no previous or existing connection to agriculture. Still, the first group 
recruited by the Agricultural Centre continued to operate the pseudo cooperative 
Agricultural Council. In the first years, this was the only council in Nirit. Nevertheless, 
as it represented only the veteran families, the Israeli High Court of Justice ordered 
Nirit, and all other non-agrarian settlements, to hold elections for a civil committee. 
Consequently, this new civil committee that represents all members became in 
charge of running all municipal matters in Nirit, like education, public buildings, 
transportation and maintenance of public facilities. The Agricultural Council, on the 
other hand, maintained a symbolic role, and retained its responsibility of the water 
system and the swimming pool.310 Thus, the rural affiliation had a spiritual role 
meant to prevent Nirit from becoming a simple Community Settlement.
Founded to serve members of the Moshavim Movement, Nirit was initially planned as 
a moshav, yet it quickly turned into a Community Settlement. Consequently, the first 
compound model layout soon transformed into a star model consisting of a system 
of cul de sacs (fig 3.40). Nevertheless, with a rural-based layout and background 
Nirit turned into a Community Settlement with the aura of a pioneer one. Nirit, that 
in the 1980s was considered as a frontier settlement, had all the needed attributes 
to become an attractive Community Settlement, affordable lands and spacious 
houses, just at the fringes of the main metropolitan region. Most important, it was 
in a politically undisputed location, therefore preventing any ideological constraints 
310 Dor, Development of Nirit.
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to its development. Nevertheless, Nirit was not yet fully suburban, as it still suffered 
from a lack of proper connection to the cities of the coastal plain, disrupted supply of 
electricity and proper development of local facilities.311 This, as this chapter shows, 
would change only by the end of the 1990s.
FIG. 3.40 Initial and second phases of Nirit. (Illustrated by the author)
 3.7 Ya’arit: early signs of corporate 
involvement
Ya’arit, unlike all other case studies in this chapter, was a private-led West-Bank 
Community Settlement that was eventually never realised (fig 3.41). Nevertheless, 
being initiated by a private entrepreneur and meant to be marketed to private 
individuals interested in purchasing a home in the West-Bank, it incorporates almost 
all characteristics of the entwined political and economic agenda of the 1980s. The 
intent to manage, fund and execute such a project by private means points out the 
rising demands for spacious detached houses in Israel of the same years. Moreover, 
it also highlights the shift from the seemingly ideological pioneer settlement to a real 
estate-oriented one; fuelled by the considerations of supply and demand.
311 Dor.
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FIG. 3.41 The site of Ya’arit. 
(Illustrated by the author)
Ya’arit is an example of the growing involvement of private entrepreneurship in the 
West-Bank, which became the main settling tool during the 1980s. Though limited in 
the 1970s, a decade later, the West-Bank witnessed a growing number of companies 
that began purchasing private-owned Palestinian lands with the intentions to develop 
new Jewish settlements upon them. While state-led settlements were bound to state-
owned lands, privately developed ones were free from these restraints. Therefore, 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), and especially Deputy Minister Michael Dekel, 
encouraged private initiative as a complementary mechanism to the public one.312 
The Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH), however, was less keen to foster 
this method. Minister of Housing, David Levi and other high-ranking officials, saw 
this as an uncontrollable, unprofessional and irresponsible process that threatens 
their authority as the main and sole executor of the government’s policy. This led to 
an open and public clash between the two ministries, which was resolved only after 
the direct interference of Prime Minister Begin, conditioning every private initiative to 
first get the approval of the MCH.313 However, the popularity of privately developed 
settlement was not limited due to the objections of the MCH, but rather due to land 
ownership issues and the unwillingness of Palestinians to sell lands to Israelis.314
The developers of Ya’arit, the Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods ltd, 
demonstrate the growing involvement of private capital in the area. This private 
company was a developer and entrepreneur in charge of promoting the foundation of 
312 Ma’ariv, ‘Ideology and Money’, 45.
313 Yediot Ahronot, ‘David Levi Wrote a Furious Letter to Dekel Declaring Disconnection’, 1.
314 Ma’ariv, ‘Ideology and Money’, 45.
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several new Community Settlements in the West-Bank. Yaari Rozen and Rachel Lahat, 
who headed the company, were both residents of Tel Aviv that were affiliated with 
the secular sector of Gush Emunim and were the first organised company to act as 
a private developer of settlements in the West-Bank. Deputy Minister of Agriculture, 
Michael Dekel, called them: “ground-breaking in regard to private initiative”.315 
Mixing ideological objectives with economic speculations, both Rozen and Lahat 
began with mortgaging their own houses in order to fund the company’s activity.316 
The company’s biggest success was the settlement of Sha’arei Tikva, where they 
were able to market almost 700 houses to families moving to the West-Bank.317 
Though the company was involved in several relatively large-scale projects like 
Sha’arei Tikva, Ganei Mod’in and Elkana C, and received the support of the different 
settling bodies,318 they still operated in a semi-clandestine manner, from their 
apartments in Tel Aviv and out of their private cars on the road.319
The company’s modus operandi concentrated on purchasing private owned lands 
and then using its political connection to receive substantial spatial privileges 
that included the power to plan, develop and market a future settlement. Lahat, 
who focused on the land acquisition aspect, would contact Palestinian touts, or 
profiteers, that would act as middlemen between her and the actual landowners. 
Selling lands to Jews was considered as a taboo and a controversial deed, threatened 
by death from the PLO.320 Around 1982, with the PLO’s withdrawal from Lebanon, 
as part of the Israeli-Lebanese war of the same year, there was an increase in land 
trading due to the decrease in the organisation’s influence over the West-Bank.321 
Yet, the entire process would remain undercover and confidential, enhancing its 
clandestine appearance. After purchasing the needed land, the Judea-Samaria 
315 Ma’ariv, 45.
316 Granot, ‘Rachel’s National Foundation’, 146.
317 Lanir-Pilansky, ‘Permanent Name’.
318 Ma’ariv, ‘Ideology and Money’, 45.
319 Granot, ‘Rachel’s National Foundation’, 146.
320 Granot, 146.; Palestinian Liberation Organisation, the (PLO; ةینیطسلفلا ریرحتلا ةمظنم  , Munadhamat 
A’Tahrir Al Falastiniah); Is an umbrella organization of several Palestinian national movements established in 
1964. The organization’s main and most important movement is Fatah. The organization’s main goals were 
the political representation of the Palestinian people and armed struggle against the State of Israel (until 
the Oslo Accords). In 1974 it gained an observer status at the United Nations and was later recognised by 
the majority of the international community as a legitimate (and the sole, by some) representative of the 
Palestinian people (including Israel in 1993, though considering it as a terrorist organisation until 1991).
321 Kotler, ‘The Construction Frenzy in Judea and Samaria - at Skyrocketing Prices’.
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Residential Neighbourhoods company would start involving the relevant bodies 
like the MA, MCH, and the regional planning committees, in order to start planning 
and executing the settlement’s construction. In the meantime, the company would 
begin advertising and selling the future, in order to fund the construction of the 
settlement’s planned infrastructure.
The Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods company implemented a new 
development process that is much more client-oriented and economically efficient.322 
The planning and construction processes would be accompanied by a Setup Team, 
in charge of the bureaucratic aspect of contacts and discussions with the relevant 
authorities and agencies; as well as an Execution Team, in charge of the construction 
of the settlement’s infrastructure, enabling the later development of each private 
parcel.323 The infrastructure would be funded by the families purchasing lots in the 
settlement. In doing so the company claimed that the construction costs would 
decrease significantly from that charged by the MCH, which according to Rozen, were 
significantly overpriced.324 Each family would then be able to plan and construct 
their own house, according to their own design, need and ability. The houses were 
intended to be built in a Cost-Plus method, where the company offered the services 
of a construction manager that divides the entire procedure into smaller, manageable 
tasks, which are forwarded to smaller contractors. This, according to the company, 
would allow better control of the project and significantly reduce construction costs, 
“Enabling a larger number of families to move to Judea and Samaria”.325 Applying 
this work method, the company asked to convince the different governmental 
agencies interested in cutting public spending, and private individuals seeking the 
luxuries of a private house, at an affordable price.
The Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods company analysed its potential 
clientele, applying promotion methods that matched the interests of the different 
target groups. The first and most important group was middle-class and upper-
middle-class families. These consisted of working professionals, usually owning an 
apartment in the coastal area, looking for an affordable private detached house in 
a small community. They are not willing to change their place of work and aspire 
322 Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods, ‘Residential Neighbourhoods in Judea and Samaria’.
323 Ibid
324 Kotler, ‘The Construction Frenzy in Judea and Samaria - at Skyrocketing Prices’, 17.
325 Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods, ‘Residential Neighbourhoods in Judea and Samaria’, 5.
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to live not further than a 20km ride from their workplace.326 Second, are young 
couples that, with sufficient governmental aid, would be able to purchase a house 
in the West-Bank, instead of an apartment in the city. Third, are Jews living abroad 
that are interested in purchasing or building a second house in Israel. However, they 
might recoil from settlements in the depth of the West-Bank, and therefore might 
be interested in a settlement of a lighter mode. The company also stated that these 
three groups are not usually the target of the existing public policy of encouraging 
West-Bank settlement and should, therefore, be concentrated in the areas close to 
the Green-Line in order to enable them to commute to the cities of the coastal plain 
on a daily basis.327
Ya’arit’s planned site made it the ideal location for a private-initiated Community 
Settlement. It was only a couple of kilometres east of the Green-Line, making it 
ideological, but not too ideological, yet ensuring that it would get the needed funds 
and assistant from the government and all other settling agencies. Though located in 
the West-Bank, it was not surrounded by Palestinian villages, like other settlements, 
but rather closer to existing ones like Sal’it and Tzur Nathan. The closest Arab 
population was that of the town of Taybeh, which is inside official Israeli territory. 
This meant that families moving to Ya’arit would not have to face the geographical 
isolation that most settlers in the West-Bank did, permitting them to easily continue 
their existing professional and social lives in the coastal area. Furthermore, located 
on a hill and overlooking a relatively open view, Ya’arit’s site provided the desired 
pristine landscapes and panoramas that many families moving to the West-Bank 
anticipated. Most important, was that the lands of Ya’arit, unlike the majority 
of private lands in the West-Bank, were registered in the Israeli Land Register. 
Accordingly, the entire process should have been relatively easier, preventing 
double or fake sales, a phenomenon that was quite common in those days, as land 
registration in the West-Bank was not documented.
In Ya’arit, the issue of raising living standards was a central and crucial aspect. In a 
brochure handed out to possible clients, the discourse repeatedly revolved around 
the political aspect of living in the West-Bank, but also, and even more, around the 
new quality of life families in the West-Bank could achieve for a relatively cheap price:
326 Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods, 2.
327 Ibid
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“The massive settling of Judea and Samaria is a national objective of the first order... 
The “Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods” Company is a private corporation 
which has taken [upon itself] to establish, by independent means, residential 
neighbourhoods in Judea and Samaria... The ways and means employed by the 
company in establishing the settlements are such as to enable a broad cross-section 
of the population to build their homes in Judea and Samaria, at a cost not exceeding 
that of an average flat in central Israel”328
The brochure, which was written in both Hebrew and English, highlighted the value 
of community life in West-Bank settlements. Based on the Community Settlement 
method, the new developed sites would consist of a small number of families, 
ensuring the intimate and amiable neighbourhoods most potential buyers are 
seeking. At the same time, the brochure warned from planning settlements that are 
too small, which would later have problems in attracting private investors willing to 
invest and construct local commercial centres and shops.329
The layout and architecture of the proposed settlement corresponded with the 
private initiative behind it. Consisting of a public core containing a school, a civic and 
commercial centre, a synagogue and a series of winding cul de sac streets, the layout 
resembled other Community Settlements. Nevertheless, efficiently and resourcefully 
using the site, the proposed layout was an effectual method to parcel the area of 
the settlement and generate the maximal amount of independent marketable private 
plots (fig 3.42). Thus, shifting from the common star model into a suburban tract 
development system, which simultaneously fragmentises and homogenises space as 
a means to turn it into a commodity.
Ya’arit followed the exact lines of the work method of the Judea-Samaria Residential 
Neighbourhoods company. It was allegedly purchased from members of the Obeid 
family from Taybeh in 1981. Using their connections, the Judea-Samaria Residential 
Neighbourhoods Company was able to receive the initial approval of the MA and 
other relevant authorities like the IDF to start planning the site and marketing lot to 
private clients. Eventually, between 1981-1982 the company sold almost half of the 
planned family parcels.330 Subsequently, in June of 1984, the Ministerial Settlement 
Committee authorised the establishment of Ya’arit, and gave approval to the on-site 
construction works.
328 Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods, ‘Residential Neighbourhoods in Judea and Samaria’, 3.
329 Ibid
330 Jerusalem District Court, Arnon et al against the District Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods ltd.
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The layout of Ya’arit resembled that of the typical settlement presented in the 
company’s brochure. It was planned by a private architect from Tel Aviv, and not by 
the Settlement Division’s internal team, like in the common case of settlements in 
the early 1980s. It had a clear public core, which was connected to the settlement’s 
access road, and a spreading system of cul de sac that followed the site’s 
topographical lines; allowing immediate and mobilised access to each of the private 
lots (fig 3.43). This also enabled the independent development of each parcel in the 
individual pace of each family. The private houses were planned along the ridgeline, 
while the open green spaces where placed in the less assessable sloping areas. This 
way, the houses were meant to take the form of the mentioned split-level house, 
ensuring integration with the given landscape, while increasing the orientation 
towards the view.
FIG. 3.42 A typical 
neighbourhood The Judea-
Samaria Residential 
Neighbourhoods Company. 1981. 
(Israel State Archives)
FIG. 3.43 Plan for Ya’arit, 1983. 
(Israel State Archive)
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The houses in Ya’arit, like the ones promoted by the company, emphasised on high 
and luxurious living standards, with a focus on individuality and singularity of design 
(fig 3.44). Highlighting the split-level typology, the brochure endorsed it as a house 
that integrates with its surroundings while reducing construction costs.331 Spacious 
and planned with an emphasis on design and details, the houses were depicted as 
villas in the midst of nature, mixing with the local topography and landscape and far 
from the simplistic ideal former rural houses. Thus, the developers targeted urban 
middle-class families interested in upgrading their living conditions, rather than ones 
in search of a pioneer-experience; corresponding with the new settlement approach 
dictated in the “100,000 Plan” earlier that year.332
FIG. 3.44 Houses promoted by the Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods Company. 1981. (Israel 
State Archives)
331 Ibid
332 Settlement Division, ‘The 100.000 Plan’, 14.
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The favourable status of the private developers enabled them to receive the 
needed political and bureaucratic result that was enough to launch the process, 
yet not to complete it. Initially, the Ministerial Settlement Committee conditioned 
the construction of Ya’arit with the proof that the Judea-Samaria Residential 
Neighbourhood Company owned the entire area of the site of the future settlement. 
The company, however, was able to prove only a shared and partial ownership 
that was not sufficient to get the needed approval for continuing the project. Plia 
Albeck,333 the deputy state attorney, who was famous for her pro-settlement line, 
stated that as long as the full ownership of the lands of Ya’arit has not been proven, 
it is illegal to start its construction, and that the state will not be able to defend these 
actions in a court of law.334 By that time, the plan for Ya’arit had been approved by 
the regional committee, and the project received the approval of the ILA. Moreover, 
the Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhood Company had already managed to 
sell almost 250 lots and to begin with the first stages of infrastructure planning and 
execution.335 However, by 1986, as the company and the other owners of the same 
land parcel were unable to agree on the terms of the deal,336 the project of Ya’arit 
was cancelled and the decision of the Ministerial Settlement Committee was revoked. 
Though initial works in Ya’arit had begun, they were never completed (fig 3.45-3.46), 
and those who purchased lots in the early 1980s, seeking to affordably construct 
their own private villa, were never compensated.337
 A former Israeli jurist that dealt with the legal status of the settlements and :(1937-2005 ;פליאה אלבק) 333
the area on which they were established. During her work she was in charge of a vast land survey of the 
West-Bank that declared intended to allocate unclaimed and unregistered lands that were then declared as 
state-owned; thus, legally able to be used for settlement purposes.
334 Albeck, ‘The Site of Ya’arit’, 1.
335 Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhood Company, ‘Ya’arit’.
336 Albeck, ‘The Site of Ya’arit’, 1.
337 Jerusalem District Cout, Arnon et al against the District Judea-Samaria Residential Neighbourhoods ltd.
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FIG. 3.45 Aerial photo of the site of Ya’arit, 2018. 
(govmap.gov.il). Note the unfinished layout of roads.
FIG. 3.46 Uncompleted buildings in the site of 
Ya’arit, 2014
The development mechanism of Ya’arit represents the new phase in the settlement 
mechanism that relied on the ability of private entrepreneurs to develop new 
settlements as its main tool. Ya’arit was an outcome of a pairing between politics and 
real estate investment, and thus had both characteristics. Its geographical location 
in the West-Bank was highly ideologically motivated, yet its relative proximity to 
the coastal area made an ideal commuters’ settlement. Thus, unlike the other 
Community Settlements which began as a counter-urban phenomenon, Ya’arit was 
suburban already from its inception. The tract housing development model enacted 
in Ya’arit followed the economic and individual interests behind it, as it divided the 
site into a reasonable number of private parcels available for sale, while promoting 
a more individualistic setting. Therefore, the layout of Ya’arit was less intended to 
create a community, but more focused on turning the site into a commodity. The 
sizes of each private lot were meant to lead to the construction of relatively large 
houses, enabling the dream of a private house in the midst of nature. The houses 
depicted in the marketing brochure highly emphasise this, as they were illustrated 
on sloping terrains and between trees, far away from future neighbours (both Jewish 
and Palestinian). The promoted daily life here was very dichotomous, there was work 
in the city, and family time at home. Community here, unlike earlier examples, was 
merely the combination of private households in one settlement, and a promotion 
technique designed to attract future buyers.
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 3.8 Expansion Neighbourhoods: 
completing the suburban turn
Due to their ex-urban and peripheral location, all settlements discussed in this chapter, 
except for Nirit, remained relatively stable up until 2006 and their expansion was quite 
limited. The main reason for their lack of development was the deficit of appropriate 
infrastructure needed in order to attract the possible families interested in moving to the 
newly constructed settlements. Even though all settlements were within a relatively short 
aerial distance from the main metropolitan areas, access to them was yet relatively poor 
and undeveloped. As a result, the daily commute was still too long to enable a comfortable 
move from the city to the countryside and the case studies became reasonably accessible 
only after the development of the road system in the area. Another main reason that 
prevented further development of the settlements was their proximity to Palestinian towns 
and villages in the West-Bank. This was more crucial during violent outbursts like the First 
and Second Intifada (1987-1991; 2000-2005), but also during calmer ones, as Jewish 
Israelis were not always keen on moving to live too close to Arab concentrations. This 
was eventually solved with the construction of the West-Bank Barrier, a land obstacle 
that was intended to block the access of Palestinians to Israel. The barrier, constructed in 
segments since 2002, did not follow the Green-Line and in many areas ran eastern to it; 
de facto annexing parts of the West-Bank to Israel. Consequently, the studied settlements 
were cut off their neighbouring Arab environment and incorporated into the Jewish-
Israeli geographical sequence.338 As a result, the former frontier settlements were able to 
become part of the main metropolitan areas.
The wide national investment in infrastructure was necessary for the development of 
the area, yet not sufficient, as a rise in demand was needed as well. The 2008 World 
Economic Crisis affected the local economy, triggering an increasing investment in real 
estate and a nation-wide surge in property values that almost tripled housing costs in 
the period from 2006-2018. This created a construction boom that influenced almost 
all cities, towns and villages across Israel. Suddenly, former remote and undesired 
places like the Reihan Bloc, turned into reasonably priced potential investments, in 
comparison to other areas, closer to the big cities of the main metropolitans. 
338 Cohen, ‘Israel’s West Bank Barrier: An Impediment to Peace?’, 682–95.
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Consequently, the former stagnating settlements in the Israeli frontier instantly began 
expanding.339
Ex-urban, communal and selective, up until the early 2000s, Sal’it remained within 
its original boundaries despite witnessing a growth in number of families. While 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the settlement was continuously able to attract a 
stream of young families that were interested in moving to a rural-like environment, 
this was still quite limited. The lack of available vacant and unbuilt lots, the selection 
procedure that lasted more than a year and the fact that the settlement was still 
quite remote and too close to the West-Bank, all restricted the number of families 
that were willing to move to Sal’it. Consequently, the majority of new houses built in 
the settlement were intended to serve the continuing generations that chose to stay 
in the area.340
With the massive national investment in the area during the 1990s, the MCH and 
the Settlement Division began promoting a new and more suburban vision for Sal’it. 
This was a direct result of the increasing state-led development of the entire area 
as part of the Starts Plan, and the grand infrastructure projects that transformed 
the Green-Line (see chapter V). By the turn of the millennium, the Settlement 
Division had issued an extension neighbourhood for Sal’it, doubling its existing 
size. The first part was merely a westward extrusion of the existing layout and an 
additional part included five more cul de sac ways located in the southern side 
of the settlement (fig 3.47). Though authorised in 1999, construction was very 
limited in the first years, and consisted merely of sporadic built houses.341 With the 
decline in violent incidents of the Second Intifada and the increasing investment 
and property values, this part would witness a construction boom in the post-crisis 
era. The BYOH units, which previously were enlarged variations of the previous rural 
model, gave way to more prestigious and luxurious houses. Consisting of white 
cubic volumes and built from expensive and high-end construction materials and 
details like metal beams, large windows, marble, wooden panels and architectural 
concrete they were seemingly minimalistic, yet practically exclusive (fig 3.48). 
339 Charney, ‘A “Supertanker” Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning 
in Netanyahu’s Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel’, 1223–43.
340 Council, 40 Years for Sal’it.
341 Moshe Ravid Architects and Planners, ‘Sal’it: Urban Outline Plan 112/1/2’.
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Lacking the common tilted red roof, which previously decorated all rural settlements, 
and designed in simple lines, the new houses in Sal’it were neo-modernistic, suiting 
the revival of the international style in Israel during the beginning of the second 
millennium,342 and characterised the secular upper-middle-class.343
FIG. 3.47 Extension plan of Sal’it, 1999. (ILA) FIG. 3.48 Neo-modern houses in Sal’it, Architect 
David Kohan, 2015
While the BYOH construction stimulated self-expression, the suburban turn and the 
growing reliance on private developers promoted a more corporate-led housing. 
Consequently, the second wave of construction in the southern section was carried 
out by a single private entrepreneur. Correspondingly, the new houses followed the 
lines of retail construction, consisting of repetitive models reproduced in the different 
parcels. Design wise, they resembled the architectural features of the neighbouring 
BYOH units, and were mainly white cubes with a closed façade towards the street 
and wide windows towards the backyard and the view.344 Focused on the privacy of 
the family, they all included a fence as part of the design, as well as a parking place 
in the entrance of the lot, separating the inner household from its surroundings 
(fig 3.49).
The second enlargement of Sal’it was much more suburban and corporate-oriented. 
The plan of 2003 included an additional expansion, yet, it was no longer an extension 
of the existing fabric of Sal’it, but rather a new compound outside of it. The new 
layout was a tract-housing model focused on parcelling the site into marketable lots 
342 Nitzan-Shiftan, ‘Whitened Houses’, 227–33.
343 Rotbard, White City, Black City: Architecture and War in Tel Aviv and Jaffa, 8–9.
344 Samaria local construction committee, ‘Permit 8-7/1/1 [Sal’it]’; Samaria local construction committee, 
‘Permit 8/84 [Sal’it]’.
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while enabling an instant gateway to each of the future houses. Correspondingly, 
it included three dead-end streets that spread from the main access road and ran 
along the topographical lines (fig 3.50). Though authorised in 2003, construction 
began only in 2017, probably due to the Second Intifada and the lack of profitability 
of the project. With the rise in property values, the ILA granted a single entrepreneur, 
Ampa Israel ltd, the spatial privilege to exclusively develop the entire neighbourhood. 
Consequently, this compound too consisted of repetitive cubic models that 
characterised all new houses (fig 3.51).
FIG. 3.49 Southern expansion of 
Sal’it, 2015. (Promotion of Sal’it 
expansion phase A, 2015)
FIG. 3.50 New 
neighbour hood in Sal’it, 
2003. (ILA)
FIG. 3.51 Northern expansion of 
Sal’it, 2018 (Promotion of Sal’it 
expnasion phase B, 2018)
With the growing development of the area, the Settlement Division began promoting 
the suburbanisation of the Reihan Bloc as well. While in the case of Shaked there 
were almost constant small extensions, they were limited to the inner framework of 
the existing grid. Already in the late 1980s, the planners of the Settlement Division 
altered the layout of Shaked. Rationalising the construction process, they replaced 
the layout that consisted of houses situated on a shared open space with a winding 
access road, thus providing each private lot with immediate car access and a parking 
place (fig 3.52-3.53). In 1999, the Settlement Division promoted two extension 
neighbourhood for the settlement that were meant to triple the existing number of 
dwelling units inside it (fig 3.54). With the privatisation of planning, the Settlement 
Division commissioned a private architecture and planning firm and stopped relying 
on its internal team. Corresponding with the growing emphasis on the private 
family lot, both new plans were based on a non-hierarchical system of streets and 
cul de sac lanes that parcelled the site, creating independent marketable tracts.345 
345 Gonen Architects and Planners, ‘Shaked: Urban Outline Plan 102/3. Tel Aviv: Israel Land Authority’.
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Thirty of the new parcels were developed by the JA and the Samaria Development 
Company. Managed by Amana, it repetitively constructed the same two-story 
housing model previously implemented in Reihan. The remaining parcels were 
marketed by the JA as BYOH lots, to be designed and developed individually by their 
future owners.346 Nevertheless, though both plans received official approval in 1999 
and the Samaria Development Company completed the thirty houses soon after, the 
majority of the plan’s site was undeveloped until 2010, mainly due to the Second 
Intifada and lack of profitability (fig 3.55).347
FIG. 3.52 New plan for Shaked, 1988. (ILA). note 
new arrangement of street layout
FIG. 3.53 Houses in Shaked, 2017. Shaked Council. 
(Shaked HaYeruka, 2017)
FIG. 3.54 Western and eastern expansion plan for Shaked, 1999. (ILA)
346 Samaria local construction committee, ‘Permit 15-231/99 [Shaked]’.
347 Samaria local construction committee, ‘Permit 1008 [Shaked]’.
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FIG. 3.55 Shaked, 2005. 
(govmap.gov.il)
The new expansion neighbourhoods in Hinanit and Reihan followed the same lines and 
were similar to those in Shaked as well. Up until the late 1990s, there were some new 
houses built inside the existing frame of both settlements, however, this was still very 
limited. Towards the end of the 1990s, the Settlement Division planned new extensions 
for both settlements as an alignment of dead-end streets spreading out from one of 
the access road that is connected to the main residential area.348 This followed the 
inner changes inside the existing fabric of the settlements, that turned the communal 
joint open space into a system of streets and parking places, just like in the former 
example of Shaked (fig 3.56-3.57). Here too, construction on site began almost 15 
years later and both settlements remained relatively undeveloped until then.349
FIG. 3.56 New neighbourhood in Hinanit, 
1999. (ILA)
FIG. 3.57 New neighbourhood in Reihan, 1999. (ILA)
348 Shomron Regional Council, ‘Building Permits Archive’.
349 Samaria local construction committee, ‘Permit 12-30/03/-01 [Reihan]’; Samaria local construction 
committee, ‘Permit 5/308/0/0 [Hinanit]’.
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The increasing interests to rapidly develop the area shifted the power to construct 
the dwelling units from the individual to the private developer. Consequently, though 
initially the aim was to create BYOH neighbourhoods, this eventually gave way to 
a limited number of private construction companies. These entrepreneurs would 
purchase (or actually lease) the lots from the state and the ILA in order to construct 
the houses in a concentrated effort, and then market them to families interested 
in moving to the settlements. This would ensure the development of the new 
neighbourhoods in a unified manner that will spread over a contracted and control 
period of time. Most importantly, this would reduce construction cost, enabling 
cheaper development and increased profitability, while absorbing the risk individual 
families would have taken. In this method, the likelihood of not developing the 
neighbourhoods decreased significantly. The BYOH model was not entirely forsaken 
but became a privilege for continuing generations.350
Built by a limited number of entrepreneurs the houses in all the mentioned 
settlements followed similar lines. Lying directly on the street they all had a private 
parking place adjacent to its entrance. The entrance area would then lead to the 
joint living room and kitchen, and all of these functions would be then located on 
the same level as the yard. In one level houses, the bedrooms would be located in a 
separate area adjacent to the living rooms (fig 3.58), while in the two-level houses 
they would be located in the upper story (fig 3.59). In case the house is built on a 
site characterised by steep topography it would then be split into two levels. The 
living room area would be at the same level as the entrance- at the bottom level in 
case the entrance was from the lower side of the lot, and on the upper level in case 
the entrance was on the upper side of the lot (fig 3.60). These new houses were 
actually formed out of two main cubic volumes - one consisting of the entrance and 
living room area, and the second consisting of the bedrooms. These cubes are then 
located one to the side of the other in case of a one-story building, and one on top 
of the other in case of a two-story building. Unlike earlier houses that almost all of 
them had a tilted red tile roof, the new ones built in the mentioned settlements had a 
flat roof, strengthening and enhancing their cubic character.
350 Cohen, Interview in Reihan.
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FIG. 3.58 Single floor house (Illustrated by the 
author)
FIG. 3.59 Double floor house (Illustrated by the 
author)
FIG. 3.60 Terraced double floor house with entrance 
from the upper level (Illustrated by the author)
FIG. 3.61 Terraced double floor house with entrance 
from the lower level (Illustrated by the author)
While the expansion neighbourhoods promoted the development of the Community 
Settlements, in some cases they hindered the former neo-rural affiliation. Besides 
the already mentioned expansions in Nirit, the works on a new neighbourhood began 
in 2004. The problem was that the site of the new project was east of the Green-Line 
and outside official Israeli territory. Officially, the new neighbourhood was not part of 
Nirit, but rather an extension to the settlement of Alfei Menashe, which is more than 
three kilometres away and is separated from it by an Arab village and the West-Bank 
Barrier (fig 3.62). Promoting an ‘extension’ of an existing settlement, rather than 
declaring a new one, enabled the Israeli regime to continue settling the occupied 
territories while avoiding international pressure, in the pretence of natural growth. 
This was exactly the case of the new neighbourhood that was attached to Nirit. 
Afraid of being affiliated with a real estate project in the West-Bank, the residents 
of Nirit objected the new neighbourhood and their appeals reached the Israeli High 
Court of Justice. Nevertheless, as the court rejected their claims, the construction of 
the new neighbourhood of Nof Hasharon began in 2005.351
351 Tzabari, ‘11.8.2018’; Rotem, ‘Nirit Regrets: They Do Not Want a Neighborhood of Alfei Menashe’.
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As a private-led real estate project, the layout of the new neighbourhood near Nirit 
was a tract housing arrangement that parcelled the site into a series of private lots. 
Consisting of a single access street, the new neighbourhood was connected to Nirit 
and relied on it for the basic municipal services (fig 3.63). Therefore, though de jure 
Nof HaSharon was part of Alfei Menashe, in practice it was a part of Nirit. Moreover, 
while the residents of Nirit feared that the affiliation with a private real estate project 
in the occupied territories would hinder the profile of their seemingly non-ideological 
settlement, the developer of Nof HaSharon used the proximity to Nirit and its rural 
background to appeal to potential buyers; turning the neo-rurality into an integral 
part of the promotion campaign.352
FIG. 3.62 Extension neighbourhood and 
surroundings. 2018. (Illustrated on aerial photo 
from govmap.gov.il)
FIG. 3.63 Plan for extension neighbourhood, 2003. 
(ILA)
The extension neighbourhoods followed a similar marketing method. In the 
promotion of almost all new projects in Reihan, Hinanit, Shaked and Sali’t the focus 
was on four main aspects: a high ‘quality of life’ that relies on a relatively large 
detached private house in the midst of nature, a vibrant and intimate community, 
proximity to main highways and cities in the coastal area, and a relatively affordable 
price. In the promotion of the new neighbourhood in Shaked for example the 
developing company, Ariel Yazamut, proclaims that:
352 Glick, ‘Nadlan - Nof HaSharon’.2,22]]},”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2010”]]}}}],”schema”:”https://github.
com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”} 
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“[Shaked is] A Community Settlement in which about 250 high-quality families live 
in a rich communal life. Shaked is located about … 10 minutes from Route 6 and 7 
minutes from Katzir-Harish. The attractive location gives quick access to the cities of 
central Israel, the Sharon and Haifa. The settlement overlooks the magnificent view 
of the Jezreel Valley to the north and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. In Shaked 
you will find a varied educational system for all ages, as well as activities after the 
school day that include classes, events and various activities. The community offers 
a wide range of services, such as a large grocery store, swimming pool, synagogues, 
club, library, animal corner and more”.353
The new neighbourhoods in the adjacent Hinanit, under the name “Vila in Nature”, 
was also advertised in the same method, with the promotion brochure mentioning 
that:
“Hinanit is a rural community secular community, located on one of the most 
spectacular mountains in the area above the settlement of Katzir, characterised by 
a unique tranquillity … The settlement is located at a height of ca. 400 m above 
sea level. On the slope, its northern branches connect to Nahal Zabadun … The 
Villa in Nature project combines modern concepts of advanced architectural design, 
a practical home plan that creates a comfortable living experience and large and 
pleasant living spaces… a 5-Room Villa… The size of the villa is about 120 Square 
meters and the total land area is 500 square meters. The variety of financing tracks 
available to you will enable you to personally tailor your mortgage. You can purchase 
a house in the Villa in Nature project in an easy and convenient way for you. .... We 
will be happy to offer you the best and most convenient way to purchase your villa 
and fulfil your dreams. Hinanit is a Community Settlement with more than 100 high 
quality families and an impressive construction momentum. In addition to a rich and 
diverse community life, there are community services that make the quality of life in 
the community especially high.”354
Interesting also is the extension of Reihan, where the developer is a subsidiary 
company of Amana - Batei Amana, which due to its political affiliation to the former 
Gush Emunim movement is apparently a more ideological and less profit-driven 
company. Yet, it uses similar marketing efforts and the discourse continues the same 
strong points as the other examples, stating that:
353 Ariel Yazamut, ‘Peoject Info’.
354 Laniv Engineering, ‘Villa in Nature’, 2.
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“Reihan is only 7 minutes from Highway 6 and 25 minutes from Hadera and Afula and 
overlooks a spectacular view of the Samaria hills on the one hand and the reserve of 
the Reihan forest on the other. You are welcome to come and join us.”355
In Sal’it, the developer of the new expansion neighbourhood Ampa Israel emphasises 
similar idealistic aspects, declaring that:
“In the heart of the country, next to Highway 6, lies the expansion of the Sal’it 
settlement, which overlooks an open panoramic view in all directions. The expansion 
of the settlement, which includes 40 charming homes in Stage A, which is fully 
occupied, and another 80 houses in Stage B, which is currently being populated, 
consists of quality families who have chosen to join the quality community”.356
Almost all extensions shown have followed the same outline and a similar 
development method. They all formed a new detached compound that is adjacent 
to the existing settlement and not an enlargement of the current fabric. The 
extension neighbourhoods constitute a physical and morphological addition 
that is highly apparent and quite hard to ignore. Unlike the former layout of the 
settlements that had a clear hierarchy, which was based on the different public 
and private functions and the relations between the community and the different 
households, the extension neighbourhood consisted of access streets, preferably 
a cul de sac, with a significant emphasis on the private lot. Furthermore, while the 
first settlement steps were carried out by the state and followed by BYOH projects, 
the extension neighbourhoods were built by private entrepreneurs. Accordingly, 
the development of these extensions was more market-led, applying a repetitive 
typology of housing used in almost all settlements that appealed to a larger number 
of families, or possible customers, while promoting an image of better ‘quality of life’. 
Consequently, giving the extension neighbourhoods their relative homogeneous and 
unified character.
355 Reihan Council, ‘Reihan’.
356 Israel, ‘Ampa Israel Website’.
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 3.9 Conclusions: from a neo‑rural lifestyle to 
a mass‑produced suburbia
The settlements described in this chapter illustrate the transition from rural to 
neo-rural and then to suburban, as well as the shift from state-led to private-led 
development. Initiated by the state and one of its affiliated organisations like the 
JA or the WZO, while generating non-agricultural secluded gated communities, the 
first stages of the discussed case study demonstrate the early privatisation of the 
settlement mechanism. At the same time, not completely privatised, the first steps 
were still carried out by the state, as it planned, funded and developed the sites 
and even supplied the first dwelling units; as seen in Sal’it and the Reihan Bloc. 
Accordingly, the spartan housing units, ill-developed infrastructure, limited access 
and lack of security highlighted the pioneer-like aspects of the settlements as 
moving there was quite a challenging experience and thus inherently counter-urban.
Returning to the equation of the state’s power over space in return to the individual 
power to colonise it, in the early Community Settlements the individuals’ spatial 
privileges derived from their affiliation to the settling group. Therefore, promoting 
the development of secluded and isolated communities was the settlement tool 
enacted by the state. In later phases, with the suburbanisation of the ex-urban 
neo-rural settlements, the individuals’ power to design and build their own private 
houses on lands provided by the state turned into the main settling tool. These 
increased spatial privileges shifted the focus from the community to the individual, 
encouraging the interests of additional families to join. Successively, the sharp rise in 
property values around the years 2008-2010, enlarged the profitability of real estate 
in the former frontier settlements, and larger agents entered the seen (fig 3.64). 
Accordingly, the state granted private developers the power to plan, develop and 
market space, completing the shift from the individual to the corporate.
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FIG. 3.64 Worth of 1 square 
meter in New Israeli Shekel, 
according to deals done in the 
area. (Based on info from the 
Israel Tax Authority)
With the increasing privatisation, the spatial privileges behind the settlement 
mechanism consisted of the power to produce space as the main settlement tool, 
rather than the power to consume it; consequently, altering the layout of the 
Community Settlements. The first state-led and funded plans were meant to create 
a community-based settlement and were shaped according to the compound model 
that consisted of small and simple private households sharing a common open 
space; like in former examples of rural settlement. With the growing privatisation and 
suburbanisation, as the state forwarded the settlement mechanism to the individual, 
the compound model gave way to the star model, that had a hierarchical setting with 
a centre and branching cul de sac streets. Thus, leading to a more family centred 
and private house focused community. The unbuilt example of Ya’arit, and the 
extension neighbourhoods form a later variation in the transformation of Community 
Settlement, as private developers began taking the lead. Consequently, as these 
received the power to develop space, they began promoting non-hierarchical and 
efficiently marketed parcelled layouts (fig 3.65).
FIG. 3.65 Compound model, Star model, extension model. (Illustrated by the author)
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The transition from state to individual and later from individual to market was not 
reflected only in the layout of the settlement but also in its common houses. The 
early houses provided by the state were small and minimal dwelling units that were 
an outcome of standardisation. Later, the spartan units were replaced by a process 
of customisation, meant to provide 'individuals and their families' larger tailored 
houses. With the shift toward corporate-led development, the houses were once 
again repetitive and homogeneous, this time, however, as an outcome of mass 
commodification (fig 3.66).
FIG. 3.66 Standardisation, Customisation, Mass commodification (Illustrated by the author)
The interior layout of the houses reflected the changes in the development 
mechanism as well. In the earlier houses, the more public areas consisting of the 
kitchen and living room were oriented towards the open public space outside, 
functioning as a continuation of it. Later, the living room area was oriented towards 
the view or towards the backyard, enhancing the feeling of better living standards 
and the inner family circle. In the corporate-led development, the public sphere is 
even further denied, forwarded by a private parking spot and a small access area, 
emphasising private car use while suppressing pedestrian accessibility and any 
possible visual connections (fig 3.67).
FIG. 3.67 Different arrangements of houses in community settlements according to the connection of the 
family area (red) to the surrounding environment. From the more connected models of the early 1980s (left), 
to the more isolated ones during the 1990s (centre) and the 2000s (right). (Illustrated by the author)
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Initially emerging as an alternative to the city, with the suburbanisation of the 
Community Settlements they turned into a mere extension of it. Correspondingly, 
the common everyday life in all case studies examined in this chapter consists of 
the same daily commute to work, school and all leisure activities. Nevertheless, the 
pursuit of better ‘quality of life’ was the main driving force behind the development 
of the discussed case studies. Though the interpretation of ‘quality of life’ changed 
over the years, it constantly relied on the desire for a private house, small or large, 
in a rural-like location close to nature. This was emphasised in the names chosen for 
the settlements, as they all had a strong affiliation to the local flora and fauna, like in 
Shaked (almond), Reihan (basil), Hinanit (daisy flower), Ya’arit (forest), Sali’t (rocky) 
and Nirit (false fennel plant). The logos of the settlements express this as well, as the 
majority of them consisted of a house with a sloping roof and a tree (fig 3.68).
FIG. 3.68 Logos of Shaked, Reihan, Hinanit and Sal’it
The emphasis on personal living standards, instead of national ideology or self-
fulfilment was compatible with the changes the Israeli culture and economy went 
through. The transition from communal life to a more introvert and individualistic 
housing was parallel to key changes in the local political system and economy, as 
Israel began shifting from the old quasi-socialist Mapai regime to a more laisse- 
faire logic during the 1980s. Therefore, the early pioneer Labour Zionism, of the 
kibbutz and the moshav that concentrated on redeeming the land of Israel by 
cultivating it, gave way to a new Real Estate Zionism, which asked to redeem the land 
of Israel by commodifying it. The neo-ruralisation of the Green-Line was the first 
step in its domestication, which later enabled its suburbanisation and eventually its 
financialisation. The following chapter, which focuses on the Suburban Settlements 
of the 1980s, illustrates the gentrification of the Green-Line, which promoted the 
area’s suburban turn and accelerated its inclusion into the Tel Aviv metropolis and 
the national consensus.
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4 Gentrification & 
The Suburban 
Settlement
The New Israeli Bourgeoise And 
The Green‑Line
Two shorter versions of this chapter were submitted and accepted at Planning Perspectives 
and  Political Geography:
–  Schwake, G. An officer and a bourgeois: Israeli military personnel, suburbanisation and 
selective privatisation. Planning Perspectives (in print)
–  Schwake, G. The Bourgeoisification of the Green-Line: The new Israeli middle-class and 
the Suburban Settlement Journal Political Geography (in print)
 4.1 Introduction: bourgeoisification for 
the sake of domestication
The Suburban Settlements of the1980s form a new step in the domestication 
mechanism of the Green-Line. They were an integral part of the economic and 
cultural changes that Israel underwent during the 1980s, which included the 
formation of a local upper-middle-class and significant modifications in its popular 
culture. Therefore, unlike earlier examples of city dwellers moving to the periphery 
in order to adopt a neo-rural and counter urban lifestyle, the exodus of the 1980s 
was mostly suburban. Fuelled by the desire for better living standards, manifested 
in a spacious private house in a small community away from the city, yet in a short 
commute from it, these new settlements were mainly an extension of the main 
metropolitan area rather than an alternative to it. Consequently, in contrast to 
former efforts of national decentralisation, which insisted on an equal dispersal of the 
TOC
 158 The  Privatisation  of a National Project
population along the country’s entire area, the focus in the 1980s shifted towards a 
more local decentralisation version, which sought to disperse the population more 
equally inside the existing metropolises.357 Subsequently, transforming the frontier 
area of the Green-Line into suburbia. As a first step in the suburban turn, the Israeli 
planning administrations endeavoured to attract the newly forming bourgeois 
upper-middle-class to the area by granting them unprecedented spatial privileges 
that consisted of the power to plan, develop, and inhabit the frontier. Eventually, this 
enabled the area’s domestication and further suburbanisation, while enhancing the 
state’s power over it.
This chapter argues that the Suburban Settlement of the early 1980s were an 
outcome of a new phase in the national geopolitical project, which derived from the 
spatial privileges granted to the bourgeoisie middle-class as a means to incorporate 
it in the evolving efforts to domesticate the Green-Line. Therefore, it focuses on 
the settlements of Kochav Yair, Alfei Menashe, Oranit and Reut; the first Suburban 
Settlements in the area. Studying their development, this chapter first explains 
the emergence of the local hegemonic middle-class and how it was incorporated 
in the national geopolitical agenda. Analysing the spatial privileges granted to the 
developers of all case studies, this chapter illustrates how the new bourgeoisie 
middle-class was able to influence the production of the local built environment, 
and how the power to produce space, turned into the leading settlement tool. 
Accordingly, it analyses how the bourgeoisie desire for social and cultural distinction 
was manifested in the settlements’ [sub]urban and architectural form. Focusing 
on case studies on both sides of the Green-Line, this chapter explains how this 
new phenomenon derived from the ability of the secular, politically central-left 
upper-middle-class to both produce and consume space. Therefore, this chapter 
demonstrates how the Suburban Settlements of the early 1980s were a state-
directed gentrification effort, intended to domesticate the Green-Line by turning it 
into the dormitory of the new Israeli bourgeoisie; thus, using bourgeoisification for 
the sake of domestication.
357 Shachar, ‘Reshaping the Map of Israel: A New National Planning Doctrine’, 209–18.
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 4.2 The bourgeoisification of the 
Israeli middle‑class
The Suburban Settlement phenomenon is an integral part of the economic and 
cultural changes that Israel underwent during the 1970s. This process was 
accompanied by a transition towards a more individualistic and consumerist culture, 
which several scholars refer to as the bourgeoisification of Israeli society.358 These 
transformations were not manifested only in the accumulation of wealth, but also 
in changes in the patterns of consumption and living standards, as part of a long 
societal process that began already during the 1960s.359 Before the establishment of 
the state, and in the first proceeding decades, the local hegemony was made out of 
the veteran Jewish socialist Ashkenazi360 sector, which was linked to the ruling Mapai 
party and consisted of the proletarian-agricultural-industrial classes.361 Though 
a local professional-academic white-collar class did exist, according to Bareli and 
Cohen, its prestige, participation in decision making and access to the country’s 
social and political leadership was limited by the socialist establishment that 
regarded the emergence of a bourgeois class as a threat.362 This non-socialist group 
included also traditional middle- class merchants, homeowners, and craftsmen who 
did not share the same concerns from the centralised state-led economy.363
With the economic growth of the 1960s, this middle-class was expanded by 
an evolving new group of public officials and executives, technocrats, military 
officers, and members of the private sector. Correspondingly, Ben Porat claims 
that it is during these years that the Israeli bourgeois would become a leading 
social group.364 The influence of this emerging class, according to Gutwein, would 
358 Gutwein, ‘The class logic of the “long revolution”, 1973-1977’, 21–57; Segev, Elvis in Jerusalem: Post-
Zionism and the Americanization of Israel; Ram, The Globalization of Israel.
359 Ram, The Globalization of Israel; Filc, Hegemony and Populism in Israel.
360 Jews originating from European countries
361 Kimmerling, The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony.
362 Bareli and Cohen, The Academic Middle-Class Rebellion Socio-Political Conflict Over Wage-Gaps in 
Israel; Heilbronner, ‘The Israeli Victorians’, 128–68.
363 Rozin, A Home for All Jews, Citizenship, Rights, and National Identity in the New Israeli.
364 Ben-Porat, Where are those bourgeois?
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continue the Mapai-led apparatus and some of its pioneering cultural values while 
adopting bourgeois-like socio-economic patterns, in what he refers to as “Pioneer 
Bourgeoisie”.365 The new emerging bourgeoisie hegemony consisted of the emerging 
white-collar classes, which according to Gutwein, would later align with the economic 
liberal right-wing Herut Party that represented the anti-socialist Zionist sector and 
large segments of the underprivileged Mizrahi Jews, and enable the 1977 political 
turnover that brought an end to the decades-long Mapai rule.366
The Bourgeoisification of Israel corresponded with the national suburban turn. 
Gonen and Cohen highlight the growing focus on the private family life during the 
1970s, as an essential element in the new isolated and retreated private houses in 
the outskirts of cities.367 Though such neighbourhoods existed in the early statehood 
years, their scope was yet limited, and the majority of white-collar middle-class 
families inhabited urban quarters such as Rechavia in Jerusalem, Hadar in Haifa, or 
the Old North and Ramat Aviv in Tel Aviv. With the suburban turn of the 1970s-80s, 
the production of housing would become entirely low-rise oriented, composing up 
to 80% of the yearly built dwelling units.368 This suburban turn served the existing 
secular Ashkenazi middle and upper-middle-class, as well as other socially upward 
groups such as the new Mizrahi middle-class.369 Consequently, while in the neo-
rural phases ‘quality of life’ dependent on a small-scale community, surrounded by 
nature and away from the city, in the new suburban pattern this shifted towards the 
autonomy and detachment of the nuclear family. As shown in a 1982 document of 
the settlement division, and latter also by the MCH, “Quality of life” was basically 
a mathematical equation of optimally dividing a certain area while providing each 
family with a large private parcel, enhanced perception of privacy and maximised 
panoramic views.370 Both documents advocated for setting the residential 
parcels perpendicular to streets, using the topographic conditions to increase the 
seclusion of the private family life while enlarging the achieved sight(fig 4.1-4.3). 
365 Gutwein, ‘Pioneer Bourgeoisie’, 685.
366 Gutwein, ‘The class logic of the “long revolution”, 1973-1977’, 21–57.
367 Gonen and Cohen, ‘Multi-Faceted Screw-up of Neighborhoods in Jerusalem’, 9–27.
368 Environmental Protection, Residential Building Pattern in Israel, 8.
369 Cohen and Leon, ‘The New Mizrahi Middle Class: Ethnic Mobility and Class Integration in Israel’, 51–64.
370 Naim, ‘Lot sizes in Toshavot and Community Settlements with mountainous topography’, 1–4; Segal and 
Eyal, ‘The Mountain’, 85–86; Weizman, Hollow Land, 130–32.
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These guidelines would become the standard parameters for frontier suburban 
development in the West-Bank, the Galilee and the Negev alike.371
FIG. 4.1 Suggested parcellation 
(left) to increase “quality of life”. 
1982. (Settlement Division)
FIG. 4.2 Suggested setting 
(left) to increase views and 
with it “quality of life”. 1982. 
(Settlement Division)
FIG. 4.3 Housing types 
according to the site’s 
topography. (Settlement Division)
While seemingly similar, the suburbanisation patterns of the bourgeoisie middle-
class differed from other groups with similar socio-economic backgrounds and 
focused on social and cultural distinction. This need for distinction, as explained 
by Bourdieu, is essential to the bourgeoisie middle-class as it enables its members 
to elevate their social status by distinguishing themselves from other parts of 
society through an emphasis on cultural capital, achieved through education, arts, 
manners, specific consumer patterns, and taste.372 Correspondingly, distinction is an 
371 Ibid
372 Bourdieu, Distinctions; Hines, ‘In Pursuit of Experience: The Postindustrial Gentrification of the Rural 
American West’, 285–308.
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integral part of Logan and Molotch’s “place stratification model”,373 which is based 
on the desire, and ability, of hegemonic groups to preserve their social, physical 
and cultural separation from other “groups they view as undesirable”.374 This was 
highly apparent in the American suburbanisation, which created racially and socially 
separated communities that went beyond economic classifications;375 while in Israel 
this matched the national demographic-based geopolitical agenda.
The desire for distinction was first of all a matter of detachment and segregation, 
enabled by the capability of the bourgeoisie middle-class to influence spatial 
production. As noted by Yiftachel, this was expressed in the ability of “influential 
groups” to move to “suburban localities, ‘protected’ from the proximity of 
‘undesirables’”.376 Among these influential groups, Yiftachel includes also the 
private developers who target “upwardly mobile groups who seek ‘quality of life’” 
and thus profit from the construction of gated communities.377 Respectively, Yacobi 
and Tzfadia highlight the selective nature of Israeli privatisation that consisted of 
granting social elites favourable conditions as a means to attract them to frontier 
areas.378 Nevertheless, while Yacobi and Tzfadia emphasise property rights, 
instead of planning rights, as the main feature of these spatial privileges,379 this 
chapter shows that in the early 1980s the social elite of the bourgeoisie middle-
class still had a significant ability to impact the production of space. Therefore, 
applying the distinction between the power over and power to, the state in this case 
granted the bourgeoisie upper-middle-class and well-connected developers the 
power to organise, plan and inhabit Suburban Settlements, in order to expand its 
power over space.
The desire for distinction was expressed not only in the settlements’ physical 
segregation but also in their different architectural and [sub]urban features. 
373 Logan and Molotch, Urban Fortunes: A Political Economy of Place; Alba and Logan, ‘Variations on Two 
Themes: Racial and Ethnic Patterns in the Attainment of Suburban Residence’, 431–53.
374 Pais, South, and Crowder, ‘Metropolitan Heterogeneity and Minority Neighborhood Attainment: Spatial 
Assimilation or Place Stratification?’, 261.
375 Logan and Alba, ‘Minority Proximity to Whites in Suburbs: An Individual-Level Analysis of Segregation’.
376 Yiftachel, ‘Bedouin-Arabs and the Israeli Settler State’, 36.
377 Ibid
378 Yacobi and Tzfadia, ‘Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and 
Nationalization in Israel’, 9.
379 Yacobi and Tzfadia, ‘Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and 
Nationalization in Israel’, 9.
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Accordingly, the bourgeoisie suburban environments were characterised by 
simplistic “good houses”,380 in comparison to the nouveau riche and flamboyant Built 
Your Own House (BYOH) neighbourhoods that housed many of the emerging Mizrahi 
middle-class of the peripheral Development Towns and the rural frontier.381
The suburban turn did not only serve the new consumer patterns of the bourgeoisie 
middle-class, but also its economic aspirations. The significance of the different 
forms of capital, whether economic, social or cultural corresponds with the leading 
hegemonic values of the relevant period.382 Appropriately, in the early statehood 
years, one’s social capital was of significant value, as the affiliation with the ruling 
Mapai party or the hegemonic Labour movement, granted one substantial privileges 
regarding employment, housing, education and other welfare services.383 Therefore, 
as noted by Bareli and Cohen, the bourgeoisie middle-class was first interested 
in gaining cultural capital and entering the existing hegemony.384 This would 
change with the global and local neoliberal turn, which financialised all aspects 
of individual and social everyday life and strengthened the importance of one’s 
economic capital.385 Therefore, according to Gutwein, parts of the upwardly old 
socialist Mapai hegemony and the bourgeoisie middle-class fully cooperated with 
the privatisation processes that followed the 1977 Turnover, in order to transform 
their social privileges into economic ones, and by that to maintain their hegemonic 
status.386 Fittingly, according to Filc, the Israeli neoliberal turn opened a way “to 
different expressions of exclusionary populism” that privatised the public sphere 
and commodified the welfare system while highlighting the existing ethnic, social, 
and religious polarisations.387 This eventually resulted in the accumulation of 
private wealth by distinguished groups, an emphasis on individualistic values, and a 
greater focus on living standards, both as social privileges and a means to promote 
territorial control; all realised in the Suburban Settlements.
380 Allweil, Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011, 14.
381 Shadar, The Foundations of Public Housing.
382 Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, 241–53.
383 Kimmerling, The End of Ashkenazi Hegemony, 11–20.
384 Bareli and Cohen, The Academic Middle-Class Rebellion Socio-Political Conflict Over Wage-Gaps in 
Israel.
385 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity; Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism; Graeber, Debt: The First 
5000 Years, 378.
386 Gutwein, ‘The class logic of the “long revolution”, 1973-1977’, 21–57.
387 Filc, The Political Right in Israel, 5.
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 4.3 Settlement and socio‑economic classes
The 1980s witnessed the rise of a new spatial phenomenon - the Israeli Suburban 
Settlement. Interchangeably referred to as Yeshuv Parvari or Toshava388 it was used 
by the Israeli administrations to attract middle-class and upper-middle-class families 
to the fringes of the Tel Aviv metropolis and the coastal plain, easing the pressure off 
existing cities and settling regions of national interest, such as the border area of the 
Green-Line. Unlike earlier national decentralisation efforts that included peripheral 
development towns or small-scale rural settlements, the Suburban Settlements were 
independent localities housing up to 2000 families, offering spacious and relatively 
affordable houses in isolated homogeneous communities;389 all just a car-ride away 
from main Israeli cities. According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, there 
are currently around 20 localities that fit the description of a Suburban Settlement. 
They are all located close to the “internal frontiers” of the predominantly Arab 
Galilee, the occupied Palestinian West-Bank and the Negev.390 Yet, still close to 
the main metropolitan areas of Haifa, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Beer Sheva. They 
are all characterised by an upper-middle-class socioeconomic Jewish Ashkenazi 
population,391 and except for two West-Bank settlements they all belong to the 
religiously secular and politically central-left leaning sector.392
The ability of the settlement enterprise to appeal to a variety of social groups was 
a well-coordinated project managed by the Settlement Division and the Israeli 
Government . The Division’s 1981 plan intended to create this appeal and thus 
focused on classifying the different areas in the West-Bank according to their 
demand and national importance, as well as the different settlement types according 
to their size, preferred location and target group. This included the City (I’ir), 
Town (Kirya), Suburban Settlement (Toshava), Community Settlement (Yeshuv 
388 Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel’s Policies, 49; Nahoum Dunsky Planners, 
‘Development of the Hills’ Axis: The Seven Stars Plan’, 2; Fogel Hertz Schwartz Architects and Planners ltd, 
‘Local Outline Plan: New Mazor GZ/BM/195’, 1–8.
389 Settlement Division, ‘The 100.000 Plan’, 16.
390 Yiftachel, ‘The Internal Frontier: Territorial Control and Ethnic Relations in Israel’, 493.
391 ICBS, ‘Population in Jewish localities, mixed localities and statistical areas, by selected countries of 
origin’.
392 ICBS, ‘Localities in Israel’; Central Elections Committee, ‘Resulst of 2015 Elections’; Central Elections 
Committee, ‘Results of 2019 Elections’.
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Kehilati), and Rural Settlement (Yeshuv Haklai).393 The different types did not only 
differ in their sizes, more than 10,000, 3000-5000, 500-2500, and 500 families 
respectively, but also in their target population and location. The settlement plan 
defined the demand areas according to the travel time from the main metropolitans, 
high-demand areas were less than 30 minutes from Tel Aviv and 20 minutes from 
Jerusalem, medium-demand were between 35-50 minutes from both cities and 
exceeding that were the low-demand zones (fig 4.4). The plan suggested reserving 
the use of community and rural settlements to medium and low-demand areas while 
developing several larger Krayot (towns) nearby, which would provide the needed 
regional services. The high demand areas would be developed privately, offering 
low-rise houses in Toshavot (Suburban Settlements) close to the Green-Line and the 
Tel Aviv metropolis, or denser cities close to the medium-demand areas (fig 4.5).394
FIG. 4.4 The 100,000 plan for the West-Bank. Division areas of 
demand
FIG. 4.5 New suburban 
settlements in the Master Plan 
for the Central District 3/2. 1980 
(authorised in 1988). Note the 
planned suburban settlements 
in orange
393 Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel’s Policies, 49; Settlement Division, ‘The 
100.000 Plan’, 15–16.
394 Settlement Division, ‘The 100.000 Plan’, 16.
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Concerning the changes in Israeli society, these settlements answered the new 
demands for better living standards. And Indeed, they all consisted of spacious 
private houses, well-developed infrastructure, green areas, and very good 
educational opportunities. At the same time, the mechanism behind the constriction 
of these settlements also enabled parts of the privileged middle-class to improve 
their economic situation. The Suburban Settlements were mainly developed by 
associations or private developers. In the case of the associations, they consisted 
of well-connected middle-class families, that were usually affiliated with one of the 
main political parties, or a powerful organisation like the military, the Ministry of 
Defence or the aerospace industry. These associations were then able to use their 
social status and political connections in order to gain access to state-owned lands, 
where they were allowed to build their new suburban community. Then, they were 
able to use their collective strength to reduce construction costs and to make the 
dream of a private house even more affordable. Thus, the social capital of these 
associations was transformed into spatial privileges and the ability to improve their 
members’ living standards. Moreover, these members eventually became owners 
of very attractive real estate, gaining concrete capital out of their social ones. The 
same goes for the privately developed settlements. Here, the developers were initially 
small-scale contractors with good ties to the government and other important 
ministries, which eventually supported their entrepreneurial efforts and helped them 
as well to turn their political capital into an entrepreneurial project. Kochav Yair, Alfei 
Menashe, Oranit and Reut (Fig 4.6), the focus of this chapter, illustrate how both an 
association-led and developer-led options were used to attract a specific societal 
group to the area, gentrifying it and enabling its further development.
FIG. 4.6 Case Studies along the 
Green-Line and the West-Bank 
Barrier (Illustrated by the author)
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 4.4 Kochav Yair: turning political capital into 
spatial privileges
Kochav Yair, presents one of the first examples of the participation of the newly 
forming bourgeoisie class in the national territorial project during the 1980s (Fig 
4.7). It was initiated and established by a group of young upper-middle-class 
families who the state granted the power to develop and settle the site in exchange 
to enhancing its power over the area. Consequently, while this group of families was 
initially associated to the right-wing Herut-Beitar Settlement movement, Kochav Yair 
quickly lost its political affiliation and turned into an attractive bourgeoisie suburban 
settlement suitable for young upper-middle-class.395 Correspondingly, it houses a 
significantly well-established community of 10,000 inhabitants; consisting of several 
former high-ranking officers and politicians, and it is made out almost entirely of 
single-family houses, with more than 90% owner-occupancy.396
FIG. 4.7 Kochav Yair in 2015. 
Creating a territorial wedge 
between the West-Bank and the 
towns of Palestinian Citizens of 
Israel west of the Green-Line 
while enhancing Jewish presence 
in the area. (Illustrated by the 
author)
395 Berger, Autotopia: Suburban In-between Space in Israel, 23–49; Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair 
[Interview].
396 ICBS, ‘Localities in Israel’.
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The site of Kochav Yair was an integral part of the state-led frontier domestication 
efforts and an ideal setting for the suburban desires of the emerging bourgeoisie. 
The specific location was chosen by the Jewish Agency (JA) already in 1978, as its 
Settlement Department led an effort to locate potential settlement sites that would 
enhance the state’s control over the Green-Line while creating a western counterpart 
to the West-Bank project.397 Located between the “southern-triangle”,398 the 
predominantly Arab district of Taybeh and Tira inside Israel, and the West-Bank, 
settling the site prevented a cross-border Palestinian sequence while promoting 
a stronger Israeli presence in the area. The site was initially called Mitzpe Sapir 
and it was part of three other settlement points in the triangle area, which formed 
the southern version of the Settlement Department’s Mitzpim Plan that focused on 
promoting Jewish presence in the northern Galilee, inside official Israeli territory as 
well.399 At the same time, located on the Israeli side of the Green-Line and just 15 
kilometres east of Tel Aviv, the site lacked the negative political affiliation of a West-
Bank settlement and enabled the formation of an exclusive commuters’ community.
The allocation of the site to the settling families was a clear example of selective 
privatisation. While the Settlement Department was in charge of tracing potential 
locations, the nature of the settlement and its future population were decided by the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MA), which functioned as a sort of land broker; in charge of 
allocating a settlement site for a settlement group interested in taking part in the 
greater national mission. Simultaneously, a group of young members of the right-
wing Herut-Beitar movement, the ideological backbone of the then ruling right-wing 
Herut party, was organising to establish a settlement of their own. The group was led 
by Michael Eitan; head of Herut-Beitar Youngsters and later a parliament member 
and minister on behalf of the Likud party and a key figure in the suburban turn of the 
Green-Line (see chapter V).400 The group consisted almost entirely of middle-class 
city dwellers that were interested in improving their living standards and to move to 
a private house, while retaining their existing workplaces in the Tel Aviv metropolitan 
area. Their demand was thus for a suburban type of settlement, characterised by 
a relatively high quality of life, which was not more than 30 minutes car-ride away 
from Tel Aviv; enabling them to commute to work on a daily basis. The group was 
397 Levav, ‘JNF to establish 3 more points in the triangle area’, 4.
398 The Triangle is the term that refers to the Arab concentrations eastern to the Green-Line, inside the state 
of Israel. The Northern Triangle refers to the area of the towns of Kufr Qara, Ar’ara, Baqa al-Gharbiyye and 
Umm al-Fahm, while the southern one refers to Qalansuwa, Taybeh, Kufr Qasem, Tira, Kufr Bara and Jaljulia.
399 Soffer, ‘Mitzpim in the Galilee - a decade of their establishment’, 24–29.
400 The successor of Herut 
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first interested in settling in the western edges of the occupied West-Bank, just over 
the Green-Line. Yet, in a meeting in 1981 with the then Minister of Agriculture, Ariel 
Sharon, Michael Eitan was offered the site of Mitzpe Sapir. The site’s proximity to the 
coastal area and the ideological mission to increase Jewish presence in the Triangle 
area appealed to the young group and they accepted Sharon’s suggestion.401
The development of Kochav Yair included ideological aspects and relied on 
individualistic aspirations, constituting an example of pioneer-bourgeoisie 
settlement. Accordingly, the group initially functioned in similar lines like the 
previous ideological Gari’inim (nucleus) that formed the pioneer core group of 
settlers in previous rural examples. Emphasising their ideological features, the 
initial members that belonged to Herut-Beitar chose to name the settlement after 
the leader of the pre-state nationalist Lehi Militia, Avraham Stern, whose nom de 
guerre was Yair.402 As the MA and the Israel Land Administration (ILA), decided to 
enlarge the planned settlement, the group turned into a registered association, as 
appropriate for a more organised and corporate project. As a well-connected agency, 
the association was granted unprecedented spatial privileges by the MA and ILA, 
which included the ability to dictate the profile of joining members and the power 
to control the [sub]urban and architectural characteristics of the future settlement. 
Consequently, the newly admitted members were not reached through the private 
market, but rather through personal connections and recommendations, managed 
by the associations; making sure that new families suited the required pioneer-
bourgeoisie profile.403
Acting as the developer, contractor and representative of settling families, the 
association still asked to be seen as an ideologically motivated organisation. In 
1981, 15 families volunteered to settle the site of Mitzpe Sapir as a temporary 
outpost (fig 4.8-4.10); a decision that did not have any practical justification and 
was mainly a residue of former settlement methods, granting Kochav-Yair the aura 
of a pioneer act. Likewise, in an official letter sent to the Minister of Construction and 
Housing David Levy, the association voiced their complaints against the ministry’s 
lack of assistance in the settlement’s development, stating that:
401 Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.
402 Kochav in Hebrew is literally a Star - Stern in German. Therefore, Kochav-Yair, is a pun that means Yair’s 
Star, but also Yair Stern.
403 Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.
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“The Jewish Agency, under the orders of the Israeli Government , established a 
settlement in western Samaria, on the 67 lines, in order to Judaize the area that is 
populated by tens of thousands of minorities, in a hostile environment… Herut-Beitar 
has taken upon itself to establish and develop a settlement in this place, which will 
be called Kochav Yair.”404
Claiming that the location of Kochav Yair is located in Western Samaria, and not the 
Eastern Sharon where it actually resides, the association highlighted the connection 
to the West-Bank project. This is further emphasised by mentioning the Green-Line 
and the “hostile” environment, and by stating that the association had “taken upon 
itself…this mission”; thus, promoting the image of a pioneer act once more.
FIG. 4.8 Zoning scheme for 
Mitzpe Kochav Yair. 1981. 
(ILA)
FIG. 4.9 JA dwelling unit in Mitzpe Kochav Yair, 1984. (JA)
FIG. 4.10 Houses in Mitzpe Sapir. 1983 (Kochav Yair Collection)
404 Kochav Yair Association, ‘Letter to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Construction and Housing David 
Levy’, 1981, 1.
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The ideological front of the Kochav Yair project ensured a wide ministerial support, 
which promoted the attractivity of the project further. While the Ministry of 
Construction and Housing (MCH) refused to back up the project, due to an inter-
ministerial feud with the MA concerning the overlapping planning responsibilities, 
the development of Kochav Yair enjoyed the growing support of the JA and the 
ILA.405 Consequently, the latter ensured the exclusive use of the settling group 
and subsidised the sale of the state-owned lots by a “conditional loan of 40% of 
the land value (according to the appraiser’s estimate), which will turn into a grant 
for each settler that will live there for a period of five years after the completion 
of construction”.406 Eventually, the lack of professional support from the MCH 
forwarded several planning responsibilities to the association, granting it additional 
spatial privileges and the power to influence the production of the settlement; 
ensuring that it would turn into the desired suburban environment the settling 
families were interested in. Consequently, the attractive location, the affordable price 
of land, the decision of the ILA and the JA to enlarge the project and the practiced 
spatial privileges appealed to large groups of young families.
As the Kochav Yair project expanded it retained its selective and exclusive nature. 
While the dominance of the original members declined admission was still reserved 
to well-connected bourgeoisie families. The MA conducted negotiations with different 
lobbying groups and allocated 200 lots to Herut-Beitar, 100 to the Lehi veterans, 
100 to members of the Defence Forces, and additional 100 to members of the 
South-Africa Zionist Federation. This selective privatisation, which granted well-
connected families such privileges is perhaps best seen in a letter from the assistant 
of Deputy Minister of Agriculture Michael Dekel, to Michael Eitan, asking him to admit 
“an old member of the Herut movement, a son of an old member”.407
The first zoning plan for Kochav Yair corresponded with the increasing individuality 
and focus on the private family. Accordingly, the ILA issued a plan that was based on 
the seclusion and isolation of the family parcel.408 Unlike a common tract housing 
development, where a given area is subdivided into smaller parcels, the plan for 
Kochav Yair started with the single parcel; reproducing it across the planned area 
405 Barel, ‘CEO of MH Warns Apartment Buyers in the West Bank’, 1; Maoz, ‘MA and MH agree on cooperation 
in construction in JS’, 1; Wiener, Letter to Michael Dekel, 1–2.
406 ILA, ‘Resolution No 262’, 1.
407 Malka, Letter to Michael Eitan, Jerusalem: Ministry of Agriculture - Found at Israel State Archive: ISA-
Moag-DeputyMinister-0013y15, 1.
408 ILA, ‘Kochav Yair’.
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while creating housing clusters. Together with the nearly perfect contour of roads, 
which followed the site’s topography and decreased the needed groundwork, the 
proposed arrangement promoted a flowing and continuous car-ride through town, 
eventually providing the sought comfortable car access to each of the parcels. Using 
separated housing clusters and a system of winding roads and streets, the proposed 
outline emphasises the desire to create a commuters’ town that focuses on detached 
private households, and less on an integrated and involved community. The repeated 
use of the cul de sac secluded each housing cluster further from the greater context 
and ensured a higher level of privacy. The use of the private parcel as the basis for 
the plan and the circular setting created an abundance of left-over spaces in the 
intersection of the streets and between the housing clusters, which the planners 
used to promote the formation of secluded and isolated housing assemblages (fig 
4.11).
FIG. 4.11 Kochav Yair Zoning 
Scheme, 1984. Israel Land 
Administration. (ILA)
The clusters of Kochav Yair consisted of different suburban types that suited its 
profile as bourgeois settlement. First and most simple sort was the array of private 
lots along the main winding roads of the town. Though very easy to execute, this 
type was not very common due to the lack of privacy and proximity of dwelling units 
to the town’s traffic, making it less attractive to future inhabitants. The most popular 
variation was that of the cul de sac. Here, a dead-end street stretched out of the 
main road and provided a more private access to each of the lots. To enhance the 
feeling of privacy and separation the private lots were partitioned from the main road 
by a “green strip”. An adaptation of the cul de sac typology was that of the common 
access. In this case, the access street was much shorter and functioned more like 
a shared admittance and parking area for the adjacent houses (fig 4.12). The first 
plan for the settlement included several larger lots, intended for larger housing 
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typologies. Later, however, as the association took over the planning process, 
it commissioned architect Meir Buchman’s office to re-arrange the settlement’s 
proposed layout, parcelling the larger lots into the same private housing clusters as 
in the rest of Kochav Yair.409 Therefore, ensuring that Kochav Yair would consist only 
of detached houses suitable for an upper-middle-class suburban community, unlike 
denser residential buildings that could harm the settlement’s morphological and 
societal homogeneity.
FIG. 4.12 Access street; cul de sac; joint access (Illustrated by the author)
The spatial privileges the members of Kochav Yair enjoyed, enabled them to 
produce private houses that suited their profile as upper-middle-class bourgeoisie. 
Regardless of their former political affiliation, each joining family became part of the 
Kochav Yair association, which was based in Metzudat Zeev, the headquarters of the 
Herut movement. Each member family was then entitled to a private lot in the future 
settlement, choosing from three options ranging from 500-1000 m2, while the exact 
location was decided through a raffle. With the association managing the design and 
construction of the houses, they were interested in promoting individuality on the 
one hand, while enforcing uniformity on the other. Therefore, together with Buchman, 
the association composed specific design regulation that with the ideal Zionist 
“good house”410 and promoted a homogeneous environment made out of two-story 
detached family houses, with simplistic white cubic features and a sloping read-tile 
roof. As claimed by Eitan, the association feared the BYOH -style “cacophony” where 
everyone does “whatever he wants” and therefore decided to create a limited number 
of housing models that each member could choose from.411 The construction of 
repetitive models was also meant to reduce construction costs and to ensure a 
quicker and more efficient procedure. Approaching six different architectural offices, 
409 Meir Buchman Architects and Planners, ‘Modification Plan SD/1002/7 A: Kochav Yair’.
410 Allweil, Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011, 14.
411 Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.
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the association invited them to propose several housing models, according to the 
different lot sizes, location, and topography. In an event held in Metzudat Zeev in 
1983, the architects presented their ideas to the first 500 members, who were then 
supposed to vote for the model of their choice (fig 4.13).412 Eventually, 80% chose 
the three models of a single architectural office while the remaining 20% chose two 
additional types.413
FIG. 4.13 Promotion drawings of a house model in Kochav Yair. 1984. The South African Zionist Federation
As bourgeois houses, they followed modest architectural characteristics and focused 
on the nuclear family and its privacy. Significantly large with an average area of 
200 m2, they consisted of a clear division between the bedroom area and the joint 
living room and kitchen space; a division heightened by the use of the split-level 
home, which characterised all of the different models.414 Though the popularity of 
this typology could be explained by the topography of the site, it is also possible 
to notice that it was used also in lots that had almost no height differences or any 
significant topographical features. The family’s privacy was further enhanced by 
orienting the living room area towards the backyard while the bedrooms faced the 
street. Consequently, creating a closed façade towards the street, shutting the house 
off of its neighbouring environment, while the more open façade was in the secluded 
family area (figure 4.14-4.15).
412 Gil-Ad, Houses in Kochav Yair [Interview].
413 Mitzpe Afek Council, ‘Building Permits Archive’.
414 Riskin, Houses in Kochav Yair and Reut [Interview]; Gil-Ad, Houses in Kochav Yair.
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FIG. 4.14 A model House - 
upper row: main facade to street, 
backyard façade, side façade. 
Lower row: Section (Note the 
family area in the lower part and 
the bedrooms area in the upper 
one, oriented towards the street); 
Plan. Gil-Ad & Yosef Architects.
FIG. 4.15 C model House - 
upper row: main facade to street, 
backyard façade, side façade. 
Lower row: Section (Note the 
family area in the lower part and 
the bedrooms area in the upper 
one, oriented towards the street); 
Plan. Gil-Ad & Yosef Architects.
The association’s ability to control the entire process enabled it to construct these 
seemingly luxurious and spacious houses in a tight and limited budget. According 
to one of the main architects involved in the project, the houses in Kochav Yair were 
“villas with a budget of social housing”.415 Nonetheless, the well-managed and 
well-connected association of Kochav Yair was able to use the recession of the early 
1980s, its contacts with leading contractors, and the purchasing power its members 
to significantly reduce the price of construction materials.416 With the help of the 
newly used computer-aided drawing software, the architects were able to produce 
repetitive plans for the different models and their various implementations.417 The 
use of reproduced details and lists was also crucial, and along with the fact that 
the contractors had to deal with a small number of architects, construction costs 
were significantly reduced. To create some variety and sophistication in the houses, 
the architects tried to design breaks and interruptions in the continuous façades 
415 Gil-Ad, Houses in Kochav Yair.
416 Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.
417 Gil-Ad, Houses in Kochav Yair.
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by creating setbacks used for balconies and entrances. Furthermore, they also 
used large concrete beams to frame two or more small windows and to create the 
appearance of a larger one.418 Maintaining low construction costs met the economic 
restraints of some of the young families, which though enjoying access to political 
power as part of the emerging middle-class, this was not (yet) translated into 
economic wealth. Consequently, due to the well-maintained budget, they succeeded 
in building their “villa” in the price of a “social housing” unit.
The managerial rights and the support the association enjoyed in Kochav Yair 
enabled a concentrated and efficient construction process. The association enacted 
a development process that included developing the needed infrastructure before 
marketing the lots to their future buyers. In doing so, the association basically 
invested the development payments paid by existing members, which they hoped to 
get back once the lots in the new neighbourhoods were sold. This proved to be highly 
efficient, as it ensured that all the public facilities such as schools, kindergartens 
and the country club, would be constructed before reaching the settlement’s full 
capacity. Nevertheless, this speculative management was made possible mainly 
due to the help of the ILA, which gave the association the needed support for the 
entire settlement before all lots were marketed; significantly reducing the risk taken. 
Eventually, despite a short period during the First Intifada when sales were low and 
some families chose not to move to the settlement, this economic model enabled the 
continuous construction of houses and the admission of new families. Subsequently, 
by the beginning of 1991, Kochav Yair became a home for almost 1000 families. 419
The scope of construction was crucial to the character of Kochav Yair as an 
exclusive settlement. The fact that almost the entire infrastructure and all houses 
were developed in several years ensured that the settlement will not turn into a 
construction site for a long period of time. Furthermore, building Kochav Yair in three 
concentrated and consecutive phases also enabled the first 500 families to enjoy the 
infrastructure and facilities that were meant to serve the whole 1000 families, which 
were crucial for the image of an appealing Suburban Settlement. With the completion 
of the third wave in the early 1990s, Kochav Yair was a done deal (fig 4.16).420 This 
meant that unlike other earlier and similar settlements, Kochav Yair had almost 
418 Drom HaSharon regional council construction committee, ‘Permit 4184/1020000400’; Drom HaSharon 
regional council construction committee, ‘Permit 21486/1020068000’; Drom HaSharon regional council 
construction committee, ‘Permit 250/1020032200’.
419 Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.
420 Maccabim Reut local council construction committee, ‘Permit 1715/210014’.
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no extensions or expansion neighbourhoods. Consequently, the homogeneous 
architecture and [sub]urban fabric were maintained, and the main changed since 
then were mostly in the level of the individual lot, as new families moving into the 
settlement would sometimes prefer demolishing the existing house they had bought 
and build a new one instead.421 However, as the houses in Kochav Yair were already 
large and relatively spacious, this was done quite seldom.
FIG. 4.16 Fig 4.16 (left-right): Houses in Kochav Yair - 1989, Tzvika Israel; 1986. Nati Harnik (GPO)
Known as the home of several generals, ministers and even an acting Prime Minister, 
Kochav Yair enjoyed the reputation of an ultimate Suburban Settlement with an ideal 
high-class community (fig 4.17-4.18). Consequently, it continued to attract the 
same upper-middle-class sector that enhanced its elitist nature. To retain this status, 
Kochav Yair resisted, quite successfully, almost all attempts of the ILA and the MCH 
to expand and change its character. These plans included annexing new settlements 
to Kochav Yair and turning it into a large regional centre that would serve the entire 
area. The objections did not concern only the changes planned in the settlement, 
but also the changes in the character of the region. In the mid-1990s for example, 
Kochav Yair voiced their disapproval to the MCH’s plan to build a new town in the 
area of Yarhiv Forest, which is more than 10km away, in fear that this would change 
the rural atmosphere of the region.422 For a period, Kochav Yair was also against 
the construction of Tzur Yigal in its southern edge. An objection that was eventually 
moderated with the promise the new settlement would also be a low-rise, spacious 
and significantly small one, designed for upper-middle-class families as well. In 2003 
421 Mitzpe Afek Council, ‘Building Permits Archive’.
422 Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel, ‘Report on the MCH plans for Kochav Yair and Yarhiv Nirit’, 
1–3.
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both settlements were merged by the Ministry of Interior into one municipal entity. 
Anyhow, they maintained their independence as no significant physical connection, 
such as streets or paths, were created between them and they were still accessible 
from two different entrances.423
FIG. 4.17 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak Meeting 
Yasser Arafat in his private residence in Kochav Yair 
(left), 2000. Amos Ben Gershom (GPO). Note the 
corner window.
FIG. 4.18 Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and 
his wife Nava watering the garden of their private 
residence in Kochav Yair, 2000. Amos Ben Gershom. 
(GPO)
The concept of detachment was an integral part of both the [sub]urban and 
architectural layouts, which is also emphasised by the lack of commercial uses. 
Though there are a few stores and public facilities inside Kochav Yair, the main 
commercial and recreational functions are found in its fringes. This includes the 
commercial centre that is located in the nearby gas-station compound, which 
consists of several stores, banks, and cafés, as well as the nearby industrial zone 
that contains office buildings, shops, and even a supermarket. The gated community 
aspect is then heightened by a physical barrier and a check post that separate the 
residential area with its nearby environment and controls those coming in, as well 
as those going out. To make this procedure more efficient and less troublesome 
for the residents, the access road consists of two lanes, one for the residents of 
Kochav Yair and one for guests. A remote identification system opens the barrier 
for cars owned by residents automatically while guests are able to enter only after 
an inspection of the security guards at the entrance. A similar inspection takes 
place also while exiting Kochav Yair, to prevent cases of car theft and burglary.424 
423 Arye Soninio Architects, ‘Urban Plan ZS/BM/1002/10 (Eyal North) Tzur Yigal’.
424 Council, ‘Security in Kichav Yair’.
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The inspection of non-residents is usually visual and based on appearance, meaning 
that the security guards distinguish by appearance those who fit the profile of 
possible guests.
Already during its construction, Kochav Yair was considered as a success story. 
Its location, which was close but not too close to Tel Aviv, attracted the potential 
young commuters that wanted to get away from the city while still remaining close 
to it. Its proximity to the Green-Line ensured that the ideological aspect of territorial 
settlement will be present, which enabled the financial and bureaucratic support of 
the state and its different administrations and settling organisations. Yet, as it was on 
the Israeli side of the line and not on occupied territory, Kochav Yair was attractive 
to upper-middle-class Israelis from all around the political and religious spectrum. 
Moreover, this also reduced the uncertainty that typically characterises settlements 
in the West-Bank, making people insecure to invest their savings in real estate in the 
area. The spacious houses and the intimate community appealed to many seeking 
spacious houses in a secluded community amidst nature, yet with all the services 
the cities close by are able to provide. Nevertheless, admittance to the settlement 
and the exposure to the project was maintained to close connected families with ties 
to the associations and one of its founding groups. All these aspects were clearly 
stated in a 1984 promotion film of the South African Zionist Federation, one of the 
partners in Kochav Yair, which was directed to members of the federation and began 
by claiming that:
“Today, sophisticated technology and a great deal of thought of quality of life are 
building Kochav Yair. Located in the vicinity of Ra’anana and Kfar Sava Kochav Yair 
is in easy reach of Tel Aviv and is located entirely in the pre-67 borders of Israel. It 
is easy to work in Tel Aviv and benefit from it culturally, yet to live in a small town. 
Kochav Yair will have a maximum of 1200 homes each with a private garden. These 
homes and the Kochav Yair lifestyle are available at a price no other quality suburb 
can offer and in travelling distance from the centre…” 425
One of the South Africans moving to Kochav Yair, who was quoted in the promotion 
film, went further and stated that:
425 Boxer, Kochav Yair.
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”One thing I want to tell you about the houses in Kochav Yair; They are not what one 
envisions when coming on Aliyah, we are talking about luxury houses, spacious … 
so this standard of housing is very high, very similar to what we have in South Africa, 
very similar”426
FIG. 4.19 Kochav Yair, 1992. 
Saar Yaacov (GPO)
Developed by and for a specific group, Kocahv Yair is a classic case of gentrification 
and place stratification. Moreover, the ability of the association to lead such a 
massive construction feasibly and efficiently could not have been done without 
the support of the different administrations, which demonstrates the selective 
privatisation enacted by the state. The focus on the detached family unit and 
simplistic design features, together with the well-perceived core settling families, 
offered this selected group the suburban dream of a spacious house and a garden in 
a distinct community while incorporating them into the national-territorial mission. 
Subsequently, in the early 1990s, as the Israeli Government asked to construct 
additional Jewish settlements in the area, it referred to them as “Stars” (Kochavim) 
as it sought to create several new reproductions of Kochav Yair along the Green-Line, 
which formed the prototype of the ideal Suburban Settlement.
426 Boxer.
TOC
 181 Gentrification & The Suburban Settlement
 4.5 Alfei Menashe: 
patches of differing spatial privileges
Developed at the same time as Kochav Yair, Alfei Menashe presents a further step 
in the privatisation of the settlement mechanism (fig 4.20). Promoted by the state, 
yet, built by private developers, it forms and interesting case study of the private-
national coalition to incorporate young, secular middle-class families in the West-
Bank project. It is located five kilometres east to the Green-Line, mostly on state-
owned lands, which were controlled by the Israeli Custodian of Absentees’ Property, 
a governmental agency that is in charge of managing the properties of absent 
Palestinians. It was built three kilometres from the Palestinian city of Qaliqilya, and 
around ten kilometres for the Israeli city of Kfar Sava. Therefore, it became part of 
the suburban projects that were referred to as the “five minutes from Kfar Sava” 
settlements;427 a slogan that derived from the marketing technique used by several 
private developers during the 1980s in order to portray the newly built settlements 
as part of the Israeli central area.
FIG. 4.20 Alfei Menashe in 2015, 
surrounded by the West Bank 
Separation Barrier (Illustrated by 
the author)
The dynamics behind the portray a process of selective privatisation, benefiting a 
well-connected and privileged group. The joint committee of the Israeli Government 
and the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) authorised the establishment of the 
427 Kislev, ‘Behind Yeruham, Behind Kfar Sava’, 7.
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settlement that would later become Alfei Menashe in August of 1979.428 Located 
near the existing Karnei Shomron the new settlement was initially named Karnei 
Shomron C. While in most cases, the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) would assign 
the location of a settlement to members of a political movement, in this case the 
representatives of the Ministry of Defence (MD) insisted that the new site would 
house families of military officers (IDF) and other employees of the Israeli Security 
Establishment.429 The Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH) and the MA 
agreed to this demand, yet due to the site’s harsh topographic conditions they 
first asked to assign the MD with an alternative location nearby. The MCH pointed 
out the site’s challenging topography, which is suitable to denser corporate-led 
construction than a low-rise environment that interested the MD (see fig 4.3 again). 
The representatives of the MD rejected the alternative site as it was too deep into 
the West-Bank and insisted on the proximity to the coastal plain. Moreover, to 
ensure this proximity the representatives of the MD required also a direct road 
connecting the site to the city of Kfar Sava while stating that they were willing to 
participate in funding some of the high development costs. The MD also insisted on 
an exclusive status for its officers, forcing the MCH to commit that all units would 
first be marketed only to members of the security forces, and only in case some 
houses remain unsold, then the MCH could have the opportunity to sell them to other 
individuals, yet only after receiving the prior consent of the MD.430
The selective privatisation continued to the choice of contractors, where the 
MCH granted favourable meant to guarantee the completion of the project. 
Tendering a project to a private corporation was a common conduct since the 
1970s. Nevertheless, with the intentions of the MD to create a high-end residential 
environment for its officers it advocated for handing the project over to a single 
large corporation that would take the responsibility for the entire process. The MCH 
would retain its managing roles while developing the needed infrastructure outside 
the settlement while the private developers would be in charge of the interior ones. 
Due to the foreseen high development costs, caused by the site’s steep and rough 
topography, the MCH agreed to grant the future corporation easier terms than 
other private developers, which included larger governmental loans and higher 
development grants. These favourable terms were improved by the MCH’s agreement 
to purchase 50% of all unsold future units, further reducing the risk taken by the 
428 Simply referred to as the “settlement committee”
429 IDF: Israel Defence Forces; Security establishment (Ma’arach HaBitahon): is an umbrella term that refers 
to the military, police, the General Security Service (Shabak), and the Mossad.
430 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘The Establishment of Alfei Menashe’, 104–15.
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private corporation. As existing large-scale construction companies were less 
interested in taking part in this project, In April 1981 the MCH signed a contract with 
Tzavta Construction and Housing ltd, a private corporation made out of eight small 
and medium-scale private construction and development companies with strong 
ties to the ruling Likud Party and the MA. With these connections, Tzavta was able to 
secure even better conditions than those initially promised by the MCH; this included 
larger governmental subsidies and even an option to construct 80% of the future 
units in the settlement.431 Subsequently, due to its monopole over the settlement, 
the name Tzavta turned into a synonym for Alfei Menashe.432
The exclusive status of Alfei Menashe included also an inclusive design, prepared 
according to the guidelines of the MD and carried out by one of the leading local 
architectural firms. In 1981, the MCH commissioned Avraham Yaski to compose Alfei 
Menashe’s masterplan and to dictate its design regulations.433 Choosing Yaski, one 
of Israel’s most successful and famous architects, emphasises the desire of creating 
an attractive suburban environment suitable for the status of the military officers.434 
Yaski’s plan of 1982 corresponded with these requirements as in consisted of a series 
of retreated and detached family parcels, which he placed along the site’s topography 
and system of curving streets; ensuring the direct and independent car access to each 
private household. Retaining the highest point in the settlement as an area for public 
functions Yaski repeated the common public centre we have already seen in previous 
settlements. However, this public area did not form the core of the settlement, but 
rather an isolated compound that Yaski separated from the exclusively residential area. 
Dealing with the site’s topography, Yaski created a system of descending terraces, 
which ensured the segregation of each house through the created height differences 
while expanding the given panorama (fig 4.21). Despite being commissioned for the 
first 500 units in Alfei Menashe (Tzavta A), Yaski’s plan included also his larger vision 
for a lager urban scheme of almost 1500 units (Tzavta B) (fig 4.22). While this greater 
plan ignored questions of land ownership and municipal boundaries, and for this 
reason it later had to be adjusted, Yaski still offered a unified vision for Alfei Menashe 
as a residentially oriented Suburban Settlement, consisting of tract houses along 
curving roads that are home to a well-established commuters’ community.435
431 State Comptroller of Israel, 104–15.
432 Kislev, ‘Behind Yeruham, Behind Kfar Sava’, 7.
433 Yaski and Partners Architects and Planners, ‘Tzavta A. Tel Aviv’.
434 Kislev, ‘Behind Yeruham, Behind Kfar Sava’, 7.
435 Yaski Partners Architects and Planners, ‘Detailed Plan 115/4: Alfei Menashe’.
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FIG. 4.21 Plan for Karnei 
Shomron C [Alfei Menashe], 
1982. Yaski Architects & Partners 
(Israel State Archives)
FIG. 4.22 Alfei Menashe, Phases 
A+B, 1982. Yaski Architects & 
Partners (Israel State Archives)
Yaski’s plan included very detailed design guidelines that promoted an exclusive 
yet restrained residential environment that is based on singularity and uniformity. 
Locating the detached houses on the inner rings and the semi-detached on the 
external roads, Yaski reduced the needed groundwork and used the site much more 
resourcefully. This concern was also manifested in the guidelines’ emphasis on the 
quite obvious manner of placing the houses along the topography, assigning each 
row or street to one latitude line. Consequently, creating the desired uniform sloped 
terraces and ensuring a higher level of perceived density. Therefore, the regulation 
stressed the need to level up each lot while constructing the houses in two levels; the 
lower one contained the kitchen and living room, surrounded by a private garden, 
while the upper level contained the bedrooms. The access to each house was either 
through the upper level in case the house was located beneath the level of the street, 
or through the lower level in case the house was higher than the street. In any case, 
the privacy of the nuclear family was ensured as the kitchen and living room, as well 
as the backyard, were always retired from the adjacent environment. The guidelines 
went also into the design of the houses, dictating a Mediterranean-like appearance 
of white cubes with setbacks that blended with the topographical differences; lacking 
the common country-side style of a cottage house with a sloping roof (see chapter 
III). Nevertheless, apparently even an avid modernist like Yaski could not avoid the 
popularity of tilted roofs during the 1980s and permitted their use. Still, he insisted 
on a unidirectional slope, limiting the diversity of its design and promoting the 
sought clean cubic form (fig 4.23).
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FIG. 4.23 Design regulations for Alfei Menashe, Yaski Architects. 1984. (Israel State Archives)
Yaski’s proposed design contradicted the regulations of the MCH, and was enabled only 
due to the demands of the MD. While in site’s with similar conditions the MCH dictated 
the construction of denser housing typologies that reduced development costs, in Alfei 
Menashe the MD insisted on a multi-terraced development of secluded single-family 
houses. With the strong influence of the MD, the MCH and the commissioned architects 
were not in the position to argue and thus offered no other planning alternatives. A 
report from the Office of the State Comptroller from 1984 heavily criticised the lack of 
alternatives and blamed the blind collaboration of the MCH on its confidence that all 
the units in Alfei Menashe would be purchased by IDF officers. According to the report, 
the MCH was sure that the high development costs would eventually be paid by the new 
homeowners from the security forces, who would receive the material support of the 
MD. An assumption that later would prove to be false.436
In the design of the houses, Tzavta continued the emphasis on the seclusion of the 
nuclear family as an essential element to the concept of ‘quality of life’. Accordingly, 
they offered four types of houses, which though differing in size, number of rooms, or 
height, all consisted of variations of the same architectural concepts. Correspondingly, 
the different dwelling types were based on the separation of the different areas of 
the house through the use of levels, which helped in merging units with the site’s 
topography while ensuring the family’s segregation from its surroundings. Similar to 
Yaski’s guidelines, Tzavta proposed different implementation options for each housing 
type, according to the location of the lot in regard to the neighbouring street (fig 4.24).
436 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘The Establishment of Alfei Menashe’.
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FIG. 4.24 House model in Alfei Menashe, 1982. Tzavta ltd. (Israel State Archives)
As the dependence on military officers proved to be unreliable, Tzavta had to launch 
a vast marketing process that targeted upper-middle-class families as their desired 
clientele. While initially, more than 400 officers expressed their interest in purchasing 
a house in Alfei Menashe, eventually only 110 did, leaving all the rest unsold. In 
search of new customers, Tzavta initiated an advertising campaign that included 
several funded promotion articles in leading newspapers and a sales office in 
downtown Tel Aviv. By choosing newspapers and locating the sales office in Tel Aviv, 
Tzavta directed its efforts the established bourgeoisie families interested in moving 
to the developing suburbia. Correspondingly, the promotion articles constantly 
highlighted the size and spaciousness of the houses in Aflei Menashe, as well as the 
community life and the allegedly high level of education it offered.437 Tzavta also 
emphasised the financial aspect of purchasing a house in Alfei Menashe, promoting 
the project not only as a desired living environment but also as an investment that 
would reap profits in the near future with the ever-increasing property values. 
Most interesting was the use of the military profile of the settlement for marketing 
purposes, as Tzavta hoped that the image of a settlement populated by IDF officers 
would form a guarantee for possible purchasers interested in a community of a 
higher level.438 The marketing efforts lasted for more than four years, and included a 
437 Ma’ariv, ‘A Fresh Method for New Settlements’, 106; Ma’ariv, ‘God’s Little Acre in Alfe Menashe’, 41.
438 Harnish, ‘Peace Now wants to srop annexation’, 1; Kislev, ‘Behind Yeruham, Behind Kfar Sava’; Pinhas, 
‘Tzavta in Alfei Menashe: a success story’, 142.
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significant price reduction of almost 20%, making Alfei Menashe the only settlement 
that witnessed a decrease in real estate prices during those years.439
With the first families moving into their houses in the summer of 1983, the flaws 
of the peculiar relationship between the MCH and Tzavta began to surface. As the 
preparations for the second phase were underway, the MCH still counted on Tzavta 
to lead the project, thus labelling it as Tzavta B. Nevertheless, the families living in 
Alfei Menashe had severe complaints against the execution of the project, leading 
to several demonstrations against what they considered as lack of infrastructure 
development, building defects and insufficient public facilities.440 At the same 
time, the relationship between Tzavta and the MCH, which gave the company a 
monopoly over the construction in Alfei Menashe, was criticised by the Office of the 
State Comptroller and several parliament members, leading almost to a criminal 
investigation due to suspicions of possible corruption and conflict of interests.441 
These complaints were backed by the lack of satisfaction from the MCH regarding 
the pace of construction and its over participation in the development costs. 
Consequently, the MCH decided to market the majority of planned dwelling units 
in the new neighbourhood to other private developers; reclaiming the power to 
develop space and fragmentising it to smaller contractors. Tzavta tried to sue the 
MCH for breach of contract, and in return, the latter sued Tzavta for the support in 
infrastructure works that were eventually not carried out. By the end of the 1980s, 
Tzavta’s role in Alfei Menashe had officially passed.442
With the loss of the MD support and the reliance on smaller construction company 
the MCH had to readapt the planned layout, taking in mind more corporate interests. 
Moreover, as vast parts of the northern area where not state-controlled but rather 
privately owned by Palestinians, the MCH had to redraft the boundaries of the 
new neighbourhood. Consequently, it adjusted Yaksi’s plan and the proposed a 
much smaller tree-shaped arrangement that consisted of a main access street and 
diverging cul de sacs. To reduce construction costs caused by the site’s topography, 
the MCH chose to turn half of the planned detached and semi-detached houses 
into row- and double-family houses. Thus, reducing the ground preparation works 
while diversifying the neighbourhoods’ composition and ensuring the developers 
profitability (fig 4.25-4.26).
439 Kislev, ‘Behind Yeruham, Behind Kfar Sava’.
440 Naveh, ‘In Aflei Menahse they don’t believe promises’, 11.
441 Bar-Yossef, ‘Earth on fire’, 13; State Comptroller of Israel, ‘The Establishment of Alfei Menashe’.
442 M.C.H., Letter from MCH Legal Department to State Atorney of the Jerusalem District - Tzavta, 2.
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FIG. 4.25 Original Zoning scheme for the northern 
neighbourhood, 1987. Yaski Architects (Israel State 
Archives)
FIG. 4.26 New Zoning scheme for the northern 
neighbourhood, 1991. Gavrin Architects. (Israel 
State Archives)
Despite the seemingly larger variety, the houses followed comparable spatial 
characteristics as the ones of the first phase. Similarly, the houses were significantly 
family-based, consisting of a living room and kitchen area that is detached from 
the nearby neighbouring environment. Correspondingly, in the row-houses, this 
detachment was achieved by orienting the relatively closed façade of the kitchen 
area and service room towards the street while the living room was oriented towards 
the backyard and the bedrooms were on the upper floor. In the double-family 
houses, where the flats were a single-floor apartment, this division was created 
by orienting the bedrooms towards the street, and the living room and kitchen 
towards the backyard (fig 4.27). The single-family houses followed the logic of 
the earlier phase of separation through topography. Though the topography was 
less sharp, and the houses were terraced, the setting used the height differences 
order to enhance the notion of separation and privacy. Later, as each house had its 
private parking place and a two-meter fence in the entrance, the spatial seclusion 
and separation was enhanced further. Though in regard to spatial characteristics 
the new models resembled former ones, in regard to design they were less similar. 
Unlike the first houses that were mainly with a flat roof, in the new parts almost all 
new units were decorated with a titled red-tiles roof. This would turn into a new 
design regulation adopted by the Alfei Menashe council, intended to promote a more 
“country-like” appearance to the settlement, and would thus characterise all future 
housing units.443
443 Sofer, Design Regulations to Tzavta B, Savion: Sofer Architects - Founf in Israel State Archive: ISA-Moch-
CentralRegion-000gw6n, 2.
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FIG. 4.27 ow houses in Aflei Menashe, 1992. Dror Sofer; Double-Family houses in Alfei Menashe, 1992. Peleg 
Architects; Arrangement of the row houses and double family houses in the northern neighbourhood, 1992. 
MCH (Israel State Archives)
To secure the continuous development of Alfei Menashe, the MCH needed to 
constantly reduce the risks taken by the private developers. Therefore, while 
the houses in the northern part were significantly denser and apparently more 
economically constructed, the contractors still dependent on the MCH for subsidies 
and support. Almost all companies involved in the new neighbourhood reported high 
development costs and approached the MCH for additional aid that would guarantee 
the project profitability and enable it completion.444 Consequently, the MCH, fearing 
that an unfinished construction project would hinder the future development of Alfei 
Menashe was willing to enlarge its participation in ground preparation works.445 
Thus, using public resources in order to enable a privately constructed project.
The development of the inner circle of Alfei Menashe presents a further step in the 
growing corporate involvement. Yaski’s plan designated the core of the settlement 
as an area for public buildings and residential uses but did not propose any detailed 
layout. In 1985, two years after the first families moved in, the MCH led a new plan 
titled “the central area”, which received the approval of the regional council.446 
It consisted of a mixed-use compound of public buildings, which included a 
kindergarten, school, supermarket and a clinic, sharing a recreational open green 
space and surrounded by a ring of multi-family residential buildings. Planned as 
terraced tenements the residential project efficiently blended with the site’s sharp 
topography while bridging the height difference between the public core on the 
hilltop and the streets around it. Through the use of the topography and by orienting 
444 Amitai, ‘Letter from Avraham Amitai CEO of Tzavta to head of central district MCH’, 1987; Milman, ‘Letter 
for CEO of Shikun u Pituah to MCH David Levy’, 1987.
445 Hameiri, Letter from Head of MCH’s Central District to Amnon Ashuri, Head of Population Department.
446 Perlstein Architcts Planners, ‘Detailed Plan 115/2’.
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the living room and kitchen area towards the open landscape, the multi-family 
buildings mimicked some of the spatial features that characterise the single-family 
house, such as a private entrance, its own backyard and undisturbed panorama (fig 
4.28). Consequently, reducing development costs and increasing the profitability of 
the project. Such a dense and resourceful use of the site suited the requirements of 
the MCH to efficiently adapt to the topographic conditions of the Samarian hills. Had 
it not been to the spatial privileges of the MD, it is likely that the entire area of Alfei 
Menashe would have consisted of similar typologies.
FIG. 4.28 The Central Area 
Plan – Upper row – layout (left) 
and zoning (right). Bottom 
row: section. 1985. Perlstein 
Architects & Partners (ILA)
While Alfei Menashe witnessed a growing corporate influence, the development of 
its eastern part presents a project dictated by the interests of a privileged organised 
association. Unlike all other parts that were initiated by the MCH, Kfir Yosef was an 
initiative of Herut-Beitar, which organised a Gar’in made out of young members of 
the movement that were interested in moving to the West-Bank. Kfir, though literally 
meaning a young Lion, was actually a portmanteau of the words Kfar (village) and 
Ir (City), which emphasised the aspiration to create a suburban community of 
commuters, somewhere between the urban and the rural. Yosef, on the other hand, 
referred to Yosef Kamerman, a politician and former parliament member on behalf of 
the Herut Party, who passed away in 1981.447 The members of Gar’in, which gave the 
name to the neighbourhood, were first interested in forming their own settlement. 
With the direct intervention of Deputy Minister of Agriculture Michael Dekel, the 
447 Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.
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group was assigned state-owned parcels adjacent to Alfei Menashe;448 receiving 
the exclusive power to colonise and develop the area. Nevertheless, to ensure a 
swift administrative process the MCH and the MA decided to regard Kfir Yosef as a 
neighbourhood of Alfei Menashe, and thus spared the bureaucracy needed for a new 
settlement.449
With the spatial privileges this group enjoyed, they were able to dictate the layout of 
their neighbourhood and the design of their houses. Accordingly, the group, which 
was headed by a Herut-Beitar association, used the same development method 
practiced in Kochav Yair; and in fact, it was managed by same person, Michael Eitan. 
Nevertheless, the group enjoyed better spatial rights, and while in Kochav Yair the 
association was able to change the proposed layout, in Kfir Yosef they were those 
that commissioned the planning scheme; thus, dictating it from the first planning 
phase. Accordingly, the group commissioned the same planner, Meir Buchman, and 
the architects designed and managed the construction of most houses in Kochav 
Yair. Therefore, the Kfir Yosef association acted as the developer, planner and a 
well-organised buyers’ club, in charge of coordinating the payments and funds and 
eventually the construction of the future houses.450
Fitting the group’s bourgeois profile the proposed layout and houses were 
significantly individualistic. Resembling the plan of Kochav Yair, Buchman drafted 
a house-oriented layout, which was based on the repetitive production of the 
private family parcel and its reachability with a private car.451 Taking the outline of 
Kochav Yair further, Buchman proposed a tract housing arrangement intended to 
parcel the area into individual private lots; thus, using the site more efficiently while 
creating a more organic layout. This organic shape was maintained also when land 
ownership issues restricted the planning area, and while an entire section was left 
out the arrangement proposed by Buchman was left intact (fig 4.29). The similarity 
to Kochav Yair continued into the level of the house, as the office of Gilad & Yossef 
proposed the same family-oriented split-level models.452 On top of being a privately 
led project built on public lands, the families of Kfir Yosef received additional funding 
from the MCH to cover construction costs, as well as special subsidies that most 
448 Dekel, A Letter from Deputy MA, Dekel to Ministry of Defence.
449 Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.
450 Eitan.
451 Buchman, Kochav Yair.
452 Gil-Ad, Houses in Kochav Yair.
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members were not entitled to as they have already owned an apartment.453 Thus, 
enabling this well-connected group to affordably build their own spacious private 
houses with substantial bureaucratic and material assistance.
FIG. 4.29 Kfir Yosef zoning 
scheme, Meir Buchman, 1984 
(left). Kfir Yosef zoning scheme, 
Meir Buchman, 1984 (right) Note 
the areas that were removed due 
to land ownership. (ILA)
As the MCH tried to further enlarge Alfei Menashe it encountered several administrative 
restrictions and the suspicion of the families living in the settlement that feared 
losing its exclusive status. Already in the late 1980s, the MCH began promoting a 
more corporate-led neighbourhood in the southern part of Alfei Menashe, Giva’at Tal. 
Therefore, it commissioned architect Israel Bar Lev to plan a new urban neighbourhood 
that would not consist of small single-family houses, but rather of 3-4 story multi-
family buildings over a ground floor, with a nearby hotel and even a Zoo.454 However, 
several issues turned this large-scale project into a complicated task. The first problem 
the planners had to cope with was land ownership. Apparently, not all the lands in the 
southern area of Alfei Menashe were owned by the state and it consisted of significant 
portions privately owned by Palestinians from neighbouring villages. Initially, the MCH 
thought that the Palestinian families would be willing to sell their lands and ordered the 
planners to think of a cohesive overall scheme. Conversely, as the Palestinian refused 
to cooperate Bar Lev had to readjust his plan and give up the intention to creating a 
cohesive scheme and shifted towards two separate residential compounds, which were 
453 Hameiri, Letter from Head of MCH Central District, Yehdua Hameiri to CEO MCH Amos Unger; MCH, 
‘Meeting Protocol - Minister of Construction and Housing David Levy at Alefi Menashe 21.10.1989’.
454 MCH, ‘Planning report for Giva’at Tal. Akfei Menashe’.
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not even connected to Alfei Menashe (again due to land-ownership).455 Moreover, 
with the advancement in the negotiations between the Israeli Government and the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Israel applied a “construction freeze” in the 
West-Bank, which caused several setbacks in the planning process and dragged it for 
almost a decade. An additional objection was raised by the Alfei Menashe council as it 
feared that a new urban neighbourhood would harm the image of an exclusive suburban 
settlement and the high living standards it asked to be affiliated with. In a steering 
meeting in 2000, Eliezer Hasdai, head of the Aflei Menashe council, claimed that they 
pressured the MCH to plan larger, and relatively more expensive units, in order not to 
attract weaker families that would harm the settlement’s status.456 Ultimately the plan 
for Giva’t Tal consisted of clusters of semi-detached houses and lots for multi-family 
high-rise buildings, resembling the high-rise suburbs that began emerging in the nearby 
area at the same time (fig 4.30) (see chapter V). Yet its construction would start almost 
twenty years after the plan’s approval.
The development of Alfei Menashe consisted of different suburban patches that 
fitted the profile of their developers and future settlers. This was caused by the 
sporadic nature of the development process, which was dictated by the differing 
demands, economic interests and corporate speculations. Alfei Menashe began as 
a classic state-led gentrification project, where the state asked to attract upper-
middle-class families to the area by granting them generous spatial rights. While 
in the first years the residents of the settlement asked to exhibit a positive image 
to their relationship with the Palestinian villages and towns, which they referred 
to as the “Arab neighbours”, the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987 caused a 
significant decrease in the perceived security. The settling families, which were 
initially proud of the lack of defensive measures such as a guarding post and a 
perimeter fence in Alfei Menashe that granted the settlement an image of a normal 
locality, soon began demanding stronger military presence and the construction of 
new bypass roads.457 Consequently, the interest in Alfei Menashe decreased, and the 
recurring construction freezes and land ownership issues did not help in attracting 
contractors.458 Therefore, as we saw here, the state kept on granting different spatial 
privileges to a variety of private agencies, in order to maintain the development of 
the settlements. Consequently, leading to a variety of suburban typologies.
455 Bar Lev, ‘A letter from Arch Israel Bar Lev to MCH’, 1994.
456 DMR Development Planning Ltd, ‘Alfei Menashe Master Plan Steering Comittee’, 3.
457 Rabinovic, ‘Residents from Alfei Mensashe and Kochav Yair: the atack on eyal road was expected due to 
weaknes of defence forces and government’.
458 Katan, ‘Letter to Benjamin ben Elizer, Minister of Housing’, 1994.
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FIG. 4.30 Giva’at Tal zoning scheme. Upper row: 1989 (left); 1990 (right). Bottom row: ca. 1995. Bar Lev 
Architects. (Israel State Archives)
While the state planned a more corporate-led development for Alfei Menashe, its 
location and status prevented this from taking place until the 2010s. The Second 
Intifada did not improve Alfei Menashe’s image and the settlement did not witness 
any significant growth during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Only after the 
construction of the West-Bank barrier that surrounded Alfei Menashe and separated 
it from the neighbouring Palestinian towns and villages and the national housing 
crisis, was the construction renewed. The works on Giv’at Tal, which was authorised 
in 1996, began almost 20 years later. The same goes for the two smaller extension 
neighbourhoods, one in the northern part Alfei Menashe, and one almost 16km 
east to it (see chapter III); both of which were privately initiated on lands bought 
from individual Palestinians. The construction of the West-Bank barrier did not only 
lead to better security, but it also allowed Alfei Menashe to shake off the West-Bank 
settlement image, and to be marketed as just another suburban community only a 
car ride away from Tel Aviv.
Alfei Menashe began as a classical Suburban Settlement, which became more 
corporate-oriented as it grew. Its initial size and layout matched the desire to 
create a somewhat exclusive and small-scale residential environment. Moreover, the 
mechanism behind its initial phases constitutes an interesting case study of power 
relations between the different groups like the military, the contractors and the 
state. Therefore, as the latter was interested in developing the area and to upgrade 
its image as an attractive suburban environment, it gave the military the power 
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to dictate the formation of space. Consequently, promoting the suburban lifestyle 
desired by the officers, all in order to attract them to the area and gentrify it. The 
contractors, on the other hand, were able to use their connections to receive an 
exclusive power to develop and market the settlements while continuously receiving 
public aid in order to complete the construction process.
Alfei Menashe was a classic example of selective privatisation. The first waves 
consisted of well-connected middle-class families that were able to transform their 
social and political capital into spatial privileges, using the state’s interests to 
gentrify the area and to improve its image. As the town grew the state continued with 
the method of creating secluded and separated residential compounds (fig 4.31). 
Therefore, though it reached almost 10,000 inhabitants, Alfei Menashe is practically 
an assemblage of different detached neighbourhoods that share the same municipal 
services (fig 4.32). Each neighbourhood has its own access to the external road 
system and is thus an independent area. The development of separated compounds 
served two main objectives. On the one hand, it enabled Alfei Menashe to spread 
over a larger area, which strengthened Israeli presence in the West-Bank, as seen in 
the extreme case of Nof Hasharon neighbourhood (chapter III). On the other hand, 
by creating these secluded clusters, Alfei Menashe retains the small-scale suburban 
atmosphere that families moving to the area are interested in purchasing. This also 
ensures that the larger projects that are being built today would not hinder the 
village-like image of the existing neighbourhoods, and that the current residents 
would not heavily resist all new real estate ventures. As seen above, suburbanisation, 
territorial expansion, and privatisation were thus the main forces that dictated the 
location, the layout and the form of Alfei Menashe, and they continue to do so today.
FIG. 4.31 Area of Alfei Menashe, 1986, Blue line is the existing parts and in yellow are the parts to be added. 
Note Kfir Yosef in the north-east corner; Area of Alfei Menashe, 1988. Note the added area of Giva’at Tal in 
the south. Area of Alfei Menashe, 1992. Note the scattered areas added south west to the settlement ,IDF. 
(Israel State Archives)
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FIG. 4.32 Different parts of Alfei Menashe, 1989, 
MCH. (Israel State Archives)
FIG. 4.33 Alfei Menashe, 2018. (Govmap)
 4.6 Oranit: a monopoly of a private 
corporation
Oranit illustrates an intriguing case study of the coalition between national and 
private interests and the gentrification of the Green-Line. It is a West-Bank 
settlement, less than a kilometre inside the occupied territories (fig 4.34), which 
houses an upper-middle-class community of 9000 inhabitants and belongs to the 2nd 
highest socio-economic decile of Israeli localities. Similar to other settlements in the 
area it is affiliated with the secular central/left side of the political map, and not the 
religious right-wing West-Bank settlers.459 It was established in 1983, and it lies in 
the fringes of the West-Bank, in the slopes of the western Samarian hills. It borders 
Horashim forest and Israeli-Arab460 village of Kufr Bara in the west, the Arab-Israeli 
town of Kufr Qasem in the south, the Arab-Palestinian villages of Azzun Atma in the 
east and that of Abu Salem in the north. The relatively sparse Palestinian population 
around Oranit, the natural landscape surrounding it and its proximity to the central 
coastal area were leading features which ensured that Oranit would become an ideal 
location for families looking for a house in the developing suburban ring.
459 ICBS, ‘Localities in Israel’; ICBS, ‘Population in Jewish localities, mixed localities and statistical areas, by 
selected countries of origin’.
460 Referring to the Palestinian Citizens of Israel
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FIG. 4.34 Oranit in 2015 
between Palestinian localities 
on both sides of the Green-Line 
(Illustrated by the author)
Oranit constitutes an additional step in the privatisation of the settlement 
mechanism. Unlike all other settlements discussed in this chapter, Oranit was almost 
entirely privately developed. It started as an initiative of Delta ltd that was formed by 
five different and quite unrelated individuals, with minimal knowledge and experience 
in development, real estate or planning.461 The company began purchasing lands 
from local Palestinians in the area, in the hope of eventually establishing a new 
Jewish settlement. They enjoyed close connections to the reigning Likud party and 
the Israeli Government, specifically with deputy Minister of Agriculture Michael Dekel, 
who was in charge of new rural settlements in the West-Bank and was known as an 
enthusiastic supporter of the settlement project in general; particularly privately 
initiated ones (figure 4.35-4.36). In September of 1982 Delta was personally 
promised by Dekel, after expressing his enthusiasm, that he will support their project 
and promote the establishment of Oranit.462
461 Shiloni, Development of Oranit [Interview].
462 Dekel, ‘A letter to Delta ltd’, 1982.
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FIG. 4.35 Deputy Minister Dekel (middle of picture) visiting the future 
site of Oranit, 1982. (Ma’ariv )
FIG. 4.36 Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir (left) and Deputy 
Minister Dekel (right) visiting the 
construction site of Oranit, 1984. 
(Ma’ariv Newspaper)
The authorisation of Oranit by the Ministerial Settlement Committee in 1983 was 
a clear act of selective privatisation spatial privilege. Beyond the common decree, 
the committee’s order stated that Oranit will be privately developed, and most 
importantly, that Delta would be its sole developer.463 The unprecedented order to 
give a private company an exclusive status will later prove to be very problematic. 
The incentive behind this decision could be explained by the government’s attempt 
to hand out its full responsibility to one clear developer that would act as its 
representative and be responsible for the entire project. Yet, in 1994, Dekel would 
be indicted and found guilty of receiving bribes from different West-Bank developers 
and land merchants that were connected to Delta. Considering the company’s lack of 
experience and knowledge, the explanation that this decision was taken mainly due 
to the company’s ties with the government is highly reasonable.
Confident in governmental support, Delta began planning and developing the site 
even before the official authorisation. It approached Giora Shiloni, a road engineer 
that had recently returned from working in the US. Shiloni made the initial layout, 
which was later processed into a more detailed urban planning scheme.464 Focused 
on generating an alignment of residential lots the proposed layout was quite 
simplistic and recreated the common arrangement of main roads and inner cul de 
sac streets. The attempt to create a distinctive low-rise and low-density environment 
continued to evolve, and while the first plans included triple-family houses in the 
settlement’s main area, these were later concentrated in its fringes, not interfering 
with the sought distinct character (fig 4.37-4.38). Land ownership issues constantly 
played a major role and though Delta undertook an intense effort to purchase private 
463 Government of Israel, Decision 1196.
464 Shiloni, Development of Oranit.
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lands from their Arab owners, these efforts were not always successful. Several 
where unwilling to sell their lands to Israelis, leaving undeveloped enclaves inside the 
settlement (fig 4.39), while other owners later claimed that their lands were taken 
from them unwillingly or by fraud, in what will be known as the “Lands Affair”.465
FIG. 4.37 Oranit, 1982. Yosef 
Sivan and Giora Shiloni, Delta ltd 
1982. (Israel State Archives)
FIG. 4.38 Oranit, 1983. 
Yosef Sivan and Giora Shiloni 
(Israel State Archives). Note 
the enclaves of unresolved or 
unbought private lands
FIG. 4.39 Oranit, 1991. Yosef 
Sivan (ILA). Note the changes in 
the allocation of lots along the 
streets, the yellow lots for more 
dense units are at the fringes of 
the settlements and no longer 
along the main street.
The marketing process was of a selective nature and targeted a specific profile. 
Aiming to attract families searching for a suburban lifestyle, the houses marketed 
in Oranit were significantly large, yet still affordable. Labelled as a “city in nature”, 
Oranit was depicted as a tranquil and pleasant small-scale settlement, which is 
surrounded by a pristine and pleasant landscape, yet, close to the main metropolitan 
area.466 The ideal location and the affordable prices, which were less than half of a 
similar house in cities nearby, enabled Delta to engage in a relatively quiet marketing 
campaign that relied more on word of mouth and targeted specific well-profiled and 
well-connected families. These included officials in the Israeli Aerospace Industries, 
where one of the developers was previously employed, or physicians from Tel-
Hashomer Hospital.467 In doing so, they ensured the desired homogeneous character 
465 Naveh, ‘Arabs sold lands and then complained that it was stolen in order not to take a bullet’, 13.
466 Delta ltd, ‘Oranit’.
467 MCH, ‘Oranit’, 1987.
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of the future population while attracting families with similar profiles. Consequently, 
almost all homebuyers were upper-middle-class families from cities in the coastal 
area and several American Jews interested in moving to Israel.468
The distinctive profile of the population was expressed also in the layout and design 
of the houses. Referred to as villas, and not cottages like in earlier cases, Delta 
intended to construct 300 out of the 500 lots while the remaining 200 were meant 
to be developed in a BYOH method. To retain the homogeneity and reduce costs 
Delta adopted the model system and proposed the families moving to Oranit seven 
different options of single and double-family houses.469 Though designed by three 
different offices that, according to the architects, enjoyed substantial professional 
freedom, the different models were significantly similar and focused on the privacy 
of the nuclear family living in spacious, yet unpretentious, houses. Accordingly, they 
repeated the popular split-level typology and the division between the different 
areas of the house while maintaining a quite humble appearance, as seen in the 
marketing pamphlets issued by Delta ltd. Fittingly, it emphasised the “good” family 
house that was depicted in the middle of nature, with no neighbours, surrounded by 
trees and an open landscape (fig 4.40).470 These similar architectural concepts were 
strengthened by the construction of almost all houses by the same contractor and 
the use of the same designs in the BYOH lots.471
Adequate to the profile of the families, Delta referred to them as “purchasers” or 
“clients”, and not merely settlers.472 Delta also referred to the act of purchasing a 
house as an “investment” to be refunded in case the Israeli Government chooses to 
withdraw from the West-Bank before the end of construction.473 This perspective 
was mutual, as seen in several residents’ comments in a 1985 interview addressing 
land ownership issues, stating that “we invested here and we will continue to 
invest here”.474
468 Delta ltd, ‘List of Homebuyers in Oranit’.
469 Iron, Houses in Oranit [Interview].
470 Delta ltd, ‘Oranit’.
471 Globes, ‘High profits from sales in Oranit’.
472 Delta ltd, ‘Oranit’, 2.
473 Ibid
474 Naveh, ‘Arabs sold lands and then complained that it was stolen in order not to take a bullet’, 13.
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FIG. 4.40 House models in Oranit - Upper Row: Model B, Kaplan, Iron, Shachar; Model C, Peri Architects; 
Model D, Kaplan, Iron, Shachar; Model H, Yacobovic Architects; Model F (double family), Kaplan, Iron, 
Shachar. Bottom row: Model B, Section; Model C, Section; Model D, Section; Model H, Section; Model F, 
Section, Delta ltd. 1982. (Israel State Archives)
After the initial selective marketing that granted Oranit the image of an attractive 
and exclusive settlement, Delta was able to promote a limited number of denser 
housing units. In the eastern part of the settlement, detached from the core of 
private houses, Delta developed a series of four-story buildings, which though being 
multi-family tenements, their design implies that they were planned to recreate 
the appearance of a private house. Using setbacks, roof terraces and separate 
entrances, the units were planned as separate apartments offering a high level of 
privacy to their dwellers (fig 4.41). A similar case were the terraced houses in the 
northern part of Oranit, which were planned to ensure a higher level of privacy while 
giving the family a feeling of living in a private house, as seen in the detachment 
of the units from their surroundings and their ornamentation with a tilted roof (fig 
4.42).
The mentioned “Lands Affair” fractured the image of Oranit as an exclusive and not 
too ideological settlement and affected its further development. After the completion 
of the first phase, Ashdar, one of Israel’s largest construction companies, was 
supposed to develop the nearby site of Tzamaraot, owned by a different private 
company. Due to the bad publicity and setbacks in the project, as well as the 
monopoly of Delta that was not revoked until the mid-1990s, Ashdar eventually 
withdrew, and though initial plans were made during the late 1980s this project 
remained on hold for more than 20 years.475
475 Baron, ‘Also here people donated to the Likud’, 23.
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FIG. 4.41 Plan of double family house. Yosef Sivan, 
Delta ltd. 1982, (Israel State Archives)
FIG. 4.42 Oranit, 2000. Moshe Milner. (GPO). Note 
the denser houses on the left side of the photo
FIG. 4.43 First houses in Oranit, 
1985. Baruch Naeh, (Ma’ariv 
Newspaper)
By the beginning of the 1990s, the problems of this selective privatisation and the 
monopoly granted to Delta began to surface. The main complaints of the newly 
established local council were that Delta did not develop the inner infrastructure as 
promised and that the roads that it did pave were done inappropriately. Privately 
developed meant that the MCH was not allowed to subsidise any of the inner 
infrastructure works. Consequently, the Oranit council had to allocate funds from 
its own budget to complete or repair the unfinished works. This meant that it had 
to issue a road tax for all households, significantly increasing their cost of living.476 
Moreover, in 1990 the office of the State Attorney gave a very strict interpretation to 
the exclusive status of Delta in Oranit, as it claimed that the company was the only 
entity that has the legal right to commission any new planning schemes or projects 
476 Cohen, ‘Letter to MCH regarding infrastructure in Oranit’, 1990.
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in the area of the settlement.477 Thus, limiting even further the responsibility and 
authority of the local municipal council. This issue eventually turned into a power-
play between Delta, the local council, and the MCH, and the exclusive status was 
revoked only in 1996.478
Though seemingly a private project, Oranit received significant governmental 
support that went beyond bureaucratic issues. Located in the occupied West-Bank 
and not in the official area of the state of Israel, several crucial planning regulations 
followed the Jordanian planning law and not the Israeli one. One of these is the 
percentage of public uses in a newly planned residential area. Using the Jordanian 
regulations, which were much less generous regarding public functions, Delta was 
able to maximise the amount of marketable residential lots.479 Subsequently, the ILA 
had to assign public lands south of the settlement for the uses of a high school and 
cultural centre, contributing public property to a private endeavour. Later, due to the 
lack of available public lands, the MCH planned to expand Oranit across the Green-
Line (on its Israeli side), on state-owned land reserves assigned to the Israeli Arab 
village of Kufr Bara (fig 4.44).480 The plan, which started as a conceptual option in 
the late 1980s, became very concrete in the mid-1990s and received the support of 
leading politicians like Prime Ministers Rabin and Peres, and even left-wing ones like 
Yosi Sarid, a fierce opponent of the settlement enterprise.481 Eventually, however, 
it was not implemented, mainly due to the inability to have one entity on both sides 
of the Green-Line, though there were several original solutions, such as having two 
different legal entities but a sole practical one.482 Consequently, the only expansion 
possibilities were the small-scale sites whose ownership was resolved (fig 4.45).
477 Albeck, ‘Delta: Oranit’.
478 Government of Israel, Decision 905.
479 Shiloni, Development of Oranit.
480 MCH, ‘Oranit’, 1991.
481 Elgazi, ‘A settelment into the Green-Line’, 8.
482 Shiloni, Development of Oranit.
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FIG. 4.44 A plan to extend Oranit westwards, 1991, 
MCH. (Israel State Archives)
FIG. 4.45 New area added to Oranit in deep grey, 
1992, IDF. (Israel State Archives)
Due to its location and population, Oranit continued to attract newcomers over the 
years. Quite detached from the West-Bank, except for a few incidents and temporary 
feelings of insecurity, the settlement was not significantly affected by the violent 
outbreaks of the First Intifada. The relative stagnation the settlement witnessed 
through the 1990s was not an outcome of political tensions or lack of attractivity, 
but mainly due to the mentioned land ownership issues. The inhabitants of Oranit, 
well aware of the reputation of their settlement, were interested in maintaining it. As 
a result, they opposed the possibility that people outside of the settlement would 
come to use public functions inside it, like the school or the new sports club, and 
therefore insisted on high prising.483 Oranit was practically a gated community, 
physically, as it is surrounded by a security fence, and socially as well.
The reputation of Oranit as an attractive and legitimate settlement increased with 
the construction of the West-Bank Separation Barrier in 2006. Physically detached 
from the occupied territories and becoming de facto part of the official area of Israel, 
Oranit was cleansed from the stigma of a West-Bank settlement, as well as the 
defence and legal repercussions that came with it. By that time, the majority of land 
issues in the nearby Tzamarot area were resolved and two different urban planning 
schemes were authorised around the year 2000, both by private companies (fig 
4.46). Though planned separately, the area did have a relatively unified character, 
which resembled the existing private-house-oriented fabric of Oranit. Unrealised for 
some time, probably due to the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, they were 
fulfilled after the construction of the separation wall in 2006 that gave it needed 
economic feasibility. Ashdar, which was supposed to be the neighbourhood’s initial 
483 Oranit Council, ‘Council Meeting Protocol - 20.3.1993’, 1–5.
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developer in the 1980s,484 bought some 150 dunams in the area,485 developed them 
and began marketing prepared lots to individual purchasers. Concurrently, smaller 
privately developed projects were also taking place in other parts of the settlement. 
Delta ltd planned and marketed the last lands in owned in the south-western part of 
Oranit, while other private entrepreneurs promoted the construction of new terraced 
housing units in the north-western fringes of the settlement’s original site; enjoying 
the spatial privileges granted by the state while adopting denser housing typologies 
(fig 4.47).
FIG. 4.46 Tzamarot Zoning scheme, 1997. Yosef Sivan; Southern Extension, 2000. Ilon Marom Architects 
and Planners; Eastern extension plan 2001, S.S architects. (ILA)
FIG. 4.47 Terraced houses in Oranit, D.M Architects and Planners, 2011. (ILA)
The story behind the establishment of Oranit consists of a mixture of private, 
economic and national interests. The state, interested in developing Jewish 
settlement in the area, was willing to hand out its sovereignty to a private contractor, 
and by giving it unprecedented spatial privileges that included the power to produce 
space the state literally privatised the settlement enterprise. The developers, on the 
other hand, were able to use the relatively comfortable terms in the West-Bank, their 
ability to purchase Palestinian lands in the area and their ties with the government 
in order to receive a monopoly over Oranit and by that to conduct a significantly 
484 Priel, ‘Dozens of large development companies are engaged in JS’, 2.
485 Yamin, ‘Ashdar purchased 150 dunams in Oranit’.
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economic and efficient process. At the same time, the families moving into the 
settlement were attracted by the location, the affordability, and the relatively small 
and high-class community. These three interests were entangled one with the other, 
until Delta’s economic interests began contradicting those of the inhabitants, the 
local council and the MCH. Yet, once this issue was resolved, the coalition of interest 
between the state, private developers and upper-middle-class families continued 
onward. In Oranit, the implementation of the national mission of settling the area 
was entirely handed over to the private market. Its development thus needed to 
answer the economic calculations of its developers and demands of their bourgeoisie 
clientele. In the 1980s this group was interested in distinctive family-oriented villas, 
and after they received the sought dream houses, the private developers were 
able to continue developing Oranit as enclaves of low-rise houses and larger-scale 
complexes, surrounded by Arab-owned lands (fig 4.48).
FIG. 4.48 Oranit and the smaller 
new residential compounds 
surrounding it, 2018. (Govmap)
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 4.7 Reut: the IDF as an omnipotent (private) 
spatial agent
Reut represents the status of military officers as an integral part of the emerging 
Israeli upper-middle-class and their leading role in the gentrification of national 
peripheries and frontiers. Perceived as a stable, ideological and rewardable group 
by the different planning administrations, mid-level military personnel became a 
dominant factor in the development of the local suburbia in the mid-1980s and 
later.486 Unlike in earlier examples, like in Alfei Menashe, where military officers 
were seen simply as potential customers, by the end of the 1980s they began 
organising associations that enabled them to take on the role of an entrepreneur. 
Later, the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) would establish an internal unit named the 
Housing Administration (Minhelet HaMegorim), which would become responsible 
for organising such housing associations and projects. The young officers’ interests 
for suburban living met those of the government to enlarge the Jewish population 
and presence in frontier areas. Moreover, different struggling localities that sought 
to improve their situation saw the potential in attracting young families of military 
officers that would strengthen the local socio-economic composition and promote 
the popular image of their town, eventually attracting also other upper-middle-
class families. The mechanism behind the new military neighbourhood was relatively 
simple. The military, or one of its branches, would organise an association that 
would manage the construction of a new town or neighbourhood. The Israel Land 
Administration (ILA) would then assign the association a site, whether in the edges 
of an existing town, or in frontier areas, in order to promote its development.487 
The association would then manage the planning and construction of the new 
neighbourhood while administrating the possible funding and governmental financial 
support available to the young military families (fig 4.49). The Reut project is 
perhaps the best example of this mechanism.
486 Berger, Autotopia: Suburban In-between Space in Israel, 140–48.
487 Berger, 140–48.
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FIG. 4.49 Illustration of the 
different special mortgages 
and funding possibilities for 
military families, which include 
three main sources: the MCH, 
IDF and MD. All managed by 
the Administration. (IDF Housing 
Administration)
One of the first examples of this new method was the military neighbourhood in 
Yavne. Yavne, a development town in the larger Tel Aviv metropolitan was considered 
up until the 1980s as a weak and unattractive locality. The young mayor of at that 
time, Meir Shitrit, who was keen on bringing a new influx of established young 
families to his town, initiated together with the Personnel Branch of the Israeli Air 
Force (IAF) a new residential neighbourhood to house its officers (fig 4.50-4.51). 
The construction of Neot Idan neighbourhood was managed by an association 
organised by the head of the IAF Personnel Branch, Colonel Zvi Gov-Ari, who named 
it after his eldest son, Idan. This model, that proved to be very successful, both 
for the town of Yavne and the IAF officers, gained much popularity, and similar 
initiatives followed. What began as an inner unit of the IAF, would later become part 
of the larger military’s Human Resources Directorate, serving officers and non-
commissioned officers from all branches of the IDF.
FIG. 4.50 Neot Idan neighbourhood, Yavne. 1980s. 
(Neot Idan collection)
FIG. 4.51 The IAF Yavne quire, 1987. (Neot Idan 
collection)
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Located in the developing national frontiers and housing one of the state’s most 
privileged groups turned Reut into an ideal Suburban Settlements. Today it 
constitutes one of the boroughs of the larger city of Modi’in, yet it preceded it and 
began as separated residential project meant to house families of IDF officers. 
Located midway between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, in the then yet undeveloped and 
relatively pristine regional council of Modi’im,488 it enjoyed a rich natural landscape, 
an open view towards the coastal plain, and a moderate climate (fig 4.52). Moreover, 
Reut is adjacent to the Green-Line, just across the developing new settlement of 
Maccabim, that was built in the former no man’s land between Israel and Jordan. Due 
to its profile as a Pilots’ settlement, together with its location and socio-economic 
composition, Reut became an attractive settlement and was considered as a typical 
suburban success story. After the establishment of the city of Modi’in in 1996, it 
was annexed to it, together with Maccabim. Yet, it still retains a relatively distinct 
character and is managed by its own borough council.
FIG. 4.52 Reut in 2015, between 
the city of Modi’in and the Green-
Line (Illustrated by the author)
Developing the site of Reut was part of the new state-led efforts to domesticate the 
area along the Green-Line. The ILA declared the area of Reut as a site for future 
settlement already in the late 1970s, which was then a military training zone and 
by settling it the ILA sought to transform its frontier-like nature and to incorporate 
it into the Tel Aviv metropolitan region. The army personnel were therefore used by 
the ILA in order to demilitarise the area,489 fitting the common phrase that “the only 
488 Not to confuse the city of Modi’in with the regional council of Modi’im
489 Ministry of Defence, ‘Draft Resolution’.
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one that can move the IDF, is the IDF”.490 The district outline plan that was under 
planning since 1980, had already designated the location for future settlement 
(fig 4.53), yet its nature was not yet decided. Parallel to the regional planning 
process, the ILA and the IDF had already been surveying possible sites for a military 
settlement that would form a duplicate of the Yavne project. Nevertheless, unlike 
Yavne, this project would be much larger with an emphasis on younger officers no 
older than thirty-five years of age. This, according to IDF Chief of General Staff 
Lieutenant General Moshe Levi, was the only way to encourage good officers to 
extend their service in the existing “budget constraints”.491 Therefore, while the ILA 
proposed other locations for the IDF, the latter insisted on this specific site, due to its 
availability, size, proximity to different military bases and designation as a Suburban 
Settlement in the draft for the new district outline plan.492
FIG. 4.53 The Future site 
of Reut, Regional Plan 3/2, 
1980-1988. (Israel Land 
Administration)
Reut was an outcome of a reciprocal collaboration between the IDF, the ILA and the 
MCH.. After the ILA and the IDF’s agreement, the military housing project needed the 
approval of the government, and thus the blessing of the MCH. Therefore, in 1984, 
Chief of Staff Levi sent an official letter to the Minister of Construction and Housing 
David Levi,493 asking for his assistance in the ministerial committee while highlighting 
the project as “crucial for Israel’s security”.494 To relief the minister from budget 
concerns, Chief of Staff Levi mentioned that the project would be planned, developed 
490 Mentzel, Reut and Rosh Ha’ayin [Interview]; Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements [Interview].
491 Levi, ‘Letter to Minister of Construction and Housing - Housing Project for Military Personnel’, 1984, 1.
492 Eldor, ‘Letter to CEO of MCH - Modi’in - 2.3.1987’, 1987.
493 No family ties. Levi is a common family name in Israel
494 Levi, ‘Letter to Minister of Construction and Housing - Housing Project for Military’, 1984, 2.
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and constructed by the military.495 In a meeting at the office of the CEO of the MCH 
that discussed the planning of a future city in the area, which at that time was still 
preliminary and spoke of possible locations on both sides of the Green-Line, it was 
agreed to allocate the “wanted hills” for the Ministry of Defence, as it is “a serious 
group that had already proven itself in Yavne”.496 Therefore, although the ministry 
officials were less interested in developing another “secluded”, “inefficient” low-rise 
settlement, they highlighted the importance of attracting a “strong population” to 
the area, which could “ease directing future ventures”.497 Therefore, the ministry was 
willing to support the IDF’s demands and to grant it substantial spatial privileges, yet 
for a residential neighbourhood that would be a starting point for the planned city 
in the area.498 Consequently, the ministry asked to refrain from designating the site 
as a Community Settlement, due to its selective nature, and asked to coordinate its 
development with all settlements nearby, east and west of the Green-Line, in order to 
aid in the development of the future city.499
The far-reaching support for the military housing project concluded in the decision 
of the Israeli Government to authorise the establishment of Reut in December of 
1985. The official statement declared the project as a “neighbourhood for military 
personnel” that would eventually “be part of an urban settlement… planned by 
the MCH”.500 This decision was not received well by all planning agencies and 
administrations, and the national emergency of developing the area was equivocal. 
The initial policy of the MCH was to refrain from vast public investment in the area, 
in order to focus more on areas of “political preferences” and to rely more on small 
scale private investment.501 Correspondingly, the Authority of Rural and Agriculture 
Planning and Development of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Jewish Agency, 
warned that such a development like in Reut, would eventually harm the plans to 
495 Ibid
496 MCH, ‘Meeting Protocol 1.4.1985’, 1.
497 Eldor, ‘Letter from the Head of the MCH’s department of urban development, Sofia Eldor, to the CEO of 
MCH, Asher Wiener - 25.10.1984’, 1985, 1.
498 Eldor, ‘Letter to IDF Housing Administration - 20.4.1985’, 1985.
499 Eldor, Letter to Cabinet Secretary, Jerusalem: Ministry of Construction and Housing - Found at Israel 
State Archive.
500 Government of Israel, Decision 1196, 1.
501 Ravid, Modi’im Area, Tel Aviv: Ministry of Construction and Housing, Administration of Rural Construction, 
1.
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“populate and strengthen areas of national importance, and especially Jerusalem”.502 
Nevertheless, as the decision was already taken, and no one wanted to confront 
the IDF and its “need to grant 1000 officers housing solutions”,503 Reut was a done 
deal. Furthermore, though several economically struggling towns in the district like 
Ramleh, Lod and Rosh Ha’ayin initially protested against the project as they hoped to 
attract the military families, they ultimately gave in as the MCH promised to promote 
new plans for low-rise suburban-like neighbourhoods in their jurisdiction, with a 
possibility of attracting military personnel as well.504
The spatial privileges the state granted to the IDF were more than the exclusive use 
of the site, and the omnipotent status of the HA enabled it to control all aspects of 
the project’s development, even its location. As both the ILA and the government 
saw the military neighbourhood as a preliminary stage in the development of the 
future city of Modi’in, and due to the IDF’s strong political and social capital, the IDF 
Housing Administration (HA) had substantial planning rights. According to Colonel 
(retired) Oren, the head of the HA at that time, though the official decision stated a 
specific location for the project, the HA was able to move it by more than a kilometre, 
bypassing the governmental decree and choosing a site with better topographic 
conditions.505 The authority of the HA continued to the planning process, as the ILA 
declared that the site would be planned and developed by the HA. Usually, while 
issuing a plan for a new residential neighbourhood, the entrepreneur requires the 
consent of the local council. However, as Reut was a new project the HA was not only 
the entrepreneur but also the local council, thus subjected only to the authority of 
the district level. Initially, the HA asked to avoid this level as well, asking that the 
MCH to create a special independent committee that would speed up the process.506 
The MCH was able to convince the HA that this is not needed, only after assuring it 
that the existing district council is unable to object the project as it is backed by both 
the government and the national planning council.507
502 Moran, ‘Analysis of Population in Modi’in Area’, 5.
503 Moran, 6.
504 Eldor, ‘Letter to CEO of MCH - Modi’in - 2.3.1987’, 1987.
505 Oren, Reut [Interview].
506 Morag, ‘Letter to CEO of MCH: Military Personnel in the Modiin area’, 1986.
507 Eldor, ‘Special Planning Committee’, 1986.
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With the significant spatial privileges the IDF received, it was able to improve its 
housing production mechanism; controlling the planning and construction more 
efficiently. Initially, the newly established housing association continued in the same 
method of Yavne, and was even named Neot-Idan B (later Neot-Reut).508 Though the 
target group, in this case, was not exclusively the Airforce, but rather from the larger 
military, the HA remained under the command of the IAF Personnel Branch due to its 
previous experience. Moreover, while in Yavne the planning work was assigned by the 
local council,509 in Reut, it was commissioned by the HA and the association, enabling 
them to dictate the layout of the future neighbourhood according to its need as a 
developer and as a representative of the future inhabitants. Accordingly, the HA hired 
the office of Meir Buchman, which had already been mentioned in the chapter.510 The 
experience of the HA, the planning expertise of Buchman, the connections and power 
of the IDF and the omnipotent status of the association in Reut, guaranteed that the 
project would be planned and accomplished efficiently and resourcefully.
Commissioned by the association, which was simultaneously the developer and 
end-user, Reut’s layout followed both suburban desires and efficiency aspirations, 
while lacking any rentability concerns of a private entrepreneur. Buchman’s proposed 
layout was a purely residential and housing-oriented setting that resembled other 
suburban projects of the time. Yet, while the common suburban layout consisted 
of parcels of different sizes, Buchman focused on a single dimension (ca. 450 m2), 
creating a non-hierarchal and uniform layout; fitting the egalitarian nature of the 
military. As the IDF was not a profit-driven developer interested in obtaining the full 
real-estate potential of the site, Buchman’s layout was not an outcome of subdividing 
a given area into marketable parcels, as commonly practised in a typical tract 
housing development, but rather a result of combining parcels into housing clusters. 
Accordingly, Buchman opted for a system of a main winding access road and a 
series of cul de sac streets which used the site’s topography to form independent 
compounds of about fifteen houses each (fig 4.54-4.55).
The association’s lack of profitability concerns enabled Buchman to plan a 
secluded settlement surrounded by a well-developed landscape. Respectively, 
his plan consisted of 30% residential areas,511 whereas in similar projects it is 
more than 50%. This enabled him to surround the isolated housing clusters with 
508 Meir Buchman Architects and Planners, ‘Detailed Plan GZ/117’.
509 Nahoum Zolotoz Architects, ‘Outline Plan YV-132-1’.
510 Buchman, Kochav Yair.
511 Meir Buchman Architects and Planners, ‘Detailed Plan GZ/117’.
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an abundance of open public spaces that addressed the main interests of the 
military officers for a secluded settlement. At the same time, while the popular tract 
housing layout that followed the economic optimisation of the site’s parcellation 
located all public functions outside of the settlement, Buchman was free from such 
considerations and was thus able to propose a public centre in Reut; implying on its 
communal character.
FIG. 4.54 Reut, 1986. Meir Buchman. (Israel Land 
Administration)
FIG. 4.55 Reut, extension, 1992. Meir Buchman. 
(Israel Land Administration)
The architectural design of the houses in Reut was an outcome of the officers’ 
desire for customisations and the association’s interests in standardisation and 
optimisation. As already stated in a memo from the Cabinet of the Chief of Staff 
in 1986, the dwelling units were to be planned with considerations of “quality and 
costs”.512 Fittingly, commissioning leading architects like Chyutin, Riskin, Bracha 
& Hakim and others, ensured the quality of future houses.513 Additionally, the 
association asked the architects for a number of housing models with an option 
for partial or full construction according to the needs and economic abilities of 
each officer. Each family was then able to choose their preferred model with a 
maximal size of around 250 m2. Though the apparent abundance of choice, the 
different housing models were significantly similar, following the same spatial 
characteristics and design regulation dictated by Buchman and the association.514 
512 Chief of Staff Cabinet, ‘Housing Project - Modi’in Plan’, 3.
513 Maccabim Reut local council construction committee, ‘Permit 1715/210014’; Maccabim Reut local 
council construction committee, ‘Permit 1435/210030’; Maccabim Reut local council construction 
committee, ‘Permit 524/210001’.
514 Buchman, Kochav Yair.
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This included an insistence on single-slope roofs, specific cubic dimensions, and 
white exterior walls,515 which gave Reut the appearance of an idyllic suburb, made 
out of rows of homogeneous white houses (fig 4.56-4.57).516
FIG. 4.56 Houses in Reut under construction, 1989. 
(IDF housing Administration)
FIG. 4.57 Reut, 1997. Moshe Milner (GPO). in the 
background the city of Modi’in during construction.
The architectural guidelines imposed by the association went beyond mere design 
and included specific instructions that ensured the formation of a withdrawn, 
introvert and homogeneous residential environment. Beyond the mentioned aesthetic 
instructions, the guidelines imposed by Buchman and the association included 
specific parameters for the placement of each house in the lot, creating a buffer 
zone that disconnects it from the nearby street and emphasises the centrality of the 
backyard and the private family area.517 Accordingly, the different models consisted 
of a split-level home, which used the site’s topography to create an inner division 
between the family area and the bedrooms while orienting the living room towards 
the backyard (fig 4.58-4.60). The only case where the association asked to place 
the family area in the front of the house was in parcels that were higher than the 
adjacent street. Yet, this was meant to increase the panoramic view from each living 
room and not to better connect the family to the community, especially as each 
parcel was then forwarded by a retaining wall that secluded it from the street.518
515 IDF Housing Administration, ‘Reut B’.
516 Oren, Reut.
517 Riskin, Houses in Kochav Yair and Reut.
518 Oren, Reut.
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FIG. 4.58 Model for a house in Reut B, Arik Riskin. 1991. (IDF Housing Administration)
FIG. 4.59 Model for a house in Reut B, Izik & Wieser Architects. 1991. (IDF Housing Administration)
FIG. 4.60 Drawings of one of the models in Reut, planned by Arik Riskin. Note the offset from the street and 
the orientation of the family area towards the backyard, closed façade the street (middle right) and open 
façade to the back (middle bottom). 1991 (IDF Housing Administration)
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With the association’s control over the entire construction process, it was able to 
enforce broad standardisation that significantly increased the homogeneity of Reut 
while optimising its development. Though each family was able to select the model of 
its choice, the location of the lot was decided by the association, as the latter wanted 
to create single-model compounds that would consist of the same housing type. 
This would enhance the uniformity of the residential environment, as suitable for a 
military-led project, while rationalising the construction process.519 To optimise the 
process further, the association established a parallel development company, named 
Megorei Modi’in ltd, which was run by the same officers, yet as a private corporation, 
and it was thus able to manage the procedure economically, ensuring the quality of 
construction in relatively low prices.520 Consequently, the first phase of Reut, which 
included around 1000 housing units, was a concentrated construction effort that the 
association was able to conclude in around three years. This was an unprecedented 
case of non-governmental suburban development that enabled the construction of 
500 additional houses directly afterwards.521
Three decades after its completion, Reut continues to form a privileged housing 
project, even after the construction of Modi’in which it was supposed to merge with. 
With a single gated entrance and no physical connections to other localities nearby, 
Reut was run by the same local council as Maccabim and functioned as separated 
upper-middle-class gated settlement. By the early 2000s, as the Ministry of Interior 
asked to merge the two with Modi’in, the citizens of Reut tried to resist the merger, 
fearing they would lose their unique small-scale suburban character by becoming 
part of a city. Eventually, even though Reut became officially a part of the city of 
Modi’in-Maccabim-Reut, it still retains its unique quality, tone and independence. The 
borough of Reut is still managed by the Neot Reut Association, which is in charge 
of running the daily municipal services and developing the area, and the built area 
of Reut and that of Modi’in still maintain their segregation through a series of open 
green spaces and lack of connecting streets. Consequently, Reut is still regarded 
as the idyllic suburban upper-middle-class settlement and the home of the pilots of 
the IAF.
Reut, with the omnipotent status of the IDF personnel in its development, presents 
a unique case in the selective privatisation of the Israeli settlement mechanism. The 
unprecedented spatial privileges granted to the IDF enabled it to control almost all 
519 Mentzel, Reut and Rosh Ha’ayin.
520 Maccabim Reut local council construction committee, ‘Permit 910127/4560’.
521 Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements; Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.
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aspects of Reut’s production. Eventually, leading to a unique settlement, which was 
an outcome of its developers’ desires for quality suburban lifestyle, as well as their 
interests for an optimised, efficient and resourceful construction process. Therefore, 
the suburban features that characterise Reut, are not simply a tool used by the state 
in order to attract officers and their families to its frontier, but rather an outcome of 
the unique development method that turned the military into both the producer and 
consumer of the new settlement. Thus, it was not the built environment in itself that 
functioned as a territorial tool, but rather the ability to develop it.
With the success of Reut in offering military officers an exclusive residential 
environment while gentrifying the Green-Line, it turned into a prototype for 
further IDF and ILA cooperation. Consequently, following Reut, the HA continued 
developing additional housing projects in the Israeli periphery. First were the military 
neighbourhoods of Rosh Ha’ayin, which the MCH and IDF suggested to develop 
already in 1987 as a way to appease the town’s discontent from choosing the 
site of Reut for the military housing project.522 Consequently, the underprivileged 
and neglected Rosh Ha’ayin of the 1980s, attracted young and well-established 
families and was thus able to continue developing, turning into one of Israel’s 
emerging cities. Later, were smaller compounds in the new city of Modi’in or new 
neighbourhoods in other underdeveloped peripheral towns like Nazareth-Illit, Negba, 
Karkur, Akko, Gadera or Beer Sheva.523 Nevertheless, in all following projects, the HA 
had to work with an existing local council and a prevailing local masterplan, which 
decreased its exclusive status and ability to dictate every aspect of the project. 
At the same time, as a representative of the IDF, the HA was still able to negotiate 
over key planning issues for the benefits of the military families. The logic behind 
these projects was maintained, as it included promising officers large houses 
in cheap prices while extending their service and gentrifying under-developed 
areas.524 Accordingly, these military neighbourhoods were secluded and segregated 
residential areas, as implied by their names, which almost always consisted of the 
words Naveh or Neot (Hebrew for Oasis). These Oases, with their unique method 
of gentrification, prepared the transformation of the public image of the areas they 
were built in, turning them from frontier regions or impoverished towns to fertile 
ground for larger investments, and the ILA was thus willing to privatise both property 
and planning rights.
522 Eldor, ‘Letter to CEO of MCH - Modi’in - 2.3.1987’, 1987.
523 IDF Housing Administration, ‘Nofei Ramot. Marketting Brochure, Petah Tikva’.
524 Bar-Eli, ‘IDF Housing Administration Offers Officers Offers They Can’t Refuse’.
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For years the slogan of the IDF’s education corps was “the nation builds the army 
that builds the nation” (A’m Bone Tzava Boneh A’m).525 Whether this sentence is 
valid for Israeli society in the individualistic 21st century or not, it still implies the role 
of the IDF as an integral part of the local culture and identity. However, in the case 
of Reut, it may be more suitable to claim that “the nation builds an army that creates 
real-state”, as it was through this unique case of selective privatisation that the state 
sought to develop its frontier, leading to one of the largest development projects in 
its history- Modi’in.
 4.8 Conclusions: localised American suburbs 
and state‑oriented gentrification
More than the appeal of the suburban dream house, it was the spatial privilege 
of being able to produce it that formed the main tool in the privatised settlement 
mechanism during the 1980s. In their analyses of place stratification, Logan and 
Alba claim that in many cases “most successful members [of the minority group] 
may live in worse locations than even the lowest-status members of the majority”.526 
Claiming this, they explain how favoured groups are able to use their privileges 
to secure their desired residential preferences. In Kochav Yair and Reut the state 
gave a small group of privileged families the permission to build an exclusive and 
secluded Suburban Settlement by granting them the power to plan, develop and 
inhabit state-owned lands. Consequently, these families significantly improved their 
living standards, as they were able to affordably obtain a spacious private house in 
a homogeneous secluded community while transforming their social and political 
capital into real estate. In Alfei Menashe the power to form space was first granted to 
the privileged group of military personnel and specific well-connected contractors. 
As these two were either uninterested in the site or unable to develop it properly, the 
state then approached other privileged contractors and civic groups, forwarding to 
them the power to develop and inhabit the settlement. In Oranit, it was the private 
525 Sasson-Levy, ‘Where Will the Women Be? Gendered Implications of the Decline of Israel’s Citizen Army’, 
183.
526 Logan and Alba, ‘Minority Proximity to Whites in Suburbs: An Individual-Level Analysis of Segregation’, 
244.
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developers’ political capital that was put to use, as the received governmental 
support granted them a monopoly over the construction process, and an almost 
unlimited power to plan, construct, commodify and market space. For marketing 
reasons, the developers sought to attract the same upper-middle-class families, 
which would grant Oranit the image of a high-class project and eventually lead to its 
success. Therefore, though all cases were supported by right-wing politicians, whose 
main electoral power consists of the blue-collar and middle-class Mizrahi sector, it 
was eventually the upper-middle-class centre/left Ashkenazi sector that inhabited 
these settlements.
The ability of the bourgeoisie to both produce and consume space concluded in the 
similar architectural and [sub]urban characteristics of all case studies presented 
in this chapter. The appeal to upper-middle-class families was the settling tool 
applied by the state, and architecture and planning were thus the product of this 
specific tool. Applying this new settlement tool, the state promoted the development 
of a new typology – i.e. the Suburban Settlement, which significantly differed from 
former Israeli urban and rural precedents. While in the communal rural settlements 
and in the quasi-socialist development towns the focus was on creating a unified 
community, in the Suburban Settlements the focus was on the individual family. 
This was echoed in the use of the single unit as the focal point of the entire planning 
process. In Kochav-Yair and Reut, the process was carried out by a non-profit 
oriented association and the layout was based on duplicating the basic parcel and 
paving the site with it. In Oranit, and also in Alfei Menashe, as the development was 
handled by a private corporation, the site was subdivided into smaller parcels, while 
resourcefully using the land’s real estate potential. Nevertheless, in both methods, 
the new settlements were purely residential, lacking any apparent hierarchy or 
diversity. Therefore, the layout of this new settlement typology, derived from its 
settlers’ interests in social seclusion and from its developers’ economic incentives.
Characterised by homogeneous lines, the architectural qualities of all settlements 
fitted the distinct profile of the new pioneer bourgeoisie. The repeatedly used split-
level houses, whether in a single, double or row-house variation, which continued 
the sequence of separations and enhanced the focus on the private family life. The 
tract housing development and the focus on the private family parcel as the basis of 
planning were clearly inspired by the American suburban model. In that sense, the 
chase of the bourgeoisifying Israeli middle-class for better living standards in the 
developing suburbia corresponded with the American Dream of a detached private 
house, a garden and a car. Nevertheless, American Suburbia was not implemented 
as is, but rather received an Israeli interpretation. The main difference was in the 
positioning of the houses and their relation to their surrounding environment (fig 
4.61). In the American example, the houses are usually built parallel to the access 
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street, while orienting an entrance porch and the living room to it. In this case, the 
private front yard formed a symbolic buffer zone between the public and the private 
spheres, while enhancing the homogeneous character of the neighbourhood. In 
the Israeli version, the houses were constructed mainly perpendicular to the street, 
minimising the relation to it, while orienting the living room towards the backyard, 
as far as possible from the neighbouring environment. Augmenting the seclusion 
further, the front yard, which functioned mostly as a parking area, was cut off from 
the street by a physical wall. In the Israeli suburban dream, the private households 
were meant to function as independent entities or monades, forming an extreme 
case of its American inspiration (fig 4.62).
FIG. 4.61 Levittown Long Island, 1954 (Bettmann/Corbis); right- Kochav Yair, 1986. Nati Harnik (GPO)
FIG. 4.62 American Suburb; right- Israeli Suburb (Illustrated by the author)
The Israeli Suburban Settlement forms a local spatial implementation of 
globalisation. In his writing on the Americanisation of Israel, Uri Ram, claims that 
globalisation is a dual process, while using the example of the McFalafel to illustrate 
the Americanisation of the local, but also the Localisation of the American.527 In a 
527 Ram, ‘Glocommodification: How the Global Consumes the Local – McDonald’s in Israel’, 11–31; Ram, The 
Globalization of Israel, 179–206.
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way, the Israeli version of the American suburb, realised in Suburban Settlements, 
constitutes the spatial version of the McFalafel phenomenon. And this McFalafel was 
precisely what the upper-middle-class families moving from cities were looking for, 
as its anti-communal features formed a contra to all former socially oriented Israeli 
residential models; transferring the Tower and Stockade approach from the level 
of the community to that of the family. Correspondingly, as the following chapters 
show, the secluded family unit would continue to form the main focus of planning in 
all future residential developments.
Using the upper-middle-class to domesticate the Green-Line was a coordinated 
gentrification process that turned the former frontier area into suburbia. Through 
this state-supported endeavour, this hegemonic group was seduced by the privileged 
spatial rights, as Kim Dovey would claim, to settle along the Green-Line and to enable 
its domestication. Turning the area from a region inhabited by pioneer-like settlers 
into the dormitory of doctors, academics, high-ranking officers and senior officials 
concluded in its legitimisation; eventually becoming an integral part of the national 
consensus. As we have seen here, the development of all case studies promoted 
the economic feasibility of larger housing projects, whether inside the settlements 
or surrounding them. Consequently, the following projects that we will encounter 
in the next chapters would no longer be the same low-rise and detached residential 
environments, but rather high-rise and denser housing typologies. The Suburban 
Settlement thus functioned as a real estate avant-garde, gentrifying the area and 
preparing it for its mass suburbanisation (fig 4.63-4.64) (chapter V).
FIG. 4.63 General view of a Suburban Settlement 
(Illustrated by the author)
FIG. 4.64 Future development around the Suburban 
Settlements (Illustrated by the author)
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5 Mass‑ 
suburbanisation 
& the stars 
 settlements
Supply‑side territoriality
A shorter version of this chapter was submitted and accepted at Space and Polity: 
–  Schwake, G. Supply-side territoriality: reshaping a geopolitical project according to economic means. 
Space and Polity. (in print)
 5.1 Introduction: from gentrification 
to suburbanisation
Following its gentrification during the 1980s, the Green-Line became an attractive 
and appealing area. Consequently, this enabled the further privatisation of the 
settlement mechanism and a growing reliance on private capital. Therefore, the state 
enacted a supply-side housing policy, securing the developers’ interests as a means 
to ensure the area’s continuous development. Subsequently, unlike earlier examples, 
where the focus was on granting future settlers the power to colonise space, this 
shifted to granting private entrepreneurs the power to develop and market it. 
Accordingly, rentability became a crucial aspect in planning and executing new 
settlements, as the new outline schemes had to take in mind the private developers’ 
investment and financial interests, eventually, reshaping the built environment. 
Therefore, as the Israeli Government had to deal with the local housing crisis 
caused by the mass Jewish immigration from the Post-Soviet Bloc, the corporate-led 
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mass-suburbanisation of the Green-Line during the 1990s was a state-organised 
development that intended to enlarge the national supply of dwelling units while 
enhancing the state’s power over its frontiers.
This chapter focuses on the ‘Stars’ settlements that present a new step in the 
privatisation of the geopolitical project and a new set of spatial privileges (fig 5.1). 
These were eight new sites initiated by the state in the early 1990s as part of the 
national efforts to expand the existing housing reserves. This chapter explains 
how the settlement mechanism relied on supply-side housing policy as its main 
method, turning into the new settlement tool. Analysing the spatial features of the 
‘Stars’ settlements, this chapter demonstrates how this newly applied supplied-side 
territoriality affected the production of the built environment, concluding in new 
architectural and [sub]urban typologies, which were part of the transformation of 
the Green-Line into real estate; eventually, finalising its domestication.
FIG. 5.1 Case Studies in 2015 
along the Green-Line and the 
West-Bank Barrier (Illustrated by 
the author)
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 5.2 Peace talks, immigration and a national 
housing crisis
The early 1990s was a period of significant political changes. By 1991, the declining 
violent uprising of the First Intifada and the Arab-American coalition during the first 
Gulf War, as well as the improving relations between the US and Russia, created an 
opportunity to revive the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian peace process. This led to the Madrid 
Conference, already during the right-wing government of Yitzhak Shamir. Though 
eventually the immediate consequences were limited, it was a crucial rapprochement 
between both sides that enabled future talks. Moreover, as part of the negotiations, 
the US administration promised the Israeli Government substantial financial aid in the 
absorption of Jewish immigrants coming from the collapsing USSR. With the election 
of Yitzhak Rabin as Prime Minister in 1992 the peace talks between Israel and the 
Palestinian representatives were restarted, eventually leading to the Oslo Accords; a 
series of agreements signed by the State of Israel and the PLO, as part of the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process, intended to lead to a permanent solution. As an interim 
agreement, it created the autonomous Palestinian Authority, as a momentary self-
governing body, in charge of the newly created areas A+B in the West-Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. These consisted of the major Palestinian cities and towns, while Israel 
retained its control over all other areas (Area C). The agreements included mutual 
recognition between the PLO and the State of Israel, while leaving the issues of the 
nature of the future Palestinian State and its borders, the status of Jerusalem and the 
question of Palestinian refugees to be dealt with in later agreements.
The political and diplomatic efforts, together with new waves of immigration affected 
the development and suburbanisation of the Green-Line. In 1989 Mikhail Gorbachev 
lifted all immigration restrictions off of the Jewish population in the USSR. The Israeli 
Government , which sees itself responsible for the fate of the entire world Jewry, 
sought to encourage this immigration, which would also aid in the local demographic 
competition with the Arab Palestinian population, hopefully guaranteeing a Jewish 
majority. The estimation was that in several years more than one million immigrants 
(referred to as O’lim) would arrive in Israel, adding up to 20% of the local population, 
which at that time included less than five million inhabitants. The estimations would 
initially come true, as in 1990-1991 more than 300,000 USSR Jews came to Israel.528 
528 Tolz, ‘Jewish Emigration from the Former USSR since 1970’, 1–27.
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This ignited, once again, the national plans of absorption and redistribution of the 
country’s population,529 while consequently causing an increase in the overall demand 
for dwelling units. The assurances to the US administration that its financial support 
of this immigration would not be invested in new West-Bank settlements, and later the 
‘construction freeze’ the Rabin government placed over the occupied territories as 
part of the peace talks with the PLO, all caused the state to focus its new development 
efforts outside of the West-Bank. At the same time, strengthening the Israeli presence 
along the Green-Line would help create an Israeli sequence with [some] of the inner 
settlement blocs. Therefore, limiting the creation of Jewish enclaves in a future 
Palestinian state, and thus ensuring the attachment of these settlement blocs to the 
state of Israel, in case of a territorial compromise. Moreover, a stronger Israeli presence 
all along the Green-Line would prevent any Palestinian claims to seize lands outside 
of the West-Bank as a compensation for the Jewish Settlement blocs that remained 
annexed to Israel. Thus, preventing any potential land swaps and minimising the size of 
a future sovereign Palestinian entity.530
The involvement of private capital in the developments along the Green-Line grew 
substantially during the 1990s. Already in the first plans for the area, during the 
tenure of Ariel Sharon as Minister of Construction and Housing, the governmental 
plan was to enlarge the supply of dwelling units by encouraging private developers. 
The new Rabin government, though led by the seemingly socialist Labour Party, 
did not withhold the privatisation processes, and even expanded it significantly.531 
Among the leading measures the government took were the privatisation of several 
state-owned companies and eventually also the construction of the planned 
transnational highway. By the 1990s, privatisation was thus a given fact, supported 
by almost the entire political spectrum.532 At the same time, the areas on the Israeli 
side of the Green-Line, which as we have seen were ideological enough to be seen 
as an area of national priority, yet no too ideological to be left outside the national 
consensus. Thus, there development was supported by almost the entire political 
spectrum as well, turning into an ideal platform for the suburban turn of the 1990s. 
This mass-suburbanisation eventually completed the domestication of the former 
frontier and incorporated it into the greater Tel Aviv metropolis.
529 Efrat, ‘Geographical Distribution of the Soviet-Jewish New Immigrants in Israel’, 355–63.
530 Adiv and Schwartz, Sharon’s Star Wars: Israel’s Seven Star Settlement Plan.
531 Hason, Three decades of privatisation.
532 Rabinowitz and Vardi, Driving Forces : Trans-Israel Highway and the privatization of Civil Infrastructures 
in Israel.
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 5.3 Pushing, pulling and supplying
In the process of suburbanisation, there are usually two main forces that generate 
urban immigration. First, there are the pull factors of suburbia, which usually consist 
of a better quality of life, manifested in a large private house, a well-established 
community, and affinity to nature. Second, are the push factors of the city, such 
as crime, taxes and ethnic/economic tensions.533 While this is usually true for the 
upper-middle-class, or ‘white suburbanisation’,534 that of lower classes is more of 
an urban ‘spill over’, caused by high rents that push the poor to the fringes of cities; 
creating an extension of the low-income ghettos.535 In a way, the pull factors of the 
suburbanisation along the Green-Line during the 1980s, were created by the state. 
By allocating lands to homogeneous communities or by subsidising construction 
costs and mortgages, the state stimulated the demand for housing units in the area, 
while supporting the decentralisation efforts.
With the ongoing privatisation of the Israeli economy, the development method of 
its built environment significantly changed by the 1990s, as already demonstrated 
in the previous chapters. Earlier, the state took the role of both the planner and 
developer. Yet, the increasing dependence on private construction companies, 
first led to the involvement of private contractors, which later turned into 
developers and entrepreneurs. The state withheld its status as planner, but relied 
on marketing the parcels of each newly planned site to private contractors, which 
were later supposed to develop each lot and to sell the constructed units to private 
families.536 Thus, similar to other neoliberal economies, Israel began applying 
a supply-side housing policy, which included a variety of economic measures, 
policies and deregulations,537 all intended to “enabling the markets to work”.538 
533 Marshall, ‘White Movement to the Suburbs: A Comparison of Explanations’, 975.
534 Ibid
535 Lake and Cutter, ‘A Typology of Black Suburbanization in New Jersey since 1970’, 172.
536 Carmon, ‘Housing Policy in Israel: Review, Evaluation and Lessons’, 200–208.
537 Brenner and Theodore, ‘Cities and the Geographies of “actually Existing Neoliberalism’, 349–52.
538 Rolnik, Urban Warfare: Housing under the Empire of Finance, 20; World Bank, ‘Housing: Enabling Markets 
to Work’.
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In this housing approach, dwelling units are supplied by safeguarding the interests of 
the developers in the hope that this would eventually benefit the end-users.539
In the Israeli territorial version of supply-side housing policy, the MCH sought 
to develop the frontier by turning it into real estate. Thus, it had to make sure 
that the new settlements were ‘marketable’, meaning that the building rights and 
regulations would also ensure the profitability of the construction. In 1990, the 
Israeli Government would take an additional crucial step towards a supply-side 
housing market as it would exempt income from rented properties from the overall 
taxed income. By enacting a maximal 10% tax rate, the state sought to encourage 
homeowners to put their properties out on the market and to enlarge the national 
housing stock.540 The financial support to settling families could on the one-hand 
be seen as demand-side housing policy, while on the other, it could be seen as 
an extension of the supply-side strategy, as it is intended to create a demand for 
housing in a specific area.541 Thus, ensuring that the supplied apartments would 
eventually be bought.
During the 1980s, the involvement of private developers west of the Green-Line 
was minimal. While in the West-Bank, the state actively attracted developers by 
financing construction costs and promising to purchase unsold units, on the Israeli 
side of the frontier there were mainly contractors, commissioned by one of the 
housing associations.542 Demand for suburban housing did exist, yet not in the 
scope of large-scale private investment. The recession in the building industry of 
the 1980s, prevented private developers from taking part in large-scale projects 
where the governmental support was minimal. On this side of the line, the state 
assigned subsidised public lands to small groups (like Kochav Yair or Reut, see 
chapter IV), who then had the ability to build their own suburban settlements. 
This step gentrified the area and turned it into an exclusive environment while 
making future investments possible. In an internal meeting of the MCH regarding 
housing settlements for IDF officers, the report clearly states that these are 
539 Galster, ‘Comparing Demand‐side and Supply‐side Housing Policies: Sub‐market and Spatial 
Perspectives’, 561–77; Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years, 377.
540 Israeli Tax Authority, ‘Israeli Tax Authority’.
541 Gutwein, ‘The class logic of the “long revolution”, 1973-1977’.
542 Maggor, ‘State, Market and the Israeli Settlements: The Ministry of Housing and the Shift from Messianic 
Outposts to Urban Settlements in the Early 1980s’, 140.
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“a factor that attracts additional populations to the area, ‘creates’ hundreds of 
housing units per year and is able to assist the ministry from an organizational 
point of view”.543 As the state substantially developed the West-Bank in the 1980s, 
as well as the infrastructure that connected it to the coastal plain, the area was no 
longer considered as a geographical periphery. Subsequently, with the national 
shortage in dwelling units in the 1990s, private developers and entrepreneurs would 
take over the development of the area; leading to an accelerated process of mass 
suburbanisation. Starting with mass-produced low-rise residential environments and 
ending with a high-rise suburbia.
With the transition into a supply-side approach, the residential parcel became 
the focus of planning. To enact an optimised marketable system, the MCH began 
implementing specific dimension for each housing type. For example, in the planning 
process of a new eastern neighbourhood in Rosh Ha’ayin during the early 1990s, 
the ministry equipped the planners with specific dimensions of parcels needed for 
each dwelling types and a list of the desired composition of housing units (fig 5.2). 
The planners were then in charge of implementing this list in their proposed outline. 
The art of urban planning was thus the ability to create a harmonious system of 
fixed parcels, while the essence of the architectural task was to optimise the building 
rights of each parcel, generating the optimal sizes and number of dwelling units.
FIG. 5.2 Instructions for 
Tzamarot neighbourhood - Left: 
desired dimensions of residential 
parcels; Right: desired dwelling 
types and composition (Israel 
State Archive)
543 MCH, Meeting Regarding Construction for Military Personnel 2.9.1990, 1.
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The Modi’in project of the mid-1990s is perhaps the best example of this transition. 
The idea of establishing the city (or even a city) of Modi’in first rose up in the late-
1960s. The initial thoughts included a new suburban town in the fringes of Gush Dan544 
(in a different location of today). The concept was of a satellite town, which would 
redistribute the population inside the Tel Aviv Metropolitan area more equally.545 In 
the late 1970s, the current site of the city was mentioned in the ‘Hills Axis Plan', as 
potential settlement area, which would become part of the overall national effort to 
develop an eastern counterpart to the coastal plain, along the hilly area of the Green-
Line.546 The idea re-emerged in the 1980s, when the emphasis was on enlarging the 
supply of residential units east of Tel Aviv.547 Meant to control the suburbanisation of 
the metropolitan area by directing it eastwards along the connection between Tel Aviv 
and Jerusalem, the MCH asked to develop the city of Modi’in “by private developers 
[and] by means of various governmental incentives”.548 Modi’in, according to the 
director of the MCH’s urban department at the time, was “based on economic efficiency, 
private initiative and indirect government involvement”.549 Thus, developed with a focus 
on encouraging private investments instead of relying on public ones.
In 1988 the MCH commissioned Israeli-born Canadian architect Moshe Safdie to 
compose a skeleton plan for the future city. Safdie’s general concept consisted 
of an orthogonal grid system, which he then adjusted to the local topography; 
developing the upper parts as residential neighbourhoods, while leaving the lower 
ones as open green spaces and access roads. Safdie’s design concept for each 
neighbourhood included terraced buildings along the topography with a park and a 
residential high-rise landmark on a hilltop.550 The MCH then divided the entire area 
into six compounds, assigning an architectural firm to plan each of them. The firms 
of Safdie, Meromi, Buchman, Gershon, Hashimshoni, and Kaiser, were then in charge 
of composing a detailed outline plan for their own site. After the approval of the 
detailed plan, the MCH was able to market the different parcels in each site to private 
developers, who would then construct the planned neighbourhoods.
544 The Tel Aviv Metropolitan area
545 IPD, ‘Modi’in’.
546 Kipnis, Potential of Developing Urban Housings along the Hills Axis.
547 Eldor, ‘Letter from the Head of the MCH’s department of urban development, Sofia Eldor, to the CEO of 
MCH, Asher Wiener - 25.10.1984’, 1985.
548 Eldor, ‘A new town in Modi’in’, 2.
549 Eldor, 3.
550 Moshe Safdie Architects ltd, Modi’in: A New City.
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The realisation of Modi’in was an unprecedently efficient process that represents 
the new supply-side approach of the MCH. In a relatively short period of time, the 
formerly vacant site turned into a city of tens of thousands of families. The efficiency 
of the construction process was not only in the assembly line production method, 
but also in the ‘closed market’ policy, that dictated that all revenues from the project 
had to be invested back in infrastructure and development, in order to attract 
more private investment.551 Modi’in was thus a classical supply-side story, and the 
homogeneous architecture, as well as the fact that the different neighbourhoods 
are still referred to as ‘sites’, bearing the names of the architects that planned them, 
highlights this even more. While the planning and execution of the first phases in 
Modi’in was a decade long coordinated process managed by the MCH and a vast 
crew of planners, project managers and other ministerial officials, the smaller 
settlements nearby, the Stars, were developed in a significantly shorter period of 
time. Built in order to rapidly answer present needs, they were thus more an outcome 
of an improvised process controlled by private developers, than a long and complex 
procedure. Therefore, the story of their development tells a more genuine and unique 
narrative on the selective privatisation of the local settlement mechanism, and the 
architectural typologies and [sub]urban models it generated.
 5.4 The Stars: from private associations to 
private corporations
The Stars (HaKochavim), is a term that refers to a series of localities that were 
developed along the Green-Line in the 1990s and form a new step in the privatisation 
of the Israeli settlement mechanism. This usually includes the new sites of Harish, 
Bat Hefer, Tzoran, Matan, Tzur Yigal, Ela’ad, Tzur Yitzhak, Shoham and sometimes 
even the city of Modi’in. Though today the Stars refer to a variety of settlements in 
different sizes and socio-economic backgrounds, the original idea was to develop 
small-scale suburban localities along the Green-Line, meant to attract young families 
seeking better living conditions manifested in suburban lifestyle. The Israel Land 
Administration (ILA), together with the Ministry of Housing and Construction (MCH) 
551 MCH, ‘Ela’ad: adjusting land costs and analysing apartment prices’.
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initially sought state-owned lands in the area for precisely this purpose. By the 
mid-1990s, as the state led an intense effort to disperse the population in the area, 
due to political reasons and the national shortage in dwelling units, it significantly 
stimulated the development of the region by promoting the enlargement of existing 
localities, the acceleration of on-going planning efforts and the transformation of 
several sites from suburban to more urban settlements.
The state promoted the ‘Stars’ settlements as an improved and more efficient version 
of the Suburban Settlement of the 1980s. One of the main driving forces behind the 
Stars was Parliament Member Michael Eitan, who already played a leading role in the 
development of Kochav Yair (see chapter IV). Offering upper-middle-class families 
an affordable detached house in commuting distance from the main metropolitan 
area while expanding the state territorial control, Kochav Yair was considered as a 
suburban and territorial success. Eitan, and several other politicians and planning 
officials, were interested in repeating this success and thus began promoting plans 
for multiple Suburban Settlements. The means were very simple as they included the 
cooperation of the ILA to locate and assign vacant lands along the Green-Line and 
the government’s financial support for young families interested in relocating to the 
area. At first, Eitan’s plan included seven new settlements, which he called the Seven 
Starts (Shiva’at HaKochavim). Stars (Kochavim), referring to the Kochav Yair model, 
yet also to the Seven Stars Flag, which 19th-century Zionist leader and thinker 
Theodor Herzl suggested for the future Jewish state.552
Targeting young families living in Gush Dan, the new settlements were also part 
of the future national struggle against the upcoming housing shortage, which 
was due to occur by the anticipated mass immigration of Jews from the post-
Soviet bloc. The planned suburbanisation would free occupied apartments and 
thus enlarge the overall supply of dwelling units. Nevertheless, with the American 
support in absorbing the post-Soviet immigration wave came a demand to invest in 
settlements inside official Israeli territory, rather than in the occupied West-Bank. 
Consequently, while the initial intentions were to enhance Israeli presence on both 
sides of the Green-Line, the Stars had to be built only west of it.553 The territorial 
objectives were not forsaken but focused on expanding the main metropolitan area 
eastwards and to fortify the Israeli presence along the border with the West-Bank.  
552 Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair [Interview].
553 Ibid
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A stronger presence would later limit the possibility of cross-border connections 
between Palestinian localities in the West-Bank and ones inside of Israel, while 
also minimising potential Palestinian claims over lands west of the Green-Line as a 
compensation for areas annexed to Israel east of it.554
As a territorial project, the efforts to detect potential sites were directed by the 
geopolitical importance of each possible location; analysing each location according 
to concepts of scarcity (of settlements), interconnections (between Jewish 
settlements) and separations (between Arab areas). As a Parliament Member and 
head of the subcommittee for Construction and Housing, Eitan was in charge of 
coordinating the work of the ILA, the MCH and the parliament, while working closely 
with the Jewish Agency (JA) and heads of the regional councils. At the same time, 
as a supply-side oriented project, the discussions were attended by representatives 
of the Association of Israeli Contractors and each site was also examined according 
to its availability and practicality (fig 5.3). The report included seven new locations 
near the existing settlements of Kfar Ruth, Kochav Yair, Yarhiv and Sha’ar Ephraim, 
and the relatively uninhabited (by Israeli Jews) sites of Yad Hannah, Budrus and 
Rantis.555 Each site was first analysed according to its feasibility. For example, in 
the case of Yad Hannah (Bat Heffer today), the report stated that as Kibbutz Yad 
Hannah Meuhad,556 to whom the site was previously assigned by the state, was 
going through a process of dissolution and liquidation, which would enable the ILA 
to retake the parcels in question. Still, it was the territorial importance that the 
report highlighted, emphasising the “high importance for the site of this settlement 
on the Green-Line, as in this area there are only a few small Jewish settlements”.557 
The same goes for Sha’ar Ephraim, where the report claimed that “[we] must 
state that beside Nitzane Oz, the settlement is surrounded by large Arab towns…
[it] is on the Green-Line in the narrowest part of the state of Israel, only 15km 
from the seashore”. The geopolitical agenda is made even more obvious in the 
recommendation for a “lookout or a military base” near the Arab villages of Ibtin, 
Marja and Beit a Siqa.558
554 Soffer, The Stars [Interview]; Soffer and Gazit, Between the Sharon and Samaria, 77–87.
555 ILA, ‘Planning and Establishing New Settlements Along the Green-Line’.
556 A different group from the neighbouring Kibbutz Yad Hannah that was established in the 1950s.
557 ILA, ‘Planning and Establishing New Settlements Along the Green-Line’, 2.
558 ILA, 2.
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FIG. 5.3 Detailed lots of proposed sites (from left): Upper row - Yad Hannah (Bat Heffer); Tzur Yigal, Matan; 
Kfar Ruth (Lapid) – Lower row - Holot Geulim (Tzoran) - Khirbet Mazor (Ela’ad) - Budrus (not built) – (ILA) 
(Courtesy of Michael Eitan)
FIG. 5.4 Detailed lots of proposed sites (from left): Upper row - Yad Hannah (Bat Heffer); Tzur Yigal, Matan; 
Kfar Ruth (Lapid) – Lower row - Holot Geulim (Tzoran) - Khirbet Mazor (Ela’ad) - Budrus (not built) – (ILA) 
(Courtesy of Michael Eitan)
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The preliminary attempts to locate sites for new settlements would receive the full 
support of the MCH and turn into a large-scale national plan. The pro-settlement 
Minister of Construction and Housing Ariel Sharon endorsed the project in a 
personal meeting with Eitan in October of 1990, asking “why only seven?...”, 
advocating for a larger scale of development.559 With the MCH on board, its 
Directory of Rural Settlement took the lead, as the ministry’s vision focused on 
small-scale suburban localities as well. With the first report’s geopolitical analyses, 
the Directory of Rural Settlement and the ILA collaborated in analysing further the 
feasibility of each site. Subsequently, as two sites were problematic in regard to land 
ownership and availability, the joint report from November 1990 recommended the 
development of two alternative sites - Mazor, and Holot Geulim (fig 5.4).560
The Stars were integrated into the new supply-side approach that focused 
on decreasing planning bureaucracy and promoting corporate efficiency and 
profitability as a means to reignite the stagnating construction industry and to 
mitigate the upcoming housing crisis. Therefore, besides the financial aid and 
guarantees to developers to purchase unsold apartments, in 1990 the government 
authorised the Special Measures in The Planning and Building Law, designed to 
swiftly authorise and execute large-scale residential projects.561 While in the existing 
planning routine a new urban outline plan is required to go through several planning 
administrations, in a process that could take several years, the new measures were 
made to reduce this into a few months. The Ministry of Interior, who was in charge of 
the national planning process, formed a special housing committee in each planning 
district, which concentrated all needed authorities in a single team, and dealt and 
authorised only feasible large-scale residential compounds. Consequently, enabling 
the mass production of housing units that would enlarge the overall national supply, 
wherever possible. Initially valid for six months, the government repeatedly extended 
the special measures, and all the sites of the Stars presented in this chapter were 
authorised by one of the special Housing Committees.
559 Eitan, The construction of Kockav Yair.
560 MCH Directorate of Rural Construction, ‘Land allocation for new settlements’.
561 Alterman, Planning in the Face of Crisis.
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Simultaneously, the ‘Stars Plan’ was officially authorised by the Israeli Government 
in December of 1990 as a demographic and geopolitical project. Being part of the 
early 1990s immigration policy, it was discussed and approved by the Ministerial 
Committee for Aliyah562 and Integration. Decision A/82 thus stated that:
“Part of the governmental policy regarding Aliyah and integration [we decide] 
to authorise the “Seven Stars” plan for the development of communal-suburban 
settlements along road number 6, which constitutes part of the larger plan for a 
nation-wide housing solutions for new O’lim and those entitled to by the Ministry of 
Construction and Housing.”563
The authorised plan had three main objectives: “1. Preparing housing solutions … 
by enlargement of housing supply. 2. Establishing a mixed communal fabric of new 
O’lim and Israelis…. 3. Creating a settlement sequence in the Hills Axis, in the aim to 
thicken the [Jewish] settlement in the area, and to execute the population dispersal 
policy”.564
The Stars Plan was highly suburban, with a significant emphasis on commuting and 
a growing dependence on private initiative. The governmental decision also declared 
that the plan will consist of 12 new settlement points, offering 28,000 dwelling units 
to 100,000 inhabitants, which would be developed by the MCH, Housing associations 
and Housing companies. While larger than the preliminary plan, the decision 
continued with the initial suburban focus stating that the new settlements “would 
be of communal suburban character, while especially focusing on maintaining the 
principles of quality of life and environment”, and that these would be relying on “the 
existing employment, education and cultural centres in Gush Dan and the central 
cities”. Creating a series of dormitory suburbs, the plan thus relied on developing the 
“needed roads and connections to the Tel Aviv metropolitan”, which were crucial to 
its success.565
562 (lit: ascent) A term that is used to refer to Jewish immigration to Israel; a Jewish immigrant is referred to 
as O’le (plural: O’lim)
563 Ministerial Committee Aliyah, ‘Decision A/82’, 3.
564 Ibid, 4.
565 Ibid, 5.
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Keen on accelerating the process, the MCH began promoting the planning and 
development of the suggested sites simultaneously to the governmental approval. 
Already in 1990 it commissioned different architecture and planning offices for 
each of the sites and provided them with detailed programs regarding the character 
of each settlement, the nature of the desired environment, the density and type of 
dwelling units, the planned socio-economic composition of the future population. 
Attuned to the initial suburban focus, the instructions of the MCH consisted of 
low-rise, low-density Suburban Settlements mainly made out of private houses, in 
a detached, semi-detached and row-houses options. Correspondingly, the target 
population was predominantly what the ministry referred to as housing improvers, 
young upper-middle-class families that were interested in better living standards in a 
suburban community.566
The comparable target groups and planning guidelines generated similar urban 
schemes that were property-oriented layouts, simultaneously fragmentising and 
homogenising the chosen sites, as expected from the increasing involvement of 
the private sector. The different plans (except for Mazor which will be discussed 
later), where very alike and relied on the same planning principles. Respectively, 
they all focused on creating a tract development scheme that parcels each site 
into individual private plots and a system of primary and secondary roads. Lacking 
an apparent hierarchy, the proposed outlines were concentrated on the private 
house, the privacy of the private family and car accessibility. The implementation 
of these principles varied, as the planners had to adjust to each site’s restrictions 
and topographical characteristics. For example, the outline of Tzoran, a site with 
minimal height differences and size limitations consisted of an open grid of primary 
roads and cul de sac streets that could have continued endlessly having not been 
bound; thus, forming an abstraction of the contemporary suburban ideals. In all 
other sites, which were located on a hillier terrain and closer to the Green-Line, 
highways and other localities, the planners had to project the abstract suburban 
grid on the given topography while squeezing it between the fixed given boundaries. 
Nevertheless, despite the small nuances, the suburban characteristics of all plans 
were quite evident, promoting the formation of homogeneous communities housing 
car-dependent commuters (fig 5.5).
566 Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements [Interview].
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FIG. 5.5 Urban Outline Plans for the new sites - Upper row: Tzur Yigal, 1991 - Not Kochav Yair in the north, 
Kibbutz Eyal in its west and the Green-Line dictating its eastern border; Matan, 1991 - Note Yarhiv in its west, 
and the Green-Line in its east; Lapid. 1991. Note the Green-Line in its west, Kfar Ruth in its south and a road 
on its east; Bottom row: Bat Heffer, 1991- Note the Green-Line on the right side and an existing road and the 
future transnational highway on the left; Tzoran. 1991. (ILA)
The initial strategy saw the future settlers as part of the supplying side and the 
state sought to develop the new settlements in the method of organised housing 
associations. First, the MCH planned and authorised the new settlements. Then it 
commissioned one of the governmental construction companies, Shikun U Pituah 
(SHOP) or Arim to conduct the groundwork and to develop the needed infrastructure. 
Subsequently, generating different parcelled compounds that the ministry would 
tender out to different housing associations. While in former precedents such as 
Kochav Yair and Reut, the associations in charge had significant spatial privileges 
that included the power to influence the proposed plan and dictate its own design 
regulations, in the Stars settlements these powers to form space were maintained 
by the state. Therefore, the associations involved were basically exclusive marketing 
agencies that ensured the suited profile of upper-middle-class [Jewish] families. 
Therefore, the spatial privileges of the associations and their members were 
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restricted to the level of the private parcel and the ability to control the societal 
composition of the settlements. Consisting of registered and admitted members, the 
new associations retained the power to shape the character of the future community, 
enacting different selection criteria and ensuring a homogeneous composition. 
Consistently, the first membership rules for the ZP association, which would later 
inhabit parts of Matan and Lapid, being Jewish was listed as one of the main 
demands for joining members.567 Later, this demand was eased into a more politically 
correct one, listing military service as a necessity, which as the Arab population in 
Israel is not mandatory drafted, essentially also means Jewish.568
With differing organisational skills and varying political affiliations and support, the 
associations’ abilities changed from one case to the other. In Tzur Yigal, with four 
active groups, the Tzur Yigal Association began working in 1991, targeting potential 
members and admitting new families. Organised by experienced members from the 
neighbouring Kochav Yair, such as Parliament Member Michael Eitan, the association 
conducted an elaborated marketing campaign emphasising the possibility to achieve 
better living standards in Tzur Yigal, while stressing out the economic feasibility 
of purchasing a house there (fig 5.6).569 The association’s persuasive recruitment 
methods concluded in admitting almost 1000 members, while Tzur Yigal was 
planned to house 1300 families.570
FIG. 5.6 A single-family houses; a double family houses, a row-house in Tzur Yigal, 1991. Gil-Ad Architects 
(Courtesy of Michael Eitan)
567 Yahad Shiveti Yisrael, ‘Association Rules’, 5.
568 ZP Association, ‘Association Rules’, 5.
569 Tzur Yigal Association, ‘Tzur Yigal’.
570 Lerer Bobrov Advocates, ‘Tzur Yigal Association’, 1991.
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FIG. 5.7 Allocation of the areas to developers, 1996 - Upper row - Tzur Yigal; Matan (Yarhiv); Lapid (Kfar 
Ruth); Bottom row: Tzoran (Pink and Yellow are parts for associations, Orange, Blue Green and White are 
private developers); Bat Heffer (Israel State Archive)
Eventually, due to the amateur nature of the non-profit association and the state’s 
interests in mass development, the MCH was quite reluctant to continue in this model 
and began relying more on private corporations. While a few associations were able 
to manage the process efficiently, on the long run, both the MCH and ILA saw them 
as inefficient and unreliable partners.571 This was an outcome of the first tenders 
from 1992, where the majority of associations that the ILA granted compounds to, 
were unable to keep with the demanding schedule and witnessed a significant loss of 
members. Consequently, causing severe setbacks and inability to populate all of the 
tendered parcels. To keep up to schedule, the associations tried once again to attract 
571 MCH, ‘Construction Through Associations’, 137–51.
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new members, in different advertisements promising villas and cottages in the Stars 
settlement. As these attempts were not very successful, the MCH began shifting from 
tendering specific areas or compounds to private contractors instead. As a result, in 
Tzur Yigal, Matan, Lapid, and Tzoran more than half of the settlements were tendered 
to private developers, who then took on themselves the task of construction, marketing 
and sales. In Bat Heffer, which was tendered out later, all of the different compounds 
were tendered to private developers, and no associations were active (fig 5.7).
The corporate development mechanism enacted by the MCH significantly 
homogenised the new settlements, implementing limited suburban models and 
housing types. Whether developed by an association or a private contractor, all new 
projects consisted of a single housing model, implemented in the different lots, with 
differing size options.572 Consequently, due to the uniform architecture of its houses, 
each part of the settlement received an obvious and undeviating character. Focusing 
on the privacy of the nuclear family, the houses repeated the already popular 
isolation method that separated the inner parts from the surrounding environment. 
Yet, the 1980s’ popular split-level model disappeared, and almost all houses in the 
Stars were uni-level, whether being one or two stories high. At the same time, the 
emphasis on seclusion was enhanced with the central role separating fences and 
walls played in the new settlements, as they formed an integral part of the planning 
principles and design regulations; creating a continuous uniform barrier to each 
row of houses.573 Suiting a suburban environment, the single-slope red-tile roof 
remained a must, decorating all new houses. Accordingly, creating compounds of 
reproduced white cubes covered with red roofs and surrounded by stripes of green, 
roads and parking places, which turned into the hallmark of the Israeli suburbia 
along the Green-Line (fig 5.8-5.10).
572 Emek Hefer local council construction committee, ‘Permit 940304 (Bat Heffer)’; Emek Hefer local council 
construction committee, ‘Permit 940433 (Bat Heffer)’; Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, 
‘Permit 95256/440031401 (Tzur Yigal)’; Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, ‘Permit 
93060/440249702 (Tzoran)’.
573 Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, ‘Permit 93205/440139000 (Tzur Yigal)’; Drom 
HaSharon local council construction committee, ‘Permit 93466/440155300 (Tzoran)’; Drom HaSharon local 
council construction committee, ‘Permit 94031/440243502 (Tzur Yigal)’.
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FIG. 5.8 Positioning plan in Tzur Yigal, 1993. (Drom HaSharon Construction Committee) Note the same 
repetitive model
FIG. 5.9 Fence in Tzur Yigal, 
1993, Gilad & Yosef Architects. 
(Drom HaSharon Construction 
Committee)
FIG. 5.10 Double Family House, Bat Heffer, 1994, Elmagor Architects; Double Family House, Bat Heffer, 
1994, Bareli, Levitzky, Ksif Yosef Architects; Single Family House, Bat Heffer, 1996, Feig Architects (Drom 
HaSharon Construction Committee)
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The strategy behind the stars was of a supply-side housing policy integrated in the 
national geopolitical project. In order to provide housing solutions for the new ex-
Soviet Jewish immigrants, the overall supply of dwelling units had to be enlarged. 
Enlarging this supply did not only mean constructing new apartments for the use 
of the new O’lim, but also releasing already occupied ones in the coastal plain 
by offering their inhabiting families better living standards in the new developing 
suburbia. This, as explained in the plan, had also other national objectives, which 
included strengthening the Israeli presence in the area and expanding the Tel 
Aviv metropolis eastwards. In light of the national privatisation measures, the 
state granted specific private developers and housing associations the power to 
construct and inhabit space, as long as they would enhance the state’s power 
over it. Eventually, though the plan did mention the integration of O’lim in the new 
settlements, that rarely happened. In the sites presented here more than 95% of the 
population was born in Israel,574 and they are mostly well-earning upper-class,575 
secular Ashkenazi Jewish families with more than 90% house ownership.576
The Stars Plan was based on a descending order of supply-side mechanisms that 
eventually led to a new settlement typology. To stimulate the housing market, 
the government regarded upper-middle-class families as part of the supplying-
side, hence, by giving them the option to affordably purchasing a new suburban 
house, they would ‘supply’ vacant apartments in the coastal area. Then, the initial 
thought was on increasing the demand for suburban environments through the 
use of housing associations. With the desire for a more efficient development, the 
government eventually chose to involve more private developers by tendering out 
entire compounds, thus enabling them to optimise the construction process and 
to ‘supply’ the demanded private houses in a faster and more feasible manner. The 
supply-side approach had a great effect on the seemingly monotonous new suburban 
environments that consisted of repetitive rows of private houses and reproduced 
residential compounds. In the later developed sites, the supply-side factor would be 
even more enhanced, leading to an even more evident monotony.
574 Ministry of Aliyah Integration, ‘O’lim 1989-2015 according to settlements’.
575 ICBS, ‘Wages and income from work by locality and various economic variables - 2013’.
576 ICBS, ‘Population in Jewish localities, mixed localities and statistical areas, by selected countries of 
origin’.
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 5.5 Shoham: an assemblage of corporate 
compounds
Shoham (שוהם), presents a further step in the mass-suburbanisation and domestication 
of the Green-Line (5.11). It is a town located in the central district, adjacent to the 
Trans-Israel Highway and several kilometres west of the Green-Line. As of 2016, it 
has a population of just over 20,000 inhabitants. It enjoys a very high socioeconomic 
status, listed 9 in a scale of 10.577 Similar to the neighbouring settlements of Bareket 
and Leshem, it carries the name of one of the stones of the Hoshen, the biblical sacred 
breastplate believed to be worn by a Jewish high priest. The town’s population is 
characterised as upper-class, highly educated white-collared families. Politically and 
religiously, the inhabitants of Soham are affiliated with the central-left oriented side of 
the Israeli political spectrum, and most families are considered as secular or traditional. 
Almost all families own the house they are living in, while almost all professionals 
are occupied outside of town.578 Despite being much larger than other previous case 
studies, Shoham, due to its architectural and urban features, as well as the commuting 
lifestyle of its inhabitants, is practically a large suburb. Developed during the early 
1990s, Shoham is often regarded as one of the Stars, though it was for long part of the 
Israel Land Administration’s (ILA) settlement plan.
FIG. 5.11 Shoham in 2015 
adjacent to the Trans-Israel 
Highway and the Green-Line 
(Illustrated by the author)
577 ICBS, ‘Localities in Israel’, 2018.
578 Madlan, ‘Statistics on Settlements’.
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The ILA began promoting the development of the site of Shoham already as part of the 
previous rural mechanism, long before the suburban turn of the Green-Line. Located 
on the lands of the former Palestinian village of Dayr Tarif, which was depopulated 
during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, it was part of the national effort to construct Jewish 
settlements on former Arab sites.579 In 1949, a group of Jewish immigrants from 
Bulgaria established the moshav of Beit Arif on a segment of the abandoned village’s 
lands. During the early 1950s, the Jewish Agency (JA) began planning a new rural 
settlement in the remaining area, under the name of Nablat (fig 5.12). A decade later, 
As this plan was not carried out, the JA and its construction company Rassco (Rural 
and Suburban Settlement Company), attempted to establish a new moshav named 
Shoham in the same area, which it designated for Jewish immigrants from Argentina.580 
The plans did proceed and Rassco even began building the initial infrastructure and 
some of the first buildings, starting with a water tower, fitting the initial rural character. 
After several setbacks, the plans re-emerged in the early 1970s but were shortly 
abandoned due to the decline in the interest of Argentinian immigrants.581 The location 
remained a suggested settlement spot and during the 1970s the ILA, together with 
Rassco, tried to re-ignite the construction of Shoham. As these attempts were no 
longer of a rural character, they were rejected and withheld by the Israeli Planning 
Administration (IPA), mainly due to the objection of the moshavim and the Committee 
for the Protection of Agricultural Land and Open Areas (VLKHSHP).582
FIG. 5.12 Plan for a rural settlement. 1953. JA 
(Central Zionist Archives)
579 Khalidi, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948.
580 Dokatz, ‘The Agency will dicuss problems of O’lim from South-America’, 2.
581 Ma’ariv, ‘Argentinian Olim will build a new settlement in the area of Modiin’, 4.
582 Regional Planning Committee, ‘Plan HZ/53/1’.; VLKHSHP: HaVa’ada LeShmira Al Karka’a Haklait U’Shtahim Ptuhim
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In light of the objection from the side of the rural sector, the ILA and Rassco began 
initiating a plan to serve the nearby moshavim. Consistently, the initial idea included 
a regional centre for the rural settlements of the surrounding regional council of 
Modi’im583, which lacked an administrative and educational centre. The designed 
centre would consist of the needed schools, administration facilities, and the 
regional council building. However, unlike former examples of regional centres, which 
functioned only during the day, and were thus called “day centres”, this plan included 
a residential area, which was supposed to offer housing opportunities for the workers 
of the regional centre; teachers, clerks, and other officials (fig 5.13). The plan’s 
appeal to the rural sector continued by designating residential lots to young families 
from the nearby moshavim that wanted to stay and live in the area, but were unable 
to find available housing solutions due to the restriction of the ILA on the number of 
siblings entitled to inherit a household built on state-owned lands.584
The suburban turn in the development of Shoham during the 1980s transformed 
the former rural vision. Previously, as the state’s official agenda was for a national 
decentralisation, some of the concerns regarding Shoham were that it was not 
peripheral enough, stating that a settlement in this area would be an unjust use of 
rural lands that also hinders the national effort of population dispersal.585 By the mid-
1980s, as the agenda changed towards regional decentralisation, Shoham turned into 
a site of national importance as it enabled the expansion of Gush Dan eastwards.586 
Consequently, it was mentioned in the new outline scheme for the central district as 
a future Suburban Settlement, and the ILA began expanding the early plan for the 
regional centre, adding additional residential compounds (fig 5.14).
As the vision for Shoham changed the proposed outline had to transform 
accordingly, becoming much suburban and targeting upper-middle-class 
commuters. Therefore, while the plans for a regional centre were not forsaken, the 
surrounding residential area was detached from it, and the planned outline gave 
way to a tract housing development scheme meant to generate private parcels of 
500 m2 (fig 5.15). The ILA did not give up the appeal to the rural sector and gave 
preference to young couples and families from the surrounding moshavim in the 
marketing process, granting the general public access only to the remaining lots. 
583 Not to confuse with the city of Modi’in that was built in 1996.
584 Abecassis, Shoham [Interview].
585 VLKHSHP, ‘Committee meeting 192’, 1.
586 Shachar, ‘Reshaping the Map of Israel: A New National Planning Doctrine’, 209–18.
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With the growing demand for a suburban lifestyle and the increasing interests 
in Shoham, the ILA decided to enlarge the settlement further, adding additional 
residential compounds and turning it into a town.587
FIG. 5.13 Plan for a Regional 
Centre for Modi’im Regional 
Council, GZ/69/2. 1981 (ILA)
FIG. 5.14 Regional Outline Plan, 
TMM/3/3. 1982. (ILA)
FIG. 5.15 The initial site from the 
1991 masterplan. (ILA)
With the expansion of the Shoham project, it was incorporated into the state-led 
urban development ventures of the early 1990s. As it entered the national efforts 
to enlarge the overall supply of dwelling units, the ILA commissioned Industrial 
Buildings Corporation ltd (IBC; Khevrat Mivne Ta’asiya ltd), a formerly state-owned 
private construction and real estate company, to manage the planning and execution 
of the enlarged project. Before its privatisation, IBC was a governmental company 
established in 1961, in charge of constructing industrial buildings in development 
areas on behalf of the Ministry of Economy.588 As the state was interested in 
developing more industrial areas, it expanded the company’s responsibilities, putting 
it in charge of entire compounds, including the needed planning, infrastructure 
and ground preparation works. Though it was completely privatised during the 
rearrangement of the government-owned companies in the 1980s, it retained its 
functions as a governmental contractor. By assigning the development of residential 
areas to IBC, the ILA sked to use its experience in mass production, in order to 
contribute to the national housing effort. Accordingly, by 1991 IBC was in command 
of developing the framework for almost 22,000 dwelling units altogether, of which 
Shoham was part of.589
587 Abecassis, Shoham; Soffer, The Stars.
588 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘Mivne Ta’asiya ltd. Jerusalem’.
589 Industrial Buildings Company ltd, ‘Industrial Buildings Company ltd’.
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With the purpose of developing a new town, IBC promoted a new masterplan 
for Shoham that suited its new vision and development method. Therefore, it 
commissioned local architect Joseph Abecassis, who was already involved in the 
earlier stages. Suitable for a company with experience in industrial areas, the 
new outline did not include a new inclusive urban concept but rather consisted 
of ten isolated purely residential areas, to be development separately according 
to the expansion of the construction process. Correspondingly, the areas’ spatial 
characteristics were dictated by their location on the development timeline and 
not by the desire to create a morphological urban hierarchy. Consequently, the 
first constructed western parts were low-rise private houses, and the eastern parts 
consisting of denser and higher compounds that grow further with the town’s 
northward extension.
With the desire to optimise the planning process, the planned layout proposed an 
efficient grid that subdivided the area into smaller tracts, creating an arrangement 
of different housing compounds. Consequently, the popular use of cul de sac streets 
gave way to a continuous system of roads that parcelled each area into a series of 
smaller residential lots. Whether for single, double or multi-family buildings, the 
layout of the different areas was significantly similar, with the larger parts forming a 
scaled version of the smaller compounds. Bearing names with strong connotations 
to the local flora, fauna and animals, such as Hadasim (Citrus,) Alonim (Oaks), 
Yealim (Ibexes), Broshim (Cypresses) and Vradim (Roses), the different parts of 
Shoham were supposed to promote the image of a town affiliated with nature and 
better quality of life, suitable for a Suburban Settlement (fig 5.16). The development 
works of Shoham suited the desired mass housing production. Accordingly, it 
was a continuous process where IBC developed the needed infrastructure to each 
residential parcel and conducted the first preparation works respectively; forwarding 
the site to private individuals and contractors.590
Planned as an assemblage of residential quarters, Shoham’s public and civil centre 
was an additional separate compound. Constituting the main area for schools, 
administration offices, the country club, commercial buildings and a cultural centre, 
it was supposed to form the public core of the future town, connected to all it pars 
through a system of pedestrian paths.591 Contrariwise, its location along the main 
access road, surrounded by open green spaces, created an isolated civic centre. With 
the site of Shoham being confined by the moshavim in its east and road number 444 
590 Abecassis, Shoham.
591 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘Yearly Report: 49. Jerusalem’, 455–59.
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in the west, the planners’ only option was to extend the town northwards. As the 
project expanded the planners continued attaching new residential clusters without 
re-adjusting the initial plan.592 Consequently, the layout of Shoham was made out 
of different housing compounds allocated along a south-north access road,593 
which provided an independent access to each neighbourhood, turning them 
into a collection of separated ‘balloons on a string’,594 rather than an integrated 
urban system.
FIG. 5.16 Masterplan for 
Shoham, 1991. (ILA)
592 Abecassis, Shoham.
593 Soffer, The Stars.
594 I borrowed the term ‘balloons on a string’ from Prof. Hillel Schocken from Tel Aviv University
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With the urban turn of Shoham, the Ministry of Interior separated it from the 
surrounding rural context of the Modi’im regional council, turning the planned town 
into an independent locality. This decision met fierce resistance from the moshavim 
in the area, as they saw this as a threat to the character of the region, creating urban 
enclaves inside the rural landscape.595 Yet, the ILA did not neglect the initial idea 
to establish a regional centre for the neighbouring moshavim, and the former area 
for public buildings was maintained. Serving the Modi’im regional council and not 
the newly independent Shoham, this compound turned into an ex-territorial enclave 
inside the borders of the new town.596 Consequently, splitting Shoham’s layout 
ones more.
Promoted by the state to quickly enlarge the existing supply of dwelling units, the 
construction on-site began immediately after the permission of the special regional 
housing committee.597 The gradual development that began with the low-rise 
houses in the western parts, increased the attractivity of the site and enabled the 
following denser corporate-led housing projects in the eastern parts.598 The strategy 
of development according to stages, enforced by IBC, assisted in focusing on a 
number of housing compounds each time, constructing each one more efficiently, 
and preventing the entire town from becoming one large construction site. To avoid 
a long construction process that might hinder the attraction to the settlements 
IBC enforced a strict realisation timetable on each family building its house own 
house.599 As a housing-oriented development, the first five residential compounds 
were completed between 1993 and 1995, before the construction of the town’s 
public and educational functions which were finalised only by 1996. Leaving a 
significant amount of families, mainly those living in the low-rise housing without the 
needed public facilities (fig 5.17).
595 Gamzo Council, ‘Changing regional jurisdiction’, 1993; Modiim Regional Council, ‘Letter to Ministry of 
Interior: On declaring Shoham as an independent council’, 1993; Council, ‘Letter to Ministry of Interior: 
Objection to Changes in Jurisdiction’, 1993; Kfar Ruth Council, ‘Letter to Ministry of Interior: Changing 
regional jurisdiction and Shoham Local Council’, 1993; Tirat Yehuda Council, ‘Letter to Ministry of Interior: 
Local Council Shoham.’, 1993.
596 Urbanics ltd, ‘Expanding Shoham’s jurisdiction’, 14.
597 Shoham Local Council, ‘Survey of the local council’s work’.
598 Soffer, The Stars.
599 Abecassis, Shoham.
TOC
 251 Mass‑ suburbanisation & the stars  settlements
FIG. 5.17 First buildings 
in Shoham with the empty 
compounds in the north , 1995. 
Moshe Milner (GPO)
With the first compounds consisting of self-built low-rise private houses, their 
architectural features resembled the popular suburban models of the time. Built 
individually, according to the taste, needs and economic restrictions of their future 
owners, they followed mutual characteristics dictated by the architectural design 
regulations and popular aesthetic qualities. The design regulations decreed by the 
plan were very minimal and consisted of a limitation on the maximum permitted 
height (two stories) and size (200-220 m2, with an additional basement area) while 
insisting on a sloping roof.600 While earlier versions of the plan enabled choosing 
between a red-tile roof and a metal one, later this changed as the regulations 
required tiles “in shades of red”, covering more than 70% of the roof’s area.601 
With the plan addressing only the external features of the houses, their inner 
arrangement, distribution of functions and dwelling concept, were to be decided 
individually. Nevertheless, the majority of houses were based on a similar dwelling 
type, reproducing in different interpretations repeated versions of the introvert 
private unit. Consequently, the differences between the private houses were created 
by setbacks and bulges in the exterior walls, the design of the windows and that of 
the sloping roof (fig 5.18-5.19).
600 Lodim Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 920111 (Shoham)’; Lodim Local Construction Committee, 
‘Permit 920114 (Shoham)’; Lodim Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 920117 (Shoham)’; Lodim Local 
Construction Committee, ‘Permit 920125 (Shoham)’.
601 Joseph Abecassis, ‘Master Plan GZ/69/10 - Shoham’, 10.
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FIG. 5.18 Low-rise private houses in Shoham, 1993-1995 (Shoham Construction Committee archives). Note 
that the short and closed façade is always the one facing the street
FIG. 5.19 Main variation of the ‘introvert’ private houses in Shoham (Illustrated by the author)
The condominium complexes followed the same lines as those of the private low-rise 
houses (fig 5.20-5.22). The masterplan for the new town mentioned that Shoham would 
be a homogeneous “White City”, meaning that its architectural design would consist of 
a collection of similarly appearing simple white cubes, covered with a red roof.602 
602 Ibid, 12.
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In the case of the low-rise houses, this corresponded with the architecture of all 
other Suburban Settlements built at the time. However, regarding the housing 
complexes, which were quite rare at that time in this area, this meant that they were 
supposed to appear as if they were a scaled version of the private suburban house, 
mimicking its aesthetics performance and its emphasis on the isolation of the nuclear 
family, which were an integral part of the pull factors of Suburbia.603 Consequently, 
all housing complexes were merely larger white cubes, covered with a sloping red-tile 
roof, even though this demand was revoked by 1997.604
FIG. 5.20 Housing types in Shoham - Upper row: Single-Family houses; I-shaped Housing complex; I-shaped 
Housing complex; Bottom row: L-shaped Housing complex; H-Shaped Housing complex; Double-Family and 
row-houses. 2018 (govmap,co,il)
FIG. 5.21 Double-family houses, Shoham. 1994. (Shoham Construction Committee archives)
603 Lodim Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 920982 (Shoham)’; Lodim Local Construction Committee, 
‘Permit 920712 (Shoham)’; Lodim Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 920709 (Shoham)’.
604 Joseph Abecassis, ‘Plan MK/SH/69/11’.
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FIG. 5.22 Multi-family cottages, Shoham. 1994. (Shoham Construction Committee archives)
Forming a scaled version of the detached private houses, the residential estates 
consisted of similar design characteristics and dwelling concepts. The different 
contractors, which included leading firms such as Shikun O'vdim, the formerly 
governmental Shikun U’Pitah (which was privatised by then), Mishor HaHof and 
the Rubenenko Group repeated the same setting of a row of houses around an 
inner courtyard, which functioned as an open parking place and the main access 
area to the different buildings.605 The differences were mostly in the arrangement 
of the dwelling units inside the tenements, generating three main types that were 
reproduced in different parcels. The simplest was the L-shaped building, which was 
made out of four to two ground apartments with a direct external access, a joint 
staircase leading to the units in the first and second floor, while the latter enjoyed 
the roof -terrace that was usually attached to it. As each unit had at least to façades, 
the main one of the living room and kitchen was repeatedly oriented towards the 
street, leaving the more closed rear façade of bath- and bedrooms facing the inner 
605 Shoham Engineering and Construction Committee, Shoham Engineering and Construction Committee.
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courtyard (fig 5.23).606 The I-shaped building was the most common typology, built 
mainly in the larger parcels. It resembled the L-shaped as it had the same inner 
distribution of units, access points, and façade orientation. Built on larger parcels, 
it was made of small uniformed apartment building, which when placed adjacent 
to similar ones, created a continuous building that surrounded the inner parking 
courtyard; enabling a more efficient use of land (fig 5.24). The H-shaped complexes 
were basically four-story apartment buildings of four dwelling units in each floor, 
sharing a common staircase and lobby. Four apartments in one floor meant that 
there was no back façade, just front and side, as in each floor the living rooms of 
the apartments faced either the street or the courtyard. Furthermore, this also 
limited the option of placing buildings one adjacent to the other, due to the need 
for the second side façade (fig 5.25). As the apartments in both the I and H-shaped 
buildings were five-room units of more than 100 m2 confined by only two façades, 
the setbacks and breaks in the external walls constituted and attempt to enlarge the 
given parameter and to provide each room with natural light and ventilation without 
having to exceed the maximum permitted built area (fig 5.26).607
FIG. 5.23 L-Shaped building, 1995. (Shoham Construction Committee archives)
FIG. 5.24 I-Shaped building, 1995. (Shoham Construction Committee archives)
606 Lodim Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 920683 (Shoham)’; Lodim Local Construction Committee, 
‘Permit 920379 (Shoham)’.
607 Shoham Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 940145 (Shoham)’.
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FIG. 5.25 H-Shaped building, 1995. (Shoham Construction Committee archives)
FIG. 5.26 L-shaped, I-shaped and H-shaped buildings in Shoham (Illustrated by the author)
As the construction of Shoham advanced its developers’ ability to influence its 
formation grew as well, regaining some of the spatial privileges the state initially 
restricted. The Hamaniyot complex (sunflowers) in the northern area of Shoham, 
which initially was supposed to resemble the previously constructed residential 
projects, turned into a much enlarged and denser version. It was an outcome 
of a collaboration between two very strong and influential private construction 
companies, Shikun U’Binui and Mishor HaHof, which by then turned into investments 
and holding corporations, and the moshav of Bareket that previously owned the 
rights in the land parcels of the project. In 1997, as the parties were not willing 
to accept the existing planning demands and restrictions, they promoted a new 
detailed plan for the area, intended to change the proposed layout and to enlarge the 
maximum permitted number of floors and dwelling units.608 Originally, the existing 
608 Z.Hashimshoni Architects and Planners, ‘Plan MK/SH/69/111 - Tzamarot Shoham’.
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plan was based on a ring of four-story housing complexes, surrounding a core of an 
open green area and public buildings. The buildings were in similar density and unit 
composition as the complexes built in the southern parts of Shoham, which were 
almost in the size of a private house. As an amendment plan with small changes, it 
was submitted to the local level, and not the district planning council, which ensured 
a quick and more efficient authorisation process. Yet, as the local council is not 
allowed to enlarge the overall permitted residential area, only the number of dwelling 
units could be changed. The construction of a larger number of smaller apartments 
points out that Shoham of the late 1990s turned into a corporate-oriented real 
estate project that was no longer meant to provide the pull factors of suburbia, but 
rather to answer the push factors of cities.
With the growing corporate influence, the housing typologies turned into volumes 
dictated by real estate calculations yet coated with a suburban appearance. The 
denser, higher and seemingly more urban buildings that the developers eventually 
constructed in the Hamaniyot project were also defined by the ultimate sign of 
suburban lifestyle, the sloping red roof. Moreover, as the buildings were essentially 
terraced condominiums, the dwelling units, mainly those in the lower parts, were 
able to function as independent private houses, due to their own entrance and 
attached garden. At the same time, as seen then in the section of the buildings, the 
developers decided to allocate more of the overall permitted areas for construction 
in the upper floors, generating a mushroom-like shape that derived from rentability 
considerations (fig 5.27-5.28).609
FIG. 5.27 A façade of a building in the Hamaniyot Project; A section of a building in the Hamaniyot project 
(note the mushroom-like section), Shoham, 1997. (Shoham Construction Committee archives)
609 Shoham Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 20020044 (Shoham)’.
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FIG. 5.28 Hamaniyot, Shoham, 1997 (Adam and Dany Eyal Architects and Planners)
While the projects of the late 1990s had some suburban characteristics, the 
following ones would become more quasi-urban. The development of Shoham 
continued with newly added patches that consisted of bigger parcels with larger 
building right. Intending to stimulate the local real estate market, the local council 
of Shoham cooperated with private developers, like Gindi ltd, and co-promoted 
a new outline plan for a compound in the northern edges of towns, enlarging the 
permitted buildings’ height while decreasing their overall number (fig 5.29).610 
By concentrating the construction into larger and more manageable buildings, 
this private-public collaboration intended to optimise the building rights and to 
enable a more efficient use of the site, hoping to accelerate the project’s realisation 
process by increasing the developers’ future profits.611 Therefore, 20 years after the 
construction of the first houses, Shoham completed the transformation from a Build 
Your Own House project into a corporate-led development mechanism, reshaped in 
order to attract more investments and to secure further growth.
610 Fintzi Raveh Architects, ‘Local Outline Plan SH/69/9/13a’.
611 Shauli, ‘While you were demonstrating: a luxury project was launched in Shoham’.
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FIG. 5.29 Cramim compound, 
Shoham, 2013. (Fogel Shoham 
Architects and Planners) – note 
that the third floors are larger 
than the lower ones
As a purely residential living environment, Shoham suffered from the lack of 
commercial and public functions. First is the economic issue, as the taxes collected 
by the local municipality were not sufficient, due to the relatively low taxation on 
residential functions, in comparison to commercial ones.612 The town, therefore, was 
in need of tax-generating properties. As a result, the Ministry of Interior granted 
Shoham percentages in the new industrial park of the Modi’im regional council. This 
was not meant to create employment for the residents of Shoham, nor to enlarge 
the local commercial uses but rather to enlarge the municipal budget.613 The lack 
of basic shops and services was thus not solved. Therefore, in 2010, the local 
council promoted a new outline plan that included the transformation of agricultural 
lands south of Shoham into a commercial and industrial complex. The new Central 
Business District, as the plan refers to the new commercial area, is yet another 
secluded and isolated compound in the fringes of town.614
The development of Shoham is a step further in the mass suburbanisation of the 
Green-Line, leading to a new type of suburban architecture and planning models. The 
initial steps did include the involvement of private individuals and families; however, 
it quickly gave way to large-scale developers that participated in the MCH’s tenders. 
In a later phase, the involvement of private developers grew further and so did their 
spatial privileges. The amendment schemes they initiated together with the ILA or 
the local council, gave them a larger influence over the construction of the town, 
enabling them to adjust the existing planning to their entrepreneurial consideration. 
The supply-side housing policy in Shoham was thus further enhanced, leading to a 
mass production process of unrelated residential compounds, designed mainly to 
meet the economic speculations of their developers.
612 Urbanics ltd, ‘Expanding Shoham’s jurisdiction’.
613 Abecassis, Shoham.
614 Joseph Abecassis, ‘Outline Plan Sh/69/9/14c: CBD Shoham’.
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 5.6 Ela’ad: corporate‑led Slumurbia
Ela’ad (אלעד), with its unique societal composition and the relatively high-rise 
environment presents an exceptional case study in the privatising settlement 
mechanism (fig 5.30). It is a city of almost 50,000 inhabitants located in the Israeli 
central district between the transnational highway and the Green-Line. It was 
populated in 1998, and it formed one of the initial sites of the Stars settlements. Yet, 
unlike the relatively low-rise suburban settlements developed at that time, which 
housed upper-middle-class secular families, Ela’ad is characterised as an urban 
settlement, designated to serve the religious ultra-orthodox sector. Therefore, it is 
a locality of considerably low economic characteristics (level 2 out of 10), housed 
by significantly low-income families, with an average number of seven children.615 
Consequently, its built environment is much higher, denser and more affordable than 
all other settlements in the region.
FIG. 5.30 Ela’ad in 2015, 
between the Trans-Israel 
Highway in the west, and the 
Green-Line and the West-Bank 
Separation Barrier in the east 
(Illustrated by the author)
The part the Ultra-Orthodox (UO) sector took in the territorial project of political 
Zionism was not a natural one. In fact, the relations between the sector, which forms 
almost 10% of the Jewish population in Israel, with the state are quite complex. 
Being more religious does not automatically mean more nationalist, due to the UO 
stream’s general disapproval to any changes made in the Jewish way of life. The main 
leaders of the UO sector initially opposed the idea of an independent Jewish state, 
which relies on secular ideals, and some segments still do not acknowledge the state 
up until this day. Conversely, larger parts of the sector eventually took a very active 
615 MCH, ‘Ela’ad’.
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part in the local political system, while maintaining a secluded and clearly introvert 
community life. This includes distinct residential areas, a segregated educational 
system, low participation in the workforce while focusing on religious studies at a 
Yeshiva.616 All meant to insure an isolated everyday life. The two main concentrations 
of the UO sector are in Jerusalem and Bnei Brak, a city in the Tel Aviv metropolis, and 
both form the sector’s cultural and spiritual centres. The group’s accelerated natural 
growth, which derives from its emphasis on childbearing, leading to an average 
of around seven children per family, causes an ever-growing shortage of dwelling 
units in both cities, which ultimately leads to an increase in the need for more UO 
neighbourhoods. At the same time, as a significantly poor group, the UO sector 
was unable to compete in the ‘free market’ and was therefore in need for special 
governmental assistance.617
Although the state’s concern to address the housing shortage of one of its poorest 
communities might seem like a continuation of the welfare approach, it was in fact 
an additional case of selective privatisation. In the privatising Israeli economy, 
the commodified social services turned into political goods, provided to privileged 
groups and sectors in exchange for their support to the ruling regime. The 
participation of the UO parties of Agudat Yisrael, and later Yahdut HaTorah, Degel 
HaTorah618 and Shas619 in almost all coalitions and governments since 1977, no 
matter whether right or left, highlights their real-politic approach. Appropriately, 
supporting the main governmental decisions such as peace agreements and 
territorial withdraws on the one hand, or wars and military campaigns on the 
other, in return to the economic support of the sector’s institutions and addressing 
its special needs and demands.620 According to Gutwein, this is practically an 
alternative welfare system, which runs parallel to the prevailing neoliberal agenda 
and is meant to reinforce it. As the alternative state funding is channelled through 
the different UO institutions it increases the power of their leadership, in return to 
their support of the ruling government. Thus, enabling the further seclusion and 
isolation of the UO sector.621
616 Is a Jewish educational institution for the study of the main religious texts of the Torah and Talmud.
617 Cahaner, ‘Between Ghetto Politics and Geopolitics: Ultraorthodox Settlements in the West Bank’, 
112–127.
618 Political parties which form the main representative of the Ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazi Sector.
619 A party which forms the representative of the Ultra-Orthodox Mizrahi Sector, as well as parts of the 
traditional and orthodox Mizrahi communities.
620 Cahaner, ‘Between Ghetto Politics and Geopolitics: Ultraorthodox Settlements in the West Bank’.
621 Gutwein, ‘The Settlements and the Relationship between Privatization and the Occupation’.
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Consequently, the UO became part of the state’s strategy of decentralisation and 
population dispersal and an active agent in the domestication of the Green-Line; 
a role which they refrained from playing until the late 1980s. As the proximity to 
the main centres in Jerusalem and Bnei Brak was crucial, the new sites for UO 
settlements had to be in the new periphery along the Green-Line. Not surprisingly, 
the largest settlements in the West-Bank are actually the UO cities of Beitar Illit and 
Modi’in Illit, which house almost 30% of the entire Jewish population in the occupied 
territories. While both these cities form a suburban extension to Jerusalem, the city 
of Ela’ad, which was built in the western side of the Green-Line, on official Israeli 
territory, formed an extension to the UO city of Bnei Brak.
The site of Ela’ad was originally an integral part of the low-rise Stars Plan of the early 
1990s. Mentioned in the plans as ‘Ancient Mazor’ it referred to the historic remains 
from the Roman period found in the area of the depopulated Arab village of Al-
Muzayri’a and that of Qule (fig 5.31), east of the Israeli moshav of Mazor, established 
in 1949.622 Until the 1990s, the spot was reserved as a future military compound 
and the new plan asked to turn it into a new suburban settlement (fig 5.32). As part 
of the Stars plan, the site of Ancient Mazor was supposed to take the form of the 
typical Suburban Settlement, designed for upper-middle-class secular families from 
the main metropolitan area. Nevertheless, in a meeting between the then Minister of 
Housing, Ariel Sharon, who took full control over the Stars Plan, his deputy, Rabbi 
Avraham Ravitz from Degel HaTorah party and several leaders of the UO sector, 
they decided to designate the area of ancient Mazor to the UO public; granting it the 
spatial privilege to exclusively inhabit the site. They also decided that the planners 
should adjust their work to the needs of the future UO inhabitants. Compatible to 
the initial development method of the Stars, the new UO settlement, though much 
larger compared to others, was to be built under the leadership of the Beit U’Menuha 
housing association.623
Despite the decision to designate the site for the UO sector, the first plans for the 
settlement resembled the ones for the remaining ‘Stars’.624 In the ministry’s program 
issued in 1990 for the Star of “New Mazor”, the settlement was described as one 
of 3000 low-rise dwelling units, which would consist of private, detached/semi-
detached- and row-houses, meant to serve secular community families looking for 
better living standards, as well as newly coming Jewish immigrants from the Former 
622 Khalidi, All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948.
623 MCH, ‘Meeting at the Office of the Minister of MCH in Tel Aviv - 6.9.1990’.
624 Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements.
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Soviet Union.625 Later, as the MCH asked to adjust the project to the needs of the 
UO sector it neglected the small-scale low-rise suburban vision, mainly in order to 
reduce the construction costs by enlarging the affordability and cost efficiency of the 
construction procedure, while expanding the overall number of dwelling units. The 
upper-middle-class suburban settlement of white houses covered with a red roof had 
to give way to a denser, mass-produced residential environment. The requirements 
of the MCH in mid-1991 spoke of a settlement of more than 6000 dwelling units, 
housing a population of almost 35,000 inhabitants.
FIG. 5.31 The old parcels of the Palestinian village 
of Qula in the first plans for Ela’ad, 1992. (ILA)
FIG. 5.32 Regional Outline Plan, TMM/3/3. 
1982. (ILA). The site is (in orange) declared as a 
military compound
Like in other projects of the MCH, the ministry assigned the governmental 
company of A’rim ltd to manage and develop the site of Ela’ad while enacting a 
more corporate-led approach. Assigning A’rim ltd, the ministry moved to a more 
commercial method and gave up the initial intentions of developing Ela’ad through 
Beit U’Menuha housing association. A’rim was thus in charge of the planning the 
future town, developing the needed infrastructure and groundwork, and then 
marketing the different parcels to private contractors.626 These would then be in 
charge of constructing the dwelling units and to sell them to families interested in 
moving to the new town. Beit U’Menuha tried to object this change of policy and 
even sued the MCH and the state of Israel for backing down on their agreement. 
Eventually, the Tel Aviv District Court ruled that the promises made earlier by 
Minister Ariel Sharon were illegal. According to this ruling, though the mandatory 
625 MCH, ‘Program for a detailed urban plan: Ancient Mazor’.
626 Beit U’Menuha, ‘Decisions Regarding Mazor (El Ad)’, 1993.
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‘Tender Procedure’ law was approved only in 1992 (after the crucial meeting with 
Ariel Sharon), by assigning a sight for a specific association the MCH acted against 
the ‘Conditions For the Allocation of Land to Associations’ law from 1990, which was 
supposed to open a call for a variety of associations.627
As the MCH shifted the development from a religious association to private 
contractors, assigning the entire project to a specific sector became a more 
complicated task. Consequently, Ela’ad couldn’t be designated exclusively to UO 
families and the emphasis was therefore on a “religious public”. Correspondingly, 
the MCH could not enforce selective population and had to promote an urban layout 
and civil and cultural infrastructure that would appeal to the UO sector and not the 
general secular one. The official statement was “the need of religious families… 
with all that implies”, and it included also an emphasis on economically constructed 
large dwelling units.628 By enforcing these planning measures, the MCH believed 
secular families would eventually refrain from moving to Ela’ad, as they would not 
be interested in living within a population with strong religious characteristics 
and everyday life. Despite the MCH’s open declaration that it would prevent the 
private developers from selling dwelling units to secular families, it still doubted the 
intentions of organised secular groups that asked to purchase apartments in the new 
project and regarded them as mere provocation, which were meant to protest against 
the luring conditions given to religious families moving to Ela’ad.629 The MCH’s 
assumptions were proven correct as eventually these organisations did not carry out 
any real attempts to purchase apartments in town.630
The plan the MCH promoted for Ela’ad focused on generating an efficient and 
resourceful urban layout that would optimise the development of the new town. 
The MCH commissioned the office of Hertz, Fogel & Schwartz to conduct the 
planning process and to dictate the urban layout and main design regulations. The 
office, which was also in charge of the district outline plan ten years earlier, was 
an experienced team of planners, working closely with the various government 
ministries and planning administrations. The planners were already contacted in the 
first phases when the intentions were still on a low-rise Suburban Settlement, and 
quite soon they had to change the scope and vision. Due to the size of the future 
627 Tel Aviv District Court, Beit U’Menuha against the State of Israel.
628 A’rim, ‘Ela’ad - Mazor.’, 2.
629 Petersburg, ‘UO trying to prevent National Relgious to settle in Ela’ad’; Wasserman, ‘MCH: Contractors 
that purchased lands in Ela’ad are prohibited from selling units to seculars’, 5.
630 Krispel, Ela’ad.
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town, they first composed a masterplan, which later could be processed into a 
detailed outline scheme for each compound. The plan included two phases, 1 (2500 
units) and 2 (4000 units) and a possible third phase. The masterplan consisted of 
three levels of access roads ranging from a width of 24m to 9m, creating mono use 
blocks. The planners insisted that each block would be of an average depth of 50m, 
which then could be divided into two rows of residential parcels of 1000 m2 with a 
depth of 25 and a maximum width of 20m. This enabled a highly efficient partition, 
due to the single façade facing the street, which reduced the construction and 
development costs and increased the profitability and thus the marketability of each 
lot.631 The same logic, just in a smaller scale, was applied in the low-rise residential 
compounds, where the planners did not use the common cul de sac typology and 
preferred creating residential areas that could be divided into two rows of plots, each 
accessible from a different road.
The planners promoted a strict division between the different functions and the 
different residential areas, suitable for the demands of the UO sector for social 
segregations. They designated the central part of the town to the denser dwelling 
types and created segregated public compounds for the needed educational 
institutions. Still, the planners did include small-scale public function in each 
residential area, which was meant to become a synagogue or a religious centre. As 
the UO sector is far from being homogeneous and includes numerous groups and 
congregations, this also enabled the formation of distinct housing blocks for the use 
of specific religious communities, concentrated around their own synagogue (fig 
5.33). Highly noticeable is the lack of public open spaces in the centre of town, which 
the planners thought to be less needed for this unique population, and therefore they 
located them in the northern and southern fringes of the residential area. Moreover, 
though Ela’ad was designed as a town for more than 40,000 inhabitants, it lacked 
almost any substantial commercial areas and had no real employment or industrial 
zones. As an UO town, where the majority of males are usually full-time Yeshiva 
students that refrain from working, the need for vast occupational opportunities was 
quite redundant. Moreover, as a suburb of Bnei Brak, the planners predicted that 
those that do work will retain their existing jobs outside of Ela’ad.632
631 Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements.
632 Fogel Hertz Schwartz Architects and Planners ltd, ‘Local Outline Plan: New Mazor GZ/BM/195’.
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FIG. 5.33 Ela’ad Masterplan, 
1992. (ILA)
The detailed instructions that followed the masterplan of Ela’ad included further 
guidelines that corresponded with the MCH’s vision of a resourceful and cost-
efficient development process. In the detailed scheme, the planners here focused on 
processing the earlier version by dictating the building and design regulations and by 
parcelling the residential area into marketable lots. The planners created 14 different 
residential compounds, 5 low-rises for semi-detached houses and 9 for multi-family 
buildings (fig 5.34). Each compound had its own building borders, where the plan 
enabled the simultaneous construction of the different structures adjacently, though 
being divided into smaller parcels, as long as it did not exceed the overall allowed 
construction area. This enabled, in the case that each compound was developed by a 
single contractor, a much more efficient and profitable construction process. Due to 
the profile of the future population, the planners insisted on cladding the houses and 
buildings in Ela’ad with limestone. Characterised as a low-income UO community, 
the planners predicted that the likelihood of maintaining a plastered white façade 
would be very low, and therefore sought to enforce a much more resilient coating 
material. They also thought that this would also contribute to a more “Jerusalem like 
appearance”, which would correspond with the population’s religious profile.633 The 
planners initially thought of enforcing a titled red roof over all buildings, enhancing 
further its Jerusalem-like, or just similar to other suburban projects (fig 5.35). 
Yet, to reduce construction costs and increase future revenues the MCH and the 
developers objected all additional expenses and the limestone cladding was reduced 
to 30% of the front façade while the tilted roofs were limited to the areas with 
significant topography.634
633 Fogel, Ela’ad, 12.
634 Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements.
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FIG. 5.34 Detailed plan for Phase 
1, 1994. (ILA)
FIG. 5.35 Illustration of Phase 
1, Hertz, Fogel Schwarts (Ela’ad 
Council)
FIG. 5.36 Construction of Phase 
1, 1997. (Ela’ad Council)
With the tight profit margins and the emphasis on cost-efficiency the developers 
of Ela’ad were all large-scale construction corporations. After some setbacks, the 
marketing process began in mid-1996 and it took the MCH two years after the 
approval of the detailed plan for phase one to start tendering the construction of the 
housing units.635 The MCH eventually chose to give the different contractors the rights 
over several joint compounds, which they would be able to plan, develop, construct 
and sell to private individuals. This limited the number of possible contractors, as they 
needed to have the necessary expertise and guaranties for a project of such scope. 
Moreover, as a low-cost project, the construction had to be very efficient, and therefore 
only highly experienced firms were able to compete. Tenders were made in the “fixed 
price” method, were contractors vouched for a maximum value per dwelling unit as 
part of their bid. Consequently, the already limited profit margins, were even further 
reduced, thus limiting the competition even more. Eventually, the contractors that the 
MCH chose for Ela’ad were leading companies such as Solel Bone, Ashdar, Minrav, 
Meshav, Heftziba and Friedman-Hakshuri.636
To ensure the development of the Ela’ad project, the MCH enacted several supply-
side interventions that guaranteed the interests of the private sector. First, in order 
to enable the targeted low-income UO population, the MCH offered an additional 
subsidy of 25% for the development costs, on top of the earlier ministerial and 
governmental grants.637 Second, the ministry, together with A’rim, decided to 
develop Ela’ad as a ‘closed market’, meaning that all unused funds would be invested 
back in the town’s infrastructure, in order to improve the town’s appearance and 
functioning, and by that attracting more developers and contractors.638
635 Petersbourg, ‘Tender for apartments in Ela’ad begins’, 13.
636 MCH, ‘Ela’ad’.
637 Government of Israel, Decision 778.
638 MCH, ‘Ela’ad: adjusting land costs and analysing apartment prices’.
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To secure the purchasing power of the UO sector and to optimise sales, the 
private contractors in charge of constructing the dwelling units hardly dealt with 
marketing them. As a low-cost project, the contractors did not invest too much in 
advertisement and commercials and preferred to promote the project through the 
different religious association and congregations. The contractors would contact, 
or be contacted by, a certain Hasidic or UO group that would become responsible 
for spreading the word and organising families interested in moving to Ela’ad (fig 
5.37). The different religious associations would thus function as advertisement 
and sales agencies for the contractors, and individuals that contacted the private 
developers would usually be referred to one of these associations.639 In doing so, 
the contractors were able to ensure sales and to minimise the promotion costs while 
the religious associations were able to reserve entire compounds for the use of their 
members, or families that are affiliated with their philosophy and religious approach 
(fig 5.38). Furthermore, as a settlement for the religious sector, the target group 
was indeed orthodox, ultra-orthodox and traditional families. However, legally the 
contractors selling the apartments could not prevent other non-religious families 
from purchasing apartments in Ela’ad. Therefore, by forwarding the sales and 
promotion to the religious association, the contractors, with the support of the MCH, 
were able to restrict the access to the apartments sold in Ela’ad to the exclusive use 
of the orthodox and the ultra-orthodox sector.640
FIG. 5.37 The compounds marketed according to 
developer. 1996. (Ela’ad local council). Note the arrow 
pointing towards north, and the arrow pointing towards 
the direction of Jerusalem
FIG. 5.38 CEO of Solel Bone, presenting a 
model of a building in Ela’ad to Rabbi Ovadia 
Yosef. The spiritual leader of Shas. 1996 (Israel 
State Archive)
639 Kessler, ‘Savione HaShem’, 12–16.
640 HaModiya, ‘Arrangement for the Construction of the Hasidic Qirya’, 5; Cohen, ‘A New UO Qirya in Ela’ad’.
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To encourage a pro-development process the MCH promoted constant construction 
and it started the works on the second stage before completing the first phase. 
Despite consisting of three different areas planned by three different offices, the 
second phase resembled the first one, as it followed the same planning guidelines 
dictated by the masterplan from 1992, and the same development and marketing 
process. Igniting the second phase before the completion of the first one was clearly 
corporate-oriented, as the MCH thought that increasing construction would promote 
the image of a successful and attractive project and to attract additional potential 
buyers.641 Although the private contractors relied on the UO sector to quickly 
purchase all apartments, sales were initially quite slow. In response, the contractors 
began selling more units to families from the orthodox sector, while also slowing the 
construction procedure. Consequently, in the first, phase almost half of the dwelling 
units were sold to national-religious families. This led to a small local conflict where 
the UO sector sought to minimise the presence of all other religious streams in 
Ela’ad.642 Thus, the relationships with the developers were tightened, ensuring 
a control over larger segments of the town by a specific UO stream, while also 
increasing the UO character of Ela’ad, by trying to limit the TV services and issuing 
a special subsidised and gender-separated public transportations to the UO centres 
in Bnei Brak.643 These measures proved to be highly successful, and in the marketing 
of the second phase, the newly constructed apartments were sold almost entirely to 
families from the UO sector.644
The desire to profitably develop an entire city led to the use of minimal building 
types and apartment typologies. Though more than 20 private developers were 
involved in the city, hiring more than 20 different architects and completing more 
than 700 buildings, the architectural product was highly repetitive. Almost all 
residential buildings, except for the semi-detached houses (fig 5.39),645 followed two 
main housing models that were reproduced all around Ela’ad. First is the elongated 
complex, which is usually referred to us a ‘train building’ (Shikun Rakevet) (fig 5.40). 
This typology consists of four-story buildings, with two apartments on each floor. 
The apartments consisted of an entrance area connected to the living room and the 
kitchen spreading from the back to the front facade, with the bedrooms area parallel 
641 Ela’ad Council, ‘Marketting Quarter B in Ela’ad’, 1997.
642 Maor, ‘Half of 200 homebuyers in UO Ela’ad - National Religious’.
643 Petersburg, ‘UO trying to prevent National Relgious to settle in Ela’ad’.
644 Taskir, ‘Survey of Homebuyers in Ela’ad’.
645 Ela’ad Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 960087 (Ela’ad)’.
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to it (fig 5.41).646 The second main housing type is the H building, which consists of 
four apartments on each floor (fig 5.42). The apartments in this case, resemble the 
ones in the first typology, yet the main difference is in the number and orientations 
of the façades. Lacking a rear facade, the kitchen, which was usually located near the 
living room at the entrance of each unit, was ventilated through a ‘cavity’ in the side 
façade (5.43).
FIG. 5.39 Semi-Detached houses, Ela’ad. 1995 (Ela’ad Construction Committee archives)
FIG. 5.40 Rakevet’ building, Ela’ad, 1995. (Ela’ad Construction Committee archives)
646 Ela’ad Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 960033 (Ela’ad)’; Ela’ad Local Construction Committee, 
‘Permit 960034 (Ela’ad)’; Ela’ad Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 960046 (Ela’ad)’; Ela’ad Local 
Construction Committee, ‘Permit 990025 (Ela’ad)’.
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FIG. 5.41 Rakevet’ building and 
its typical apartment (Illustrated 
by the author)
FIG. 5.42 H-building, Ela’ad, 
1996. (Ela’ad Construction 
Committee archives)
FIG. 5.43 H-building and its 
typical apartment (Illustrated by 
the author)
Highly affordable, the construction process had to be very well calculated concerning 
schedule, time management and sales. The developers could not spare time and 
costs and therefore had to be in full control of the whole procedure. This meant that 
all apartments had to be sold before construction began, and in case they were not, 
then to postpone it as much as possible. The MCH tried to limit this by enforcing a 
strict schedule, but it eventually could not oppose the control of the private sector. 
This caused several setbacks in the first phase and sales to non-UO families, which 
eventually led to stronger connections and deals between the developers and 
different UO congregations in the second one, which ensured the needed capital. 
Nevertheless, not all contractors were successful in managing such low budget 
projects and one of the companies, Heftziba, which was an expert in ventures of this 
sort, was bankrupted in 2007.
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The economic calculation made its remarks in the details and choice of materials. 
Already in the planning stages, the architects chose the minimal requirements of 
areas and spaces. This was reflected in the building’s outline, which unlike similar 
projects in Israel at that time, was strictly cubic, creating a marginal envelope 
surface.647 The chosen windows and openings reflected the affordability of the 
project as well, as they were significantly minimal, unlike the desire of that time to 
create open façades. The building materials chosen by the contractors were very 
inexpensive, consisting of plastered wall and affordable cladding stones where they 
were enforced. All of this led to a significantly uniform built environment, made out of 
repetitive sealed cubes with small holes as windows.
A main architectural feature that distinguishes Ela’ad from other corporate-
led developments is the Sukkah terrace that is noticeable in all of its buildings. 
According to the Jewish Torah, during the feast of Sukkot, it is mandatory to eat and 
sleep in a Sukkah (a hut), for a period of almost a week. The Sukkah has to be of 
temporary materials and under the open sky. Practising Jews living in an apartment 
building usually have a problem in fulfilling this custom, due to the lack of space. 
Furthermore, a normal balcony is mostly not sufficient, as it is usually too small and 
is not located directly under the sky. Therefore, families from the UO sector, which 
are keen on implementing the Torah as strictly as possible, would usually have a 
special terrace, that answers the needs for a kosher Sukkah; thus, referred to as 
a Sukkah terrace. Consequently, the contractors had to build such terraces for all 
apartments in Ela’ad, which added an exterior layer of retreating or ‘jumping’ large 
balconies (fig 5.44), while also breaking the uniformity of all buildings.648 In order 
to enable the construction of these terraces, the building regulations stated in the 
masterplan excluded their surface from the overall allowed built area. This gave the 
developers greater building rights and ensured that the Sukkah terrace would not 
come in place of the liveable area.649
647 Ela’ad Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 960034 (Ela’ad)’; Ela’ad Local Construction Committee, 
‘Permit 960033 (Ela’ad)’; Ela’ad Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 960034 (Ela’ad)’; Ela’ad Local 
Construction Committee, ‘Permit 960087 (Ela’ad)’; Ela’ad Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 20020179 
(Ela’ad)’.
648 Ela’ad Local Construction Committee, ‘Permit 20020179 (Ela’ad)’.
649 Fogel Hertz Schwartz Architects and Planners ltd, ‘Local Outline Plan: New Mazor GZ/BM/195’.
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FIG. 5.44 Sukkah terraces 
(Illustrated by the author)
Ela’ad is a unique case of a collaboration between the state, the religious sectors 
and private capital that created new local urban-suburban hybrid. Different from all 
previous settlements in the area, that were designed according to the ‘pull factors’ 
of the suburban environment, Ela’ad was developed to answer the ‘push factors’ 
of the urban one. In a survey conducted by the MCH in 2000, the families in Ela’ad 
stated ‘the ability of purchasing and apartment’ and the proximity to Bnei Brak as 
the main reasons for moving to the new settlement. ‘Quality of life’, on the contrary, 
was the least stated motive.650 The affordability of the dwelling units, as well as 
the high governmental subsidies, might seem like Keynesian residues from welfare-
state housing policies. On the other hand, the selective welfare approach applied 
by the MCH highlights that in the privatising Israeli economic affordable housing 
turned into a political commodity; traded for the sake of an electoral allegiance. As 
a city designated to one the weakest socio-economic groups, with minimal taxable 
commercial and industrial uses, Ela’ad is located at the poorest 20% of all Israeli 
localities; constituting an example of state-designed Slumurbia, Consequently, the 
urban and architectural form of Ela’ad were an outcome of an attempt to create a 
profit out of a low-budget project.
650 Taskir, ‘Survey of Homebuyers in Ela’ad’.
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 5.7 Tzur Yitzhak: high‑rise Suburbia
The last developed ‘Star’, Tzur Yitzhak, included a greater involvement of private 
capital and concluded in a unique hybrid of a high-rise suburb; representing an 
advanced stage of the privatisation of the Israeli geopolitical project (fig 5.45). It is 
an independent locality that began as an integral part of the Stars Plan and turned 
into a new, denser and urban-like variation of it. It was initially referred to as Tzur 
Nathan B, or simply the Tzur Nathan project, as it was planned to extend the nearby 
rural settlement, bearing the same name. Like the other Stars, it was initially under 
the responsibility of the MCH’ rural division and it was supposed to resemble the 
other low-rise suburban settlements built in the area. Accordingly, the first ideas 
included a new small-scale settlement of around 1500 housing units. Nevertheless, 
with the change in the ministry’s policy, the project began including more dwelling 
units, as well as higher and denser housing typologies.651
FIG. 5.45 Tzur Yitzhak in 2015, 
enhancing the Jewish settlement 
in the area along the Green-Line 
and between the Palestinian 
localities inside the West-Bank 
and Israel (Illustrated by the 
author)
With the increasing metropolitan-based approach, the MCH began endorsing a 
more ‘urban’ image to the area, which affected Tzur Yitzhak’s mode of development. 
Consequently, the MCH moved the project, together with all the other Stars 
settlements from its rural division to its urban one.652 As all other settlements were 
651 MCH Directorate of Rural Construction, ‘Program for Tzur Nathan’.
652 MCH Directorate of Rural Construction.
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already under construction or in advanced planning phases, this decision did not 
really affect their nature. The Tzur Nathan project, however, was in its first steps, 
which meant that the ‘urban’ characteristics of its future environment would be much 
more evident. This change was part of the MCH’s attempts to locate land reserves 
in the area,653 in the attempts to create new urban compound, leaving behind the 
former small-scale suburban approach (fig 5.46). The new vision consisted of several 
different plans, including merging all localities into one town, or the establishment of 
a detached “urban” regional centre (fig 5.47).654 Due to the strong objections from 
the nearby localities, and even the Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel, the 
MCH had to put its larger plans on hold. Nevertheless, the direction was obvious, and 
the era of small-scale suburbia gave way to the large-scale one, and with the ILA 
declaring the areas east of Kochav Yair as a site of expansion, it is obvious that the 
urban transformation was not neglected, but rather paused (fig 5.48).655
FIG. 5.46 Areas for urban 
complexes along the Hills’ Axis, 
1994, Nahoum Dunsky (Israel 
State Archives)
FIG. 5.47 A plan for a new 
“urban” regional centre near 
Kochav Yair, 1998. Reches Eshkol 
(Israel State Archive)
FIG. 5.48 A plan for a new 
“urban” regional centre near 
Kochav Yair, 1998. Reches Eshkol 
(Israel State Archives)
While the vision to transform the area stagnated, the MCH proceeded in developing 
the project independently, integrating it into the new urban approach. This was 
possible mainly because the project followed the similar lines of development in 
the previous stars and was not fully integrated with the larger plan. The MCH had 
put A’rim ltd in charge of developing the site already in 1992, and it continued in 
its mission separately, though the urban transition in the ministry’s policy.656 A’rim, 
however, adapted the nature of the project to the new development policy. Despite 
653 Nahoum Dunsky Planners, ‘Development of the Hills’ Axis: The Seven Stars Plan’.
654 Halufa - Dov Kehat ltd., ‘Kochav Yair- Options for Municipal formation’.
655 Fogel-Hertz-Schwartz Architects and Planners ltd. 2002, ‘District Outline Plan TMM/3/21’.
656 MCH, ‘Tzur Nathan’.
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the instructions to create a new urban neighbourhood, in the new outline plan for the 
central district the project was considered an extension of the rural environment of 
Tzur Nathan and the MCH labelled it as a Community Settlement.657 The project was 
thus a hybrid of rural, suburban and urban approaches; a combination that would 
continue to accompany the settlement over the years.
The new vision for an urban complex caused several objections from the nearby rural 
settlement of Tzur Nathan, which were appeased only after the latter was enabled 
to take part in the new mode of production, receiving significant spatial privileges. 
As the commissioned planner, Meir Nir, began composing an outline scheme for the 
new project, the scope and capacity of the new plan were still not clear. The MCH 
and the ILA were interested in a residential project of 5000 units, while Tzur Nathan 
and the regional council were interested in maintaining the area’s small-scale rural 
characteristics. Eventually, it was agreed between the different parties that the new 
site would include around 3000 units, while Tzur Nathan, which was the lessee of the 
location of the project, would have the right to develop 49% of the area, containing 
a third of all future units.658 In the meantime, the administrative status of the future 
project was also not clear. Afraid that the new urban compound would change its 
rural nature, Tzur Nathan was not interested that the new project would be part of 
its settlement; willing to receive the ‘urban’ building rights but not the non-rural 
population that came with it. Therefore, in 2003 the Israeli Government, after 
receiving the recommendations of the MCH, ILA and the regional council decided that 
the new project would be an independent locality. In 2005, the government named 
the new settlement Tzur Yitzhak, after the former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who 
was murdered in 1995 while in office (fig 5.49-5.50).659
657 MCH Urban Planning Unit, ‘List of the Stars Settlements’.
658 Tal, ‘Development momentum’; Tal, ‘Tzur Nathan: Forgot the VLKH’.
659 National Committee for Planning and Construction, ‘Meeting number 534’.
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FIG. 5.49 Minister of the Interior Ophir 
Paz-Pines with representatives of MCH 
at the cornerstone ceremony for Tzur 
Yizhak, 2005 (Tzur Yitzhak Council)
FIG. 5.50 Minister of the Interior Ophir Paz-Pines, Chief Rabbi of 
Tel Aviv Jaffa Rabbi Meir Lau, representative of MCH. Dalia Rabin, 
daughter of late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, at the corner stone 
ceremony for Tzur Yizhak, 2005 (Tzur Yitzhak Council)
The proposed outline proceeded with the fragmentation and homogenisation of 
space while creating a new residential environment that is caught between urban 
and suburban models. The layout consisted of a system of wide roads, not streets, 
that created three main residential areas. Each area was defined by a circular road 
and a core with an open green space or a public institution (fig 5.51). Seemingly 
urban, Nir’s vision of the project was based on strong references to the surrounding 
suburban environment; lacking any apparent hierarchy, commercial uses, and other 
functions that go beyond the settlement’s role as a dormitory town. Semi-urban, Nir 
insisted on a relatively moderate height of buildings, mainly two to five stories, with 
one exception of a ten-story tenement in the middle of the project. Additionally, Nir 
asked to dictate a suburban appearance by enforcing a tilted roof for all buildings, 
and by planning a vast system of open green spaces and connecting paths (fig 
5.52).660 The project was hence planned as an enlarged and expanded version 
of the previous Stars settlements and while the former layouts fragmentised and 
homogenised space two-dimensionally, Nir’s plan did so three-dimensionally.
660 Nir, Tzur Yitzhak [Interview].
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FIG. 5.51 Outline Plan, Tzur 
Nathan B (Tzur Yitzhak). 2000. 
(ILA)
FIG. 5.52 Illustration of the Tzur 
Nathan Project, 1997. Meir Nir 
(Courtesy of Meir Nir)
The urban turn and the increasing dependence on private developers delayed the 
completion of the project in additional five years, causing the MCH to find alternative 
supplying sides. Therefore, despite the approval of the plan in 2000, construction 
on-site did not begin until 2005 (fig 5.53). One of the main reasons for the delay 
was the MCH’s inability to market the project. By the end of the 1990s, after an 
extensive period of state-initiated or sponsored construction, the local market 
witnessed a state of recession. More than a decrease in the demand for new dwelling 
units, this recession caused a severe decrease in the willingness of developers 
and entrepreneurs to invest in large-scale projects and this severely withheld the 
construction of Tzur Yitzhak. The MCH initially thought that the project would enjoy 
the same interest as other residential developments in the area such, as Shoham 
and Modi’in, and thus asked to market the different lots to private developers. 
It even rejected the attempts of housing association, such as the Pioneers of 
Tzur Nathan that included almost 1800 families, which were interested in finding 
“suitable housing” while participating in “settling thousands of Jews in the area of 
Tzur Nathan, up to the outskirts of Taybeh” as part of the mission to “stop the Arab 
expansion”.661 Seeking alternative solutions, the MCH first thought of granting the 
661 Rabin, ‘Building in Tzur Nathan’, 1999, 2.
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IDF personnel branch the spatial privilege to develop the site, hoping to attract 
military families to the project as a means to accelerate development. However, 
as the latter was not interested, the MCH eventually marketed the lots to housing 
associations,662 hoping that the relatively homogeneous and selective character 
would attract a critical mass of upper-middle-class families and ignite the investment 
interest in the project.663
FIG. 5.53 First Project in Tzur 
Yitzhak, developed by the private 
settlers’ associations, 2008 (Tzur 
Yitzhak Council)
To promote the stagnated marketing process, the MCH and the governmental 
construction corporation of A’rim ltd acted to ensure the profitability of future 
developers by granting them the power to re-parcel the site. A’rim was well aware 
and attentive to the demands of private developers. For example, as each urban 
outline plan usually includes an architectural appendix (nispach binui), here, 
A’rim argued that such an appendix is redundant as the private contractors that 
will develop each lot would eventually compose one of their own, which would 
better suit their economic interests.664 In such a statement, A’rim basically gave 
away its responsibility for the nature of the future built environment, granting 
future developers the spatial privilege of developing space according to their 
economic interests.
The MCH, the ILA, and the regional council supported a series of new spot planning 
schemes, enhancing the developers’ privileged status in order to make Tzur 
Yitzhak more attractive for investment. In 2006, the private developers of the 
Ya’ara compound received the local committee’s approval to increase the number 
of dwelling units by 10% and the number of floors from five to nine, all in order 
662 Maor, ‘Marketting to Associations, the Improved Version’.
663 Lori, ‘The Strike of Real Estate Monsters Continues, This Time in the Tzur Yitzhak Version’.
664 Bar, ‘Zur Nathan’.
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to “optimally use the building rights”.665 An additional plan from 2008, submitted 
by a private developer and supported by the MCH, officially asked to adjust the 
existing outline plan to “the demands of the market”;666 combining different lots and 
increasing the number of dwelling units by 20% and the permitted floors from five 
to eight.667 The changes also included combining ten different lots into four larger 
continuous ones. This was not made to create a fewer number of buildings, but 
rather on the contrary, as the new plan suggested four different buildings in each of 
the new lots. Moreover, this also cancelled the previous paths between the buildings 
and merged them into two main entrances, creating an uninterrupted private area 
along the settlement’s main road (fig 5.54-5.55).
FIG. 5.54 Authorised outline 
plan, 2000. (ILA)
FIG. 5.55 New outline plan, 
2008. (ILA)
With the private developers receiving an additional power to form space, they were 
able to secure the profitability of their projects. The changes they proposed were 
seemingly minor and were thus subjected to the local planning committee, what 
ensured an easier and quicker bureaucratic procedure. Such minor modifications 
cannot enlarge the overall permitted area for residential use, yet they can 
665 Golan Architects, ‘Town Outline Plan SD/MK/101/15/3’, 2.
666 Cohen Lifshitz Architects, ‘Urban Ouline Plan SD/MK/101/15/8’, 2.
667 Ibid
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redistribute the inner functions inside the settlement, exchange lots and alter the 
total number of units, building and floors; ensuring the feasibility of construction. For 
instance, the original plan designated a strip of housings along the northern edges 
of the project that created marketing problem due to the proximity to the Arab city of 
Taybeh, not a quality that upper-middle-class Jewish families were seeking. Two local 
outline plans, from 2008 and 2010, authorised exchanging the residential lots with 
the inner ones designated for public institutions.668 Consequently, the schools and 
kindergartens, which were not subjected to marketing and real estate interests, were 
to be located in the strip close to Taybeh; an area with substantially less economic 
potential.669 Moreover, the amendments plans enabled the construction of the same 
residential square meterage in a smaller number of buildings, with a larger number 
of floors and apartments. Consequently, enlarging the number of apartments sharing 
a common staircase and elevator, decreasing the construction costs, while creating 
higher apartments that could be marketed as luxurious lofty “villas in the air” 
(fig 5.56).670
FIG. 5.56 Initially proposed 
buildings (left) and the eventually 
constructed ones (right); 
creating a denser and more cost-
efficient construction process. 
(Illustrated by the author)
All of these aspects are clearly obvious in the marketing brochures for one of the 
projects built in Tzur Yitzhak, titled “An apartment in nature”. The brochure includes 
a general map of the new settlement, an exemplary plan of an apartment, a view 
from a living room, and the usual explanatory text. The map, which points out the 
location of the project in Tzur Yitzhak, also states that the strip of schools in the 
northern edges is turned towards Taybeh, ensuring that not the dwelling units do 
668 Mintz-Melamed Architects and Planners, ‘Local Outline Plan SD/MD/101/15/1’; Gvuli, Naveh Afek.
669 Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, ‘Permit 2008188 (Tzur Yitzhak)’; Drom HaSharon 
local council construction committee, ‘Permit 20070273 (Tzur Yitzhak)’; Drom HaSharon local council 
construction committee, ‘Permit 2007117 (Tzur Yitzhak)’.
670 Y.H. Dimri, ‘The Most Prestigious Villas in the Sharon Area Are in the Sky at All’.
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so (fig 5.57). Moreover, the apartments are depicted as an autonomous dwelling 
unit, disconnected from all adjacent ones, a virtue that is highlighted by the units’ 
broken outline (fig 5.58), which in a way mimics that of private houses. The living 
room rendering that is oriented towards a non-existing open view (fig 5.59) and the 
promotion text enhance this idea further:
“Along the Samarian slopes, opposite to HaMarzeva Valley, right near Alexander 
stream and the blossoming Tzur Yitzhak forest. There, amid nature, with no barrier 
to the view and the open air, stands a residential project. The project overlooks the 
entire settlement of Tzur Nathan in the Sharon, and is close to Highway 6 and 531, 
so it is easy to get to employment and recreation places in the Dan region, in the 
Sharon cities and in general.” 671
This quote illustrates the logic of the new Tzur Yitzhak, a notion of living in an open 
landscape, away from the city life, but accessible to all major highways. One is 
supposed to seek employment, recreation and cultural life outside of the settlement. 
Inside the settlement, one should only seek to be at home with one’s family.
FIG. 5.57 Tzur Yitzhak promotion 
brochure, 2017. (Hanan Mor ltd)
671 Hanan Mor ltd, ‘Apartment in Nature - the Green Spot in Tzur Yitzhak’.
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FIG. 5.58 An apartment in Tzur Yitzhak 
promotion brochure, 2017. (Hanan Mor ltd)
FIG. 5.59 A rendering of a living room in Tzur Yitzhak, 
2017. (Hanan Mor ltd)
The alterations in the plan significantly transformed Tzur Yitzhak from the initially 
planned suburban residential environment to a high-rise housing semi-urban 
development. Though the changes made in order to increase the profitability of the 
project could be also explained as a beneficiary for the future inhabitants, it is quite 
hard to make such a claim in this case. The settlements’ central park, for example, 
was originally supposed to be connected to the surrounding streets through several 
pedestrian paths, as mentioned above. By combining the adjacent lots into large 
parcels and cancelling the lots, the new plan of 2008 enabled the developers to 
construct a consecutive project along both the outer road and the inner park. 
Besides, though the original plan suggested underground parking and positioning 
the buildings at the height of the access street, the new plan allowed parking 
places above the ground, while also raising the level of the ground floor over the 
entrance level. This, as could be seen in the building permit, eventually resulted in 
severe height differences between the building and the street, while creating a long, 
continuous and closed supporting wall as the main façade.672 The building permit 
also shows that these differences are not an outcome of the local topography, but 
rather made in order to create a separation between the ‘garden apartments’ in the 
ground floor, providing them with a better sense of privacy (fig 5.60-5.61). This also 
created a closed and continuous façade in the shape of a supporting wall towards 
the inner park, which as it was now enclosed by an unbroken residential parcel, 
became a confined and restricted open public space (fig 6.62).
672 Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, ‘Permit 20090085 (Tzur Yitzhak)’.
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FIG. 5.60 Underground parking in a section of a 
suggested building. Meir Nir. 1999 (Courtesy of Meir 
Nir)
FIG. 5.61 Aboveground parking areas in the section 
of a constructed building. 2008. (Drom HaSharon 
Committee)
FIG. 5.62 Area of the planned 
main park, 2015. (Eyal Tueg)
The changes in the plan for Tzur Yitzhak affected also the design of the buildings. 
Except for the changes made in the height, scale and number of units, the new 
regulation enabled the redistribution of the overall permitted area along the different 
floors. This supported the construction of larger apartments on the upper floors, 
where the real estate is of higher value. Consequently, this facilitated in giving the 
buildings in Tzur Yitzhak a mushroom-like appearance, which is dictated according 
to the changes in the value of a square meter depending on the floor in which it is 
located (fig 5.63). The intensified pro-development approach that accompanied 
the project eventually dictated almost every aspect of the built environment of Tzur 
Yitzhak, from the zoning plan to the apartment, leading to a settlement made out of 
isolated buildings, surrounded by parking places and supporting wall (fig 5.64).
Tzur Yitzhak project suffered from a rough start that caused several delays in its 
development. Besides the marketing problems and the recession in the construction 
industry, the violent events of the second Intifada, which began the same year as 
the approval of the outline plan, caused a severe decrease in interest in the area. 
Moreover, the planning administration subjugated the construction in Tzur Yitzhak 
to the development of the needed regional infrastructure, dictating several phases, 
which depended on the expansion of regional routes 444, 531 and 532, as well as 
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the construction of highway 6.673 As all these projects were delayed so were the 
works in Tzur Yitzhak.674 Eventually, although the somewhat hesitating start, the new 
settlement became an attractive real estate project, with substantial rises in property 
values that were doubled in less than ten years.675 This was an outcome of intense 
promotion efforts conducted by the developers of the settlements, but also by the 
post-2008 national housing crisis that triggered several results in other places as 
well. The construction of the West-Bank Separation Barrier in the area in 2006 and 
the end of the Second Intifada at the same time also helped to promote the project.
FIG. 5.63 Section of a 
constructed building. 2008. 
(Drom HaSharon Committee). 
Note the upper floors are larger 
than the lower ones
FIG. 5.64 Tzur Yitzhak as a collection of isolated buildings, 2014. 
(Shikun U’Binui)
The eastern part of the settlement would undergo a larger number of changes, 
caused by the developers’ interests to further optimise the development process. 
This area was mostly handled by the Tzur Nathan council, which received the building 
rights according to the agreement with the ILA as it was previously the lessee of 
the same area. Here, the involvement of the MCH was minimal, and as it stated 
earlier that it had no interests in developing it.676 Although the area was under the 
responsibility of Tzur Nathan, it was developed in a partnership with the Industrial 
Buildings Corporation ltd (that was in charge of Shoham), now under the name of 
Mevnim ltd. Since the approval of the first outline plan in 2000, the partnership, 
673 Meir Nir Architects, ‘Town Outline Plan SD/101/15/D’.
674 MCH, ‘Tzur Nathan - SD/101/15/D’.
675 Buso, ‘Once an Apartment was worth Half a Million Shekels’.
676 Bar, Zur Nathan, Tel Aviv: A’rim, 1; Steinmentz, ‘Tzur Nathan’, 1.
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together with the ILA, submitted three different amendment plans to the local 
committee, which the latter approved (fig 5.65). Though their official objective was to 
re-arrange the public parcels in the site, they were used to redistribute the building 
rights inside the new neighbourhoods.677 Beside the low-rise semi-detached houses 
and the mid-rise “boutique buildings”,678 the amendment plans created a series 
of 16-story residential towers; way beyond the initially approved five-story ones 
(fig 5.66).679
FIG. 5.65 Original and amendment plans of the eastern neighbourhood, 2000, 2008, 2011, 2014 (ILA)
FIG. 5.66 Tzur Yitzhak, 2017. (Mivne Group). In the lower part of the image is the eastern part 
under construction. Built are the low-rise and mid-rise houses. The parcels in the left part are for the 
residential towers
677 Dov Koren Architects, ‘Local Outline Plan SD/101/15/5’; Dov Koren Architects, ‘Local Outline Plan 
SD/101/15/12’; Dov Koren Architects, ‘Local Outline Plan SD/101/15/18’.
678 Drom HaSharon local council construction committee, ‘Permit 20090215 (Tzur Yitzhak)’.
679 Mevnim Ltd, ‘Marom HaSharon’.
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The different transformations in the planning and development of Tzur Yitzhak 
created an undefinable settlement type. Entirely suburban, yet with 16-story 
residential towers, it is entirely different from previously constructed settlements 
nearby. This was not only a question of appearance and design, but also an issue of 
managerial and municipal governance. It was built in the former jurisdictional area of 
Tzur Nathan, yet the latter was not interested in losing its small-scale character and 
thus advocated for a separation from the new project. Consequently, the Ministry 
of Interior decided that it would become a Community Settlement, on a temporary 
basis, in the larger regional council of Drom Hasharon. Yet, as the regional council 
mainly consists of small rural settlements, it was unable to support the large-scale 
of Tzur Nathan, and the Ministry of Interior asked to merge it with the neighbouring 
locality of Kochav Yair-Tzur Yigal. An attempt that was heavily fought by Kochav Yair-
Tzur Yigal and was therefore rejected.680 As of 2019, Tzur Yitzhak was still officially 
a Community Settlement, a definition that is usually used for small-scale semi-rural 
settlements (see chapter III). Practically, Tzur Yitzhak is more a hybrid of suburban 
ideas and seemingly urban ones; functioning as a gated compound of high-rise 
residential buildings that are situated on a hilltop, housing a population of young 
commuting families (fig 5.67).
FIG. 5.67 Entrance to Tzur 
Yitzhak, 2016 (Eyal Tueg)
680 Levi, ‘A committee of the Interior Ministry recommended’.
TOC
 288 The  Privatisation  of a National Project
 5.8 Conclusions: the state creates a market 
that shapes the state
Following the gentrification of the 1980s, the area of along the Green-Line was 
opened for its mass suburbanisation during the 1990s. Fuelled by geopolitical 
considerations and a desire for a vast production of dwelling units the development 
of the area turned into a national project executed by private capital. Consequently, 
as shown in this chapter, the former association-led mechanism was weakened 
and eventually cancelled, as the state preferred to rely on the experience and profit 
incentives of private developers. In doing so, the state commodified its frontier, 
hoping that this would generate a circular process of supply and demand. To 
create the needed real estate market, the state carried out major administrative 
and planning interventions, which were meant to promote an efficient and swift 
development process that would secure the investments of private entrepreneurs. 
Enacting such a top-down process meant that the state took back the power to plan 
and form space, which it had previously granted the early housing associations and 
developers active in the area. The spatial privileges were thus mainly property rights 
and the ability to develop a specific site.
As mass-produced projects, the architectural and [sub]urban models introduced 
in the Stars settlements were the product of the new supply-side perspective and 
the growing involvement of the private sector. The earlier focus on the detached 
house and the seclusion of the private family life from the greater communal 
context was not forsaken but rather enhanced by the market incentives to produce 
an ever-growing number of units. In that sense, the commodification of space, 
manifested in the tract housing developments, suited the detached suburban lifestyle 
urban families were looking for while moving away from the cities they lived in. 
Lacking almost any employment and recreational opportunities and made out of 
free-standing residential buildings, the high-rise suburbia that began developing 
in Shoham and continued in Tzur-Yitzhak, could be understood as a vertical 
tract housing development, subdividing a certain area in all three dimensions 
(fig 5.68-5.70). Accessible mainly through an underground parking area that 
is connected to each floor by an elevator, with an outline imitating a layout of a 
detached private house, the newly designed buildings were planned as a collection 
of separated dwelling units. Thus, constituting a scaled version of the earlier 
Suburban Settlements.
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With the growing reliance on the market, rentability of a certain urban plan and the 
architectural regulations it dictated turned into a leading concern. Consequently, 
the [sub]urban and architectural form of the new environment were heavily dictated 
by profitability and economic efficiency interests. With an increase in demand for 
housing units, the state focused on creating more urban-like settlements, that form 
a more economically efficient use of a given site; concentrating efforts and enlarging 
profits. At the same time, as demands decreased, the state acted in order to create 
one, solving the ‘market failure’ by promising the economic feasibility of the project 
and with it the continuation of the development of the entire area. Later, as the 
state was entirely dependent on private capital, it granted the private developers 
additional spatial privileges, giving them the power to form space by promoting 
new schemes or making amendments to existing ones. In doing so, the state hoped 
to meet the developers’ speculative interests and to ensure the realisation of the 
project; completing the domestication of the frontier and securing the state’s 
power over space. Thus, as the state created a market, the latter eventually began 
physically shaping the state that created it.
FIG. 5.68 New compounds 
(Illustrated by the author)
FIG. 5.69 A ‘Vertical Suburb’ 
(Illustrated by the author)
FIG. 5.70 Dwelling unit in a 
new high-rise suburban building 
(Illustrated by the author)
During the 1990s, the settlement development mechanism turned into a supply-
side territorial policy, focused on creating a market as a means to promote spatial 
control. While classic supply-side housing strategies are usually used to answer 
the public need for dwelling units, in this case, the state intervened in order to 
regenerate it. Consequently, as the following chapter shows, the 2010 Israeli 
housing crisis could be explained not by the lack of supply, but rather by the over-
profitability of real estate, which caused an ever-growing demand for dwelling units 
as investments. Harish, the focus of the next chapter, illustrates how the supply-
side territorial approach continued to develop, leading to the financialisation of the 
national settlement mechanism.
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6 Financialisation & 
Harish City
Merging financial and 
 geopolitical frontiers
A shorter version of this chapter is currently under review at Cities
 6.1 Introduction: forming a crisis
The transition into a supply-side approach of frontier domestication increased 
the speculative aspects of its built environment. Accordingly, the production and 
consumption of private property, became the main tool in housing development. 
Therefore, as the 2008 global economic turmoil led to an increase in real estate 
prices in Israel, which eventually led to a national housing crisis, the government 
sought to appease the growing public pressure by stimulating the real estate 
market; increasing the focus on property and regenerating the financial aspect of 
development. The government’s main strategy relied on tendering state-owned 
lands, deregulation of the planning process and economic incentives to private 
developers, with an emphasis on large-scale developments that would increase the 
overall supply of residential units. Consequently, undeveloped planned cities, new 
urban quarters and various settlements, of which the execution was continuously 
halted, swiftly became sites of rapid construction. With a strong focus on the 
geographical periphery and areas of so-called national priority, the state hoped to 
use the increasing need for dwelling units for the development of previously under-
developed peripheral and frontier areas. Thus, opening new financial frontiers in 
order to domesticate national ones.
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This chapter focuses on the city of Harish, a unique case study whose different 
development attempts demonstrate the gradual privatisation of the Israeli settlement 
mechanism and the different architectural and urban models it produced. The first 
attempts included a kibbutz, a Community Settlement and later also a suburban one. 
All of which were unsuccessful, due to the peripheral location and proximity to the 
West-Bank and other Arab towns. By 2010, the wide demand for new dwelling units, 
the construction of the Trans-Israel Highway and the West-Bank Separation Barrier 
all contributed to turning Harish into an attractive piece of real estate. Consequently, 
enabling the Israeli Government to designate it as a city with a target population 
of 60,000. This chapter illustrates the financialisation of the national settlement 
project, explaining how the state apparatus was used to create a real estate market 
in a certain area, in order supply the needed dwelling units while expanding the 
national territorial project. Analysing the different phases in Harish, this chapter 
demonstrates how the ability to produce space turned into the main settlement tool, 
initially instigating a turf battle between different groups seeking spatial privileges 
that was eventually won by large-scale corporations and led to a new phase in 
the privatisation of the settlement mechanism. Consequently, domesticating the 
Green-Line by completing its transition into a real estate market while promoting 
the formation of new architectural and urban typologies; directed by the economic 
considerations of their developers.
 6.2 The crisis and emergency measures
The 2008 world financial crisis significantly affected the Israeli housing market. 
Initially, it seemed that the small and relatively isolated economy would be 
left untouched by the global confusion, with the local banking system and 
stock exchange witnessing modest fluctuations. Eventually, however, the post-
2008 years became a period of an increasing real estate prices. The usual and 
common explanation is the lack of sufficient development during the late 1990s, 
which followed the early 1990s construction boom.681 On the other hand, other 
explanations point the finger on the low interest rate placed by the Israeli Central 
Bank, parallel to similar decisions worldwide. This, together with the uncertainty of 
681 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘Report of the Housing Crisis’.
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the stock market, turned real estate into the most common investment method.682 As 
shown by Boruchov, though the official state claims spoke of a ‘real’ deficit of tens 
of thousands of dwelling units yearly, a proper analysis of the statistics indicates 
a significantly much lower number. Thus, that the demand for housing is not only 
due to the yearly production of dwelling units lagging behind the yearly increase in 
households, but due to the increasing profitability of real estate investment.683 Or in 
other words, the increasing demand was not only for the ‘use-value’ of housing but 
also (or even mainly) for its ‘exchange-value’.684 No matter whether it was a question 
of lack of supply or high demands, the increasing housing prices led to the vast 
demonstrations of the summer of 2011, which became known as the Israeli Social 
Justice Protests685. These focused on the increasing living costs of the local middle-
class, and especially emphasised the ever-increasing rental prices and property 
values.686
The housing crisis led the Israeli Government to take significant measures that were 
meant to drastically enlarge the national stock of dwelling units. This was in line 
with the decades-long supply-side housing approach of the Israeli Government, 
which sought to promote the construction of dwelling units by stimulating the 
economic interests of the private market.687 Like in similar neoliberal economies, 
bureaucracy and regulations turned into the new public enemy that prevents the 
public from receiving the services it is entitled to.688 Accordingly, in 2011, prime 
minister Netanyahu promised a ‘Supertanker’ against bureaucracy, which would 
enable the immediate construction of hundreds of thousands of dwelling units in 
a short period of time.689 Using the metaphor of the Supertanker, the large-scale 
682 Boruchov, ‘On Target: The Housing Crisis and Damage to the Planning System’, 63–70.
683 Boruchov, 80–85.
684 Harvey, Seventeen Contradictions and the End of Capitalism, 15–25.
685 Alfasi and Fenster, ‘Between Socio-Spatial and Urban Justice: Rawls’ Principles of Justice in the 2011 
Israeli Protest Movement’, 407–27; Marom, ‘Activising Space: The Spatial Politics of the 2011 Protest 
Movement in Israel’, 2826–41.
686 Allweil, Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011, 1–26.
687 Carmon, ‘Housing Policy in Israel: Review, Evaluation and Lessons’, 181–208; Barzilai, ‘Fantasies 
of Liberalism and Liberal Jurisprudence State Law: Politics and the Israeli Arab-Palestinian Community’, 
426–51.
688 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 61; Graeber, The Utopia of Rules, 6–29.
689 Charney, ‘A “Supertanker” Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning 
in Netanyahu’s Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel’, 1224; Somfalvi and Lahav, ‘Natanyahu 
on Housing: Supertanker for Bureaucracy’.
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firefighting aeroplane Israel had borrowed from the US in the efforts to extinguish 
the Carmel fires a year earlier, Netanyahu expressed his desire to promote massive 
governmental interventions that would bypass the existing planning and construction 
procedure.690 Netanyahu’s different ‘Supertankers’ included a new National Housing 
Committee, de-regulation and speeding the planning process and authorisation 
of urban outline schemes and easing the private development of state-owned 
lands.691 These measures, as this chapter shows, significantly influenced the popular 
architectural and planning practices, eventually reshaping the former frontier area.
The main challenge of the Israeli Government to enlarge the supply in areas of 
high demand caused it to try expanding the main metropolises into the peripheries 
and internal frontiers. With the neoliberal turn in the Israeli economy of the 1980s 
and 90s and the new market-oriented metropolitan-based planning strategy, the 
government did not forsake its territorial agenda and continued to invest in the 
development of settlements in areas of national interests, outside of the main 
metropolises.692 With the limited state-owned lands in areas of high demand and 
the national desire to continuously expand its power over space, the state sought 
to extend the areas of high demand while incorporating parts of the geographical 
peripheries and internal frontiers.693 Eventually, creating a neoliberal frontier 
domestication mechanism by developing a real estate market in areas of national 
interests; merging social, territorial and entrepreneurial interests. To stimulate the 
interests of the private market, the state promoted special measures, like tendering 
state-owned lands for almost free and new planning committees that bypass the 
existing hierarchy. By doing so, the state created what Agamben refers to as “Zones 
of Indistinction”, where a sovereign entity imposes a state of emergency that 
usually includes temporary suspending the existing legal framework, until the state 
emergency is solved.694 Usually, these new measures correlate with the interests of 
the ruling authorities and hegemonic elites, which by adapting the crisis discourse 
690 Charney, ‘A “Supertanker” Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing 
Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel’, 1224; Mualem, ‘Playing with 
Supertankers: Centralization in Land Use Planning in Israel: A National Experiment Underway’, 270; Eshel 
and Hananel, ‘Centralization, Neoliberalism, and Housing Policy Central–Local Government Relations and 
Residential Development in Israel’, 238.
691 Rubin and Felsenstein, ‘Supply Side Constraints in the Israeli Housing Market: The Impact of State Owned 
Land’, 267.
692 Shachar, ‘Reshaping the Map of Israel: A New National Planning Doctrine’, 208–18.
693 Charney, ‘A “Supertanker” Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning 
in Netanyahu’s Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel’, 1240–43.
694 Agamben, State of Exception, 25.
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they are able to promote their national and economic agenda.695 Building on 
Agamben, Weizman explains frontier settlement as extraterritorial exclaves, which 
remain outside of the existing jurisdiction until the frontier is domesticated.696 In this 
sense, the attempts to develop a real estate market in the Israeli internal frontier 
are a continuation of the desire to domesticate it, and the emergency measures 
enacted by the Israeli Government thus serve the interests of the ruling national and 
economic hegemony.
Harish, the focus of this chapter, was an integral part of the government’s efforts to 
enhance the state’s control over the Green-Line and the predominantly Arab Wadi 
A’ara (fig 6.1). From the late 1970s, the government led several attempts to develop 
the site, yet it was the housing crisis of 2011 that eventually enabled the mass 
settlement of the area. The story of Harish illustrates how, as Graeber claims, states 
create markets, and not otherwise.697 Moreover, it demonstrates how by creating 
a market in a specific area, the state is able to harness the interests of the private 
sector. Presenting the different stages of the development of Harish and analysing 
the architectural and urban products of each stage, this chapter clarifies the 
changing public-private alliance and how it shapes the local built environment.
FIG. 6.1 Harish in 2015, located 
on the Green-Line between the 
West-Bank Separation Barrier 
and the Arab area of Wadi A’ara 
(Illustrated by the author)
695 ibid
696 Weizman, ‘Principles of Frontier Geography’, 84–92.
697 Graeber, Debt: The First 5000 Years, 50–55.
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 6.3 Kibbutz Harish and Moshav Katzir: 
early rural and neo‑rural attempts
During the past four decades, Harish went through different endeavours and 
transformations that correspond with the changes in the Israeli settlement 
development mechanism. These included a frontier Nahal outpost that was 
supposed to be developed into a kibbutz, a Community Settlement, a large 
Suburban Settlement, a city for the Ultra-Orthodox sector and eventually the current 
corporate-led environment. These variations were parallel to the local economic and 
political transformations and demonstrate the changing relation between national 
agendas and the private market, as well as the growing reliance of the former on 
the latter. Overall, the case of Harish expresses the state’s efforts to create new real 
estate markets in order to promote the national territorial considerations and to 
harness the interests of the private market to those of the state.
Harish today is still a city in the making, anticipating a future of a large-scale 
development. As of early 2019, it consists of around a couple of thousand inhabited 
apartments and a population of just over 10,000. Currently, across the new town, 
there are some 4000-6000 dwelling units in different construction and approval 
phases and additional tens of thousands planned ones.698 While the original target 
for the year 2020 was a city with a total population of 60,000, the new objectives are 
aiming towards 100,000 inhabitants by 2030. These ambitious intentions, if fulfilled, 
will turn Harish into the fastest developing city in the history of the state of Israel; 
surpassing all former precedents.
The site of Harish has long been a part of the national geopolitical agenda. The first 
attempts to settle the site were already taken in the late 1970s as part of the Israeli 
Government and the Jewish Agency’s (JA) Judaization campaign of the northern 
Galilee. Accordingly, the state-led endeavours focused on establishing an array of 
small-scale Jewish settlements on state-owned lands, across the predominantly 
Arab area. These efforts turned into an official scheme named the “lookouts plan”, 
as they consisted of an initial temporary settlement phase, which usually included 
a provisional site on a vacant hilltop that later would become permanent. While the 
main focus was the upper Galilee, in what would later become the Misgav regional 
698 ICBS, ‘Localities in Israel’.
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council, the JA located a few southern sites, west of the Green-Line and in the mainly 
Arab populated areas of Wadi A’ara and the Triangle. The site of Harish was one of 
these points, which included also the future settlements of Kochav Yair and Katzir. 
Therefore, forming a western counterpart to the settlement efforts east of the Green-
Line and inside the West-Bank.699
The new site of Harish was part of the state’s strategical Nahal Eron Plan. Nahal 
Eron, or in its Arab name “Wadi A’ara”, is an area in northern Israel with a vast 
majority of an Arab population, living mainly in the cities and towns of Umm al-Fahm, 
Kufr Qara, and Baqa al-Gharbiyye, and in several smaller villages as well. With its 
location adjacent to the northern Green-Line, the Israeli Government had for a long 
time feared the formation of an Arab territorial sequence across both sides of the 
former border, and thus promoted the establishment of new Jewish settlements that 
would prevent this potential sequence. These settlements included the kibbutzim of 
Metzer, Magal, and Barkai in the early 1950s, as well the moshav of Mei Ami, which 
was built as part of the 1960s “Frontier Fortresses Plan”.700 During the 1980s, the 
Israeli Government and the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organisation 
(WZO) initiated the Reihan settlement block inside the West-Bank, as an additional 
attempt to prevent the formation of a potential cross-border Arab territorial 
sequence (see chapter III).
Besides the usual emphasis on rural and small-scale settlements, the different 
planning administrations were interested in promoting a new city in the area. Already 
in the late 1970s, the “Hills Axis” plan of Baruch Kipnis for the development of urban 
settlements along the Green-Line mentioned three possible sites for a city in Wadi 
A’ara (fig 6.2). These, according to Kipnis, “would enable introducing a big urban 
Jewish settlement in the Nahal Eron region, which constitutes a consecutive Arab 
area”.701 In the same year, the Israel Land Administration (ILA) would discuss the 
sites recommended by Kipnis. And, while the northern option (A), enjoyed a much 
better planning potential, due to the site’s topography and size, the tendency was to 
pick the southern site. An internal report submitted to Ya’acov Dash, the head of the 
Planning Administration, highlighted two main reasons for developing a new urban 
centre in the area. First, was the interest “to break” the Arab sequence on both sides 
of the Green-Line, while the second was to create an urban development reserve 
699 Soffer, ‘Mitzpim in the Galilee - a decade of their establishment’, 24–29; Falah, ‘Israeli “Judaization” 
Policy in Galilee’, 69–85.
700 Tal, The Frontier Fortresses Plan.
701 Kipnis, Potential of Developing Urban Housings along the Hills Axis, 18.
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for the heavily populated coastal plain (fig 6.3). The report concluded that if the 
main consideration are territorial ones, then the southern site is the better option, 
and in case the main considerations are the expansion of the coastal area, then the 
northern site should be the preferred option. Nonetheless, the report determined 
that the territorial perspective should be favoured, despite the southern site’s harsh 
topographic conditions.702
FIG. 6.2 Possible sites for an urban settlement in Wadi A’ara, 1978, 
(Baruch Kipnis)
FIG. 6.3 Possible sites for an 
urban settlement in Wadi A’ara, 
Israel Planning Administration 
(Israel State Archives)
Despite the growing urban focus, the JA decided to proceed with the rural option, 
indicating the lack of economic probability for a project of a larger scale. The 
masterplan for Settlement Development in the West Bank, which prevailed over the 
more urban idea, designated the area of Nahal Eron as a hybrid of agricultural and 
industrial villages of around 50 families.703 The early plan did not mention the site 
of Harish directly, but by in the early 1980s, it was included in two different plans 
for the development of the area. Composed by the Settlement Division, the first plan 
declared both Harish and the nearby site of Katzir as Community Settlements, and 
therefore not agricultural ones (fig 6.4).704 Similar to other settlements developed at 
that time, they enjoyed a reputation of being rural-like or neo-rural, bearing names 
702 Israel Planning Administration, ‘An Analyses for a new Jewish Settlement in Wadi A’ara’, 2.
703 Drobles, ‘Master plan for Settlement Development in Judea and Samaria, 1979-1983’, 4.
704 Settlement Division, ‘A Proposal for Settlement Development in the Eron-Reihan Hills’.
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with strong farming connotations like Plough (Harish-חריש) and Harvest (Katzir-
 The plan of the Settlement Division from a year later would declare Harish as .(קציר
a kibbutz of the National Kibbutzim Movement, to be settled on a temporary basis 
in 1982. The first phase would include 15 temporary units, while the plan estimated 
that the future kibbutz would include around 200 families, which would mainly be 
occupied in intensive agriculture, cotton and dairy farming.705 Thus, becoming a 
rural settlement per se.
The first step promoted by the JA resembled former rural examples and relied on 
the fusion of communal life, agriculture and territory. In 1982 a settling group from 
the Nahal corps, arrived at the site of Harish and established a temporary outpost. 
The JA’s Settlement Department, which was in charge of new rural settlements 
inside the official borders of Israel, had already conducted the needed planning for 
the provisional site a year earlier, as suitable for pre-privatisation development. 
Consequently, this supposedly momentary station resembled the other frontier Nahal 
settlements of the area and was made out of rows of prefabricated dwelling units and 
a communal clubhouse (fig 6.5). Later, the JA and the Kibbutzim Movement promoted 
a plan to turn the temporary site into a permanent kibbutz, while the movement’s 
settling group began occupying the settlement. As Harish was to become part of the 
kibbutzim of HaShomer HaTzair movement, its technical department was in charge of 
the drafting and submitted a detailed outline plan in 1984, which would later receive 
the official approval of the district committee, enabling the development of the site 
into its permanent phase.706 The plan for Harish followed the classical concepts of 
a kibbutz (fig 6.6).707 Thus. it consisted of a communal public core, surrounded by 
the members dwelling units, which were divided between regular, children and youth 
compounds; all sharing a common open green car-free space.
705 Settlement Division, ‘Development Plan for Jewish Settlement In the Eron Hills- Reihan Region’.
706 Department, Outline Plan M/146.
707 Chyutin and Chyutin, Architecture and Utopia: Kibbutz and Moshav, 45–53.
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FIG. 6.4 Jewish Settlements (Blue) 
in Wadi A’ara, 1980, WZO Settlement 
Division (WZO)
FIG. 6.5 Plan for the 
temporary site of 
Kibbutz Harish, 1981. JA 
Settlement Department. 
(Central Zionist Archive 
-CZA)
FIG. 6.6 Harish Outline Plan, 1984, 
(ILA). Note the public core in brown
Parallel to the decline in rural settlement during the 1980s, Kibbutz Harish was 
short-lived. While the initial military post turned into a civilian kibbutz, it housed 
mainly a variety of Nahal soldiers’ settling groups, which lived and worked in it, 
yet never turned it into an official permanent settlement (fig 6.7). The plan of 
the Kibbutzim Movement was never fulfilled, and the site was mainly made of the 
initial temporary dwelling units. The Kibbutzim Crisis of the 1980s, which left the 
movement almost bankrupted, as well as the inability to find a proper civilian settling 
group, eventually led to the failure of Harish as a communal rural settlement. By 
the early 1990s, the Kibbutzim Movement vacated the site, which remained briefly 
settled by a small company of the Borders Police Forces.
FIG. 6.7 Establishment of Nahal Harish, 1982, (Hashomer Hatzair Archives Yad Yaar)i; a female Nahal soldier 
in Harish. 1982-1990, note the prefabricated units in the background; Nahal soldiers in Harish. 1982-1990
While Harish was considered as a failure, the neighbouring Katzir was much 
more successful. The JA established Katzir in 1982, in the same wave as Harish. 
Nevertheless, Katzir, was planned neither as a kibbutz and nor as a moshav, but 
rather as a Community Settlement. It started as a temporary site as well, yet, it was 
housed by a civilian settling group, organised by the JA, and not by soldiers from 
the Nahal corps. The JA was thus in charge of assembling the settling families and 
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prepared a small group of ten members that it turned into a registered association. 
A year later, a group of ten more families would join the first members, all of which 
would live in temporary light-weight units, supplied by the JA, while the efforts to 
plan and to expand the settlements were underway (fig 6.8).708
As a Community Settlement, Katzir started out with a communal core that later 
formed the centre of future development, which suited its neo-rural profile. Similar 
to other Community Settlements, the layout of the initial phase consisted of the 
temporary dwelling units, and was made out of two parallel rows of houses, placed 
along the topographic lines (fig 6.9). The planners of the JA located the public area 
of the settlement on the site’s highest point, which included the secretariat and 
the members club, while forming the official entrance and the main parking spot. A 
series of pedestrian paths connected the settlement’s centre to each of the dwelling 
units, creating a well-integrated and communal compound, which is based on 
private households, yet sharing a collective open space (fig 6.10). As a Community 
Settlement, the JA planned to populate Katzir by a small homogeneous group, to 
which it would grant the spatial privilege to settle the site.
FIG. 6.8 Plans for the temporary 
dwelling units in Katzir. 1980. JA 
Settlement Department. (CZA)
708 Lanir, ‘You plowed and harvested’, 26.
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FIG. 6.9 Plan for Mitzpe Katzir, 1981. (ILA)
FIG. 6.10 Temporary units 
in Katzir, 1983. Boris Carmi 
(Ma’ariv)
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 6.4 Katzir‑Harish: the suburban turn
The plans for the expansion of Katzir were slightly more suburban and less 
communal (fig 6.11). While the logic of the first plan focused on creating the 
communal basic core, the logic of the latter was on forming a series of detached 
lots that could then be developed separately by the new members of the community. 
Correspondingly, the new layout was made out four dead-end streets that formed 
two rows of private parcels, which could then be marketed to newly arriving 
families.709 Though Katzir attracted several upper-middle-class families, usually 
with a high academic background that were interested in improving their quality of 
life, the expansion plan was not completely fulfilled, and the settlement remained 
relatively vacant. This was mainly due to the site’s remote location and poor 
accessibility, that while enhancing the pioneer-like image of Katzir, it prevented it 
from becoming an attractive residential environment, attracting additional families 
to the area.710 Katzir of the 1980s was thus still an ex-urban settlement, built in the 
geographic periphery of the frontier area of the seam-zone, and not yet the ideal 
Suburban Settlement. Still, the border of the total area of Katzir, which was more 
than five times larger than the developed one, indicated future intentions of turning 
it into a much larger settlement. Forming a small-scale settlement with vast land 
reserves was a common territorial tactic, repeatedly used by the different Israeli 
planning administration in order to limit the expansion of Arab localities nearby. In 
fact, this was constantly stated in the different settlement plans in the West Bank and 
the Galilee.711 However, while in former cases the land reserves were usually farming 
plots, in this case, they were merely a statement of intent of future actions.
709 Arye Sonino Architects, ‘M/139’.
710 Lanir, ‘You plowed and harvested’, 26.
711 Soffer, ‘Mitzpim in the Galilee - a decade of their establishment’, 24–29; Falah, ‘Israeli “Judaization” 
Policy in Galilee’, 69–85.
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FIG. 6.11 Outline Plan of Katzir, 
1985. (ILA)
By the early 1990s, the Israeli Government had already developed a new 
comprehensive vision for the area, with Harish and Katzir playing a major role in 
it. Both sites were incorporated in the greater Stars Plan, for the development of 
suburban settlements along the Green-Line (see chapter V). Consequently, both 
settlements lost their former frontier-like or ex-urban characteristics and turned into 
suburban residential environments. The Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH), 
which took control of developing the ‘Stars’, promoted new outline schemes, with 
the ministry’s rural department taking the lead. Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior 
united both settlements into one council, and though they maintained their relative 
independence, they now formed a new locality named Tel Eron (fig 6.12).
FIG. 6.12 The joint area of Katzir 
and Harish - Tel Eron council 
- as a single continuous entity 
between the Arab towns in Wadi 
A’ara and the West Bank. (year 
unknown). (CZA)
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The new plans for Katzir transformed the initial small-scale layout into a large 
Suburban Settlement; adding two additional sites while expanding the original one 
(fig 6.13). Dealing with topographic conditions and land ownership issues, the 
new plan “Katzir: Emergency Site” consisted of bulbs and a broken outline.712 As 
a new suburban environment, the proposed layout of Katzir was of a tract housing 
development, subdividing the site into repetitive residential parcels. Based on a 
non-hierarchical system of access roads and cul de sac streets, the new plan for 
Katzir focused on the private family lot, its autonomy and detachment, as well 
as commuting ability. In this sense, the proposed plan corresponded with other 
Suburban Settlements planned in same the years. Yet, while all other ‘Stars’ relied 
on corporate-led or organised construction, Katzir was planned as a Build Your 
Own House project (BYOH). Moreover, unlike all other Stars settlements, Katzir also 
included several prefabricated units, issued for the use of Jewish immigrants from 
the former Soviet Union (fig 6.14).
FIG. 6.13 Outline Plan of Katzir, 1994. (ILA) FIG. 6.14 Temporary dwelling units in Katzir, 1988. 
JA Settlement Department. (CZA)
With its relative distance from the Tel Aviv metropolis, Katzir was a decade behind 
in the mechanism of frontier settlement. Its remote location and lack of accessibility 
prevented the formation of the needed conditions that would attract private 
developers. Its definition as a Community Settlement, with an active admission 
committee that secured its members’ spatial privilege of controlling its societal 
composition, hindered the potential of an intensive private-led construction project. 
Accordingly, Katizr became famous in Israel for refusing to admit the Arab family 
of Ka’adan from the neighbouring town of Baqa al-Gharbiyye. The settlement’s 
712 Lavi-Bar Architects and Planners, ‘Outline Plan M/196a Katzir: Emergency Site’, 1–3.
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admission committee, backed by the Jewish Agency (JA) and the Jewish National 
Fund (JNF), claimed that the lands of the settlement are designated as National 
Lands (Admot Leom), and are thus intended for the exclusive use of the Jewish (not 
Israeli) nation.713 This decision would later be revoked by the Israeli High Court 
of Justice after the appeal of the Ka’adan family.714 In sites close to the Tel Aviv 
metropolis, such a selection committee was not needed, mainly due to the housing 
associations, targeted promotion and relative high-prices, where privatisation 
corresponded with the national geopolitical agenda. In remote locations like Katzir, 
a more selective privatisation had to be implemented, in order to maintain the ethnic 
homogeneity, and thus indicating on the difficulty of creating a simple real estate-
oriented development.715 Consequently, preventing Katzir from becoming another 
reproduced suburb.
With the new vision for the area, Harish anticipated a future of a much larger scale 
and the MCH began promoting its development as a Suburban Settlement. The 
ministry’s rural department commissioned a private architectural firm to compose a 
new outline plan for the site. In 1994, the new plan for a settlement of around 4000 
units would receive the official approval of the district planning committee, under the 
emergency regulations of 1990.716 Typically suburban, the plan proposed a low-rise 
and low-density residential environment, with high emphases on integrating with 
the natural landscape, going as far as dictated planting a tree in each of the front 
yards..717 The core of the plan was HaParsa (the Horseshoe) neighbourhood, which 
was intended to become the first project of Harish, followed by the northern part 
and then the eastern neighbourhood named HaMagaf (the boot) (fig 6.15). With four 
different housing types, the plan allocated each to a specific compound, creating 
homogeneous residential quarters to be gradually developed; starting with single 
and double-family houses in the first parts, and moving on to the denser three-story 
and terraced tenements in later phases (fig 6.16).
713 Barzilai, ‘Fantasies of Liberalism and Liberal Jurisprudence State Law: Politics and the Israeli Arab-
Palestinian Community’, 426–30.
714 Israel High Court of Justice, Ruling 6698/95.
715 Yacobi and Tzfadia, Rethinking Israeli Periphery, 35–52.
716 ‘Moshe Zur Architects and Planners’.
717 ‘Moshe Zur Architects and Planners’, 9.
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FIG. 6.15 Harish Outline Plan, 1992. Moshe Zur Architects 
(ILA)
FIG. 6.16 Different housing typologies: 
Double-Family, Row Houses; three story 
tenements; terraced houses in Harish, 1992. 
Moshe Zur Architects (Israel State Archive)
As a typical Suburban Settlement, the outline of Harish was of a tract housing 
development that resourcefully subdivided the site into smaller lots. Relying on an 
excessive system of roads, the plan was highly car-oriented, and while the main 
arteries created the different residential areas, the secondary streets subdivided 
them into smaller marketable compounds and parcels. With the placement of all 
public buildings on the main entrance road, and not in the centre of any of the 
residential area, the plan created a public strip, rather than a public core, and 
thus highlighting the car-oriented approach once more. Moreover, developed in a 
corporate-oriented perspective, the plan created housing complexes, consisting 
of a single housing model, tendered to private contractors (fig 6.17). Accordingly, 
the basis of this plan was the residential parcel and the ability to reach it with a 
private car. Each housing typology, low or high-rise, dictated specific dimensions 
of residential lots, which would enable an optimised future construction process. 
Forming two rows of the same housing type, the plan ensured an optimal ratio 
between roads and residential area, dictating the distance between each two parallel 
streets according to the dimensions of the different housing parcels it served. The 
site’s topography granted the proposed road system a nearly perfect form, which 
decreased needed groundwork while creating a flowing and continuous car-ride 
through town; eventually providing the sought comfortable car access to each of the 
parcels. While highly efficient for the residential lots, this circular setting created an 
abundance of left-over spaces in the intersection between the streets. Due to their 
irregular proportions these left-over spaces were of low economic feasibility for 
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corporate residential development, thus turning into an ideal spot for open areas 
and public buildings, which are not subjected to the rentability constraints of the real 
estate market (fig 6.18).
FIG. 6.17 Compounds of Harish, 1992. Moshe Zur 
Architects (Israel State Archive) 
FIG. 6.18 A section in Harish; distribution of functions with public areas (brown and green) located in the 
“leftover” spaces – (Illustrated by the author)
The proposed order of development corresponded with the corporate-led approach. 
The first neighbourhood to be developed included mainly double-family homes and 
row-houses, with several tenements in its centre. The following area, the northern 
section, included a higher percentage of tenements, yet it was still mainly of lower 
density. The last part in the development order, was almost purely of higher density 
tenements. This resembled former examples, where the MCH used the low-rise 
and seemingly more prestigious units to attract well-established families. These 
would help in promoting a more positive and esteemed image that would lead to 
an increase in the economic potential of the area, creating the financial feasibility 
needed for construction of the higher-density dwelling units (see chapter V+IV).
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As a corporate-oriented plan, it was based on a clear marketing strategy that relied 
on a covert system of spatial privileges, intended to attract suitable middle-class 
families that would encourage demands and ensure the project’s success. A study 
of the market situation conducted by Tznovar Consultants ltd for the MCH, showed 
that in the surrounding area of Harish there is an expected surplus in both low and 
high-rise housing. Yet, the report stated that if the MCH is able to promote Harish 
as an attractive settlement, with high living standards, a strong affinity to nature 
and a comfortable commute to the main metropolitan region then these predictions 
could be disregarded. Therefore, the report suggested directing the first efforts 
to attracting strong young families, mainly from the moshavim and kibbutzim of 
the area, and urban families looking for better living standards. These would then 
grant Harish the required image of a settlement with a strong community.718 To 
further promote this image the strategy report also recommended marketing 
Harish as a ‘Green Urban Settlement’, which blends into the natural landscape and 
has an environmentally aware community; all in order to attract well-established 
families.719 Compatibly, the report stated that the first units in Harish would need to 
be significantly cheaper than similar ones in the area. At the same time, the report 
warned from lowering the prices too much, due to the potential of attracting families 
with a weaker socio-economic background that would harm the desired image of 
the settlement. Thus, the suggested strategy was to conduct special sales to the 
pursued type of families, which would gentrify Harish, and enable the continuation 
of development according to an economic rationale. This internal report basically 
concluded that there was no market-based logic in building a new town, and thus 
suggested tools that would promote the formation of such a market.
With the MCH’s intentions of promoting concentrated construction, it marketed 
the first compounds to a single developer. Ashdar ltd, had a leading role in the 
construction of a variety of settlements and several key national projects; with a 
speciality in prefabricated units (see chapter III+IV),720 which enabled it to receive 
the spatial privilege of being the and single developer of the first compounds. 
Correspondingly, it was a highly cost-efficient project that consisted of a series 
of ten three-story apartment complexes surrounding an inner courtyard, with a 
total amount of 250 dwelling units. The entire compound was made out of a single 
model that included eight similar double-bedroom apartments (fig 6.19-6.20). 
Each apartment included an entrance area that directly led to the living room and 
718 Tznovar Consultants ltd, ‘Populating Harish Katzir’, 1–10.
719 Tznovar Consultants ltd, 5.
720 Ashtrom, ‘Milestones’.
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the semi-open kitchen, with the bedrooms on the opposite side (fig 6.21). Ashdar 
planned and constructed the buildings out of prefabricated concrete slabs, coated 
with limestone and assembled on-site, thus creating an industrialised and affordable 
construction process. The second and seemingly more luxurious compound included 
some 50 double-family houses. Each unit was a semi-detached house, spreading 
over two floors and was covered by a sloping red roof, yet just like the denser 
apartment buildings, they were also of prefabricated concrete walls covered by 
limestone (fig 6.22-6.23).
FIG. 6.19 Main Complex, 1992. 
Dauber Architects. (Harish 
Council Archive)
FIG. 6.20 Facade of an 
apartment building in Harish, 
1992. Dauber Architects. (Harish 
Council Archive)
FIG. 6.21 Floorplan of an 
apartment building in Harish, 
1992. Dauber Architects. (Harish 
Council Archive)
FIG. 6.22 Front facade of a double-family house in 
Harish, 1992. Moshe Zur Architects, (Harish Council 
Archive)
FIG. 6.23 Back facade of a double-family house in 
Harish, 1992. Moshe Zur Architects. (Harish Council 
Archive)
Marketing and populating the apartments in Harish did not go as the MCH expected, 
causing it to implement various selective promotion campaigns. Eventually, the units 
of Ashdar were finished by 1994, yet they were only partially soled. Ashdar and the 
MCH found it very hard to market and sell these housing units, and the fact that they 
were made out of prefabricated concrete slabs did not help. Due to the over-supply 
of apartment, the MCH housed several families of former Soviet Union immigrants, 
mainly from the Caucasus area, while still trying to market the rest of the units. After 
almost two unsuccessful years, the MCH contacted Hever, the consumers’ club of the 
IDF personnel, in order to interest its members, military officers, in purchasing the 
remaining vacant units. By offering this specific group the chance of a house in Harish 
in an affordable price, the MCH hoped that the respected public profile of the military 
would promote the image of the settlement, and thus help future development and 
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marketing efforts.721 Eventually, several IDF personnel purchased some 230 units in 
Harish, yet almost none of them would physically live in the settlement and preferred 
renting out their properties. The failure to market the first phase caused the MCH 
to halt the tenders for remaining compounds, and even to cancel the infrastructure 
development for the northern neighbourhood.722 At the same time, the idea of Harish 
as a settlement that is affiliated with the IDF interested the MCH, and after receiving 
Hever’s promise to aid in the marketing efforts, it began working on a new tender for 
some 200 Build Your Own House plots (BYOH) for military personnel.723
The MCH proceeded in the detailed planning of Harish despite the inability to market 
the houses of the first phases, hoping that constant development would eventually 
create demand. The MCH halted all construction works after the failure of the first 
project, yet it continued investing in planning and it hired several architectural and 
planning firms to prepare detailed schemes for the remaining neighbourhoods.724 
The MCH’s perspective was that an intense effort would eventually lead to the 
development of Harish and thus in the late 1990s it hired an entire team of planners 
to compose a new masterplan, attempting to merge the isolated neighbourhoods into 
one urban system. The different changes and adjustments the MCH tried to promote 
varied one from the other, ranging from a low-rise military settlement to an Ultra-
Orthodox (UO) town.725 The focus was constantly on re-igniting the development 
process, and in total, by 1997 the MCH would invest a tremendous amount of almost 
100,000,000 NIS726 for an unexecuted project.727 As the MCH’s urban planning unit 
took the lead, the new plans for Harish included exploring the options of creating 
a city of almost 200,000 inhabitants, stretching over an area of around 1000 km2, 
including lands eastern to the Green-Line.728 Thus, the MCH persistently resisted to 
re-adjust its large-scale plans, and insisted on enlarging them further; assuming that 
as the project grows then the interests of the developers would grow as well.
721 Council, ‘Council Meeting 01/95’, 1.
722 Davidovic, ‘Haifa District - Harish - Tender #’, 1.
723 Dvir, ‘Meeting Protcol regarding tendering lots in Harish 17.3.1996’, 1.
724 Eiges, ‘Development Works in Harish’, 1.
725 Dvir, ‘Meeting Protcol regarding tendering lots in Harish 17.3.1996’, 1.
726 Roughly around 45,000,000 US dollars in 2016 prices
727 Karp, ‘Harish’, 1; Meridor, ‘Harish’, 1997, 1.
728 Freund, ‘Survey for the Extension of Harish’, 1–5.
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By the late 1990s, the inconsistency between the plans of the MCH and the 
demands of the housing market turned Harish into an ill-developed town. The 
repeated attempts to ignite the construction process failed, and consisting only of 
a few buildings, Harish was not a small-scale Community Settlement, but rather 
an uncompleted urban project. The population of Harish was composed of Jewish 
Caucasian families of the Former Soviet Union, and mainly tenants that rented 
the apartments from the property owners that were not keen on living in the 
undeveloped settlement. By the late 1990s, the MCH, the Israeli Police and the 
Ministry of Interior relocated members of the Arab crime family of Karaja from the 
town of Lod to Harish, in an attempt to resolve a long turf battle and vendettas; a 
step that did not improve the image of the town, to say the least.729 In comparison 
with Katzir, which Harish shared its local council with, the population of the former 
was in scale 8 out of 10 in regard to socioeconomic status, while the latter was 2 out 
10. The violent events of the Second Intifada, which started in 2000 and the mass 
demonstrations held by the Arab citizens of Israel, especially in the Wadi A’ara area, 
did not improve the attractivity of Harish. Despite the MCH’s attempt to tender some 
300 units to five different developers in 1999, by 2002, after several bureaucratic 
setbacks and a vast lack, of interest these tenders were conclusively revoked.730
Promoting the image of Harish as a means for its development, concerned both its 
residents and contractors as well. In a letter to the MCH, the Katzir-Harish council 
highlighted the need for and “aggressive” marketing strategy.731 Therefore, they 
demanded an elaborative public relations campaign, which would focus on well-
established groups, with an emphasis on employees in the High-tech industry, the 
military and upper-middle-class families from the greater Tel Aviv area (Gush Dan). This 
requested campaign would include promoted Colour pieces in “elitist” newspapers that 
would improve the popular image of Harish and address the sought clientele.732 Other 
promotion techniques would include a greater emphasis on Harish as a “Green” town, 
naming the streets after names of the area’s fauna and flora. Disappointed with the 
MCH’s lack of collaboration with the attempts to improve the image of Harish, a group of 
organised residents sent an angry petition to the CEO of the Prime Minister’s Office. To 
emphasis their despair and their national leverage, they stated that in case the current 
situation continues they would eventually sell their apartments to the “highest bidder, 
729 Sandrov, ‘Local Council Katzir-Harish’, 1.
730 Zimmerman, ‘Tender 10025/99 HaParsa Neighbourhood- Harish’, 1.
731 Katzir-Harish Council, ‘Strategic Outline for the Development of Harish-Katzir’, 2.
732 Katzir-Harish Council, 5.
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meaning Arabs in the area”.733 Similar discontent was expressed by a group of private 
developers in charge of constructing some 200 units in Harish. Their attorney sent an 
official complaint to the MCH, protesting against an interview given by the head of the 
Haifa District of the MCH, who described Harish as a site of “prostitution and drugs, 
which no sane person would like to live in”.734
 6.5 Harish: the next city of Israel
By the early 2000s, it became clear to the MCH that the possibility of creating a 
market-led development in the current conditions was quite impossible, causing it 
to implement more exclusive spatial privileges. An official report of the MCH even 
stated that the possible success of marketing Harish could form a double-edged 
sword, as such a success would also appeal to the Arab population of the area, who 
would then be interested in moving into Harish as well.735 This report mentioned the 
Ka’adan case from Katzir, as well as the fact that unlike Katzir, Harish does not have 
an admission committee that would dictate the future character of the settlement. 
Therefore, as the appeal to the private market was not successful, and in case it 
would have been successful then it would lead to the Arabisation of the planned 
settlement, the report suggested renewing the plans for and Ultra-Orthodox town.736 
The MCH had already considered this idea twice in the past, under two different 
administrations, yet in the end, it decided to drop it.737 As claimed in an official 
report of the MCH from 2001, it is impossible populate Harish due to its location 
and the current circumstances. However, as only the UO sector had the potential of 
brining tens of thousands of [Jewish] families to the area, this turned into the only 
way out.738
733 Harish Representatives, ‘Harish Settlement’, 2001, 1.
734 Marom, ‘Tender 10025/99- HaParsa Neighbourhood- Harish’, 2001, 2.
735 Rubenstein, ‘Harish Survey’, 1–2.
736 ibid
737 Rubenstein, ‘Proposal for the Planning of Harish’.
738 Rubenstein, ‘The Minister’s decisions regarding Harish’.
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For the MCH, an Ultra-Orthodox Harish was basically the last resort, which enabled 
the participation of the market and continued the privatisation of the settlement 
mechanism. Approaching this specific sector did not mean that the MCH gave up on 
a market-oriented development, but rather that it asked to adapt the development 
process to the rationale of the UO real estate market. The Israeli UO sector has 
to some extent its own internal economic system, which is quite parallel to the 
larger Israeli one. Consisting of families with a significantly low socio-economic 
background, with considerably high fertility rates and a fundamental need to live 
in isolated neighbourhoods, the UO sector is constantly facing a housing crisis.739 
With the existing centres of Bnei Brak and Jerusalem being unable to continue 
supplying the needed dwelling units, the leaders of the UO sector, the MCH and 
some affiliated entrepreneurs and housing associations initiated and promoted 
several UO oriented neighbourhoods and settlements like Ela’ad, Beitar Illit, Modi’in 
Illit, and others (see chapter V). The main component in a UO market-oriented 
development is its masses and loyalty. Private developers would focus on cheap 
construction, while making deals with rabbis and leaders of the different UO streams, 
which would guarantee the purchase of all units in a specific project. Relying on 
its internal loaning and mortgage systems, like the Gemach funds,740 interest-free 
loans organised by each community, the UO sector was able to grant each family 
the economic tools to purchase an apartment. This, of course, would be done only 
in case the family is part of the same UO community and is intending to use the loan 
to purchase an apartment in one of the community’s neighbourhoods or residential 
projects. Thus, each specific stream is able to form alliances with private developers 
and to eventually create their own compounds.741
The decision for a UO city followed negotiations between the MCH with 
representatives and contractors from the UO sector that ensured their participation 
in the development process. As they all agreed to cooperate on this project, the 
representatives of the MCH promised to adjust the development and marketing to 
the needs and abilities of the UO sector. Moreover, they also guaranteed the status 
of Harish as a site of national priority, which includes a zero pricing for state-owned 
lands and substantial governmental grants and funding.742 In return, the UO leaders 
guaranteed the interests of the different streams to eventually purchase the future 
739 Cahaner, ‘Between Ghetto Politics and Geopolitics: Ultraorthodox Settlements in the West Bank’, 112–27; 
Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements, Interview; Kehat, Harish, Interview.
740 Gemilut chasadim, “acts of kindness”
741 Fogel, Highway 6 Settlements.
742 Assaf, ‘Meeting of the Minister with Representatives of the UO Sector - 15/01/2001’, 1.
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dwelling units, bringing tens of thousands of Jewish families to the predominantly 
Arab area of Wadi A’ara.743
Designating Harish as an UO city required its re-planning, in order to adjust it to 
the needs of the sector and the considerations of its new developers. The suburban 
residential environment that the MCH initially promoted, and which consisted of 
low-rise cottages along cul de sac streets and three-story apartment buildings 
surrounding a shared courtyard, was far from suitable for the new target group. 
The lack of suitability was not due to cultural differences, but above all due to the 
affordability of construction. Consequently, the MCH recommended transforming 
the approved fabric of private households into a series of larger parcels, containing 
four-story apartment buildings, with some 20 dwelling units each. Limiting the 
height of the buildings to four floors derives from the UO sector’s avoidance of using 
electricity during Saturdays, as part of the religious practice of not working on the 
Sabbath; thus, limiting the option of using an elevator that is required in all high-
rise tenements. Additionally, the substantially large size of a common UO family that 
usually consists of 8-10 members, not to mention the constant presence of multiple 
baby carriages, would lead to an extensive pressure on the shared elevator system. 
Turning Harish into an environment of four-story buildings was thus the ultimate 
solution for housing large UO families.744 In order to make the process even more 
affordable, the MCH emphasised on reducing construction costs, reaching around 
500$ per square meter; less than half the price of a common project. Therefore, 
the MCH asked to create a concentrated construction effort of 4000 units that 
could optimise the process and reduce prices further.745 This corresponded with the 
demands of the leaders of the UO sector, as they too believed that it would lead to a 
significant reduction in construction costs. Moreover, their demand to start with an 
initial phase of mass construction was also driven from the fear of the possibility that 
the MCH would eventually not proceed in developing Harish; creating a small-scale, 
remote and ill-developed settlement, like in the case of Emmanuel.746
The re-planning of Harish was based on a new overall vision, rather than simple 
adjustments, which effected all planning levels. The MCH commissioned Mansfeld-
Kehat architects for the task, and the locally renowned firm first began with 
analysing the overall potential of the site, composing a Skeleton Plan (Tochnit 
743 Rubenstein, ‘Harish Survey’, 1–3.
744 Kehat, Harish.
745 Rubenstein, ‘Proposal for the Planning of Harish’.
746 Rubenstein, ‘Discussion Regarding the Decision for Harish’.
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Sheled) for the city that stated the general future vision for Harish; followed by a 
new masterplan and then by detailed ones (fig 6.24). Focusing on the UO sector the 
planners encountered several unique issues that usually do not exist in other urban 
contexts. Besides the previously mentioned issue of height limitations and desired 
building sizes, Mansfeld-Kehat needed to adjust the needed areas for public buildings 
and the proposed system of roads. In a usual planning process in Israel, the planners 
would base all of their calculations according to the overall number of dwelling units. 
However, while in most cases a dwelling unit consists of 3-4 individuals, in the case 
of an UO community the number is closer to 7-8. This means that the same number 
of units would need a much larger quota of public areas, facilities, and infrastructure. 
Moreover, while the common Israeli family usually relies on the use of a private car, 
UO families typically do not own a private vehicle, and they would mainly rely on 
public transportation and internally organised shuttle services. Therefore, the road 
system had to be based on large transportations vehicles, thus consisting of wider 
access streets and almost no cul de sac paths.747 As stated by Haim Kehat, Harish as 
an UO city basically meant a significantly affordable residential environment for large 
families that rely on communal transportation.748
The changes addressing the new target population changed the city’s density, 
function distribution, layout and even design regulations. The masterplan, which 
deliberately stated the objective of an UO city, included an overall of 8800 dwelling 
units, divided into the same three main residential quarters: HaParsa, the northern 
neighbourhood and HaMagaf (fig 6.25). An additional part was the Central Business 
District (CBD) that was turned into a mere service-oriented area, due to the usual 
lack of commercial establishments in UO settlements. While having been previously 
planned, these compounds had to go through major transformations, including a 
higher density of dwelling units, to meet the sought population size and combination. 
Typical for an UO neighbourhood, the masterplan contained several design and 
planning guidelines, like the instruction to coat 70% of the façades in stone and the 
permission to construct special Sukkah balconies (see chapter V).
While the masterplan was naturally of a more general nature, the detailed scheme 
for HaParsa neighbourhood was much more explicit, completely changing the 
previously approved urban fabric.749 Except for the already constructed complexes, 
the new layout consisted of a system of wide continuous access roads, and larger 
747 Kehat, Harish.
748 Ibid
749 Mansfeld-Kehat Architects and Planners, ‘Local Outline Plan Harish/1/A’.
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oblong residential parcels. Accordingly, it generated buildings with a single main 
façade and three incidental ones that the contractors had to invest less in their 
development. This scaled version of tract development was based on an optimal 
ratio between roads and lots as well, grounding the subdivision of the site on the 
same economic considerations as in a typical Suburban Settlement, yet in a larger 
context. Respectively, the plan also divided the entire neighbourhood into some 70 
different residential compounds, with an intention to tender each of them to a single 
developer (fig 6.26). Most important, however, was the relative flexibility enabled 
by the plan, which was manifested in gradual construction, and relatively adjustable 
instructions for the overall building rights, stating the minimum size of an average 
apartment (80m2) and a minimum number of units per Dunam.750
FIG. 6.24 Masterplan of Harish, 
2011. Mansfeld-Kehat Architects 
(ILA)
FIG. 6.25 Local Outline Plan of 
HaParsa Neighbourhood Harish, 
2012. Mansfeld-Kehat Architects 
(ILA)
FIG. 6.26 Compounds Plan of 
HaParsa Neighbourhood Harish, 
2012. Mansfeld-Kehat Architects 
(ILA)
In order to promote the planning process, the Ministry of Interior created a special 
planning committee for Harish, bypassing the existing planning hierarchy. This 
committee was autonomous from the district of Haifa, which Harish originally 
belonged to, and was thus subjected directly to the national level. Becoming an 
independent entity, the former merger with Katzir was cancelled, and the latter 
returned to the regional council of Menashe.751 This would help in accelerating the 
entire procedure, while also decreasing the public’s ability to object to the plan. At 
the same time, the special committee’s decision to approve the plans that designated 
Harish for the UO sector led to several objections from the general secular public. All 
of these were declined by the National Appeals Committee, which stated that there 
750 Mansfeld-Kehat Architects and Planners, ‘Local Outline Plan Harish/1/A’, 12.
751 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘Local government audit reports’, 613.
TOC
 318 The  Privatisation  of a National Project
is no legal impediment in the decision to define the new town as an UO locality.752 
Nevertheless, the Appeals Committee directed the planners to add possible 
functions and flexibility to the plan, in case that Harish would be populated by 
non-UO families.753 Simultaneously to the approval of the detailed plan for HaParsa 
neighbourhood, the MCH continued planning of the town’s remaining quarters.
While in 2001 the UO sector was the only optional target group, by 2010 the 
situation was entirely different. The global crisis of 2008 had led to severe increases 
in real estate prices in Israel. Whether it was due to insufficient construction, or 
the low interest rates that made real estate a solid investment, in 2010 Israel was 
facing a major housing crisis.754 Following the vast public discontent the Israeli 
Government continued and even enhanced its supply-side housing policy.755 
Consequently, igniting a vicious circle of increasing property values and increasing 
profitability of real estate investment.756 Subsequently, owning an apartment, even 
for mere investment, became a crucial component in the economic stability of 
the average Israeli family. Suddenly, remote housing projects like Harish, turned 
into attractive pieces of real estate. Additionally, by 2010, the new Trans-Israel 
Highway had already reached the area of Harish, and the construction of the West-
Bank Separation Barrier nearby had cut the site from the neighbouring Palestinian 
environment; causing the area to somewhat lose its peripheral and frontier-like 
image. Consequently, the intentions of the MCH to exclusively designate Harish 
for the UO sector raised a wide national objection from the secular and National-
Orthodox (dati leumi - NO) public. In 2012 the Haifa district court ruled in favour of 
the appeal submitted against the MCH’s intentions, forcing it to open the marketing 
process for the general Israeli public, religious and none religious alike and thus to 
revoke the discriminating spatial privileges.757
752 Ibid
753 Ibid
754 Boruchov, ‘On Target: The Housing Crisis and Damage to the Planning System’, 63–65; Eshel and 
Hananel, ‘Centralization, Neoliberalism, and Housing Policy Central–Local Government Relations and 
Residential Development in Israel’, 237–39; Mualem, ‘Playing with Supertankers: Centralization in Land 
Use Planning in Israel: A National Experiment Underway’, 269–83; Charney, ‘A “Supertanker” Against 
Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel: Neoliberalizing 
Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel’, 1223–43.
755 Rubin and Felsenstein, ‘Supply Side Constraints in the Israeli Housing Market: The Impact of State Owned 
Land’, 266–75.
756 Boruchov, ‘On Target: The Housing Crisis and Damage to the Planning System’, 85.
757 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘Local government audit reports’, 619.
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The tender and marketing process for Harish turned into a struggle between the UO 
and non-UO sector. While the different UO streams and communities were already 
represented by their own housing associations, several secular and NO groups 
began organising their own associations with the intentions to compete in the open 
public housing tenders. Tendering compounds to housing associations, and not 
contractors, was not a new practice for the MCH. While during the 1990s the MCH 
began preferring private developers due to the associations’ lack of experience,758 
in areas like Harish, which were still not attractive enough for private developers, 
the housing associations were a useful tool to ignite the first construction stages 
(see chapter V). Moreover, as these associations consisted of registered members, 
they provided the potential property owners with certainty regarding the profile of 
their future neighbours. Thus, enabling the creation of associations with specific 
ethnic or religious backgrounds, while limiting the inclusion of less wanted families, 
such as Arabs. In this manner, the housing associations were a sort of an admission 
committee that guaranteed a solid social group that could secure the appeal of the 
following construction stages.
The first tender of 2012 proved to be a crucial point for Harish. In the first phase, 
the Israel Land Administration (ILA) and the MCH tendered out some 4500 dwelling 
units in 29 compounds. The different participants included several UO housing 
associations, secular and NO organisations, and a few private contractors. A group of 
12 UO associations were extremely organised and were thus able to submit a much 
higher bid than the other participants. However, their coordination led the ILA to 
conclude that they were acting as a cartel, thus contradicting the rules of the tender, 
leading to their disqualification. Eventually, only a single UO association acquired a 
compound in Harish, as well as two private contractors that were affiliated with the 
UO sector, making up less than 10% of the overall tendered units.759 The majority 
of the compounds were eventually won by secular and NO associations, and three 
private developers, who submitted significantly low bids, and eventually sold most of 
their to associations as well.760
Adapting the planned town from an UO-oriented project to a non-UO cliental was 
not a complicated task. Generally, the Israeli planning law has several specific 
regulations that are meant to enable some flexibility in the implementation of local 
outline plans. These enable developers to increase the overall permitted number of 
758 MCH, ‘Construction Through Associations’, 137–51.
759 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘Local government audit reports’, 619; Levi, ‘Harish for everyone’.
760 Levi, ‘Harish for everyone’.
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dwelling units by 30%, as well the permitted number of floors. This is allowed as 
long as the total maximum surface area is maintained and the average apartment 
is not smaller than 80 m2.761 As the planners had initially thought of substantially 
larger apartments and allowed quite generous building rights, the developers were 
able to significantly increase the number of apartments and to add up to three 
additional floors.762 Due to the increase in the overall number of apartments, the 
ratio between residential areas and public uses was also maintained, despite the 
private households in Harish being much smaller than planned.763
The secular success in the first tenders in Harish re-incorporated the development of 
the city into the logic of the national real estate market. While just ten years earlier 
the MCH thought that “no sane person would like to live in” Harish,764 and that the 
UO sector was the only possibility to develop the settlement without turning it into 
an Arab town, in 2011 Harish turned into the real estate project the MCH initially 
hoped that it would become. As a market-oriented venture, the UO sector that the 
MCH relied on to save the town, did not stand a chance against the secular and 
NO middle-class. Subsequently, the ILA and MCH sought to find a new solution 
for the UO sector, which would provide them with the needed dwelling units in 
an isolated community while not interfering in the booming real estate market of 
Harish. To answer these needs and the UO discontent for “losing” Harish, the Israeli 
Government designated the future town of Kasif for their exclusive use. With its 
location in southern Israel, it was reasonably far from the expanding demand areas 
of the Israeli middle-class.765
With the state’s intentions to accelerate development the MCH began tendering 
larger compounds, limiting the spatial privileges of the housing associations in 
favour of large-scale private corporations. In 2014 and 2015 the MCH promoted 
the authorisation of three additional detail plans for three new neighbourhoods 
while the Israeli Government declared the city as a site of national priority, 
promising to direct a total sum of one billion Israeli Shekels to stimulate the town’s 
construction (fig 6.27-6.28).766 The accelerated development and planning, and 
761 Ministry of Interior, ‘Planning and Building Regulations (considerable deviation from plan)’.
762 Kehat, Harish.
763 ibid
764 Marom, ‘Tender 10025/99- HaParsa Neighbourhood- Harish’, 2001, 2.
765 Abovich, ‘After Harish Comes Kasif’.
766 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘Local government audit reports’, 629.
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the substantial governmental aid led to an increase in the appeal to the private 
market. Subsequently, private entrepreneurs would make the vast majority of 
participants and winners in all following housing tenders. In the third neighbourhood, 
Or HaMizrah, the MCH chose to tender all of the compounds to a single developer, 
thus, completing the transition from housing associations to private entrepreneurs. 
Symbolically, this new corporately developed neighbourhood would be built on the 
ruins of the former Kibbutz Harish (fig 6.29).
FIG. 6.27 Detailed Outline Plan 
of HaPrahim neighbourhood 
(previously HaMagaf), 2014 (ILA)
FIG. 6.28 Detailed Outline 
Plan of Maof neighbourhood 
(previously CBD), 2015 (ILA)
FIG. 6.29 Detailed Outline 
Plan of Tzavta neighbourhood 
(previously Or HaMizrah), 2015 
(ILA). Note in yellow, the houses 
of the former kibbutz listed 
for demolition.
The layout of Harish is a spatial arrangement that enabled the recreation of the 
same housing typology, homogenising the site as in order to promote an optimised 
pro-market development. Like in the plan of the early 1990s, the basis of the 
ones from the 2000s was the residential parcel. Nevertheless, while former plans 
were slightly more varied, the current ones consisted of almost a single type of a 
residential parcel. As in the mentioned report of the MCH, the residential buildings 
with affordable and simple layout of four apartments on each floor were the focus 
of the plans of Harish.767 Therefore, as the mentioned elementary floorplan dictated 
the dimensions of the basic floor plan, the latter eventually created the dimensions of 
the ideal housing parcel. Respectively, the dimensions of the ideal residential parcel 
dictated the distance between the roads, creating two rows of buildings between 
them, while the circular street layout enabled the uninterrupted ride through town 
and generated the different residential areas. Just like in former plans, the triangular 
leftover spaces in the intersection between the roads, which due to their shape 
had little real estate value, were kept for public buildings and open public areas. 
Therefore, creating the framework needed for the commodification of the future city.
767 Rubenstein, ‘Proposal for the Planning of Harish’.
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The planned density of Harish also implies on the pro-market approach. The initial 
suburban plan included some 4000 units in a total area of 3021 dunams. Excluding the 
areas designated for a forest, existing farming parcels and plots for future planning, The 
early plan was of 1863 dunams, of which 655 were for residential uses. This means that 
the proposed gross density was 2,2 units per dunam while the net density was around 
6 units per dunam.768 The new two plans of 2014 and 2015, which dealt more or less 
with the same site, consisted of a total area of 3564 dunams and 3155 excluding 
farming parcels and forest area. However, these plans offered some 8500 units and 
around 880 dunam of residential plots.769 Consistently, the new gross density was 
2,6 per dunam while the net density was almost 10, and as the former increased by 
just 20% the latter increased by 60%. Therefore, the overall supply of units was not 
significantly larger, on the other hand, the potential of each parcel became much more 
attractive to private developers. Thus, the new plans were mainly meant to improve 
the rentability of Harish, and less to enlarge the number of planned dwelling units.
For a city of its size, Harish has a significantly limited number of housing types. 
Essentially, it consists of a single residential model, which the different contractors, 
developers, and entrepreneurs repeatedly implemented. Surveying more than 150 
different permits it is possible to conclude that the basis of almost all residential 
buildings is the four/five-room apartment. This apartment consists of a shared family 
area of a living room and kitchen right at its entrance, which forms the apartment’s 
core, with the bedrooms attached to it on the opposite side. Therefore, forming a 
basic unit with changing possible number of rooms. This model has mainly three 
different variations, which differ according to the connection between the living room 
and the kitchen, with a closed kitchen in apartments for the UO sector that prefers 
a separation between the feminine and masculine spaces, and a fully open one for 
more secular families (fig 6.30). The outline of the apartment follows the number of 
rooms creating a broken shape that provides each bedroom with its own window, and 
the kitchen with a rear service area. A common floor of an apartment consists of four 
duplicated apartments, and a building would have 4-6 repetitive floors (fig 6.31); 
with the penthouse and the garden apartment as the exception (fig 6.32). Defining 
more than 90% of the buildings in Harish, this simple housing type forms the 
ultimate optimisation of corporate construction, forming an exceptionally basic and 
efficient model, which could be repetitively implemented and adapted (fig 6.33-6.35). 
Thus, completing the transformation of the house into a commodity.
768 ‘Moshe Zur Architects and Planners’, 4.
769 Mansfeld-Kehat Architects and Planners, ‘Local Outline Plan Harish/1/A’, 3; Yaar Architects, ‘Local 
Outline Plan Harish/1/b’, 3–4.
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FIG. 6.30 Types of Apartments 
in Harish according to the 
separation between the kitchen 
and the Livingroom, (Illustrated 
by the author)
FIG. 6.31 A typical floor plan 
in Harish. (Illustrated by the 
author)
FIG. 6.32 A typical building 
in Harish. (Illustrated by the 
author)
FIG. 6.33 A group of typical 
building on top of a commercial 
floor (Illustrated by the author)
FIG. 6.34 A typical building in 
a terraced option (Illustrated by 
the author)
FIG. 6.35 A typical building for 
UO families, note the “jumping” 
sukkah terraces (Illustrated by 
the author)
Similar to almost all new settlements built along the Green-Line in the past 40 
years, Harish is a housing-oriented development. With the intention to attract as 
many [Jewish] families to the area, in a relatively short period of time, the MCH 
and the different planning administrations focused on creating an abundance of 
dwelling units. These developments, however, almost always relied on the existing 
social infrastructure as well as the employment and service centres in Gush Dan. 
Creating purely residential environments was also a tool to promote an image of 
high living standards, as industry, commerce and businesses did not usually fit the 
sought tranquil suburban setting. A study of the Office of the State Comptroller of 
Israel showed that in 2016, more than 70% of the property owners of Harish were 
employed in the greater Tel Aviv area.770
770 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘Local government audit reports’, 627.
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Besides the common critique that single-use zoning schemes generate ill-planned 
environments, they also create none feasible local councils. The budget of local 
councils relies mainly on property taxes. With tariffs for housing being significantly 
lower than for businesses, it is the taxes collected from the different commercial and 
industrial properties that enable a local council to maintain a balanced budget. A lack 
of sufficient business-related uses could lead to a significant deficit, leaving a local 
council bankrupt, or heavily depending on governmental aid.771 The same study of 
the Office of State Comptroller stated that as of 2013, Harish is in need of additional 
930,000 m2 of commercial uses, just for the council to avoid a deficit.772 In order to 
protect the council from an economic crash, the ILA is currently seeking to involve 
Harish in some of the newly developed industrial areas close by; making sure that 
the new city would receive a portion of the property taxes paid there. Therefore, 
enforcing additional state interventions in order to continue stimulating the market.
With the intentions of stimulating investment, the development of Harish was 
accompanied by a vast and aggressive marketing strategy. While the suggestions 
for such a campaign during the 1990s remained on paper, by 2015, Harish would 
become more a PR campaign than a housing project. The first advertisings and 
promotions were carried out by the housing associations that competed in the first 
tenders, which sought to admit as many members as possible. Beside the emphases 
on affordable housing possibilities, reasonable commuting distances and the usual 
affinity to nature, the associations focused also on the sense of community, and on 
the right of the non-UO sector to live in Harish. In that sense, asking to purchase an 
apartment in the new city became an act of civil protest, and the housing associations 
commonly used slogans like “our Harish” and “Harish for everyone”. A much better 
slogan was “Harish is Green, not Black”, emphasising the struggle between the UO 
sector [Black] and the aspirations of secular families for a suburban community 
[Green].773 With private developers taking over, their marketing strategy had some 
similar features, which is perhaps best represented in HarishCity. This is a private 
internet platform, consisting of a website, Instagram and Facebook page, and 
concentrates all the development updates and advertisements of all entrepreneurs 
active in the city. Consistently, it is focused on promoting an image of a young 
community, living in affordable houses with high living standards, which is of course 
surrounded by nature, yet close to all urban centres. The green-washing campaign 
continued in the rebranding efforts made by the Harish local council, which included 
771 Local Government Administration, ‘Economic Resilience of Local Authorities’.
772 State Comptroller of Israel, ‘Local government audit reports’, 623.
773 Eitiel, ‘Harish is Green, not Black’.
TOC
 325 Financialisation & Harish City
changing the previous neighbourhoods’ names of HaParsa (horseshoe) and HaMagaf 
(boot) to more appealing ones, like HaPrahim (flowers), HaHoresh (Grove), Maof 
(bird flight) Avne Hen (Gems) and Tzavta (together). The fierce PR campaign included 
endless colour pieces that intended to promote the same young image. Noticeably, 
almost all promotion articles included an interview with Sheli Abutbul and Moran 
Klaura, a lesbian couple that owns and operates a local diner named HaMangalistiyot; 
thus, adding some pink-washing to the previous green-washing attempts while 
promoting the appearance of a young and open-minded community (fig 6.36).774
FIG. 6.36 Sheli Abutbul and Moran Klaura, 2019. Gil Elyahu, (Haaretz); Sheli Abutbul and Moran Klaura, 
2019 (Harsih 24); Sheli Abutbul and Moran Klaura, 2019. Yaron Sharon. (ynet)
To promote the construction of the new city, the Israeli Government enacted an ever-
growing supply-side approach that included repetitive attempts to create a market. 
Respectively, the recent strategy is aimed to make Harish a project that is “too big to 
fail”, enlarging its municipal borders and its intended target population. Harish was 
Netanyahu’s promised Supertanker, flooding the market with tens of thousands of 
new dwelling units. However, as shown by Boruchov, this approach eventually keeps 
igniting the national real estate market, leading to additional increases in housing 
prices, instead of lowering them.775 Not surprisingly, according to the estimations 
of the MCH, half of the apartments in Harish were bought by investors that rent out 
their new properties, relying on the received monthly rent to exceed the mortgage 
returns they pay.776 No wonder that the constant rise in the property values in Harish 
is repeatedly used as a marketing tool for new housing projects in town.777 Thus, the 
success of the city that was built in order to fight the increasing real estate prices is 
proven by the increase of real estate prices.
774 Shaked, ‘Eyal Berkowitz: “I Recommend young couples to think of Harish”’; Patilon, ‘Derech Eretz Avenue 
continues to populate: Get to know the new businesses’; Arad, ‘You will be recorded in history as the first 
reporter to write anything good about Harish’; Ynet, ‘Harish: not what you thought’.
775 Boruchov, ‘On Target: The Housing Crisis and Damage to the Planning System’, 63–64.
776 Levi and Bahor-Nir, ‘Harish: A City for Rent’.
777 Cohen and Horesh, ‘How to Market 86 Buildings in Harish When the market slows’.
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 6.6 Conclusions: the architecture of 
exchange‑value
Harish represents the gradual financialisation of the national project of settlement 
development. Along its different phases, from the kibbutz and to the future city of 
Israel, one could easily identify the manner in which the settlement mechanism 
transformed and how the conceived space changed accordingly. Correspondingly, 
along the different phases, the state granted a variety of selected groups diverse 
spatial privileges in order to promote the national geopolitical agenda. In the rural 
and neo-rural phases, the state sought to attract pioneer settlers by granting 
them the power to cultivate and exclusively inhabit space. As these attempts were 
unsuccessful, the government sought to turn Harish into a Suburban Settlement, 
attracting developers by giving them the power to construct and commodify 
space, and young privileged families by offering them the power to consume it. The 
objective was to create an appealing suburban environment and to entice upper-
middle-class families to move to the area, which would then generate an image of 
an attractive suburb and enable the settlement’s further development. As the area 
was still a geographical periphery, both the developers and the upper-middle-class 
families were not interested in the spatial rights the state wanted to provide. To solve 
this market failure while preventing the formation of an Arab town, the state focused 
on the power to exclusively use space, as a means to appeal to Ultra-Orthodox 
sector. With the housing crisis and the Israeli Government’s attempt to expand 
the existing areas of demand into its internal frontiers, it focused on encouraging 
the appeal of Harish to private developers with the help of affordable tenders and 
a speedy planning procedure. Therefore, the financialisation of frontier settlement 
occurred when the power to speculate in spatial development turned into the leading 
method to stimulate entrepreneurs, contractors and investors to develop the frontier 
and to complete its domestication.
With the financialisation of the settlement mechanism, its architectural and urban 
characteristics transformed and turned into by-products of the new mode of 
production. Consequently, while early plans focused on the private household, later 
ones focused on the residential parcel as a means to optimally subdivide a given area 
into an ideal amount of private lots. As spatial speculation became the leading force 
behind frontier settlement, the emphasis on the use-value of the private parcel, gave 
way to a growing focus on its exchange-value, and how to efficiently and feasibly 
extract the economic potential of a given site. Consistently, while re-planning Harish, 
the emphasis was on subdividing the site into a system of residential parcels, which 
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would enable private entrepreneurs to generate an optimal layout and number of 
apartments. Respectively, as Harish turned into a high-rise residential environment, 
the number of units did not significantly increase. The net density of a residential 
parcel, on the other hand, substantially rose. Accordingly, increasing the rentability 
of the residential area in order to turn the planned units into constructed ones.
As exchange-value took the lead, architecture turned into the art of optimally using 
the building rights of a given residential parcel in order to generate profit. Not by 
chance that almost all of the buildings in Harish followed very similar spatial features. 
With a few minimal variations between the different apartments, the buildings in 
Harish were three-dimensional grids that generated cubic commodities. With some 
design nuances in façades, meant to create a seemingly unique envelope to the same 
reproduced volume, the new financialised environment completed the transition 
from the state-led reproduced urban environment of the 1950s and 1960, to the a 
reproduced corporate-led quasi-urban landscape of the 2010s.
While neoliberal development is usually used as an antonym to state intervention, 
Harish proves the opposite. Though allegedly, the neoliberal agenda as a market-
oriented approach should lead to the decentralisation of society and its economy, 
followed by a decrease in national and political interests, de facto, this is rarely the 
case. To create a market in Harish that private developers would invest in, the Israeli 
Government thought in an “if you build it, they will come” approach - repeatedly 
investing public funds to enlarge the project and create a pro-business environment 
that would appeal to private developers. As the same time, as the role of the state 
only increased, similar to a neoliberal development approach, it was used to enforce 
the logic of the market on all aspects of the urban system.778 Eventually, promoting 
real estate speculations in order to domesticate the national frontier. Therefore, the 
measures enacted in Harish, turned the planning process and planning system into 
the “new ally of market forces”,779 and the market forces into the ally of the greater 
national territorial project.
778 Brenner and Theodore, ‘Cities and the Geographies of “actually Existing Neoliberalism’, 349–79.
779 Lovering, ‘Will Recession Prove to Be a Turning Point in Planning and Urban Development Thinking?’, 238; 
Charney, ‘A “Supertanker” Against Bureaucracy in the Wake of a Housing Crisis: Neoliberalizing Planning in 
Netanyahu’s Israel: Neoliberalizing Planning in Netanyahu’s Israel’, 1238.
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7 Conclusions
 7.1 Ends and means, tools and products
My first time visiting a settlement was in November of 2008 when I had to spend 
a weekend in Yitzhar. Located in the heart of the West-Bank and populated by one 
the most extreme, right-wing fanatic group of settlers, Yitzhar was basically the last 
place for a gentile like myself. In order not to arrows any suspicions or to quarrel 
with my weekend neighbours, I could not refuse an invitation of one of the families 
for the traditional Shabbat dinner. To avoid the awkward silence around the supper 
table, and in an attempt to be kind to my hosts I thought it would be a good idea to 
complement them and stated that they had a lovely panoramic view. The husband, 
Niryah, who would later be arrested by the Israeli forces for alleged terrorism, was 
highly offended from my attempted complement and stated angrily that “we are not 
here for the view”.
Niryah’s comment was in the back of my mind during my entire fieldwork, especially 
while conducting interviews. Dealing with case studies that most Israelis would 
consider as light-settlements, or even as non-settlements due to their location west 
of the Green-Line, I was not surprised that most of my interviewees spoke with a 
mixture of national and personal interests. Mentioning the “quality of life” on the 
one hand, and the defence and security importance of their settlement on the other, 
I understood that the image they tried to portray was of an ideological group of 
people, which also knew how and when to seize the opportunity and upgrade their 
living conditions by moving to a private house in a new settlement. Thus, ideological 
but not extremists, and perhaps also opportunists, yet not parasites that abuse the 
state for their interests. These conversations reminded me of a satirical sketch from 
the Israeli HaHamishia HaKamerit television program of the 1990s, where one of the 
actors, Rami Heuberger, plays a role of a settler who is trying to explain the qualities 
of living in a West-Bank settlement:
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“Look at this view. Vegetation, boulders, rocks, animals ... you have everything 
here. Look at the horizon how bright it is. Look at the houses, how nice they are… 
the kids are playing in the yard. Look at how everything was built here with faith, 
love, honesty… Do you feel the breeze? Do you see the skies? Aren’t they bluer 
here? Breathe! Breathe! It’s not Tel Aviv here, you can breathe with all the lungs… 
You know, I open my eyes here in the morning, birds on the windows, sunsets over 
the mountains… This house, for example, built to stand for years, three floors. 
With room for many children, and grandchildren ‘Inshallah’… The basketball that I 
installed in the yard… The pool is almost finished, just left to pave around it… And 
I’m not a religious person, but add to all of this the sense of mission, and the power 
of the concept of ancestral land, which all have real meaning here, a tangible one ... 
isn’t worth 1,200,000 [shekels]?”780
FIG. 7.1 Screen Shots of Rami Heuberger in “HaHamishia HaKamerit”,1995. (youtube)
In a settler-chic look of a military Doobon coat, a chequered flannel shirt and a 
moustache, yet lacking the religious yarmulke headcover, Heuberger exhibits a 
typecast image of a secular Israeli settler. Surrounded by white cubic houses with 
red-roofs and a Caterpillar truck, the scene depicts a stereotypical quality of life 
settlement. Starting with the natural landscape and vivid community life, then 
mentioning the quality of houses, national pretensions, and ending with real estate 
value, Heuberger’s monologue illustrates the fusion of ends and means, objects and 
tools of the Israeli settlement project. This is precisely the settlement mechanism, 
which perhaps has a main territorial objective, yet always included additional 
intentions and purposes; starting from the Jewish national renaissance through 
agricultural work and ending with the current market-led development. Nevertheless, 
the privatisation of this mechanism meant that its additional purposes were of an 
individualistic nature, unlike the former spiritual national endeavours or state-led 
socialisation plans. Thus, using personal interests of self-fulfilment, seclusion and 
investment as settlement tools, meant to promote the national geopolitical agenda 
while producing a variety of new architectural and urban models.
780 Tzur, HaHamishia HaKamerit.
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 7.2 The privatised settlement mechanism
The settlements described in this thesis illustrate the gradual privatisation of the 
national settlement project. As we have seen, the larger objective remained the 
state’s power over space, achieved through the construction of new settlements 
in the former frontier area of the Green-Line. Yet, to ensure their unceasing 
development, the state constantly sought to involve a variety of private organised 
families, developers and entrepreneurs, using different settlement tools, which were 
the spatial privileges that gave these new agents the power to produce, consume and 
market space.
With the increasing privatisation, the national settlement project went through 
different privatisation phases, each with its own settlement mechanism, which 
progressively included more organised and economically efficient private allies. 
Starting with the first case studies of the Community Settlements during the early 
1980s, through the Suburbanisation of the 1980s and 1990s, and up until the 
recent corporate-led development, it is possible to notice a continuous process 
where the settlement agents turned into private entrepreneurial corporations, and 
the spatial rights they were granted became real estate oriented. In this sense, the 
privatisation of the settlement mechanism was intended to increase the profitability 
and rentability of the planned residential environments, turning them into “bankable” 
projects,781 in order to enhance the national territorial agenda. Thus, the state 
adopted a non-interventionist laissez-faire approach, meant to eventually increase 
its control; turning the settlements of the Trans-Israel highway into a privately 
developed national project, just like the road that passes between them.
Each of the different settlement mechanisms generated its own architectural and 
urban typologies. As we have seen in all previous chapters, the location of the new 
settlements was dictated by the territorial aspirations of the state. Nevertheless, 
while the strategic geopolitical agenda created new ink spots on the map, the 
different settling agents which the state relied on dictated how these spots would 
be materialised. Therefore, as the power to produce and consume space turned 
into the leading settlement tool, the transforming settlement mechanism constantly 
produced new architectural and urban products.
781 Rolnik, Urban Warfare: Housing under the Empire of Finance, 95.
TOC
 332 The  Privatisation  of a National Project
In the early privatisation phases, the Community Settlement in itself was still a 
settlement tool, and not yet a mere outcome of economic calculations. As the 
state initially retained its role as the planner and developer of the new sites, it 
attracted organised groups by granting them the power to exclusively populate 
a small-scale ex-urban settlement. In this case, the appeal was to the desires of 
the settling groups for a pioneer-like experience away from the cities its members 
originated from. Consequently, the different planning administrations imitated 
former rural models, which though lacking all means of production, were supposed 
to replicate some of the communal values of previous pioneer settlements. On the 
one hand, the Community Settlements symbolise the primary transformations in 
the settlement efforts; disconnecting them from the former coalition with physical 
farming and labour while starting a new one based on individualistic self-fulfilment 
interests. On the other, as the state still reserved its power to produce space, the 
architectural and urban characteristics of the new settlements were an outcome of 
pre-privatisation mechanism.
As a neo-rural territorial tool, the new Community Settlements were far from being 
luxurious suburban communities to begin with. Affected by earlier settlement 
patterns and featuring several pioneer-like residues, they consisted of spartan 
houses in peripheral locations. At the same time, unlike the former pioneer rural 
settlements that formed a physical and spiritual avante garde alike, the Community 
Settlements were mainly intended to function as segregated homogeneous localities. 
The individual interests of the settling groups changed as well, and while the 
Community Settlement first began as an attempt to create a contra to city life by 
establishing ex-urban communities, they eventually turned into an integral part of 
the expanding national suburbanisation process. Consequently, “quality of life” was 
not measured by the remoteness from urban centres, but rather by luxurious living 
standards and short commuting distances.
The transformations in the Community Settlement model corresponded with the 
growing ability of private actors to produce space which shifted the focus from 
communal aspects to individual and corporate interests. Subsequently, the first 
phases consisting of an array of small private households sharing a communal 
open space and a public core, gave way to more house-oriented typologies, which 
focused on detaching the family from the greater collective context. Respectively, 
the emphasis was on car accessibility and on generating detached private parcels 
to be developed by their future residents. Later on, with the growing involvement of 
private developers, these urban and architectural typologies of self-fulfilment gave 
way to repetitive and economic-efficient housing models. Thus, completing the shift 
from the power to customise space by the individual, to the power to commodify it by 
the developer.
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With the suburban turn of the 1980s, the power to produce space became the focus 
of the settlement mechanism. Compatibly, while in the late 1970s the spatial rights 
granted by the state were manifested in the ability to settle secluded ex-urban 
communities, the suburban efforts of the 1980s relied on the power to affordably 
construct spacious houses in a reasonable distance from the Tel Aviv metropolis. 
Being a substantial spatial privilege, it was granted by the state either to favoured 
groups, like members of a ruling political party, large unions and the military, or to 
well-connected developers that obtained the permission to develop a certain site. 
These “private initiative settlements”,782 as the different administrations referred to 
them, witnessed minimal professional involvement of the Ministry of Construction 
and Housing, and thus followed the desires and aspirations of their settlers and 
developers. Therefore, as the power to develop new settlements became the main 
territorial tool, the architecture and layout of the new site were a product of the new 
settlement mechanism. Correspondingly, advertising campaigns were limited, and 
they were used only as a backup to the exclusive mouth to ear marketing efforts. The 
suburban lifestyle was thus not a means, but rather an artefact of the newly enacted 
settlement tool.
The suburban turn of the mid-1980s illustrates the changes in both consumption 
patterns and production apparatus of housing and residential environments. In the 
attempts of the state to involve the upper-middle-class in its territorial project, it 
granted its members the ability to develop new settlements. Consequently, the new 
residential environments followed this class’ new individualistic forms of consumption. 
On the level of the house, this was echoed in the recurring attempt to create a private 
and secluded family area, which is cut off from the surrounding environment, and the 
frequent use of the split-level unit. The external use of vegetation, fences, walls and 
closed facades, and the inner orientation of the different uses, generated an urban 
system that is subdivided into smaller entities which have no relations one to the 
other. In this sense, the suburban private parcel is similar to Leibniz’s Monads, which 
are self-sufficient substances that form the universe. They are coordinated one to the 
other, yet there is no causal relationship between them, as they “have no windows 
through which something can enter or leave”783.
The mass-suburbanisation phase and the supply-side policy the state promoted 
during the 1990s formed a new privatised settlement mechanism. The gentrification 
efforts of the 1980s created the appeal to live along the Green-Line, depicting it 
782 Settlement Division, ‘The 100.000 Plan’, 8.
783 Leibniz, Monadology, 219.
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as a natural and pristine environment, populated by well-established communities. 
Subsequently, the state-led planning, tendering, and promotion efforts of a decade 
later turned the area into a flourishing real estate market that attracted additional 
families, contractors and investors. While initially, the intentions included a reliance 
on organised housing associations, the increasing public appeal and the growing 
economic potential enabled the state to rely on larger developers. Therefore, going 
one step further in the privatisation process and turning the power to commodify 
and market space into the main settlement tool. With the commodification of the 
newly built environment, the state hoped to generate a process of supply and 
demand that would lead to the continuous development of the area and complete 
the domestication of the frontier. Correspondingly, profitability, marketability, 
and rentability became leading values of the settlement mechanism. Urban and 
architectural planning thus turned into a framework intended to promote market-
oriented environments and profitable dwelling units. Harmoniously, the shift towards 
the self-sufficient monads, suited the new modes of production, which used the new 
parcel-oriented approach in order to subdivide a given site into a series of marketable 
residential lots. Therefore, while Allweil depicts the development of Israeli settlements 
as a housing regime,784 by the 1990s it is more accurate to refer to it as a commodity 
regime; as the use-value of housing gave way to its exchange-value.
The commodification of the built environment was a one-way street that eventually 
turned architecture and planning into by-products of the privatised settlement 
mechanism. Once the state endorsed the market-oriented approach, there was no 
possible way back. Therefore, in the case of a ‘market failure’, as we have seen in 
Tzur Yitzhak, the state and its planning agencies supported new outline plans and 
adjustments in order to meet the speculative interests of private developers, and to 
ensure that the planned dwelling units would eventually become concrete dwelling 
units. Therefore, the rights granted to private entrepreneurs included a substantial 
power to plan space and to turn it into a feasible residential project. Subsequently, 
the state financialised the settlement mechanism, creating a market that would 
become the main ally of the territorial agenda, and later dictate the formation of 
the built environment. This would reach a pinnacle in the case of Harish, which 
transformed greatly in the past forty years, concluding in the current corporate-led 
urban project. With the different attempts used by the state to ignite the process, 
it was eventually the market-oriented and financial-minded approach, which relies 
on ever-increasing investment that became the main driving force behind the 
development of the future city of Israel.
784 Allweil, Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011, 5.
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 7.3 A privatising settlement mechanism
Over the surveyed forty years of privatisation, the role of the individual in the national 
settlement mechanism changed drastically. While in the Community Settlement the 
individual retained some of the pioneer characteristics and features, these seemingly 
self-sacrificing attributes gave way to the individualistic interests of better living 
standards in the Suburban Settlement. Consequently, the farmer or pioneer, who 
enhanced the territorial efforts by his plough, was replaced by the upper-middle-
class commuter. This neo-settler, as referred to by Yacobi and Tzfadia,785 promoted 
the national territorial agenda by his private house and the distance covered by his 
car during his daily commute. Finally, the market-oriented financial development 
would replace the commuter with the shareholder, who is willing to take part in the 
national project by literally owning a piece of it. Real estate, therefore, turned into 
the last virtue of the patriot.
The changes in the role of the individual in domesticating the Green-Line 
corresponded with the way the state chose to enforce its power. According to Kim 
Dovey’s analyses of the spatial mediation of power, which we already discussed in 
the introduction chapter, there are five different modes the state is able to ensure the 
individual’s compliance: force, coercion, manipulation, seduction, and authority.786 
Force is a situation in which the individual basically has no choice other than 
compliance, just like the Palestinians who lived in the area in 1948 and were forced 
to leave. Coercion is compliance made due to the fear of the consequences; which 
is the dilemma of many of the Mizrahi immigrants that the government settled in 
the area during the 1950s, who feared that lack obedience would cut them off the 
welfare system. Manipulation is when the individual is tricked to think that one is 
acting out of free choice, like the pioneer-like settlers of the late 1970s. Seduction is 
when the individual is lured by one’s desires, just as in the ability to produce space in 
the 1980s and 1990s.787 Therefore, the spatial privileges granted in the Community 
Settlement and the suburban ones turned the favoured groups they were granted 
to into settlement agents; enhancing the state’s spatial dominance while freely 
incorporating more individuals in its territorial agenda.
785 Yacobi and Tzfadia, ‘Neo-Settler Colonialism and the Re-Formation of Territory: Privatization and 
Nationalization in Israel’, 1–19.
786 Dovey, Framing Place. Mediating Power in Built Form, 3.
787 Dovey, 10–12.
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Tying individuals to the state by turning them into homeowners was a common 
practice during the 20th century.788 Correspondingly, the famous quote of US 
president Roosevelt that America as “a nation of homeowners, of people who own 
a real share in their own land” is an invincible power, highlights this assumption 
further.789 Therefore, as shareholders in suburbia, citizens are seduced, by the ability 
to form their own exclusive communities. Segal and Weitzman, and Gutwein as 
well, state that as Israelis become homeowners and shareholders in the settlement 
enterprise they will more likely affiliate themselves with the right-wing territorial 
agenda and its representatives in the parliament; ensuring the continuous role of 
right-wing political parties.790 Nevertheless, while the seduction mechanism spoke 
of metaphoric shareholders, in the financialised mode of production, the speculating 
individuals and investors became real shareholders, tied not only to the continuation 
of the settlement enterprise but also to its constant growth. Therefore, while the 
mentioned modes imply on overt attempts to enforce the state’s power over space, 
the financialisation of the settlement mechanism is closer to the mode of Authority, 
which is embedded in the social structure, and is thus an undisputable given fact and 
the most useful means.791
As described by Rabinowitz and Vardi, the Israeli neoliberal turn was accompanied 
by an undisputed consensus in favour of privatisation, which turned laissez-faire into 
the only means to improve and optimise the state apparatus.792 This widespread 
support, they claim, was not an outcome of a greater conspiracy, but rather a contra 
to the decades-long state-controlled economy, and due to the perception of Israel 
as a state facing constant war threats, whose government should focus on security 
and defence while leaving marginal issues, like the economy, aside. Therefore, 
turning market economy into the natural way things are supposed to be done.793 
788 Wright, Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America; Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The 
Suburbanization of the United States, 45–72; Hayden, Redesigning the American Dream: Gender, Housing, 
and Family Life, 3–38; Vale, From the Puritans to the Projects: Public Housing and Public Neighbors, 92–104; 
Allweil, Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011, 17–19.
789 quoted in Archer, Architecture and Suburbia: From English Villa to American Dream House, 1690-2000; 
and in Allweil, Homeland: Zionism as Housing Regime, 1860–2011, 17.
790 Segal and Eyal, A Civilian Occupation: The Politics of Israeli Architecture; Gutwein, ‘The Settlements and 
the Relationship between Privatization and the Occupation’.
791 Delso, ‘Concrete Punishment: Time, Architecture and Art as Weapons in the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict’, 
60.
792 Rabinowitz and Vardi, Driving Forces : Trans-Israel Highway and the privatization of Civil Infrastructures 
in Israel, 11–27.
793 Rabinowitz and Vardi, 15–18.
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Accordingly, by harnessing the development of the Green-Line to the seemingly 
natural process of the ‘free market’, the state was able to turn its territorial project 
into an integral part of the social structure.
As an ethno-territorial project, the privatisation of the settlement mechanism was 
a means to improve the state’s geopolitical apparatus and to eventually nationalise 
space. As seen in the case studies analysed along this thesis, the selective 
privatisation measures were enforced by the state in order to relocate a specific type 
of population to a given area, granting them privileges that enabled them to consume 
and/or produce space. Therefore, privatisation was not simply a tool to fulfil the 
national settlement agenda, but actually an integral part of it. The state-directed 
gentrification process, as well as its support of exclusive measures like admission 
committees and housing administrations, ensured that the ‘free market’ would 
serve certain geopolitical aspirations while preventing the Arabisation of space. 
This ethnocentric privatisation process, or ‘privati-nation’,794 was a clear attempt 
to adjust the ‘free market’ to the state’s territorial interests while enhancing the 
existing ethnic segregation and polarisation. Therefore, the Trans-Israel settlements 
were not only an outcome of a privatised national project but also a national project 
of privatisation, as the increasing involvement of the ‘free market’ only boosted the 
state’s involvement and its control over space.
 7.4 Post‑socialist neoliberalism?
The privatisation of the Israeli settlement mechanism constitutes a local 
implementation of a global phenomenon. Besides the unique geopolitical agenda 
that is omnipresent, this process is exceptional in the manner it was executed. 
While the main texts regarding neoliberalism discuss it as a return to power of the 
pre-war financial elites and their economic and societal values, the case of Israel 
is significantly different. Being a relatively young state with an ethnocentric quasi-
socialist background, Israel lacked an old economic hegemony. Therefore, the 
privatisation of the local economy did not conclude in the revival of old financial 
elites, but rather in the formation of a new one. This consisted of well-connected 
794 Yiftachel and Avni, ‘Privati-nation’– Privatization, Nationalization, Housing and Gaps’, 225–26.
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individuals that either benefited from their former role as governmental contractors, 
becoming leading entrepreneurs, and ones that used their connections to purchase 
state-owned corporations.
Correspondingly, in the settlement mechanism, it is possible to identify two main 
groups. Either previously small contractors that turned into large-scale concerns, 
or formerly public or state-owned companies that were sold to well-connected 
businessmen and entrepreneurs. Ashtrom and Ashdar, for example, which in the 
late 1970s supplied the prefabricated concrete units for the frontier Community 
Settlements, by the early 2000s turned into a billion-dollar concern, involved in 
real estate, infrastructure, and holdings. Among its different projects are numerous 
residential neighbourhoods and high-rise buildings in the area, as well as some 
of the construction works of the Trans-Israel Highway. Another example is Shikun 
U’Binui, which was previously owned by the socialist central workers’ union, the 
Histadrut, purchased by the Arison Group it became involved in large-scale high-rise 
residential projects such as in Shoham or Tzur Yitzhak while forming one of the main 
forces behind the Trans-Israel Highway as well.
The liquidation of the state-controlled monopoly over the development of the built 
environment did not conclude in a greater competitive market that benefited the 
end users, but rather in a private cartel that is able to continuously protect its 
interests. As noted by Rabinowitz and Vardi, the termination of the Israeli state-
monopoly resolved in a severe market concentration, where a small number of 
post-governmental firms controls the industry, in all its aspects.795 As shown in 
this thesis, these unique circumstances, which one could refer to as post-socialist 
neoliberalism, are significantly apparent in the settlement mechanism. The 
development of all case studies was eventually controlled by a restricted number 
of developers and contractors, directing the process and concluding in larger 
concentrated construction segments.
As private entrepreneurs became the main executors of the state’s territorial 
agenda, their leverage steadily increased. Subsequently, their ability to dictate, 
directly or indirectly, the formation of the built environment increased as well. 
Eventually, leading to the reproduction of the same housing typologies all across 
the settlements of the Trans-Israel Highway, whether in Harish, Shoham, or Rosh 
Ha’ayin; recreating and duplicating the same residential environments. In the long 
run, the old quasi-socialist monotonous horizontal development towns, which were 
795 Rabinowitz and Vardi, Driving Forces : Trans-Israel Highway and the privatization of Civil Infrastructures 
in Israel, 18–20.
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the focus of the national decentralisation efforts during the 1950s and formed 
the immediate example of alienated housing projects, gave way to the reproduced 
vertical high-rise suburbs of the 2000s, which were allegedly an outcome of a more 
liberal economic approach. Therefore, as the state concentration was replaced by 
market concentration, the former monotonous housing estates were replaced by 
repetitive market-led residential towers.
 7.5 Architecture without architects: the 
neoliberal version
Every first-year architecture student is able to quote Ludwig Mies-van der Rohe 
and to state that “form follows function”. Compatibly, as the Israeli settlement 
mechanism consisted of a coalition of private and national interests, its form had to 
follow a variety of functions. On the strategic level, the form of the different territorial 
enclaves and exclaves was dictated by the geopolitical considerations of creating a 
consecutive Israeli sequence. The following smaller levels were then subjected to the 
relevant phase in the privatisation of the settlement mechanism in which they were 
produced. Nevertheless, while pro laissez-faire approaches usually highlight the self-
fulfilment potential in the process of privatisation, with Polanyi mentioning “[private]
property in land” as an essential part of the concept “of individual liberty”;796 in the 
case of the Trans-Israel settlements this was quite the contrary. Despite a restricted 
period during the early 1980s, when a small and very privileged group was able to 
plan and construct their houses according to their desires and needs, the process 
indicates a gradual diminishing individual ability to influence the production of space. 
Even then, these privileges were part of a state-directed gentrification process, 
intended to enable the corporate development of a given area; as seen in the early 
Suburban Settlements that were later surrounded by high-rise residential projects 
that followed them. Thus, briefly enabling self-fulfilment in order to eventually 
replace it by market-oriented development.
796 Polanyi, quoted in Rolnik, Urban Warfare: Housing under the Empire of Finance, 151.
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Eventually, with the financialisation of the settlement mechanism the form of the built 
environment had to follow new functions. As private entrepreneurs and investors 
took the lead, the emphasis was on the profitability of planning and construction. 
Consequently, as seen in the last case studies of Harish and Tzur Yitzhak, this 
concluded in a limited number of housing models, which were an outcome of 
speculative calculations, meant to optimise the distribution of the overall building 
rights in a given parcel. Therefore, as private investment became the main force 
behind the development of new residential environments, the role of architects 
and planners turned into the capacity to create three-dimensional grids of real 
estate. The planner is in charge of dividing space into marketable parcels, while the 
architect is in charge of extracting the maximal economic potential out of a given 
parcel. Fittingly, design is the attempt of creating a unique and singular façade, 
which camouflages the commodification of the built environment while promoting 
a seemingly user-friendly environment that hides the financial considerations that 
produced it.
As entrepreneurial and speculative interests fuelled all recent developments this 
created the same reproduced housing models all across the Trans-Israel Highway. 
Similarly, Raquel Rolnik, in her writing on the financialisation of housing production, 
points out the increasing standardisation which includes the “uniformization 
of measurements, materials, components and even forms of execution and 
management”, like the example of “40,000 units… in more than seven Brazilian 
cities…. following only three different housing typologies”.797 Appropriately, the 
current financialised housing development mechanism, whether in Brasilia or in 
Harish, produces a new mode of architecture without architects, the neoliberal 
version; each with its own unique local implementation. As seen in this dissertation, 
the Israeli version of architecture without architects, was the final and perhaps the 
most efficient tactic to ensure the continuation of the national geopolitical project by 
harnessing it to the rationale of the market. Thus, using state interventions in order 
to encourage continuous private investments, while constantly forming new housing 
typologies. In his ground-breaking book, “The Decline of the West”, German historian 
Oswald Spengler wrote that “Gothic cathedrals and Doric temples are mathematics in 
stone”.798 Building on Spengler, we could easily claim that housing in the neoliberal 
age is speculations in concrete.
797 Rolnik, 223.
798 Spengler, The Decline of the West, 44.
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1948 Arab‑Israeli War, the: A war fought between the newly established state 
of Israel and a coalition of Arab countries from May of 1948 to March of 1949. 
It concluded in the 1949 armistice agreement, which defined the borders of the 
state of Israel with Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. It is referred to as the War of 
Independence by Israelis. (for the Palestinian Exodus see Nakba).
1948 Arabs, the ( نیعبراو ةینامثلا برع  , Arab Al Thamaniya WaArbaeen; ושמונה 
 Arvei Arbaim VeShmone(: A term commonly used in Arabic and Hebrew ,ערבי ארבעים
to refer to the Arab citizens of the State of Israel, meaning the Arabs who staid after 
1948. They constitute approximately 20% of the Israel population. Other terms 
include Israeli Arabs, Palestinian citizens of Israel, the Arab Minority, the Arab sector, 
the inner Palestinians or the inner Arabs.
1962 New Economic policy, the: Was a name of a series of economic reforms 
declared in 1962, which included a significant devaluation of the Israeli Lira, linking it 
to the US dollar, while cancelling its earlier linkage to the British pound.
1966 Recession, the: After the significant growth in the Israeli economy during 
the 1950s and early 50s, the economy entered an unprecedented recession. It 
was mainly and due to the cessation of the transfer of reparations money from the 
German government, and the conclusion of comprehensive national projects.
1967 Arab‑Israeli War, the: A war fought between Israel and the countries of Egypt, 
Syria and Jordan, from 5–10 June 1967 (giving it the name the six-day war). The 
war ended with Israel taking over the territories of the Golan Heights from Syria, the 
West Bank from Jordan and the Gaza strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt. In 
Arabic it is also known as the Naksah (the setback).
1973 Arab‑Israeli War, the: A war fought between Israel and Egypt and Syria, during 
October 1973. (in Israel it is known as the Yom Kippur War; in Syria and Egypt as 
the October war, Tishreen War or Ramadan War). Though it concluded in minimal 
territorial changes, and the borders remained as of the evening of the war, it is 
considered as an Arab military achievement.
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1973 Oil Crisis: Is an energy crisis that erupted before the 1973 Israeli-Arab War 
and worsened during and after it, when the Arab countries reduced the supply of oil 
to the Western countries and sharply raising its price as retaliation for their support 
of Israel.
1977 Economic turnover, the (המהפך הכלכלי; HaMahapach HaKalkali): Is the name 
given to the economic liberalisation program presented by Finance Minister Simha 
Ehrlich in 1977, shortly after the political of the same year. The plan aimed to 
liberate the economy from excessive government involvement and to turn the Israeli 
economy into a liberal free market economy.
1979 Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, the: A treaty signed by Egyptian President Anwar 
Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, witnessed by American President 
Jimmy Carter. The treaty led to the normalisation of the relations between to states, 
making Egypt the first Arab country to form official relation with Israel. The treaty 
included the withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai Peninsula it occupied in 1967, and 
the dismantling of its settlements and military bases in the area.
1980‑1985 Inflation, the: A period of increasing inflation rates that, with an 
all-time record of 445% in 1984. The inflation was stopped only after the 1985 
stabilisation plan.
1982 Lebanon War, the: Initially named Operation Peace for Galilee by the Israeli 
Government, was a military campaign launched by Israel in Lebanon against the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), and other paramilitary organisations that 
supported it. What began as a limited operation turned merged with the ongoing 
Lebanese civil war, as Israel formed cooperated with Maronite militias, reaching 
Beirut. The war ended with the PLO evacuation of Beirut, and an Israeli withdrawal to 
the south Lebanon Security Belt.
1983 Stock Exchange Crises, the: Was a severe economic crisis in Israel, which was 
created due to the regulation of securities’ exchange rates of the banks, concluded 
in the nationalisation of the banking system by the Israeli government and with a 
significant decrease in the public’s investment in stocks.
1985 Economic Stabilisation Plan, the (תכנית הייצוב הכלכלית; Tochnit Hayitzov 
Hakalkalit): An economic plan that consisted of several steps aimed to reduce the 
public deficit. The plan, which included a significant reduction in public spending and 
a sharp decrease in subsidies symbolises the official transition in Israel from a quasi-
social democratic economy towards a liberal one.
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2011 Social Justice Protests, the: Is a series of protests and demonstrations 
throughout Israel in the summer of 2011 that focused on several socio-economic 
issues, with an emphasis on the cost of living and the housing shortage. Following 
the demonstrations, the Israeli government announced a number of steps to be 
taken to solve the housing shortage, some of which were already in the process of 
planning and ratification, while others were presented in response to the demands of 
the protesters.
100,000 Plan, the (תכנית המאה אלף; Tochnit HaMeah Elef): A master plan issued 
by the Settlement Division of the Jewish Agency to settle 100.000 Jews in the 
area of the West Bank. The plan is a detailed version of the earlier “Master Plan for 
Settlement Development in Judea and Samaria 1979-1983” (known as the Drobles 
plan).
A
Absentees’ Property Law (חוק נכסי נפקדים; Hok Nihsei Nifkadim): A law issued by the 
Israeli parliament in 1950. The law appoints a custodian of absentee property for 
property of Arab refugees including real estate, currency, financial instruments and 
other goods, and allows rental of such property as well as release and sale.
Agricultural Centre, the (המרכז החקלא; HaMirkaz HaHaklai): Is a Settlement 
Movement established in the pre-statehood years as a joint framework of the Labour 
Settlement and the agricultural education workers. It is made out of representatives 
of the Agricultural Labourers’ Union (established 1919), which later formed a central 
part of the Histadrut (established 1920). With the organisational change of the 
Histadrut in 1994, the Agricultural Centre disengaged from it. It still represents the 
interests of farmers and rural settlements vis-à-vis the government institutions. 
Since 2001, the Agricultural Centre, together with representatives of other 
agricultural organisations and settlements formed a joint body named the Israel 
Farmers Union.
Al Hamishmar (על המשמר): The official journal of Hashomer Hatzair movement, 
which was published during 1943-1995.
Alignment, the (המערך; HaMaarach): Was a political alliance in Israel between the 
different socialist Zionist parties. The first alignment was in 1965-1968, named the 
“Alignment of the Unity of the Workers of Eretz Israel” made out of Mapai and Ahdut 
HaAvoda, which later merged with other parties, including the Poali Zion and Rafi into 
the Israel Labour Party (Haavoda). The second was during 1969-1984, formed out 
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of an alliance between the Labour Party and Mapam (the united workers’ party). In 
1991 it merged into a single party, the Labour Party. Due to the dominance of Mapai, 
the terms Alignment, Mapai and Labour Party are often used interchangeably.
Aliyah (עליה): Literally meaning ascent, is a term used to describe Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, and later the state of Israel. It is common to refer to the 
first waves of Zionist immigrations in 1882 as the first Aliyah (Haliyah Harishona). 
Jewish immigrants to Israel are referred to as O’lim (ascenders), while emigrants are 
referred to as Yordim (descenders).
Alon Plan, the (תכנית אלון; Tochnit Alon): A plan composed by Yigal Alon, the 
minister of Labour, and submitted to the Israeli government in 1967, a month after 
the 1967 war under the title “The Future of the Territories and the Treatment of 
Refugees.”. The plan suggested creating a partition between Jordan and the West 
Bank by annexing most of the Jordan Valley, East Jerusalem, and the Etzion bloc, to 
Israel. An autonomous Palestinian territory was to be formed in the remaining areas 
(if not returned to Jordan). Alon also suggested a Druze state in the Israeli-occupied 
Golan Heights and return most of the Sinai Peninsula to Arab control. Though never 
adopted by the state of Israel, it did form an official guideline.
Amana (אמנה): Is a settlement movement established in 1976 by Gush Emunim, 
aimed to develop settlements is the West Bank, Golan Heights, Galilee, Negev and 
Gaza Strip. It was registered as an association in 1978, and later recognised by the 
World Zionist Organisation.
Afforestation: Is the process of creating a forest in a non-wooded area. In Israel/
Palestine the Jewish National Fund (JNF) is in charge of planting trees in places 
where there had been no forests before and restoring forests damaged by pests, 
fires, droughts, snow, and the life of trees. These actions are often seen as part of 
land redemption efforts.
Africa Israel Investments Ltd. (AFI Group; or Africa Israel): Is one of the leading real 
state and holding groups in the Israeli market. It consists of several sub-companies 
active in real estate, construction, infrastructure, manufacturing, tourism, and 
leisure. Formed in 1934 by Jewish businessmen from South Africa interested in 
investing in Palestine and was named Africa Palestine Investment Limited (Changed 
Palestine to Israel in 1967). Was active in the local private construction from the 
early 1950s. Purchased by Bank Leumi in 1970 and Lev Leviev in 1997.
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Albeck, Plia (1937-2005 ;פליאה אלבק): A former Israeli jurist that dealt with the 
legal status of the settlements and the area on which they were established. During 
her work she was in charge of a vast land survey of the West Bank that declared 
intended to allocate unclaimed and unregistered lands that were then declared as 
state-owned; thus, legally able to be used for settlement purposes.
Arab League boycott of Israel: A boycott issued by the Arab league initially in 1945 
on Jewish products from Palestine, which later evolved into a boycott on Israeli 
products and to companies dealing and operating in Israel. The boycott was never 
officially lifted, though it lost its impact after the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and 
later the Jordanian one.
Arabah, the (הערבה): A geographical area in southern Israel. It is a narrow valley 
stretching from the Dead Sea to the Eilat bay, separating between Jordan and 
the Negev.
Arafat, Yaser ( تافرع رسای  , also known as Abu Amar; 1929-2004): A Palestinian 
political and military figure. Headed the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
and one of the leaders of the armed and paramilitary Palestinian struggle against 
the state of Israel. Former Chairman of the Palestinian National Authority. Signed 
the Oslo Accords in 1993, for which he was granted the Nobel Peace Prize. Later, in 
2000 lead the “second Intifada” until his death in 2004.
Areas A, B, and C: An administration division of the West Bank area into three 
categories as a result of the Oslo II Accord. Areas A are under civil and security 
control of the Palestinian Authority. B areas are under Palestinian civil control but 
Israeli security Jurisdiction. Areas C are under full Israeli control.
Aretz, the (הארץ; Haaretz): Literally meaning the land. A term used by Israelis to 
refer to the geographical entity of Israel. In contrast to “outside the land” (Hutz 
Laaretz, or Hul), which means abroad.
Ashkenazi (אשכנזי): A term that refers to Jews from western or European origin.
Ashkubit (אשקובית): A prefabricated dwelling unit developed by Ashdar ltd. Being a 
modular method it was widely used in the first phases of settlement construction.
Ashtrum ltd (אשטרום): Is a leading Israeli construction company established in 
1963. Was initially involved in the development of prefabricated housings named 
Ashkubit and developed into a concern of several subcompanies focusing on 
construction, real estate, development, and infrastructure.
TOC
 372 The  Privatisation  of a National Project
Austerity regime, the (משטר הצנע; Mishtar Hazena’a): is a term used to refer to an 
economic policy introduced by the State of Israel between 1949 and 1959 (though 
some restrictions ended in 1952) aiming to create a stable exchange by reducing 
the use in foreign currency. It was expressed in two main ways: targeting credit and 
investments, but mainly by restrictions on the purchase of food and consumer goods 
through the use of fixed allowances.
B
B’Tselem (בצלם): An Israel NGO, founded in 1989 and based in Jerusalem. The 
organisation focuses on documenting and recording violation of human rights in the 
territories occupied by Israel (West Bank and Gaza).
Bagatz: see Supreme Court.
Barak, Ehud (1942 ;אהוד ברק -): Former Israeli General and Chief of Staff. Was the 
tenth prime minister of Israel (1999-2001), Minister of Defence (2007-2013), and 
parliament member representing the Labour Party.
Balfour Declaration, the (November 2, 1917): A statement of British support for “the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” It was made 
in a letter from Arthur James Balfour, the British foreign secretary, to Lionel Walter 
Rothschild, 2nd Baron Rothschild (of Tring), a leader of British Jewry.
Begin, Menachem (1913-1992 ;מנחם בגין): Israeli politician and head of state. 
Before the establishment of the state of Israel, he was the leader of the paramilitary 
Irgun Zevai Leumi (Irgun). Founder of the Herut Party and main opponent of the 
Labour governments from 1948-1977. Israeli Prime Minister (1977-1983).
Beitar (בית״ר :ברית יוסף טרומפלדור; Brit Yosef Trumpledor): A revisionist Zionist 
youth movement founded in 1923 by Ze’ev Jabotinsky. It was affiliated with the Irgun 
Zevai Leumi, and after 1948 with the Herut and Likud parties. It was named after 
Yoses Trumpeldor, a leading Zionist figure in Palestine that was killed in clashes with 
local Arabs, but also after the biblical city of Beitar, which was the last stronghold of 
Simon bar Kokhba in his revolt against the Roman Empire.
Border Police (מג״ב :משמר הגבול; Magav: Mishmar HaGvul): part of the Israeli 
national police force, it constitutes its gendarmerie and is in charge of border 
security. Along its tasks securing Israeli borders, it is also deployed in law 
enforcement tasks in the West Bank and in counter-terrorism.
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Build Your Own House (בנה ביתך; BYOH; Bnei Bitcha): A development method, where 
a lot is leased or sold to an individual, upon it he is later able to construct a private 
house of his own design.
C
Camp David Accords (1978), the: A framework agreement signed by Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and led to the 
1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty.
Central Command, the (פיקוד מרכז; Pikud Merkaz(: A regional command of the IDF 
that is in charge of the central area of Israel. This includes Gush Dan, the Sharon, the 
Shphelah, Jerusalem and the West Bank. The commander of the Central command is 
the official sovereign in the West Bank.
Checkpoint, a (מחסוםו; Mahsom): A road barrier erected by the IDF in the West Bank, 
in order to control and manage the flow of people in the area.
Civil Administration, the (המנהל האזרחי; Haminhal Haezrahi): An Israeli governing 
authority established in 1981 in order to replace the former Military government, 
which is in charge of carrying out all bureaucratic civil matters in the territories 
Israel occupied during the 1967 and has not formally annexed. Its duties include 
public services, work permits, travel permits, and building permits.
Coastal Plain, the (מישור החוף; Mishor HaHof): A geographical area in Israel that 
spreads from the Haifa Bay in the north, along the coast, to the Gaza strip in the 
south. It houses almost 60% of the Israeli population, most of which in the Tel Aviv 
metropolitan area and that the Haifa metropolitan area.
Community Settlement (יישוב קהילתי; Yeshuv Kehilati(: A settlement method that 
evolved mainly in the late 1970s and 1980s, which was based on a homogeneous 
small group (around 250 families), that usually shared a common ideological 
background and was interested to form a new settlement of its own. This method 
was widely used in the development of Jewish settlements in the Galilee and the 
West Bank.
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D
Development Authority, the (רשות הפיתוח; Rashut Hapituah): An Israeli 
governmental agency established in 1951 in charge of managing the absentees’ 
property. The lands managed by the Development Authority are considered to be 
part of the state-owned land.
Development Town, a (עיירת פיתוח; Ayarat Pituah): Is a term used to refer to towns 
in Israel that were constructed during the 1950s and 1960s in peripheral areas, in 
the purpose of population dispersal.
Dekel, Michael (1920-1994 ;מיכאל דקל): An Israeli politician and parliament member 
(1977-1988) on behalf of the Likud party. Served as deputy minister of agriculture 
(1981-1984), where he coordinated the development of Jewish settlements in the 
West Bank and the Galilee.
Detailed Plan, a (תכנית מפורטת, Tochnit Mefuretet): A zoning scheme which provides 
sufficient details regarding the dimensions of the possible buildings that could be 
constructed in its area, according to it a building permit could be issued.
Disengagement Plan, the (Tochnit Hahitnatkut, or simply the Hitnatkut): An Israeli 
withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and (and parts of Northern Samaria), which included 
the evacuation and dismantling of Jewish settlements in the area. It was led by Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon in 2005.
District Outline Plan, a (Tamam: Tochnit Mitaar Mehuzit): A planning scheme that 
details the lands uses and functions of a district in Israel, according to the relevant 
national outline plans. Usually addresses more than one municipal entity. The local 
zoning plans of each city derive from that of the district.
Drobles, Matityahu (1931-2018 ;מתיתיהו דרובלס): Was an Israeli politician and 
parliament member (1972-1977) on behalf of Gahal and the Likud. From 1978-
1992 he was a member of the board of the World Zionist Organisation, while he 
acted as the head of its Settlement Division. In this position, he was in charge of the 
development of new settlements in the West Bank. He composed the “Master Plan for 
Settlement Development in Judea and Samaria 1979-1983”, which became known as 
the Drobles plan, and supervised the 100.000 plan.
Dunam, a (Ottoman Turkish: منود  ; Turkish: dönüm; Hebrew: דונם) An Ottoman 
measurement unit that is an equivalent of 1000m2.
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E
E’retz Israel (ארץ ישראל): Literally meaning the Land of Israel. A biblical historical 
term that refers to the territory of the biblical kingdoms of Israel and Judea. 
Usually used to refer to the geographical area of Palestine, with a more Jewish/
Zionist sentiment.
Erlich, Simha (1915-1983 ;שמחה ארליך): Was an Israeli politician who acted as 
parliament member (1969-1983), Minister of Finance (1977-1979) and Minister of 
Agriculture (1981-1983), all on behalf of the Likud party. Known for the economic 
reforms he led as Minister of Finance, which constituted the official liberalization of 
the Israel economy.
F
Fatah ( نیطسلف ریرحت ةكرح حتف :  ; Harakat Tahrir Falastin): A nationalist Palestinian 
movement, political party and paramilitary group established in 1959. Constituted 
the largest fraction of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, as both were led by 
Yasser Arafat. Fatah and its sub-groups led the armed struggle against Israel, which 
defined it as a terrorist organisation in 1986.
Frontier Areas (אזורי ספר): A term used in Israel to define border and undeveloped 
areas; or areas that are sparsely populated [by Jews]. These include the Galilee, 
the Green Line area (eastern frontier), the West Bank, the Negev, the Arabah and 
the Golan Heights. These areas usually considered as “conflict areas” due to their 
proximity to a “hostile border”.
G
Gahal (גח״ל: גוש חירות ליברלים; Gush Herut Liberalim): Was the leading main right-
wing political party, headed by Menachem Begin during the 1960s and early 1970s. 
It was formed as a merger of the Herut Party and the Liberal Party in 1965. In 1973, 
it merged with other smaller parties forming the Likud.
Galilee (لیلجلا ;הגליל  ): A geographical area in northern Israel that borders Lebanon 
in the north, the Mediterranean in the west, the Jordan River in the east and the 
Jezreel valley in the south.
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Gari’in, a (גרעין; Pl.: Gari’inim): Hebrew for Kernel. Used to refer to the initial core 
of a settling group, which would carry out the first phases of foundations. A Gari’in 
could be a civilian one, belonging to one of the settling movements, or a military one, 
as part of the Nahal corps.
Gaza Strip, the (רצועת עזה; Rezuat Aza; ةزغ عاطق  ; Qita’ Ghazza): is an autonomous 
Palestinian Zone, 51 km long and 11 km wide, that borders Israel in its north and 
east, the Mediterranean in its west and Egypt in its south. Part of the British Mandate 
over Palestine it was under Egyptian rule between 1948-1967. It fell under full 
Israeli occupation in 1967, and in 1994 became part of the Palestinian National 
Authority, though Physically disconnected from the West Bank. After Israel’s 
unilateral disengagement from Gaza in 2005, it fell under a full closure and blockade 
by Israel, which controls all exits and entries to the strip. After the 2006 elections 
for the Palestinian Authority, Gaza became a de facto separated authority, as it is 
administrated by its own different government, different than that of the West Bank. 
The main cities in the Gaza Strip are Gaza city, Rafah, Khan Younis, Beit Lahia and 
Beit Hanoun.
Golan Heights, the (רמת הגולן, Ramat HaGolan; نالوجلا ةبضھ  , Hadabat AlJoulan): 
Is a geographical area in a form of a plateau that borders The Sea of Galilee and the 
Hula valley in the west, the Yarmuk valley in the south, the Hermon mountains in the 
north and the Ruqqad valley in the east. It was occupied by Israel from Syria in the 
1967 war, and officially annexed to it in 1981.
Green Line, the (הקו הירוק, HaKav HaYarok): Is the term used to describe the border 
between the official state of Israel and the West Bank. Between 1949-1967, it formed 
the border between Israel and the kingdom of Jordan, it got its name from the colour it 
was drawn in at the 1949 armistice agreements. After Israel occupied the West Bank in 
1967, the former international border turned into an administrative and legal one.
Gush Dan (גוש דן): Is a conurbation of cities in central Israel, along the 
Mediterranean, and Is a part of the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. Sometimes it 
is used to refer to the inner ring of cities in the metropolitan (Tel Aviv, Ramat, 
Givaataim, Bnei Brak, Holon, and Bat Yam), though it is also used to refer to the 
larger metropolitan area, from Netanya in the north to Ashdod in the south, The 
Mediterranean in the west and the Green Line in the east. It constitutes the densest 
area in Israel, and its economic, cultural and civic centre.
Gush Emunim (גוש אמונים): Literally meaning the bloc of believers, was a Jewish 
religious movement, established in 1974 aiming to develop the Jewish settlement 
in the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights, and to strengthen the ones in the 
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Galilee and the Negev. It was highly active in the West Bank during the 1980s and 
led the construction of dozens of new settlements. Amana organisation formed its 
executing agency and it is still active (2018), though the movement is no longer 
active. Politically, the movement was affiliated with several right-wing Jewish 
orthodox parties like Moledet (Homeland), Mafdal (National Religious Party, Miflaga 
Datit Leumit), Tehiya (Revival) and later HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home).
H
Haaretz (the Land [of Israel]; הארץ): An Israeli daily newspaper, published in Tel Aviv 
since 1918. Known for its relatively left-wing and liberal agenda.
Haganah, the (ההגנה; Literally meaning the Defence): Was the largest and the main 
paramilitary organization of the Jewish community and the Zionist movement in 
Palestine during the British Mandate. I was formed in 1921 and constituted the basis 
of the IDF with the establishment of the state of Israel.
Heahzut (היאחזות): Literally meaning a handhold, or outpost, is a Hebrew term used 
to refer to the first phase in the foundation of a settlement, which usually consists 
of a temporary form of living in a given site, by a small group of people (see Gari’in), 
intended to prepare the ground for the future development.
Herut (חירות): Literally meaning Freedom. Is a former Israeli right-wing political 
party affiliated with Revisionist Zionism. It was established in 1948 by veterans of 
the Irgun led by Menachem Begin. It constituted the main opposition for the Mapai 
governments. In 1973, it became the main fraction of the larger Likud list, which 
came to power in the 1977 elections and merged into one party in 1988.
High Court of Justice (בית המשפט הגבוה לצדק: בג״ץ, Beit Hamishpat HaGavoah 
LeTzedek: Bagatz): One of the duties of the Israeli supreme court, as it deals with 
petitions against the state, or any other public authority, regarding the legality of 
governmental decisions and matters of human rights and relief.
Highway 6 (כביש שש): The trans-Israel highway, running from Galilee in the north 
to the Negev in the south, eastern to the Tel Aviv Metropolitan and adjacent to the 
Green Line, which began operating in the early 2000s. Constructed in the Build-
Operate-Transfer (BOT) method, it is the first private road in Israel. Officially it is 
named after Prime Minister Yithzhak Rabin.
TOC
 378 The  Privatisation  of a National Project
Histadrut, the (ההסתדרות): Originaly named HaHistadrut HaKlalit shel HaOvdim 
B’Eretz Yisrael (the general organization of workers in Eretz Israel), Was founded 
in 1920 by socialist parties in order to unite the Jewish workers in Palestine. With 
the establishment of the State of Israel, some of the organization’s activities were 
transferred to the responsibility of the government. It was long headed by David Ben 
Gurion (1921-1936), who later became the first Prime Minister. It was considered as 
the main institution the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine in general, and of 
Labour Zionism in particular, considered by many as the representative of the Mapai 
hegemony. During the 1980s, the organization began to fall apart until in 1994 it 
was re-established as the New General Federation of Labour, which focuses mainly 
on labour union activity.
Hityashvut (התיישבות): A Hebrew term used to describe to act of settlement in a 
place. In accordance, Yeshuv (a settlement; Pl: Yeshuvim) and Metyashev (settler; 
Pl: Metyashvim). The Hityashvut refers to Zionist settlement enterprise in the entire 
area of Israel/Palestine, in contrast to the term Hitnahlut, which usually refers to the 
West Bank.
Hitnahlut, a (התנחלות): The Israeli term for a West Bank settlement. A settler is 
referred to as a Mitnahel (Pl: Mitnahlim). It is sometimes used as a derogatory 
term for settlements, while Hitshavut and Metyashvim are considered as the 
appropriate ones.
Hitnahlut, the (ההתנחלות): An additional term used to describe the act of settling 
in a place. Derives from term Nahala (allotment), referring to the biblical allotments 
of the tribes of Israel, where each tribe settled and what is described in Hebrew as 
Tkufat HaHitnahlut (the settling period). It is used also to refer to the settlement 
enterprise in the West Bank.
Housing Company, a (Hevra Meshakenet; חברה משכנת): A recognised entity, that is 
in charge of managing the registration of dwelling units built on state-owned land, 
and transfer their ownership, from the Israel Land Administration to the individuals 
that purchased them. In cases where individual registration is not possible (like in 
the case of the West-Bank), the role of the company as a private registry continuous 
for years later.
I
IDF (Israel Defence Forces; צה״ל, Zahal: Ztva Hagana LeIsrael): The official name of 
the Israeli military.
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Immigrant camp (מחנה עולים; Mahane Olim): A term used for temporary camps were 
temporarily built in Israel from 1947 until the early 1950s in order to accommodate 
Jewish immigrants coming to Palestine/Israel. Composed of tents and characterised 
with low living standards, they were replaced by the Ma’abarot.
Intifada, the First (ةضافتنا ;אינתיפאדה  ): Literally meaning Shuddering. Was a 
violent Palestinian uprising against the Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza 
(1987-1991/1993). The uprising was characterised in demonstrations, strikes, 
stone-throwing, roadblocks, attacks by improvised weapons, kidnapping, and some 
shooting incidents.
Intifada, the Second (In Arabic the Aqsa Intifada, Intifadat al Aqsa, ىصقألا ةضافتنا  
 HaIntifada HaShniya): Is a term used to refer to the violent ,האינתיפאדה השנייה ;
clashes between Israel and the different Palestinian organisations (including the 
Palestinian Authority) during 2000-2005. It began as a civil uprising, but evolved 
into armed clashes, shootings, bombings, and suicide attacks from the Palestinian 
side and sieges, arrests, and airstrikes from the Israel side. Led to the Israeli 
withdrawal from the Gaza strip and the construction of the West Bank barrier.
Israel Land Authority (רמ״י: רשות מקרקעי ישראל; ILA, Rami: Reshut Mekarka’ei 
Yisrael): Previously known as Israel Land Administration (ממ״י: מנהל מקרקעי ישראל; 
Minhal Mekarka’ei Yisra’el). A national authority created in 1960 in order to manage 
the lands in Israel that are owned by the state, the Jewish National Fund or the 
Development Authority. In total it is in charge of 93% of the lands inside the state 
of Israel.
Israel Land Development Company (הכשרת היישוב; Hachsharat HaYeshuv): It 
was formed in London in 1909 under the name of Palestine Land Development 
Company, by the British Zionist Federation in order to act as an executive arm of the 
WZO in aiding the development of Jewish rural (and later also urban) settlement in 
Palestine. In 1953 it turned went public and in 1954 it focused on construction and 
development, and later also on hotels and commercial buildings. In 1988 the Zionist 
institutions decided to sell the company and it was privatised.
J
Jewish Agency for Israel, the (הסוכנות היהודית, HaSochnut HaYehudit; JA): Is 
an international non-profit Zionist Jewish organisation, founded in 1929 as the 
executive arm of the World Zionists Organisation (originally as the Jewish Agency 
for Palestine). During the British Mandate, the JA constituted the representatives 
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and administrative institution of the Jewish population in Palestine, in charge 
of education, immigration, governance, and security, laying the ground for the 
future Israeli government. After the establishment of the state of Israel, the JA 
concentrated on promoting Jewish immigration (Aliya), education (for Jews outside 
of Israel), economic development and establishing settlements. The status of the JA 
(as well as that of the WZO), was formalised by las passed by the Israeli parliament 
in 1952, which stated that both organisations will retain their responsibilities in 
supervising and encouraging Jewish immigration and absorption in Israel, as well as 
the development of settlements. The Settlement Department (not division) of the JA 
played a significant role in the development of rural settlements in Israel.
Jewish National Fund, the (קק״ל, קרן קיימת לישראל KKL, Keren Kayemet Le’Israel, 
JNF): Is a non-profit organisation that was founded in 1901, during the Ottoman rule 
over Palestine, in the aim to raise donations and to purchase, develop and prepare 
lands for Jewish settlement in the area. The JNF took a leading part in afforestation 
efforts and the creation of national parks.
Jordan Valley (בקעת הירדן): a geographical area between the Sea of Galilee in the 
north and the Dead Sea in the south, containing the southern part of the Jordan 
River. It separates the West Bank from Jordan and since 1967 forms the border 
between Israel and Jordan.
Judea (יהודה): A Hebrew term that refers to the geographical mountainous area in 
central Palestine, southern to the Jerusalem mountains, western to the Dead Sea, 
northern to the Negev and eastern to the southern Coastal Plain. Its name derives 
from the biblical Kingdom of Judah, and the later Roman name of the province of 
Judea. It is mainly used to refer to the southern part of the West Bank: the area of 
Judea and Samaria.
K
Keren Hayesod (קרן היסוד; literally meaning the “foundation fund”): Is the central 
financial institution for the activities of the World Zionist Organization. It was 
established in 1920, in order to form the fund-raising agency of the WZO. In 1956, 
the Israeli Parliament passed a law declaring Keren Heyesod as the official fundraiser 
of the State of Israel.
Kibbutz, a (קיבוץ; Pl: Kibbutzim): A communal socialist rural settlement, that is 
characterised by strong collective features which included shared ownership of the 
means of production and a collective budget with minimal private property. It usually 
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consisted of small-scale community based on agriculture and small industries. The 
Kibbutzim took a leading role in the pre-state Jewish settlement and formed the 
ideological role model of Labour Zionism.
Kibbutz Crisis, the (משבר הקיבוצים; Mashber HaKibbutzim): Is a term used to refer 
to the experienced by a large part of the kibbutzim in Israel. It began in the early 
1980s and intensified after the 1985 stabilisation program, in which inflation was 
halted and characterized by the accumulation of large debts by the kibbutzim and a 
low ability to repay them. This was accompanied by a social and demographic crisis 
some kibbutzim witnessed. In 1989 and 1996, the Israeli government, the banks, 
and the kibbutz movements signed two debt arrangements designed to help solve 
the crisis. The economic and demographic crisis was a major catalyst for change 
processes many kibbutzim have undergone since the 1990s.
KKL: See JNF.
L
Labour Zionism (ציונות סוציאליסטית, Tzionot Sotzialistit): An ideological framework 
that formed a merger of Zionist ideals with Marxist ones, as it emphasised on 
creating a new progressive and socialist Jewish society in Palestine, based on 
communal Kibbutzim and Moshavim and an urban proletariat. It formed the leading 
ideological framework in Zionism through the 20th century in general, and that of the 
Labour Movement and the Mapai party in particular.
Land Redemption (גאולת אדמה, Geulat Adama): A term used to refer to the action 
of land acquisition and reclamation by Jews in Palestine, perceived as an act of 
redeeming the land of Israel to its historical inhabitants and a part of the rebirth of 
the Jewish nation in its historic homeland.
Lehi, the (לח״י, לוחמי חירות ישראל; Lohamei Herut Yisrael, Israel Freedom Fighters): 
Was a Jewish underground paramilitary organisation operating against the British 
Mandate from 1940 until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Lehi was 
declared a terrorist organization by the Mandatory government, and for a period also 
by the state of Israel. It was created by former members of the Irgun, that opposed 
the cessation of the struggle against the British Mandate during WWII. In 1980 the 
state of Israel recognised the Lehi as one of the pre-state undergrounds that helped 
in the national armed struggle.
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Levi, David (1937 ;דוד לוי): An Israeli politician, who acted as a parliament member 
between 1969-2006 on behalf of several parties that include Gahal, Likud, Gesher 
and Israel Ahat. Levi acted as Minister of Aliyah and Integration (1977-1981), 
Minister of Housing and Construction (1979-1990) and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(1990-1992; 1996-1998; 1999-2000).
Likud, the (הליכוד): A nationalist right-wing Zionist Jewish political party in 
Israel. Formed out of the merger of the former Gahal and Herut parties and 
constitutes the ideological and political successor of Herut. It first came to power 
in the 1977 elections, while headed by Menachem Begin, and have led several 
governments since.
Local Planning and Construction Committee (ועדה מקומית לתכנון ובניה; Veada 
Mekumit LeTichnon U’Bniya):
Local Town Planning Scheme (Tochnit mita’ar mekomit): Sometime referred to as 
just Town Planning Scheme (Taba: Tochnit Binyan Ir), is a binding legal document 
consisting of a map and a regulation book, that determines the zoning codes of 
a town. It details the land uses, street layout, construction area, the height of 
buildings, the outline of buildings, and number of permitted units. It is in accordance 
with the regional and national planning scheme. It is authorised by the regional 
planning committee, and in case it does not have substantial changes, it could be 
authorised by the local committee.
M
Ma’ariv (מעריב; Evening): Was a leading Israeli newspaper published in Tel Aviv 
during 1948-2014.
Ma’abara, a (מעברה): Is a term used to define an immigration transition camp 
in Israel during the 1950s. The Ma’abarot were supposed to provide temporary 
accommodation solution for Jewish immigrant. The Ma’abarot were placed in the 
fringes of existing cities or in former Arab Palestinian towns and villages. They 
replaced the former immigrant camps (Mahanaot Olim). Along the 1950s most of the 
Ma’abarot were dismantled, and many of them were turned into development towns.
Magav: see Border Police.
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Mahpach of 1977, the (המהפך, the “Turnover” or “revolution”): A term used to refer 
to the Likud victory in the Israeli legislative election of 1977, which brought an end 
to the sequence of Mapai led governments since 1948.
Mapai (מפא״י: מפלגת פועלי ארץ ישראל; Mifleget Poali Eretz Yisrael, The Eretz Yisrael 
Workers’ Party): Is a socialist Zionist party established in 1930 in Palestine, as a 
merger HaPoel HaTzair (the young worker) and Ahdot HaAvoda (the unity of work). It 
constituted a leading force in the Jewish population of Mandatory Palestine, and later 
the main party in the State of Israel, leading all governments from 1948-1977. For 
several years it was part of the Ma’arach (the Alignment). The Israeli Labour Party is 
considered as its political and ideological successor.
Meretz (מרץ): Is an Israeli-Zionist social-democratic left-wing party. The party was 
formed in 1992 by the unification of the Ratz, Mapam, and part of Shinui.
Ministerial Committee for Settlement, the (ועדת השרים לענייני התיישבות; Veadat 
HaSarim LeInyane Hityashvut): Is a ministerial committee of the Israeli government-
appointed to approve the establishment of new settlements in the State of Israel 
and the West Bank. Its approval grants the settlement an official status, allowing it 
to receive municipal and other services. Established in 1982, it operated until 1995, 
then during 1999-2002, and once again since 2012.
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (משרד החקלאות ופיתוח הכפר; Misrad 
HaHaklaut VeHapituach HaKfar): Is an office in the Israeli government responsible 
for agriculture and rural areas. The Ministry’s main activities include planning and 
development of rural settlements, agriculture, provision of veterinary services, land 
conservation, drainage and plant protection.
Ministry of Aliyah and Integration (משרד העלייה והקליטה; Misrad HaAliyah 
VeHaKlita): Is a government ministry responsible for implementing government 
policy in the area of immigrant absorption. Was established in 1968, after operating 
earlier during 1948-1951.
Ministry of Defence (משרד הביטחון; Misrad HaBitahon): Is the government ministry 
responsible for the security of the State of Israel. The responsibilities of this ministry 
include the IDF and the government defence and security industries.
Ministry of Housing and Construction (משרד הבינוי והשיכון; Misrad Habinui 
VeHashikun): Is the office responsible for the construction and housing sector 
in Israel, as well as the creation of conditions that will enable households with 
reasonable housing opportunities.
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Misgav Regional Council (מועצה אזורית משגב; Moatza Ezorit Misgav): Is a regional 
council in the Galilee, formed in 1982, mainly to form the administrative framework 
for the newly constructed Jewish settlements in the area (Mitzpim). It compromises 
29 Jewish settlements and 6 Arab villages.
Mishkei Herut Beitar (משקי חירות בית״ר): Is a Zionist settlement movement affiliated 
with Revisionist Zionism, Beitar movement and the Herut Party (later Likud)
Mitzpe, a (מצפה): Literally meaning a lookout point. It is used to describe a 
settlement, which was established as part of the Mitzpim plan, that asked to establish 
Jewish settlements in the Galilee, in a relatively short period of time. The term refers 
to the settlements’ location on a hilltop, providing it with panoramic views. Other 
settlements may have a name starting with Mitzpe, due to their location as well, 
though as they were not part of the Mitzpim plan, they do not constitute “A” Mitzpe.
Mizrahi (מזרחי; literally meaning eastern): A term used to refer to Jews originated 
from Arab or Islamic countries. This also includes Jews who are members of 
communities originated from Spain and relocated after their deportation in 1492 to 
North Africa, Turkey, the Netherlands, Greece, the Balkans or Palestine. Referred to 
also as Sephardim (or Sephardians), meaning Spaniards.
Moshav, a (מושב; Pl: Moshavim): A rural settlement with agricultural characteristics. 
Usually consists of private households with differing levels of communal and 
shared features.
Moshav Ovdim (מושב עובדים; literally meaning a workers’ Moshav): A rural 
settlement where each household operated autonomously in regard to labour, 
finance, subsistence, and consumption. Its communal aspect is manifested in joint 
administration and mutual responsibility.
Moshav Shitufi (מושב שיתופי; literally meaning a communal Moshav): A rural 
settlement where each household forms an autonomous unit in regard to 
consumption, housing, and family life. The lands of the Moshav however, as well 
as the buildings, the means of production and their outcome are considered as 
collective property, owned by the association of all members of the Moshav. Each 
family receives a budget, according to its size and needs.
Moshavim Movement, the (תנועת המושבים; Tnuat HaMoshavim): Established in 1933 
by members of Moshavim to deal with their unique problems vis-à-vis the various 
national institutions. It is the largest settlement movement in Israel, representing 
254 of them. The movement also deals with the representation of the moshavim vis-
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a-vis state institutions in all matters relating to members rights to land ownership, 
agricultural and rural policy in the State of Israel and economic development in 
rural areas.
N
National Committee for Planning and Construction of Preferred Housing Areas 
(Vatmal: Veada letichnun u’labinya shel mithamim mo’dafei diur): Formed in 2011 by 
the Israeli government, it is intended to approve large-scale construction projects on 
a national level in a rapid manner and to overcome all other plans (with the exception 
of Tama 35). The promoted plans are large construction plans on state-owned land 
(750 housing units and 500 minority housing units). The committee consists of 
representatives of government ministries, 4 from the local government, a planning 
professional, a representative of the Israel Lands Authority and a representative of 
a body that deals with the protection of the environment. In 2017 the committee’s 
authorities were expanded also to include private-owned lands.
National Infrastructure Committee (ות״ל: ועדה לתשתיות לאומיות; Vatal: Veada 
letashtiyot Leumiyot): A committee established in 2002 in order to speed up the 
planning process of infrastructures defined as “national infrastructures”. The 
committee is vested with the powers of the National Council in the planning and 
construction of national infrastructures, including infrastructure installations, 
airports, ports, anchorages, water desalination plants, water and sewage 
installations including reservoirs, waste disposal and treatment sites, roads, railways, 
gas installations, mining and quarrying sites, all if the Prime Minister, the Minister 
of Finance and the Minister of the Interior declared each of them to be of “national 
importance”.
National Institutions, the (המוסדות הלאומיים; HaMosadot HaLeumiem): Was a term 
used to refer to the institutions established by the Zionist movement during the pre-
statehood years, in the preparation for the establishment of a state. They included: 
The World Zionist Organisation (WZO); the Jewish Agency (JA); the Jewish National 
Fund (JNF) and Keren Hayesod.
National Outline Plan (תמ״א: תכנית מתאר ארצית; Tama: Tokhnit mit’ar artzit): A 
plan that applies to the entire territory of the State of Israel, affecting all regional 
and local planning, as well as issues of public importance, such as the principles of 
construction and the use of beaches, transportation, and other subjects of national 
importance. The national outline plan also serves the regional and local committees 
and guides them in their work.
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National Outline Plan 35 (35 תמ״א; Tama 35): Is a national master plan designed 
to define planning and settlement policy in Israel by 2020. The plan, also called 
the National Master Plan for Construction, Development, and Conservation, was 
published in 2000 and approved by the Israeli in 2005. The main objectives of the 
plan were to “ Respond to the building and development needs of the State while 
preserving the open spaces and the land reserves for future generations “ The main 
principles of the plan were the strengthening of existing cities and metropolises, 
avoiding suburbanization, encouraging mixed land uses and urban renewal, while 
strengthening public transport, construction of textures, and more. The plan also 
called for the preservation of green buffer zones between in order to avoid turning 
Israel into one large built sequence. It was the first plan to recommend not to 
establish any new settlements (a restriction later exempted in “frontier areas”).
Nahal, the (נח״ל: נוער חלוצי לוחם; Noar Haluzi Lohem: Pioneer Fighting Youth): A 
military corps established in 1948, under the direct orders of prime-minster Ben 
Gurion, where members of the different Zionist youth movements would be able to 
serve together, combining military service with educational tasks and other national 
missions. In the first three decades up to 1978, the Nahal soldiers took an active 
part, and led the construction of almost 150 new settlements. In 1982 soldiers from 
the Nahal founded an infantry brigade under the same name.
Nahal Settlement, a (היאחזות נח״ל; Heahzut Nahal): A settlement that was initially 
established by soldiers from the Nahal. The first phase would usually consist of an 
early temporary settlement by a Gari’in (a kennel or a seed, that would later evolve 
into a settlement). The Gari’in was in charge of the first preparation stages, and, 
after a given period, they were handed to a civilian settling group, in what became to 
be known as a civilizing ceremony
Nakba, the ( ةبكنلا  , Al-Nakbah): Literally meaning catastrophe, is an Arabic term 
used to describe the Palestinian exodus of 1948, which occurred during the 1948 
Israeli-Arab war and included the displacement of around 700.000 people and the 
evacuation and destruction of some 400 towns and villages.
Naksa, the ( ةسكنلا   , Al-Naksah: Literally meaning the Relapse. An Arabic term used 
to refer to the outcomes of the 1967 war, which concluded in the Israeli occupation 
of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula.
Negev, the ( بقنلا  , Al-Naqab; הנגב, HaNegev): Is a desert area in southern Israel, 
bordering Jordan and the Arabah valley in the east, the Read See in the south, the 
Sinai Peninsula in the west and the Judea mountains in the north. It constitutes more 
than 50% of the area of the State of Israel.
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Netanyahu, Benjamin (1949 ;בנימין נתניהו-): An Israeli politician and head of state, 
who acted as UN ambassador (1984-1988), Parliament Member (1988-1999; 
2003), Head of Opposition (1993-1996), Minister of Finance (2003-2005), Minister 
of Foreign Affairs (1996, 1998, 2002-2003, 2015), Minister of Defence (2016), 
Minister of Communications (2014-2017) and Prime Minister (1999-2000; 2008-), 
all on behalf of the Likud party.
Noar Oved VeLomed, Ha (הנוער העובד והלומד; literally meaning “working and 
studying youth”): Is a socialist Zionist youth movement established in 1924. It 
formed the youth movement of the Histadrut, Labour Zionism, and the Mapai party.
O
Oslo Accords, the: A term that refers to a series of agreements signed by the State 
of Israel and the PLO, as part of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, intended 
to lead a permanent solution in the area. As an interim agreement, it created the 
autonomous Palestinian Authority, as a temporary self-governing body, in charge 
of the newly created areas A+B in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which consists 
of the major Palestinian cities and towns, while Israel retained its control over all 
other areas (area C). The agreements included mutual recognition between the PLO 
and the State of Israel. It left the issues of the nature of the Palestinian State and its 
borders, the status of Jerusalem and the question of Palestinian refugees to be dealt 
with in later agreements.
Outpost (מאחז; Maahaz): A term used to refer to a Jewish settlement point in the 
West Bank, which did not receive the permission of the state or the other authority.
Oved HaTzioni, ha (העובד הציוני; The Zionist Worker): A settlement movement 
established in 1936, affiliated with the non-socialist line of Zionism (yet non-
revisionist), later the liberal Israeli Progressive Party and the General Zionists.
P
Palestinian Liberation Organisation, the (PLO; ةینیطسلفلا ریرحتلا ةمظنم  
, Munadhamat A’Tahrir Al Falastiniah); Is an umbrella organization of several 
Palestinian national movements established in 1964. The organization’s main and 
most important movement is Fatah. The organization’s main goals were the political 
representation of the Palestinian people and armed struggle against the State of 
Israel (until the Oslo accords). In 1974 it gained an observer status at the United 
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Nations and was later recognised by the majority of the international community as a 
legitimate (and the sole, by some) representative of the Palestinian people (including 
Israel in 1993, though considering it as a terrorist organisation until 1991).
Palestinian National Authority, the (PA; הרשות הפלסטינאית, HaRashut HaFalistinayit; 
ةینیطسلفلا ةینطولا ةطلسلا  , A’Sulta AlWataniya AlFalastinya): Is a limited self-
governing Palestinian entity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, in charge of 
civil administration and, in area A, also internal security. Established in 1994 as 
part of the Oslo accords, the PA is supposed to form the foundation of a future 
Palestinian State.
Palmach, the (פלוגות המחץ: הפלמ״ח; Plugut HaMahatz; literally meaning the strike 
force): Was a paramilitary organisation that formed the leading force of the Haganah, 
which was the main fighting force of the Jewish community during the British 
Mandate over Palestine. It was established in 1941 and in 1948 merged into the 
newly founded IDF.
Peres, Shimon (1923-2016 ;שמעון פרס; Born as Szymon Perski): Was an Israeli 
politician and head of state, served in multiple roles including parliament member 
(1959-2007), Minister of Transportation (1970-1973), Minister of Finance (1988-
1990), Minister of Defence (1995-1996), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1986-1988, 
1992-1995, 2001-2002), Interim Prime Minister (1977) and Prime Minister (1984-
1986, 1995-1996) on behalf of Mapai, the Labour Party and later Kadima. He served 
as the President of the State of Israel (2007-2014). He was a leading figure in the 
Oslo Accords, for which he received the Nobel Prize for Peace.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the (PFLP, 
نیطسلف ریرحتل ةیبعشلا ةھبجلا  ; Al-Jabha AlShaabiya LeTahrir Falastin): Is a left-wing 
nationalist Marxist and socialist Palestinian movement and paramilitary organisation. 
It was founded in 1967 and formed the second strongest group inside of the PLO, 
after Fatah.
Planning Administration, the Israel (מנהל התכנון, Minhal HaTichnun): Is in charge of 
formulating the national planning policy of the State of Israel in various subjects. It 
initiates and promotes national, regional and local master plans. It is also in charge 
of running the national planning institutions, handling detailed plans, preparing and 
promoting regulations; and supervising the work of district planners and district 
planning bureau employees. In addition, it is responsible for all aspects of the 
operation of the planning institutions in the national and regional level, in matters of 
manpower, budgeting, coordination, and governance.
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Practical Zionism (ציונות מעשית): An approach that supported a variety of activities 
focusing on immigration to Palestine, land acquisition and establishing settlements 
as a means to eventually lead to a Jewish homeland.
Q
Qiryat Arba’a (קריית ארבע): Is an Israeli urban settlement with the status of a local 
council, located east and near the city of Hebron. It was established in 1968 and 
considered as one of the earliest Jewish settlements in the West Bank.
R
Rabin, Yitzhak (1922-1995 ;יצחק רבין): Was an Israeli military general, politician, 
and head of state. He was the IDF chief of staff during the 1967 war, and later 
parliament member (1974-1995), Minister of Labour (1974), Minister of 
Communications (1974-1975), Minister of Defence (1984-1990, 1992-1995) and 
Prime Minister (1974-1977;1992-1995). He was the Prime Minister during the Oslo 
accords, for which he received the Nobel Prize for Peace. He was assassinated in 
1995 while in office.
Revisionist Zionism (ציונות רוויזיוניסטית): A right-wing ideology within Zionism, 
founded by Zeev Jabotinsky as an ideological counter to the socialist Labour 
Zionism. In 1923 after Jabotinsky quit form the World Zionist Organisation due to 
his objection to its policies, which he saw as too appeasing to the British control 
of Palestine and called for a “revision” in Zionism. Revisionist Zionism advocated 
for a Jewish sovereign state in the greater area of Eretz Israel, which includes 
both banks of the Jordan and the rejection of territorial compromises. Revisionism 
opposed socialism and supported a liberal economy. The political party of Revisionist 
Zionism was HaTzhoar [HaTzionim HaRevizionistim (הציונים הרוויזיוניסטים)], while 
the Irgun was in paramilitary force and Beitar its youth movement. After 1948 and 
the establishment of Israel, the Herut party became the representative of Revisionist 
Zionism, and later the Likud.
Road #60 (60 כביש): A road that connects major cities, from Nazareth in the 
north, through Jenin, Nablus, Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron and Be’er Sheva in the 
South. The majority of the road passes through the West Bank and forms its main 
transportation artery.
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Road Map for Peace: Is a political plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It 
was presented by US President George W. Bush 2002. The plan proposes a gradual, 
multi-stage, multi-year solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, supervised and 
supported by the Quartet (US, EU, Russia, and the UN), by 2005.
Rural Settlement (התיישבות כפרית; Hityashvut Kafrit): A term initially used to refer 
small-scale agricultural settlements (such as the Kibbutzim and Moshavim), though 
in the 1970s it began being used also for non-agricultural one (like to community 
settlements).
S
Sabra, a (צבר; Tzabar; literally meaning “cactus” or “prickly pear”): Is a term used to 
refer to a Jew that was born in the area of Palestine, before the establishment of the 
State of Israel, or in the State of Israel. In contrast to an “Oleh”.
Sabra and Shatila Massacre, the: Is a massacre conducted by the Lebanese 
Christian Maronite militias, the Kataeb (Phalanges) forces in the Sabra and Shatila 
refugee camps in Beirut, as a retaliation to the assassination of their leader Bashir 
Gemayel. The number of victims, who were mostly Palestinians, ranges between 300-
4000 according to different sources. The Kataeb were Israel’s allies in Lebanon, and 
Israel was therefore blamed for being responsible for their actions.
Samaria (השומרון; HaShomron): A Hebrew term, originated from the bible, used 
when referring to the northern part of the West Bank. The area it refers to is located 
between The Jezreel valley in the north, The Jerusalem mountains in the south, the 
Jordan valley in the east and the coastal plain in the east.
Samaria Central Development Company, the (המרכזית לפיתוח השומרון: החל״פ 
 HaHevra HaMerkazit LePituah HaShomron, Halap): Is a private company ;החברה
owned by different communities in the Samaria Regional Council and does not 
receive government assistance
Sebastia ( ةیطسبس  Is a Palestinian village in the West Bank, western to the :(סבסטיה ; 
city of Nablus. In 1976, members of Gush Emunim movement attempted to establish 
a Jewish settlement in the historic train station near the village. Due to the refusal of 
the Israel government to cooperate with the attempt they were evacuated. Though 
unsuccessful, Sebastia became a milestone in the development of Jewish settlements 
in the West Bank.
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Settlement Division (החטיבה להתיישבות, HaHativa LeHityashvut): Is an independent 
unit of the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) and consists the executive arm of the 
State of Israel for the purpose of developing settlements in the West Bank and the 
Golan Heights (Previously also in the Sinai Peninsula). Since 2004 the establishment 
Galilee and Negev, being considered as frontier areas, also came under the 
responsibility of the Division. Founded in 1967, it operated as part of the Settlement 
Department, under the same management (though with different funding sources) in 
order to expand its works also to the newly occupied areas, until their separation in 
1992. The Division is funded entirely by the State of Israel.
Settlement Department (המחלקה להתיישבות, HaMahlaka LeHityashvut): The 
executive arm of the JA, in charge of establishing agricultural settlements in 
the State of Israel, and previously in Palestine during the British Mandate. The 
department supported the settlements from their initial phases up until the 
establishment of their own economy, provided them with productive means, farm 
buildings and residential units. The financing was provided as loans under long-
term favourable terms, within the framework of the JA’s budgets. Its activities later 
dissolved into other departments of the JA.
Settlement Movement, a (תנועת התיישבות; Tnuat Hityashvut): Is a term used to refer 
to Zionist organizations that engaged (and still engage) in organising the foundation 
of new settlements, before and after the establishment of the state of Israel. The 
term refers to movements from a variety of political affiliation and ideological or 
religious orientation.
Separation Barrier: Is a multi-layer fence system, separating Israel and the 
Palestinian territories, running partly along the Green Line and partly through the 
West Bank. It has been constructed by Israel since 2003. It is considered by Israel 
as a necessary defensive measure while Palestinians consider it as a tool of racial 
segregation or as an apartheid wall,
Sinai Peninsula, the: Is a peninsula in Egypt between the Mediterranean Sea in 
the north, the Negev to the northeast, the Gulf of Eilat to the southeast, the Gulf of 
Suez and the Suez Canal in the west. It was occupied by Israel during the 1967 and 
returned to Egypt in 1982 as part of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
Shalom Achshav: see Peace Now.
Shamir, Yitzhak (1915-2012 ;יצחק שמיר): Was an Israeli politician and head of state. 
He was the leader of the Zionist right-wing Paramilitary organisation Lehi. After 1948 
and the establishment of the State of Israel, he joined the Mossad until 1965. Later, 
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he served as a parliament member (1973-1994), Speaker of the Knesset (1977-
1980), Foreign Minister (1980-1986) and Prime Minister (1986-1992), all on behalf 
of the Likud.
Sharon, Arieh (1900-1984 ;אריה שרון): Was an Israeli architect. After studying at 
the Bauhaus under Hannes Meyer, Sharon returned to Palestine, where he became 
a leading architect, earning several commissions for the Histadrut (the General 
Organization of Workers), gaining the admiration of its leader, David Ben Gurion, 
who later became the first Prime Minister. After the establishment of the State of 
Israel, Sharon plaid a key role in the state’s architecture and planning, composing 
the Physical Plan for Israel in 1951. Later he continued his private practice, leading 
several major projects, in Israel and in Africa.
Sharon, Ariel (1928-2014 ;אריאל שרון): Was an Israeli military officer, Parliament 
Member (1974, 1974-2006), Minister of Agriculture (1977-1981), Minister of 
Defence (1981-1983), Minister of Economy (1984-1990), Minister of Housing 
(1990-1992), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998-1999) and Prime Minister (2001-
2006). He began his political carrier in the Liberal Party, later merging the Likud, 
which he then left during his tenure as Prime Minister to establish the Kadima party. 
He is mostly remembered for commanding unit 101; leading the Suez crossing 
and counter-attack against Egyptian forces during the 1973 war; promoting of the 
settlement enterprise as Minister of Agriculture and Minister of Housing; planning 
and executing the 1982 war in Lebanon as Minister of Defence (he was later 
prevented from acting in this office due to his responsibility for the Sabra and Shatila 
massacre); leading Israeli fighting in the Second Intifada as Prime Minister and later 
the withdrawal from Gaza and the evacuation of Jewish settlements the area.
Sharon, the (השרון; HaSharon): Is a geographical area in central Israel, located in its 
coastal plain it borders the Samarian hills in the east, the Yarkon river and Tel Aviv in 
the south and Taninim stream and the Carmel mountains in the north.
Sharon Plan, the (1951 ;תכנית שרון): Was the first national master plan of the State 
of Israel. The plan was composed by Arieh Sharon and published in 1951, who 
headed the planning department in the Prime Minister’s Office (giving its unofficial 
name). The plan’s main principles were the dispersal of the population in the Negev 
and the Galilee and the creation of a hierarchical network of settlements, towns and 
cities. Though the plan did not have statutory validity, it served as the basis for the 
development policy of the State of Israel for many years.
Shomron: see Samaria.
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Shomer HaTzair, ha (השומר הצעיר; literally meaning the young guardian): A Socialist-
Zionist youth movement established in 1919. It is also the name of Marxist-Zionist 
Party active in Mandatory Palestine, which later became part of the Israeli Mapam 
(Mifleget HaPoalim HaMeuhedet; The united workers’ party).
Shikun: literately meaning dwelling, The Hebrew term for housing-estate. Used to 
describe a housing estate built by the state. Similar to the American term “Project”.
Shikun O’vdim (שיכון עובדים; literally meaning “housing workers”; or a “housing 
for workers”): Was a construction company owned by the Histadrut (Central 
Workers’ Organisation). Officially established in 1955 as a merger of two different 
Histadrut companies (Neve Oved and Shikun). Highly active during the 1960s, it 
was responsible for almost 25% of all public construction done in Israel up until the 
1980s. in 1988 it merged with another Histadrut company, Solel Bone, into Shikun 
U’benui (Housing and Construction), that was sold to the Arison group in 1996.
Shikun U’benui (שיכון ובינוי; Housing & Construction Holding Company Limited): A 
company that was initially owned by the Histadrut (Central Workers’ Organisation) 
and formed out of a merger of two other Histadrut companies (Shikun Ovdim and 
Solel Bone). In 1996 the Histadrut sold its shares to the Arsion group as part 
of its privatisation process. The company turned in a construction, holding and 
investment company, taking part in Public Private Partnerships (such as Highway 6), 
Infrastructure and real estate and.
Solel Bone (סולל בונה; literally meaning “paving and constructing”): A construction 
company established by the Histadrut (Central Workers’ Organisation) in 1921. It 
was the in charge of public and infrastructure project in the pre-state years, and 
after 1948 it became one of the leading companies in the field. in 1988 it merged 
with another Histadrut company, Shikun Ovdim, into Shikun U’benui (Housing and 
Construction), that was sold to the Arison group in 1996.
Supreme Court (בית המשפט העליון; Beit HaMishpat HaElyon): The Israeli supreme 
court, it is the highest court in the judicial hierarchy in Israel in charge of appeals 
over decisions from lower courts. It also acts as the High Court of Justice (Bagatz; 
See: High Court of Justice).
T
Territories, the (Hashtahim): A term used to refer to the territories Israel occupied in 
1967. Mostly used for the West Bank, and formerly also for Gaza.
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Transfer (טרנספר): A nationalist political agenda that calls for displacement of 
Arab population in areas controlled by Israel (by deportation or immigration 
encouragement), mutual population exchange or agreed mutual expulsion between 
Israel and other Arab countries, in order to promote it as the nation-state of the 
Jewish people. This agenda is inspired by the Turkish-Greek population exchange 
of 1923.
Two‑States Solution, the: A political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian that is 
based on the creation of two states: Israel and Palestine, in the area of the state 
of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Most proposals rely on the 1967 
border as the future border between Israel and Palestine, with different levels of 
territorial adjustments.
U
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181: Known also the Palestine 
partition plan. A resolution accepted by the general assembly of the United Nations 
on 27.11.1947 that called for the division of the area of the British Mandate of 
Palestine to two different states; an Arab state and a Jewish state, leaving Jerusalem 
under international rule. The violence that broke after the resolution is seen as the 
first (and internal) phase of the 1948 Arab Israeli War.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242: Was a resolution adopted by the 
security council in 22.11.1967, after the 1967 war, that called for the withdrawal 
of Israeli forces from territories (The territories, according to the French version) it 
occupied; End of violence and respect of mutual sovereignty; ensuring the freedom 
of naval navigation in international routes ; a just solution to the refugee problem; 
ensuring the territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the region.
V
Va’ada (ועדה): the Hebrew term for “committee”. See committees.
W
West Bank ( ةیبرغلا ةفضلا  , A’Dhafa Al-Gharbia; הגדה המערבית, HaGada HaMa’aravit): 
Is a term used to refer to the territories Israel occupied from Jordan in 1967, and the 
formerly were part of the British Mandate over Palestine. The term originated from 
TOC
 395 Glossary
the British Mandate period, originally referring to the entire area that lies west to the 
Jordan river, unlike Kingdom of Transjordan, which forms the east bank. After the 
1948 Arab-Israeli war it turned into a part of Jordan, until being occupied in 1967 by 
Israel. Its borders today are Jordan in the east and the Green Line in the north, west, 
and south. In 1988 Jordan declared its official disengagement from the area, in order 
to promote a future Palestinian state. With the formation of the Palestinian Authority 
in 1994, the West Bank was divided into three categories Areas A, B, C, with varying 
levels of Palestinian autonomy and Israeli responsibility. Never annexed by Israel 
(except for east Jerusalem), the west bank is still considered as occupied territories. 
The formal term used in Israel is “The District of Judea and Samaria”. Mostly referred 
to as the territories (HaShtahim).
Weitz, Ra’anan (1919-1998 ;רענן וייץ): A main figure of the settlement department 
since 1948, and its director from 1963-1984. Though being in charge of settlement 
development he ideologically opposed the West Bank enterprise and advocated for 
other areas.
World Zionist Organization (WZO; ההסתדרות הציונית העולמית, HaHistadrut 
HaTzionit HaOlamit): Is an umbrella organisation established in 1897, in order 
to coordinate the activities of all Zionist movements and organisations in terms 
of lands acquisition, settlement, immigration, education and absorption. It was 
originally named the Zionist Organisation (ZO) and changed its name in 1960. In 
1929, the Jewish Agency took over the practical actions of the WZO and remained 
as a policymaking and administrative body. It formed to representative of the Jewish 
community in Mandatory Palestine, and the basis for the future government of the 
State of Israel. After 1948, with the establishment of Israel, its roles were redefined, 
and the WZO focus turned to encourage Jewish immigration, development of Jewish 
settlement and education of Jewish communities outside of Israel. The Organisations 
institution include the World Zionist Congress; the Zionist General Council; The 
Palestine Office (no longer active); the Israel Land Development Company (sold); the 
JA; the JNF; the Israeli Zionist Council; the Settlement Division.
Y
Yediot Ahronoth (ידיעות אחרונות): Literally meaning the latest news, it is a daily 
newspaper that has been published in Tel Aviv since 1939. It is regarded as the most 
widespread newspaper in Israel by sales and circulation.
Yesha Council (מועצת יש״ע; Moetzet Yeshah): Officially the committee of Jewish 
Settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza (Yehuda, Shomron VeHevel Aza – Yesha). It 
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is an organization that incorporates all Jewish municipalities in the West Bank (and 
formerly Gaza Strip). It is regarded as the representative of all Jewish settlers.
Yeshiva, a (ישיבה): A religious Jewish educational insinuation, mostly for men only, 
which concentrates on the teachings of religious texts.
Yeshuv, a (יישוב): The Hebrew term for a settlement. It could take the form of a 
village, a town or even a city.
Yeshuv, the (היישוב; Literally meaning a settlement): A term used to refer to the 
entire body of Jews living Palestine during the Ottoman Empire and the British 
Mandate, which formed the backbone for the latter Jewish population of the state of 
Israel. It is common to refer to the Jews residing before 1882 (the first Aliyah) as the 
old Yeshuv (Hayeshuv HayYashan), and the community that was formed afterwards 
as the new Yeshuv (Hayeshuv HaHadash).
Yom Elaard ( ضرألا موی  ; Land Day): Is an annual event held by Arab citizens 
of Israel on March 30th, in commemoration of the 1976 demonstrations against 
the expropriation of Arab lands in the Galilee, for the sake of expanding Jewish 
settlement in the area.
Z
Zahal: see IDF.
Ze’evi, Rehavam (רחבעם זאבי, also known as Ghandi; 1926-2001): A former Israeli 
general and commander of the Central Command. Later a politician, parliament 
member, and minister. He founded the nationalist right-wing party of Moledet. 
Assassinated by the PFLP in 2001.
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The Privatisation of a National Project
The settlements along the Trans‑Israel Highway since 1977
Gabriel Schwake
The settlements along the Trans‑Israel Highway illustrate the privatisation of the national 
settlement enterprise. To understand this process, this dissertation focuses on the settlement 
production mechanism, which consists of the reciprocal interests of the government and various 
private groups to develop and domesticate the border area between the State of Israel and the 
occupied West‑Bank ‑  the Green‑Line. Centring on the spatial privileges the state granted to 
diverse spatial agents, this dissertation examines the manner in which different favoured groups 
were given the power to colonise, plan, develop and market space as a means to enhance the 
state’s power over it. Investigating the gradual transformation of this production mechanism, this 
dissertation explores the increasing privatisation of the local economy and culture, as well as how 
this was manifested in the built environment. Examining the modifications in the architectural and 
urban products this mechanism produced, this dissertation analyses the materialisation of the 
privatised national settlement project and how it transformed together with the changing political 
and economic interests.
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